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Chapter 1 General Introduction 
‘Therein is the tragedy. […] Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing 
his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a 
commons brings ruin to all.’1 
With that comes a solemn responsibility: the need to ensure that law is a tool conducive to, and 
not impeding, a solution to the climate crisis.2  
Climate is a global issue, global problem and global opportunity at the same time.3  
 
1. About my PhD topic 
1.1 Objective of this study 
Human beings can suffer from climate change – ironically, from the damage to nature that 
humans inflict.4  
The strong scientific consensus is that the global climate is changing and that human activity 
from industry, transport, agriculture and other vital economic sectors is contributing 
significantly.5 These changes have resulted in large-scale environmental hazards to human health, 
such as extreme weather, ozone depletion, loss of biodiversity, stress to food-producing systems 
and the global spread of infectious diseases.6 The World Health Organisation (WHO) estimates 
that 160,000 deaths since 1950 are directly attributable to climate change.7 Every year, a large 
number of people suffer from natural disasters or are displaced as a result of climate change.  
Therefore, it is urgent and necessary for human beings to take action to fight climate change. 
One type of action that can be taken is to mitigate climate change, thus limiting the magnitude 
                                                           
1 Garrett Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ (1968) 162 (3859) Science, 1243-1248 
<http://www.sciencemag.org/content/162/3859/1243.full> accessed 28 November 2013. 
2 Michael Mehling, ‘Editorial’, (2012) 3 Climate and Carbon Law Review 185. 
3 Marcin Korolec, ‘Opening Speech by the President of COP 19’ (11 November 2013) 
<http://www.cop19.gov.pl/latest-news/items/opening-speech-by-the-president-of-cop19-mr-marcin-korolec> 
accessed 29 November 2013. 
4 Vesselin Popovski, Kieran G. Mundy, ‘Defining Climate-change Victims’ (2012) 7 (1) Sustainability Science 5. 
5 ‘A Summary of Current Climate Change Findings and Figures’ (UNFCCC, March 2013) 
<http://unfccc.int/cc_inet/cc_inet/six_elements/public_awareness/items/3529.php?displayPool=1568> accessed 29 
November 2013. 
6 A. J. McMichael and others, ‘Climate Change and Human Health: Risks and Responses’ (World Health 
Organisation Geneva, 2003) 2. 
7 A.J. McMichael, Rosalie E Woodruff and Simon Hales, ‘Climate Change and Human Health: Present and Future 
Risks’ (2006) 367 (9513) The Lancet 859-869. 
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and/or rate of long-term change.8 Economic incentive-based policies, such as carbon trading, 
carbon tax policy and subsidy policy, have been considered or applied worldwide as a mitigation 
tool. And to some extent, these policies have obtained success in dealing with carbon emissions 
reduction. Therefore, research into a market-based system that has benefits for the environment, 
can be valuable for the earth we live in and those people who suffer from climate change.  
1.1.1 Overall study objective 
This book is submitted as a PhD dissertation to the Faculty of Law of Ghent University as a 
requirement to obtain the academic degree of Doctor of Law. This work is the result of a four-
year research project originally titled, ‘A Comparative Legal Study of Emissions Trading 
Systems in the EU and in China’. 
The objective of this book is to explore the Emissions Trading System (ETS) in both the EU and 
China, in particular its emergence, design and implementation. The EU and China are important 
players in the international community in addressing climate change, but are running at different 
speeds in implementing such a system. Hence, I sought to discover what experiences China can 
learn from the EU ETS, and to explore the linkage9 between the ETSs in these two legal regimes. 
1.1.2 Contributions to academic field and policymaking 
Ideally, any academic research contributes both to academic science and to policymaking, and 
this research offers such a two-fold contribution as well. At the academic level, this study 
provides a comparative study between the ETSs in the EU and China, including the legal issues 
in their design and implementation. Through critically analysing the ETSs’ emergence, 
framework and implementation, I sought to point out valuable lessons, including mistakes to 
avoid and useful experiences that can be applied to China.  
In addition, this book provides a debate on the feasibility of a linkage between the two ETSs, 
based on the outcome of this comparative study. Therefore, this book not only provides readers 
an overview of the current ETSs in the two regimes, but also helps readers to consider whether 
and how the systems may be linked in the future. 
                                                           
8 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), ‘Climate Change 2007: Working Group III: Mitigation of 
Climate Change’, ch3 pt 5 <http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg3/en/ch3s3-5.html> accessed 29 
November 2013. These two pillars of actions are mitigation and adaptation of climate change. The mitigation 
includes actions that reduce net carbon emissions and limit long-term climate change, while adaptation includes 
actions that help human and natural systems to adjust to climate change. 
9 ‘Link’ vs. ‘Linkage’, <http://www.kirkmahoney.com/blog/2008/07/link-vs-linkage/> accessed 29 November 2013. 
The two concepts “linkage” and “link” are different. The link essentially means anything that connects two people, 
places or things. Linkage means, (1) the act of linking and (2) a system of links. When the author mentions ‘linkage’ 
here, it means the act of linking the ETSs. In the last few chapters of this dissertation, the linkage may mean a 
system of links, as it will be marked later. 
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To some extent in particular, this research starts with an abstract and theoretical study on 
concepts related to the ETS, such as different types of ETSs and their advantages and 
disadvantages. Then, this book incorporates the theory into an analysis of the EU’s and China’s 
ETSs, revealing their differences in policy options and choices, design and challenges. In so 
doing, this book may assist policymakers to make better choices or to modify existing policies 
for better performance. 
1.1.3 Originality /added value of this study 
Scholars have been researching on emissions trading for many years. In 1968, J. H. Dales 
analysed the first examination of the permit market in his book ‘Pollution, Property and Prices’.10 
Then, emissions trading was introduced in the United States as air quality policy. In 1985, Errol 
Meidinger stated in a paper that ‘the legal-administrative framework of the U.S. air pollution 
regulation has changed almost entirely from a command and control policy to one allowing 
considerable use of ‘transferable pollution permits’ over the past decade’.11 In 1992, Professor 
Marjan Peeters explored the possibility of a European permit market, based on applications of 
the U.S. permit market.12 Her study concerned a legal analysis of emissions trading and was one 
of the first to examine the introduction of emissions trading in Europe.13 
In the years following these early works, various researchers explored the possibility and 
feasibility of applying emissions trading to regulate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Since the 
Kyoto Protocol was adopted in 2005, more EU scholars have explored the application of 
emissions trading in the EU because the protocol defined the EU as an Annex I Party. Since 2005, 
research increase due to the implementation of the EU ETS. However, these studies were 
developing alongside the development of the EU ETS; therefore, research outcomes cannot 
cover all three phases of the EU ETS. Scholars have neither compared the three phases on an 
element-related basis, nor answered why the phases developed or changed. Thus, this book 
conducts a critical review of the EU ETS, historically, systematically and comprehensively. 
To some extent, the concept of emissions trading was not new to Chinese academia. Many 
scholars have contributed to the application of emissions trading in regulating sulphur dioxide 
emissions. 14  In contrast, few studies have discussed emissions trading for reducing carbon 
                                                           
10 J.H. Dales, Pollution, Property and Prices (University of Toronto Press, 1968). 
11 Errol Meidinger, ‘On Explaining the Development of “Emissions Trading” in U.S. Air Pollution Regulation’, Law 
and Policy, (1998)7 (4) 447-479, 447. 
12 Marian Peeters, Towards a European system of tradable pollution permits? 1993 2(2) Tilburg Foreign Law Review 
117-134, 118. 
13 Marjan Peeters, <http://www.iucnael.org/about-us/81-marjan-peeters.html> accessed 29 November 2013. 
14 Wang Jinnan and others, ‘Chinese Academy for Environmental Planning, Practices and Prospects of Emissions 
Trading Programs in China’ (Beijing); Wang Jinnan and others, ‘SO2 Emissions Trading Program: A Feasibility 
Study for China’ <http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/international/china/feasibility.pdf> accessed 21 November 2013. 
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emissions in China. Current studies about emissions trading in China are from an economic or 
political perspective,15 and few take a legal or institutional viewpoint.16 
All these works are valuable and merit recognition because they shed light on the application of 
emissions trading in reducing China’s carbon emissions; however, these early studies focused on 
individual elements of the ETS design. As a result, they lack an overview of China’s plan for 
emissions trading, as well as deep insight into the reasons and motivations for policymakers to 
apply emissions trading. Few studies can explain why China’s ETS is not exactly the same as the 
EU’s ETS, why the current practice of trading allowances in China is a compromise, and how 
limited data, documentation and legislation affect the Chinese ETS design. 
To fill this scholarly gap, this book aims to analyse the latest legislation on carbon trading in 
China, to explore the disadvantages and advantages of the ETS planned in the law and to point 
out the challenges and solutions, the uncertainties and the reasons. In other words, this book 
examines the issues surrounding China’s carbon trading in a more detailed, profound manner, 
particularly with respect to the current status of China’s carbon trading (Section 2 of Chapter 4), 
where all legislation in local piloting of ETS are included in both design and implementation 
aspects. 
In addition, this study addresses issues that either were not or were only briefly considered in the 
previous works. One such issue is the expansion of China’s emissions trading system, taking the 
linkage between two provincial piloting systems as an example (Section 3 of Chapter 4). Also, 
this book compares the EU ETS and China’s ETS (Section 2 and 3 of Chapter 5) in terms of 
external circumstances and internal design. Considerable attention is paid to the lessons China 
can learn from the EU ETS. Another less explored area is the linkage between the EU ETS and 
China’s ETS, based on routes and instruments introduced earlier (Section 3 of Chapter 3). In 
addition, this book explores the question of linking the EU ETS and China’s ETS (Section 4 of 
Chapter 5). 
                                                           
15 Jiahua Pan, Jonathan Phillips and Ying Chen, China’s Balance of Emissions Embodied in Trade: Approaches to 
Measurement and Allocating International Responsibility, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, (2008) 24(2) 354-
376; Zhongxiang Zhang, Can China Afford to Commit itself an Emissions cap? An Economic and Political Analysis, 
Energy Economics (2000) 22 587-614; Yen-Chiang Chang, Nannan Wang, Environmental Regulations and 
Emissions Trading in China. 
16 Yen-Chiang Chang and Nannan Wang, ‘Environmental Regulations and Emissions Trading in China’, (2010) 
Energy Policy; Wu Qian, ‘Policy and Politics of a Carbon Market in China’, Asia and Beyond: the Roadmap: to 
Global Carbon & Energy Markets, International Emissions Trading Association Report, (2011, Genève, 
Switzerland); Alex Lo, Commentary: Carbon Emissions Trading in China, Griffith Research Online 
<http://www98.griffith.edu.au/dspace/bitstream/handle/10072/50208/81941_1.pdf;jsessionid=375EE93C088AE35A
72980421A33B2884?sequence=1> accessed 21 April 2014; Shaozhou Qi and Banban Wang, ‘Fundamental Issues 
and Solutions in the Design of China’s ETS Pilots: Allowances Allocation, Price Mechanism and State-owned Key 
Enterprises’ (2013) 11 (1) Chinese Journal of Population Resources and Environment 26-32, 31; Shumao Zhang, ‘A 
Research on the Dilemma in China’s Emissions Trading System and Relevant Countermeasures’, International 
Journal of Business and Management (2010) 5 (6). 
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In sum, this book constitutes an updated and more detailed analysis of both the EU’s and China’s 
ETSs, and addresses the challenges of linking the two systems in the future. 
1.1.4 Who will be interested in this book 
I hope this book will be applicable and helpful to a wide number of people from academia, 
industry, and the public at large, including policymakers, researchers, reporters, students, 
industry investors and other stakeholders. 
People interested in studying Chinese climate law, in particular Chinese emissions trading, can 
enrich their knowledge through this book. I have collected the latest information and first-hand 
materials to describe a complete picture of Chinese emissions trading pilot projects and potential 
conditions for establishing a national carbon market. I also hope this book will provide insight 
for those interested in exploring the linkage between Chinese emissions trading and the EU ETS. 
1.2 Research questions forming the structure of the book 
This study is based on two core research questions. Answers to the fourth and fifth questions 
below constitute this study’s main contributions. The questions as ordered below form the 
structure of this book. The first two questions provide the foundation for further and detailed 
discussions of the remaining questions. 
1. What is the meaning of ‘emissions trading’? How does the system work? What are the 
types of ETSs? What are their advantages and disadvantages? (Chapter 2) 
2. What experiences can be learned based on a review of the EU ETS? (Chapter 3) 
 What is the trend of the EU ETS? 
 What have been the challenges and solutions during implementation of the EU 
ETS? 
 How does the EU ETS expand and link to other ETSs? 
 What are the influences from the EU ETS case law? 
3. What is the status quo of Chinese emissions trading practice? (Chapter 4) 
 How has China applied emissions trading in history? 
 What is the legal framework of China’s ETS in regulating GHGs? How is it 
implemented? 
 How can China expand its ETS from several pilot systems? 
4. What lessons can China learned from the EU ETS? (Section 2 and 3 of Chapter 5) 
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 Why conduct a comparative study between the EU ETS and Chinese ETS? 
 What are the different external circumstances of the EU ETS and the Chinese 
ETS? 
 What are the internal differences between the EU ETS and the Chinese ETS?  
5. How can the EU ETS link to the Chinese ETS? (Section 4 of Chapter 5) 
 What is the necessity and feasibility of linking the EU ETS and Chinese ETS? 
 What is the potential for linking the EU ETS and Chinese ETS in the future? 
 What are the linkage routes? 
 What are the requirements to complete that linkage? 
1.3 Research methodology 
A PhD study should be innovative, with either original findings or a creative approach. But how 
can young, inexperienced researchers know if their writings are original? The answer is first of 
all to read a vast number of peer-reviewed articles, books, book chapters, legislation, and policies 
and any other documents relevant to the topic. This is the only way a researcher can discover 
what work has been done and which areas are less explored and deserve more research. Although 
one may lose one’s way in the literature jungle for a while, desktop research that includes all 
above sources is always the first method. 
Also important is to check findings with practice. Therefore, a field study method has been 
applied in this current study. I established close contact with researchers, policymakers and 
stakeholders in China, which allowed me to conduct interviews with people who had access to 
first-hand materials regarding Chinese emissions trading. I also was able to discuss Chinese 
emissions trading with these sources and to discover stakeholders’ opinions and attitudes. These 
relationships also provided opportunities to test my assumptions regarding China’s emissions 
trading.  
I intensively conducted interviews between April 16 and 26, 2013. Five people agreed to be 
interviewed and voice recorded. Two additional contacts were interviewed by email. For these 
interviews, I followed completely the preparation plan approved by my doctoral advisor, 
Professor Frank Maes. Interviewees reviewed the interview results and analyses, which are 
included in this dissertation with their permission. 
Interviewees were selected carefully, mainly because they were top leaders in their fields. 
Although the sample of interviewees was not large, their opinions were meaningful to this study. 
Geographically, interviewees were located in Beijing, Guangzhou (capital city of Guangdong 
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Province), Wuhan (capital city of Hubei Province) and Shenzhen. Thus, four out of seven 
provinces and cities that are piloting ETS in China are covered by this study.17  
The interviewees, who play different roles in China’s ETS, include the following: Mr. Bjorn 
Odenbro, General Manager of the Beijing office of the Swedish company, Tricorona; Mr. 
Qianguo Qiang, Strategy Director of Sino Carbon Innovation & Investment18; Ms. Meiying Li, 
the journalist for the 21st Century Economic Report19; Mr. Xikang Zhao, Director of the Centre 
for Environmental Economic and Policy Research (CEEPR) and Guangdong Academy of Social 
Sciences (GDASS)20; Mr. Xingan Ge, Vice President of Shenzhen Environmental Exchange; Ms. 
Ying Huang, PhD researcher in the Shenzhen Graduate School of Peking University and Mr. 
Tianbao Qin, professor at the Research Institute of Environmental Law in Wuhan University21. 
The outcomes of the interviews indicated a specific feature of this topic: different stakeholders 
have different expectations for emissions trading. The insights and opinions revealed in this 
current study support the belief that emissions trading is one tool that may mitigate climate 
change, but never a perfect tool without other climate measures and policies. 
For instance, academic researchers pay special attention to the adaptability of the emissions 
trading framework, the legality of a government’s decision on emissions trading, the different 
backgrounds when transplanting experiences from other legal regimes. Academia has focused 
more on the ideal establishment and implementation of a system. In comparison, those who 
purchase emissions consider emissions trading as a business tool. Their minds are on benefit-
directed settings, which shed light on the sustainability of the system and the economic value of 
supporting ETS in the long run.  
Furthermore, I served for three months as an intern in the Brussels office of the International 
Emissions Trading Association (IETA), which provided vastly expanded access to literature and 
the latest developments in Chinese emissions trading. In collaboration with the IETA staff 
members during that time, I finalised a formal report for the IETA that introduced and analysed 
all policies and rules of trading emissions in the seven piloting cities and provinces in China. 
                                                           
17 The three cities not covered by the interview plan are Chongqing, Tianjin and Shanghai. Chongqing is the slowest 
runner in applying the emissions trading, few policies are made by the government and even fewer activities 
happened in private market. During the preparation of interviews, the author sent many interview invitations to 
contacts in Tianjin and Shanghai, however, the author has not received any reply. Besides, the author decided not to 
conduct interviews in Shanghai due to the avian influenza (known informally as avian flu or bird flu). 
18 Lecture information of Mr. Qianguo Qiang (in Chinese) <http://www.sinocarbon-
edu.cn/english/Lecturer/Lecturer0101.asp?50> accessed 21 April 2013. 
19 Homepage of Ms. Meiying Li (in Chinese) <http://author.21cbh.com/limeiying> accessed 23 April 2013. 
20 Homepage of Mr. Xikang Zhao (in Chinese) <http://www.gdass.gov.cn/2010/0715/294.html> accessed 23 April 
2013. 
21 Homepage of Mr. Tianbao Qin (in Chinese) 
<http://fxy.whu.edu.cn/html/staff/huanjingyuziyuanbaohufaxue/081258.html> accessed 12 April 2013. 
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In addition, a comparative methodology was applied as part of this study. As many scholars 
indicate, a fair legal comparison requires research to examine the historical and social context of 
the problem and the proposed solutions.22 Thus, I conducted an external comparative study 
between the EU ETS and China’s ETS in aspects of policy objectives, expectations and 
enforcement bodies; the nature of the market economy, energy consumption structures, 
administrative structures, legislative enforcements and public participation (Section 2 of Chapter 
5). More important, a parallel analysis of legal rules on emissions trading also was made in this 
study to point out valuable experiences from the EU that may apply to China. 
Finally, research outcomes have been put to test in the academic environment through 
participation in several conferences and seminars. Several texts have been published or will be 
published as book chapters or journal articles. The listed academic activities and contributions 
will be summarised in the last section of this chapter. 
1.4 Scope and limitation 
Any Ph.D. research must have a delineated context and boundary, and therefore, any limitation 
in its scope should be pointed out. Through identifying the issues that are beyond the scope of 
this book, the boundary can be set. Of course, issues not included into this book are valuable, but 
may be over-explored or better evaluated by researchers from other scientific domains. 
Several issues are beyond the scope of this book.  
First, this study was not an economic research, and no economic research method was applied. 
Many studies from an economic perspective have explored arguments for the design of an ETS, 
the effect of carbon price and other quantitative research. However, this study did not conduct an 
economic or financial analysis and considered ETS itself only from the legal, political and 
institutional aspects.  
The implementation of emissions trading at a company level also was not studied. The aim of 
this book is to explore the design options for China, based on the experiences of the EU ETS. 
Therefore, the research target was the system itself. The perspective of this book is more from 
the policy designer, rather than the participants. The book’s topic does not include trading rules, 
settlement of disputes and transaction contracts. In addition, this book examines only carbon 
trading in the EU and China, along with the historical application in the United States, and does 
not discuss carbon trading in other parts of the world. 
 
 
                                                           
22 Wei Wu, ‘Human Rights and Chinese Culture: A Functional Comparative Study of Police Interrogation in China 




During the process of this research project, I have written several publications in English. These 
texts are incorporated as chapters or sections in this book, after slight modifications.  
An overview of these contributions: 
 Ping Chen & Frank Maes, ‘Cap and Trade versus Carbon Tax to Mitigate Climate 
Change, One-Size-Fits-All Solution in China?’ (Accepted for publication by Edward 
Elgar Publishing, June 2014) 
 Ping Chen, Country Report: ‘Interim Measures for Voluntary Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Trading’, E-Journal of IUCN Academy, Issue 4, 2013. (Published) 
 Jeff Swartz & Ping Chen, A User’s Guide to Emissions Trading in China (1st Edition), 
released in September 2013. (Published on behalf of the IETA Brussels Office) 
At the time of this writing, two papers are being prepared for submission: 
 Emissions Trading in China from a Legal Perspective: From SO2 to CO2 
 Cold Thinking of China’s Carbon Trading System: Discussion on Key Issues Based on 
Current Development 
An overview of my active participation: 
 10th IUCN Academy of Environmental Law Colloquium, 1–5 July, 2012, Maryland, U.S. 
Presentation title: ‘Carbon tax v. cap and trade, one-size-fits-all solution in China?’ 
 12th Global Conference on Environmental Taxation (GCET), 20–21 October, 2011, 
Madrid, Spain. Presentation title: ‘The establishment of carbon trading system in China - 
legal perspectives’ 
 21st Ph.D. Workshop on International Climate Policy, 22–23 October, 2010, University 
of Zurich, Switzerland. Exploring Domestic Emissions Trading System in China: lessons 
drawn from European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
 8th IUCN Academy of Environmental Law Colloquium, 14–16 September, 2010, 
University of Ghent, Belgium. Presentation title: ‘European Union Emissions Trading 




Chapter 2 Concept and background of the emissions trading 
Chapter 2 introduces the basic knowledge and theoretical background of emissions trading. In 
this chapter, several research questions are answered: What is the meaning of ‘emissions trading’? 
Does it work? What are the types of emissions trading? 
Section 1 introduces the concept of emissions trading, including the emergence of the ETS from 
a pollutant regulation policy to a climate policy and the regular framework of an ETS. Section 2 
explains why the ETS works from an economics perspective. Section 3 compares emissions 
trading with other policy alternatives, such as command-and-control policies and carbon taxes. 
Both of these two sections reflect the merits of emissions trading on the basis of its internal 
theorem and its advantages and of its external comparison with other policies. Section 4 
introduces different types of ETSs and their advantages and disadvantages. 
1. Definition of emissions trading 
Divergent answers can be found when defining emissions trading. For instance, emissions 
trading is a market-based approach to control pollution; unlike traditional environmental 
regulation based solely on threat of penalties, emissions trading attempts to add a profit motive 
as an incentive for good performance by creating tradable permits.23 ETS is a market-based 
scheme for environmental improvement that allows parties to buy and sell permits for emissions 
or credits for reductions in emissions of certain pollutants.24 
The original theory of emissions trading can be traced back to J. H. Dales’ book Pollution, 
Property and Price, published in 1969. In theory, the first step is to decide how much pollution is 
acceptable in a certain area; second, this maximum amount of emissions is divided into quotas 
and third, the quotas are allocated to the possible participants in the market, in Dales’ mind, 
through an auction.25  In the market, participants can purchase transferable quotas. Emitters 
whose real emissions exceed their regulated cap can buy extra quotas to achieve their emissions 
reduction target. Compliance with emissions trading can be ensured through high penalties if the 
emissions reduction target is not achieved. Essentially, Dales’ concept of emissions trading is a 
cap-and-trade style, also called cap and trading. 
 
                                                           
23 Sandbag, ‘What is emissions trading’ The Guardian (London, 5 July 2011) 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/jul/05/what-is-emissions-trading> accessed 6 July 2012. 
24 Environment and heritage, ‘What is emissions trading’ (NSW Government) 
<http://www.environment.nsw.gov.au/licensing/emissionstrading.htm> accessed 26 July 2012. 
25 Marjan Peeters, ‘Towards an Effective Enforcement of the EU Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Scheme: an 
Exploration of the Current Regime’ (Research Project: emissions trading and equal competition, 9 November 2005) 
<http://www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/web/file?uuid=5725908a-00ce-4ff8-9fdd-56cac241ae1e&owner=26b2a088-




1.1.1 Introduction as a pollution control policy 
The publication of J. H. Dales’ idea was followed by the United States’ adoption of the Title IV 
in the Clean Air Act (CAA) in 1990. In practice, cap and trading based on the 1990 CAA 
Amendments has proved to be successful. In the 1990s, the U.S. acid rain cap and trading 
programme achieved 100 per cent compliance in reducing sulphur dioxide emissions; power 
plants participating in the programme reduced SO2 emissions by 22 per cent (7.3 million tonnes) 
below mandated levels.26 ‘The Second Prospective Study from 1990 to 2020’ estimates that 
under the CAA Amendments, emissions of SO2 and NO2 will decrease steadily through 2020; as 
with reduction in NO2 emissions, the Title IV cap and trading programme is partly responsible 
for SO2 reductions.
27 
The reasons for the successful cap and trading in the United States have been summarised as, 
‘markets provide greater environmental effectiveness than command-and-control regulation 
because they turn pollution reductions into market assets. By doing so, this system creates 
tangible financial rewards for environmental performances’.28 Then, new low carbon-intensity 
technologies and innovations can be stimulated, because economic incentives can result from the 
application of these environmental friendly technologies. Thus, not only can better 
environmental outcomes be achieved, but also environmental friendly technology and innovation 
can be prompted. 
1.1.2 Expansion to mitigation of climate change 
Cap and trading is attractive because of its huge success in achieving multiple targets in the 
United States. Consequently, the concept was considered as a way to address climate change, 
and applications of emissions trading can be found at both the international and regional levels.  
At the international level, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) noted that emissions trading, as set out in Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol, allows 
countries that have emission units to spare – emissions that were permitted but are not being used 
– to sell this excess capacity to countries that are exceeding their targets.29 During the Kyoto 
Protocol’s first commitment period, emissions trading played an important role in reducing 
carbon emissions, along with two other mechanisms, called the clean development mechanism 
                                                           
26 United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), ‘Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 
1990’ <http://www.epa.gov/air/sect812/feb11/factsheet.pdf> accessed 27 July 2012. 
27 U.S. EPA Office of Air and Radiation, ‘Final report of “the benefits and costs of the Clean Air Act from 1990 to 
2020”’ (EPA, March 2011) <http://www.epa.gov/air/sect812/feb11/fullreport_rev_a.pdf> accessed 27 July 2012. 
28 ‘Acid Rain: The Power of Markets to Help the Planet’ (Environmental Defence Fund) 
<http://www.edf.org/approach/markets/acid-rain> accessed 27 July 2012. 




(CDM) and joint implementation (JI). Internal linkage among these three flexible mechanisms is 
established by equalising each certified emissions reduction (CER) and each emissions reduction 
unit (ERU) to each assigned amount unit (AAU). 
At the regional level, the EU introduced emissions trading into the field of climate policy, 
establishing the world’s first regional ETS, a cap-and-trade system. The EU ETS was established 
even before the existence of the international emissions trading market, which has developed 
since 2008, based on the Kyoto Protocol. Within the EU cap, companies receive emission 
allowances that they can purchase from one another as needed.30 
As the time moves on, other jurisdictions, including the developing countries, are considering 
emissions trading as a mitigation tool. At this writing for example, the Korean government has 
drafted the Basic Act on Low Carbon and Green Growth (currently under deliberation in the 
National Assembly), in which Article 46 specifies the basis for an ETS. 31  The Chinese 
government has announced that China will work on establishing a national carbon market during 
the 12th Five-Year-Plan period. Kazakhstan has a draft emissions trading law in Parliament. 
Brazil has established a largely private-driven carbon certificate exchange market and other 
countries such as Chile, Turkey and South Africa have expressed general interest in designing a 
domestic ETS and some have taken early steps in designing such systems.32 Even in the United 
States, all major congressional bills concerning the environment33 for the past several years have 
included as their centrepiece a cap-and-trade scheme.34 
In the future, we can expect a global carbon market, and such a well-functioning market is 
essential for driving low-carbon investments and achieving global mitigation objectives in a cost-
efficient manner.35 But more participants and a larger carbon market are required to boost the 
dynamics and efficiency of the ETS. Linking the existing independent carbon markets in 
                                                           
30 ‘The EU Emissions Trading System’ (The European Commission) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm> accessed 26 July 2012. 
31 Hong Sik Cho, ‘Legal Issues Regarding the Legislation for an Emission Trading System in Korea’, (2009) 9 
Journal of Korean Law, 161-171. 
32 Wolfgand Sterk and Florian Mersmann, ‘Domestic Emission Trading System in Developing Countries – State of 
Play and Future Prospects’ (Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy, August 2011)  
<http://www.jiko-bmu.de/files/basisinformationen/application/pdf/pp-ets-developing-countries.pdf> accessed 10 
December 2011. 
33 (1) The U.S. House of Representative passed H.R. 2454, the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 
(known as Waxman-Markey Bill), H.R. 2454, 111st congress (2009); (2) U.S. Senators Barbara Boxer and John 
Kerry introduced a bill in the 111st Congress to regulate greenhouse gas emissions in large measure through cap and 
trade, S. 1733, 111st Congress (2010); (3) Senators Kerry and Joseph Lieberman drafted and circulated legislation 
that included cap-and-trade as a central component. 
34 Ann E. Carlson, ‘Designing Effective Climate Policy: Cap-and-Trade and Complementary Policies’ (2012) 49 
Harvard Journal on Legislation 207-208. 
35 European Commission, ‘International Climate Policy post-Copenhagen: Acting Now to Reinvigorate Global 
action on Climate Change’, COM (2010) 86 final, 11. 
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different jurisdictions could be a feasible choice to form a global carbon market. Details of such 
a linkage will be discussed later in this book. 
1.1.3 Differences between an ETS and emissions trading (ET) 
To avoid possible confusion, the differences between two concepts – an ETS and ET – must be 
clarified. Literally, an emissions trading system (ETS) is a system that applies the theory of 
emissions trading (ET). 
In his 1969 book, J. H. Dales talked about a cap-and-trading theory, and a system based on this 
theory is called a cap-and-trading system, essentially an allowances-based ETS. However, the 
content of ET has expanded in practice, and nowadays, other emission trading systems have 
emerged, such as projects-based trading or baseline-based trading (explained in section 3 of this 
chapter), from ET theory. Therefore, projects-based ETS or baseline-based ETS are no longer 
novel. 
In addition, ET can refer to a business. Participants can purchase allowances in ET; while an 
ETS is a systematic process and the basis to implement ET. An ETS not only considers 
allowances purchased through transactions, but also the process before and after the purchase. 
Trading transactions of allowances is only one process at work in an ETS. An ETS contains 
several elements, including how the ETS works for environmental benefits, how the government 
regulates the emissions release, how the quality of emissions data is supervised and how the 
emissions reduction commitment is fulfilled through strong enforcement. Thus, an ETS is more 
than trading allowances only.  
In summary, in this book an ETS means a system that lays down the basis for trading allowances 
and an ET refers to the theory and transaction behaviour. 
1.2 Building blocks for a cap-and-trade system 
Establishment of an ETS means that a constructive system is built with specific elements and 
processes. In this section, the common design of a cap-and-trade system is explained. 
1.2.1 Limitation on the amount of allowable emissions 
An ETS aims to reduce emissions. Hence, a mandatory cap is necessary to designate the amount 
of emissions to be released. In a broad way, the cap could be either an absolute number of tonnes 
of emissions or an emissions rate that measures standard performance. Both are ways to set an 
emissions reduction target. The differences between these two will be explained later. 
No matter the form of the target, a constraint on emissions is set. The limitation on releasing 
emissions is important in an ETS, and because total emissions are limited, the allowable 
emissions become the scarcity resources, which are valuable assets in the market. The targeted 
allowable emissions can be divided into sub-branch targets and assigned to emitters from the 
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national to the company level. If a company’s actual emissions level exceeds the allowable 
emissions level, the company will find a solution either by purchasing trading units or by 
improving its low-carbon technology. 
In summary, the total amount of allowable emissions acts as a ruler to measure the gap between 
the actual emissions performance and the regulatory emissions requirement. 
1.2.2 Regulated sources 
1.2.2.1 Importance 
Defining the regulated sources and sectors is important because these affect the carbon market in 
three aspects: determining the participants in the trading allowances, the size of the carbon 
market and whether the upstream mode or downstream mode is applied. 
Limitation on emissions is the environmental target of an ETS. To achieve the target, appropriate 
types of GHGs should be targeted according to their effects on global warming. By a scientific 
approach, the environmental effects and percentage of a specific GHG towards the total 
emissions can be measured. Based on this percentage, the types of GHGs can be targeted. In turn, 
these targeted GHGs define the sectors and industries to be included in an ETS. 
Defining the GHGs and their sources is an issue of scope. Broadening the scope to include more 
gases, more countries and international credits would be important for building confidence in a 
stable long-term carbon price and in realising the full efficiency benefits of any trading scheme – 
the creation of a deep, and liquid and efficient market.36 The deeper and more liquid a market, 
the harder it is for any individual trade to affect the overall price level, and hence, the less 
volatile the market will tend to be.37 In other words, the more participants in trading allowances, 
the more efficient and more dynamic the carbon market will be.  
Finally, participants’ sectors determine the upstream or downstream trading model. A concrete 
explanation for the differences between upstream and downstream trading models will be 
discussed later in this chapter. 
1.2.2.2 Sources of GHGs  
Other types of GHGs exist besides carbon dioxide (CO2), and different sources are regulated in 
different carbon markets. For instance, the international carbon market38 and the EU carbon 
market39 target six GHGs, while the U.S. Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative targets only CO2.  
                                                           
36 Nicholas Stern, The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change (1st edn, UK Cambridge University Press 
2007) 375. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change UN Doc 
FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, Dec. 10, 1997; 37 ILM 22 (1998) (concluded 11 December 1997, entered into force 16 
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Scientifically, the increase in all long-lived GHGs is the cause of climate change, but CO2 is the 
most important anthropogenic GHG because its annual emissions grew by about 80 per cent 
between 1970 and 2004, from 21 to 38 gigatonnes (Gt40).41 The amount of CO2 emissions 
represented 77 per cent of total anthropogenic GHG emissions in 2004, besides the carbon 
dioxide equivalent (CO2-eq) emissions from other types of GHGs.
42 The rate of growth of CO2-
eq emissions was much higher between 1995 and 2004 (0.92 GtCO2-eq per year) than during the 
previous period, 1970 to 1994 (0.43 GtCO2-eq per year).
43  Therefore, not only must CO2 
emissions be limited, but also CO2-eq emissions from other GHGs. 
1.2.2.2.1 Global warming potentials (GWPs) 
Global warming potential (GWP) is a relative measure of how much heat a GHG traps in the 
atmosphere. GWP compares the amount of heat trapped by a certain mass of a particular gas to 
that trapped by a similar mass of CO2.
44 This, GWP is used to measure the impact of a specific 
GHG on the overall warming potential effects.  
Because there are several types of GHGs, one reference gas is assigned as a basis for 
measurement for the rest. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) chose CO2 as 
the reference gas and set its GWP equal to one. Therefore, if the GWP of methane is 72, it means 
that if the same mass of methane and CO2 were introduced into the atmosphere, the methane 
would absorb 72 times more heat than the CO2.
45
 Thus, the GWP – the amount of heat that a 
GHG absorbs – can be comparably measured. The GWP value of each GHG reflects the heat-
trapping capacity over a specific time period, and is based on the heat-absorbing ability of each 
gas relative to that of CO2, as well as the decay rate of each gas (the amount removed from the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
February 2005) (1997) (Kyoto Protocol) Annex B. It stipulates the six GHGs Includes only carbon dioxide (CO2), 
methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulphurhexafluoride 
(SF6). 
39 Council Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a 
scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 
96/61/EC [2003] OJ L 275/32 Annex II (Directive 2003/87/EC). 
40 ‘What are the most widely used units of measurement for GHG emissions and what are their conversion factors’ 
<http://unfccc.int/ghg_data/online_help/frequently_asked_questions/items/3826.php> accessed 13 June 2013. 1 Gt 
= 1	Pg =	1015 
41 IPCC, ‘Climate change 2007: Synthesis Report’, pt 2 
<http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/syr/en/spms2.html> accessed 28 July 2012 (Climate Change 2007: 
Synthesis Report). 
42 Ibid, pt 2.1. 
43 Ibid. 
44 ‘Global-warming potential’, <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global-warming_potential> accessed 29 July 2012. 




atmosphere over a given number of years).46 The IPCC report sets the GWPs of specific GHGs 
over 20, 100 and 500 years.47  
1.2.2.2.2 Carbon dioxide equivalent emissions 
Carbon dioxide equivalent emissions (CDE or CO2-equivalent emissions) are the amount of CO2 
emissions that would cause the same time-integrated radiative forcing over a given time period 
as an emitted amount of a long-lived GHG or a mixture of GHGs. 48  The CO2-equivalent 
emission is obtained by multiplying the emission of a GHG by its GWP, which is shown in an 
equation:49 
 (Mass of gas) x (GWP) = mass CO2 eq 
Where GWP = global warming potential; and mass CO2 eq. = mass (such as metric tonnes) of 
carbon dioxide equivalent. For example, the GWP for methane over 100 years is 25, which 
means that emissions of 1 million metric tonnes of methane are equivalent to the emissions of 25 
million metric tonnes of CO2.
50 Thus, CO2-eq is a standard calculation approach to measure 
different GHGs. This common measurement lays the foundations for carbon trading because all 
GHGs can be calculated by MtCO2-eq. or GtCO2-eq. 
1.2.2.3 Sectors 
The regulated sources are facilities or sectors that release GHGs into the atmosphere. Reuters 
reported 10 sources of GHGs, which are power plants, deforestation, road transportation, oil and 
gas production, fertilizers, livestock, cement production, aviation, iron and steel production and 
garbage.51 The IPCC 2007 reported that the largest growth in GHG emissions between 1970 and 
2004 came from energy supply, transport and industry, while residential and commercial 
buildings, forestry (including deforestation) and agriculture sectors grew at a lower rate.52 In 
implementation, the competent authority confirms regulated sectors based on the amount of CO2-
                                                           
46 ‘Global Warming Potential’, <http://www.global-greenhouse-warming.com/global-warming-potential.html> 
accessed on 29 July 2012. 
47 IPCC Workgroup I, ‘IPCC Fourth Assessment Report: Climate Change 2007’ ch 2, 212. “lifetimes, radiative 
efficiencies and direct (except for CH4) GWPs relative to CO2”. 
48 IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report (n 41). 
49 Michael Gillenwater, ‘What is global warming potential? And which one do I use?’ 
<http://ghginstitute.org/2010/06/28/what-is-a-global-warming-potential/> accessed 29 July 2012. 
50 Carbon dioxide equivalent, <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carbon_dioxide_equivalent#cite_note-0> accessed 29 
July 2012. 
51 Reuters, ‘Ten Sources of Greenhouse Gases’ <http://knowledge.allianz.com/climate/agenda/?651/greenhouse-gas-
sources> accessed 27 July 2012. 
52 Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report (n 41). 
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equivalent they produce. After regulated sectors are defined, specific enterprises and their 
installations can be targeted. 
1.2.3 Allocation 
After defining the emissions reduction target, a regulatory authority divides this target into units 
and assigns them to the various regulated enterprises.  
1.2.3.1 Nature of the tradable units 
ETS participants purchase tradable units, which may have different names in various trading 
systems. For instance, in the international ETS stipulated by the Kyoto Protocol, tradable units 
are called ‘assigned amount units’ (AAUs); in the EU ETS, the tradable units are ‘the allowance’ 
and in the SO2 ETS in the U.S. and China, tradable units are called ‘allowances or quotas.’ 
One tradable unit is the authorisation to release one metric tonne of carbon dioxide, and the units 
can be purchased in the carbon market. Taking the U.S. SO2 cap-and-trade programme as an 
example, Title IV of the Clean Air Act defines that an allowance allocated as the authorization to 
emit sulphur dioxide does not constitute a property right53; and each permit under Title IV 
provides that the regulated facility may not emit an annual tonnage of sulphur dioxide in excess 
of the allowances held for that facility. 
Besides, the value of a tradable unit is different from commodity values because tradable units 
are connected to government policy and the ‘inherent’ value is entirely dependent on government 
fiat54 and action.55 Unless the government requires emitters of GHGs to surrender some right to 
emit, emission units have no scarcity and no market value at all.56 
1.2.3.2 Allocation methodology 
The approach of allocating tradable units includes grandfathering, known as a method free of 
charge, and auction. 
 
 
                                                           
53 Ibid. (f). 
54 Daniel D. Barnhizer, ‘Givings Recapture: Funding Public Acquisition of Private Property Interest on the Coasts’ 
(2003) 27 Harvard Environmental Law Review 295-375, 321. He states that, ‘protection by fiat is backed by the full 
faith and credit of the government issuing the fiat’. ‘Fiat’ also connotes that value has been created where it did not 
exist before, purely by the exercise of the sovereign will.  
55 Victor B. Flatt, ‘“Offsetting” Crisis? – Climate Change Cap-and-Trade Need Not Contribute to another Financial 





Grandfathering is an allocation method by which emissions rights are allocated free of charge to 
polluters in the form of emission caps based on their historical emissions.57 Grandfathering has 
its advantages, but also can result several risks. 
From the aspects of simplicity of policy, grandfathering is much more acceptable in the 
beginning of experimenting with emissions trading. Allocation free of charge does not add cost 
to industries and other regulated participants, so emissions trading are more welcome and 
obstacles of its adoption are diminished.  
However, grandfathering has limitations. Firstly, it can result in an unfair competitiveness 
between new entrants and incumbents (companies that already have tradable units). During the 
pilot phase of an ETS, free allocation of allowances can attract more industry participants; while, 
later participants need to auction or even pay for allowances from. Secondly, over-allocating 
allowances for free can result in low carbon prices, because of the oversupply of available 
allowances in the market. In combination with grandfathering, those industries who acquire 
allowances for free have the capability to control the carbon price. 
Decision making in specific jurisdictions such as the EU ETS and China’s ETS are discussed 
later in this book. 
1.2.3.2.2 Auction 
Auction is another allocation method. Companies compete in auctions to bid on the price of 
emission units, and thus set the price. Existing studies show the influences and advantages of 
auctions. 
First, an auction allocates permits efficiently to those who value them most, reveals marginal 
abatement costs and raises public revenues.58 Governments can use the revenues to establish 
                                                           
57 Edwin Woerdman, Alessandra Arcuri and Stefano Clo, ‘Emissions Trading and the Polluter-pays Principle: Do 
Polluters Pay under Grandfathering?’ (2008) 4 (2) Review of Law and Economic 566–569. Friedemann Muller, 
‘Kyoto’s Grandfathering Principle as an Obstacle to be Overcome’ (2005) Stifung Wissenschaft und Politik German 
Institute for International and Security Affairs- Research Unit Global Issues Working Paper FG 8, April 2005 
<http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/arbeitspapiere/DiskP2005_04_mlr_sicher.pdf> accessed 4 
October 2012. It defines that ’the grandfathering principle defines the distribution of emission rights according to the 
emission distribution in a base year before emission restrictions came into force. In a next step it restricts the 
emission rights proportionally to this base year structure, usually some per cent less than in the base year’. 
58 Stuart McCreery, ‘Possible Design for a Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading System: further definition of the 
auction proposals in the NETT Discussion Paper’ Evans & Peck, August 




funding to cope with climate change, and administrative agencies may have a greater incentive to 
monitor compliance.59  
Second, auctions can establish fair competitiveness between new entrants and existing 
participants. Although politicians consider grandfathering as a way to initiate the operation of a 
carbon market, the unfair competitiveness grandfathering establishes between new entrants and 
incumbents cannot be disregarded. If limited flexibilities cannot be provided to new entrants, 
existing participants from the same sectors will make use of the obtained units as a competitive 
advantage. Thus, if incumbents do not remove the units from the market, incumbents will control 
the carbon price, which will impact the dynamics of the market. 
Third, an auction can prevent participants from rent-seeking behaviour. Rent-seeking is 
behaviour that extracts uncompensated value from others without making any contribution to 
productivity,60 which is displayed by market participants in the design and implementation of the 
market.61 
In summary, when considering allocation methodologies such as grandfathering or auction, 
policymakers should think about the advantages and risks of the two methods, and then decide 
whether to apply them individually or in combination. 
1.2.4 Monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) 
1.2.4.1 Definitions 
Monitoring is a systematic process of recording information from one or more meters in order to 
determine directly or indirectly the amounts or activities over a defined time period.62 The meter 
is a device that tracks and measures the amount of carbon emissions. To some extent, monitoring 
is a technical scientific process because the operation of meters is a key element in monitoring.  
Reporting provides access to the carbon emissions data, which is important for public 
transparency. 
Verification ensures the quality of GHGs emissions data and involves a third-party supervisory 
body. Verifiers must be qualified and have the capability to assess and analyse emissions data 
and its quality. 
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1.2.4.2 Importance and functions 
The objective of a MRV system is to track actual GHG emissions within a specific period to 
acquire accurate, consistent and accredited data. Accurate measurement of GHG emissions is 
important for several reasons. First, calculation of actual total GHGs is the basis for estimating 
an emissions reduction target. In other words, policymakers set the target in comparison with the 
actual GHG emissions. An emissions reduction target will produce environmental outcomes only 
if the target is lower than the current actual GHG emissions. Both overestimation and 
underestimation can result in inappropriate emissions target setting. Furthermore, incorrect data 
could impact on supply and demand of allowable units in the market, potentially causing 
fluctuation of carbon price and instability in the carbon market. 
Second, calculation of actual GHG emissions from individual enterprises can help participants 
achieve their emissions reduction targets. Based on the measurement of actual emissions, 
individual companies can assess their emissions performance and their capability to reach their 
targets. After that, the companies can decide whether to continue to reduce carbon emissions or 
to purchase tradable units to achieve their targets. 
Third, GHG emissions data are valuable in the carbon market. The measurement of GHG 
emissions is closely connected to economic benefits, because the amount of GHG emissions can 
be translated into tradable units to be purchased in the carbon market. 
1.2.4.3 Principles for establishing an MRV system 
This section summarises the specific principles and guides the establishment of a MRV system.  
First, the meter’s ability to monitor carbon emissions accurately is critical. Uncertainties in 
achieving an accurate measurement may not be resolved because of scientific limits. Regulations 
are necessary to assess whether any uncertainty of risk will influence the achievement of the 
emissions reduction target. In practice, a concept of materiality is used when uncertainty of risk 
occurs in measuring carbon emissions. The verifier considers whether the size of the error is 
small enough to be ‘immaterial’, or large enough to be serious. The regulator determines the 
range of uncertainty to be covered. 
The second principle is that emissions data must be complete, that is, all the regulated GHGs 
must be included. Even ETSs that regulate different GHGs must monitor, report and verify all 
regulated GHGs in those ETSs to track carbon emissions. Implementation of the completeness 
principle helps policymakers to estimate the total emissions reduction target. 
Third, the principle of transparency requires MRV systems to have transparent procedures. The 
requirement of transparency ensures that the public has access to emissions data. 
Fourth, the principle of comparability means that the emissions data from different countries, 
sectors and even enterprises can be compared. Comparisons are important in order to determine 
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if an emissions reduction target has been reached. Emission reduction targets may be either an 
absolute figure or a relative emissions level. Applying the same calculation method standardises 
the collection of emissions data from various regulated sectors and companies. 
Finally, consistency is important for tracking progress toward a target; however, consistency may 
be compromised by inevitable improvements in the quality of monitoring data.63 A specific 
example is when an operator upgrades the monitoring system by installing a direct-flow meter 
rather than using a mass balance approach. This upgrade improves the accuracy of the data, but 
compromises consistency.64 One way to balance these two principles is to run both systems in 
parallel for sufficient time to estimate the impact of the change and then adjust the allocation of 
permits accordingly.65  
1.2.5 Compliance system 
The final objective of an ETS is to achieve the emissions reduction obligation. However, the 
achievement of this target heavily depends on implementation and enforcement of the ETS 
through regulations.  
The compliance provisions of an ETS can explicitly show the threatened risks that will result 
from participants’ noncompliance. If participants realise the cost of noncompliance exceeds the 
cost of compliance, then they will be more likely to follow ETS regulations. Therefore, penalties 
are important in designing a compliance system. All regulatory ETSs have designed compliance 
systems into their frameworks, although the forms of penalty are divergent. For example, the U.S. 
SO2 cap-and-trade programme gives the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) the power to 
enforce the Clean Air Act through civil penalties, civil actions and other actions. Violators are 
liable for a civil penalty of not more than the sum of $25,000 for each and every day of each 
violation, or the amount of economic benefit resulting from the violation.66 When the EPA finds 
that a violation has occurred, it can issue an administrative penalty order (to use EPA 
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1.2.6.1 Banking and borrowing 
1.2.6.1.1 Definitions and influences 
Banking and borrowing draw public attention because of their successful applications in trading 
programmes68 regulated by the U.S. Clean Air Act. They are used to provide flexibilities for 
participants in an ETS. If a participant can reduce GHGs more than the required level in a given 
period, then the surplus tradable units can be ‘banked’ toward the participant’s target 
achievement in the next commitment period. Similarly, participants who cannot achieve the 
required emissions level in a given period may ‘borrow’ tradable units to be repaid from the 
amount of allowable units in the next commitment period. 
Banking allowances directly decreases the amount of allowable tradable units in the market 
during the current commitment period, and borrowing allowances increases them. Logically, the 
supply of allowable units will be reversed in the next commitment period. Therefore, banking 
allowances increases the tradable allowances in the next commitment period, and borrowing 
allowances decreases them in the next commitment period. Furthermore, the change in the 
supply of allowances in the carbon market directly impacts carbon price. In other words, banking 
allowances from the existing given period to the next period increases the current carbon price, 
and to the contrary, borrowing allowances from the next commitment period for the existing 
period decreases the current carbon price.  
In summary, banking and borrowing influence the amount of tradable units in the carbon market 
and impact the carbon price. The function of banking and borrowing is useful in adjusting supply 
and demand and finally achieving the optimal benefits for participants. 
1.2.6.1.2 Pros and cons of banking and borrowing 
The advantages of banking are obvious. First, banking allowances can encourage participants to 
reduce actual emissions in advance and bank the surplus allowances in the future. Banking 
provides an economic incentive to participants. For achieving the emissions reduction target 
earlier, they obtain the surplus allowances with market value. In other words, the value of surplus 
allowances is a reward for participants’ achieving better environmental performance in advance. 
Second, banking allowances keeps the carbon price stable by adjusting the supply of allowances 
if the carbon price drops too low. Third, participants can obtain optimal benefits by deciding the 
amount of allowances to be banked, according to their abatement costs and their capability for 
                                                           
68 The Clean Air Act provides some forms of trading programmes, including the lead-in-gasoline phase-down 
programme, the cap-and-trade programme to reduce SO2, the NOx budget programme in the north-eastern, the 
RECLAIM in the Los Angeles, ect. 
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emissions reduction. In summary, banking allowances can give an emitter a vested interest in 
reducing emissions, which may more effectively align with regulators’ interests.69 
However, risk can result from excessive banking of allowances. Banked allowances (from the 
given period) can be used in the next commitment period, which results in more tradable 
allowances than the required emissions reduction target for the next commitment period. 
Consequently, the allowable emissions units could exceed the required emissions level, which 
may risk not achieving the reduction target. To avoid this risk, a regulator can end the existing 
emissions trading programme (rendering allowances useless) or limit banked allowances 
(reducing their value); thus, allowances would only retain value to the extent that the regulators 
credibly promise not to undermine them.70 If participants fail to have faith in the value of the 
banked allowances, they will neither keep the allowances banked nor achieve the emissions level 
earlier. Therefore, the banking rules in an ETS should strike a balance between achievement of 
environmental outcomes and obtaining the allowance value. 
A similar rationale applies to borrowing allowances. Borrowing is a form of intertemporal 
substitution related to banking in which a polluter is allowed emissions above its requirement in 
a given period in exchange for the obligation to emit below its requirement in a future period, 
when the ‘borrowed’ amount is ‘repaid’.71 For example, if the required emissions level for a 
company is 500t of CO2 in A period, but instead the company emits 600t of CO2, the extra 
emissions can be allowable in exchange for the company’s emitting 100t of CO2 less than its 
target in period B. 
Borrowing can provide flexibility to participants and help them achieve emissions reduction 
targets within the given period. However, excessive borrowing presents risks to the achievement 
of the environmental outcome and the stability of carbon price. First, the actual emissions level 
will always exceed the required emissions level in a given period, which makes achieving the 
environmental outcome uncertain. Second, the carbon price will be unstable in a given period 
and its following period because allowable emissions are less in the following period than in the 
previous one. As a result, proper limitation of borrowing rules should be considered.  
Banking and borrowing provide flexibility to trading participants in achieving emissions levels at 
lower cost; however, excessive banking and borrowing may result in instability of the carbon 
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price and environmental uncertainties. Governments and regulators should consider appropriate 
limitations on banking and borrowing. 
1.2.6.2 New entrants and closures 
This section considers the movements of new entrants into the ETS and of closures who leave 
the carbon market, such as when and how new entrants can enter the market and closures can 
leave it. Free movement of entrants and closures is important to ensure the dynamics of the 
market. 
1.2.6.2.1 Importance of rules on new entrants and incumbents 
To make ETS more political acceptable, not all the sectors and companies are regulated at the 
same time in the beginning. Therefore, big emitters may be included in the regulatory system in 
advance and become incumbents. After that, new emitters may participate gradually as new 
entrants. Because new entrants and incumbents participate in an ETS at different implementation 
periods and different policies may be employed at different times, new entrants and incumbents 
may receive different treatment, which may be perceived as discrimination. 
For example, if the allocation methodology changed from grandfathering in the first pilot period 
to auction in the second, new entrants will be required to pay for tradable units instead of 
acquiring allowances free of charge. Therefore, an obvious unfair situation arises between new 
entrants and incumbents in the allocation procedure. Regulators should consider ways to avoid 
such an unfair situation in the competition, such as providing free tradable units to new entrants 
or a combination of free allocation and auction for incumbents. 
However, differentiating free allocation to new entrants according to the CO2 intensity of the 
new investment, gives an incentive for more CO2-intense means of production, thereby eroding 
the trading system’s objectives.72 Therefore, a limitation should be put on free allocations to new 
entrants, and this so-called new entrant reserve should be based on output or capacity to avoid 
differentiating according to the CO2 intensity of the new investment.
73 
The other risk of discrimination between new entrants and incumbents arises from the 
incumbents’ excessive holdings of tradable units. This risk is called ‘exclusionary manipulation’, 
which means a firm that holds a significant share of tradable units decides to hoard them in order 
to exclude other firms from the carbon market.74 In this situation a small number of firms control 
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the tradable units, which means that the carbon price will not reflect the real supply and demand 
in the market. In response, regulators should provide enough paths and support to attract new 
entrants. 
1.2.6.2.2 Importance of rules on the closures 
Once facilities are required to fulfil obligations of reaching an emissions reduction target, they 
are interested in acquiring tradable emissions units and have an economic incentive to participate 
in the ETS because achieving their emissions reduction targets is cost effective. However, if 
these facilities no longer need the tradable units, the ETS is no longer attractive to them and will 
seek to opt out of the ETS, as provided explicitly in legislation. Rules on closures are necessary 
to avoid motivation 75  for shutting down facilities and moving production elsewhere. If no 
explicit provisions on closure are given, companies may simply relocate and keep releasing 
GHGs. 
To summarise this discussion, first the definition of new entrants and closures must be clear. A 
new entrant may be a participant who enters the ETS for the first time or an incumbent whose 
tradable units have significantly changed.76 This definition refers to the type of participants in an 
ETS, whether an enterprise or an installation (facility) that release GHGs into air. Regulators 
should acknowledge the differences and put them into the rules. Second, discrimination may 
arise between new entrants and incumbents in allocation of tradable units, and policymakers 
should consider whether to set aside tradable units for new entrants. In regard to rules for closure, 
policymakers should consider how to deal with unused tradable units when facilities are closed, 
such as returning them to the regulator. 
2. The economics: Why does emissions trading work? 
Emissions trading has many critics, including those who see it as a commercial license to pollute 
and others who fear its success may result in a transfer of economic benefits to other regions. 
Other critics include those who deny climate change exists and those who do not believe that 
trading pollution offsets can be taken seriously.77 However, critics cannot prevent emissions 
trading from receiving public attention, especially after the success of the U.S. Clean Air Act. 
Convincing and persuasive reasons support emissions trading. This section describes the 
economic theory behind emissions trading. 
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2.1 Economic theory of emissions trading 
2.1.1 Negative externalities 
The ‘tragedy of the commons’ was raised to explain problems of the ‘free riding’ in managing 
public natural resources in 1968. The public natural resources, such as clean air and water, are 
not the property rights of a specific person but belong to the public or ‘the commons’. Then 
when people or companies are free to consume or even pollute public natural resources, the cost 
cannot be made up to the victims because no specific person owns the resources and the 
contamination may not be obvious until the resources are totally consumed. Finally, public 
resources will be consumed until they have no value because every resource has a ceiling of 
valuable capacity. 
For the sustainability of public natural resources, economists suggest that the consumers or 
polluters must take responsibility for alleviation of damages and recovery of the resources. 
Therefore, they can pay for consuming or polluting the resources or take actions to compensate 
or preserve them. From the consumers’ or polluters’ perspective, their behaviour toward public 
natural resources, such as releasing pollutants into the air or water, is part of their production that 
can provide economic benefits. The result from pollution behaviours forms external influences 
on the environment. When these external influences cause a loss of value to public natural 
resources, they are considered ‘negative externalities’. 
In the case of climate change, the tragedy of the commons and negative externalities apply. A 
clean atmosphere is a public natural resource, and companies that release GHGs earn benefits in 
exchange for air quality. Unless their behaviour is restricted, more and more GHGs will be 
released into the atmosphere and the warming effects of GHGs (the negative externalities) will 
become more significant. 
One way to reduce negative externalities is to make emitters find alternative technology that will 
decrease or stop the release of GHGs. Another way is to impose an emission cap, which is a 
combination of rights to release GHGs into the atmosphere that can be divided into pieces and 
endowed to emitters. Here, the right to the air does not mean that emitters own the property right 
to the air but that the emitters have been authorised to release GHGs into the atmosphere. This 
authorisation can set a time limit, amount limit and price limit of the emissions permission. With 
a binding cap, each emitter should not release more than its limited amount, or it must pay for 
extra emission rights. Many economic scholars have concluded that externalities can be 
controlled with the price system.78 
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2.1.2 The Coase theorem 
The Coase theorem was raised in the article ‘the problem of social cost’79, published in 1960. 
The main theory stems from Ronald Coase’s seminal economic idea that the most efficient 
distribution of resources exists when parties can bargain for mutually desired property without 
transaction costs in an open market.80 
The Coase theorem does not imply that the market will solve all externalities; rather, it suggests 
that the market can potentially solve externalities if property rights are clearly assigned and 
negotiation is feasible.81 If property rights are assigned clearly and transaction costs are sufficient 
low, the negotiation parties can always find an efficient solution to the externality. Accordingly, 
allocation of property rights and feasibility of negotiation are the main elements for achieving an 
efficient solution. Therefore, two essential responsibilities of governments are to provide laws 
for property rights and to create institutions that minimize transactions costs. 
The Coase theorem lays a foundation for assignment of property rights and states that the most 
efficient solution between the participants requires low transactions costs and feasible 
negotiations. Therefore, in applying the theorem to an ETS, authorisation to release GHGs into 
the atmosphere first should be allocated to participants in the carbon market. This authorisation 
can be calculated by the total amount of GHGs emissions within specific period, limited to the 
allowable emissions. Allocation of allowable emissions is defined by legal rules. Second, 
establishing a carbon market requires establishing an emissions inventory, emissions registry and 
trading platform. These institutional changes can decrease transaction costs in trading allowances 
because participants can access information conveniently through efficient communication. 
According to the Coase theorem, transaction costs are important because they can increase the 
expenses of participating in a market.  Third, in a dynamic carbon market, buyers and sellers can 
easily negotiate allowance transactions. Based on different abatement costs, purchases can be 
made through feasible negotiation. 
2.2 Environmental achievement of an ETS 
An emissions trading system is a solution to deal with negative externalities resulting from 
behaviour that releases GHGs. The negative externalities of GHGs emissions pollute the air and 
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create climate change. Hence, limiting emissions of GHGs is the aim of emissions trading. 
Essentially, the target is to produce positive environmental outcomes.  
Emitters can find the lowest cost means to control GHGs emissions, either by purchasing 
tradable units or applying alternative technology. Firms that keep their emission levels below 
their allotted level may sell their surplus permits to other firms or use them to offset excess 
emissions in other parts of their facilities.82 
The creation of a carbon market can help decrease the transaction costs of emissions trading. 
Then, by bargaining in the carbon market, participants can always find an efficient solution (an 
acceptable and appropriate price) for purchase, no matter how many allowable emissions permits 
they have obtained in the initial allocation. Once emitters have found a carbon price in the 
market that is less than or equal to their marginal abatement costs, they will obtain the maximum 
benefits, which are the most efficient way to achieve GHG abatement. 
In summary, based on the Coase theorem, an ETS is the most cost-effective approach to reducing 
GHGs, not only because it is cost effective, but also because it is capable of achieving the 
environmental outcome. 
3. Comparison between emissions trading and other policy alternatives 
A comparative look at an ETS and other policy alternatives may elicit external reasons for 
supporting an ETS. When considering policies and measures to deal with environmental 
concerns such as climate change, policymakers are confronted with a number of alternatives, 
which may be divided into two categories. Some alternatives are traditional command-and-
control policies, and others are economic incentive policies, called market-based instruments 
(MBI). The market rather than government plays an important role in achieving an emissions 
reduction target; hence, policymakers must understand the differences between these two types 
of policies. 
In addition, the choice between the ETS and an environmental tax is hotly debated. Both policies 
create economic incentives to reduce GHGs and to develop technology innovation. When 
policymakers seek a market-based policy, these two options both have advantages and 
disadvantages that should be analysed. 
3.1 Market-based policy versus command-and-control policy 
3.1.1 Market-based policy 
A market-based instrument is one type of policy measure for dealing with climate change issues. 
Unlike a traditional command-and-control instrument, a market-based instrument creates 
                                                           
82 Robert N. Stavins, ‘Experience with market-based environmental policy instruments’ (July 2002) FEEM Working 
Paper No. 52.2002 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=199848> accessed 14 August 2010. 
42 
 
economic incentive to encourage enterprises and other legal entities to participate in a trading 
market, to adopt energy-conserving technology, and finally to achieve an emissions reduction 
target with the least mitigation cost. A central feature of a market-based approach is to develop a 
price signal for carbon that incorporates the costs of the externality and drives the market toward 
acceptable alternatives.83 Therefore, the market-based instrument is also referred to as a price-
based instrument, as in the IPPC 2007 report. This report confirms that an effective carbon price 
signal could realise significant mitigation potential,84 strengthening the connection between the 
price signal and the mitigation objective.85 
The features of a market-based instrument include first that the market, not the government, 
decides the most cost-effective way to reduce emissions. The market plays the active role in 
causing participants to find the least costly ways to achieve emissions reduction targets. Second, 
a market-based instrument allows the market – the ‘invisible hand’ – to provide the incentive for 
participants to control and reduce pollutants, to the limited extent that the regulatory authority 
can intervene. The regulatory authority is responsible only for the design, establishment and 
compliance of the instrument and does not guide implementation of the market-based instrument. 
The regulatory authority does not conduct the essential trading transactions, but rather, the 
participants of the ETS. Emission sources are free to choose how to reduce emissions, either by 
purchasing trading units or by undertaking abatement costs. 
3.1.2 Command-and-control policy 
A command-and-control instrument is a popular approach for dealing with environmental 
pollution. This approach relies on detailed regulations and an on-going inspection programme. 
The regulations focus on preventing environmental problems by specifying how a company must 
manage a pollution-generating process. 86  Implementing a command-and-control instrument 
requires government guidance and strong intervention through regulations and inspecting 
procedures. For instance, a regulatory authority may specify a pollutant as a target substance to 
be reduced by legal regulation, and the emission facilities will be considered the source of this 
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pollutant. The regulatory authority is then entitled to set emission standards to limit these 
facilities’ emissions. Noncompliant emitters face penalties. 
Command-and-control regulations often work best when: (1) the emission reduction experience 
is limited and expertise is concentrated among regulators; (2) solutions are clear or there are few 
options for reducing emissions; (3) monitoring total mass emissions is not feasible; (4) emissions 
have serious local health impacts, and trading might exacerbate such hotspots; (5) emissions are 
toxic and the desired emissions level might be zero.87 Command-and-control regulations are 
more suitable for pollutants that have severe local or concentrated contaminated impacts, and 
therefore, regulators should consider the nature and characteristics of the pollution problem to 
evaluate the suitability of a policy option. 
A command-and-control instrument has the following features: First, the regulators play a 
guidance role. As a traditional environmental governance approach, a command-and-control 
instrument is implemented by the administrative authority’s regulatory power. Authorities take 
responsibility for specifying the target pollutants, monitoring and tracking the emission sources, 
setting the emission limitations and enforcing the penalty provisions. Second, the legal 
regulations are the basis for implementation and set out the obligations of the emission sources. 
In addition, the supervisory institutions, procedures and penalties for noncompliance comprise 
the regulation. Third, command-and-control is considered a regulatory approach because of its 
high dependence on governmental intervention, which results in higher administrative costs than 
with a market-based instrument. 
Policymakers need to consider the nature of climate change and feasibility of either command-
and-control or market-based instruments. Climate change caused by release of diverse GHGs is a 
global issue that impacts each continent on earth. A command-and-control instrument will have 
higher administrative costs because the defining standards, calculating and inspection procedures 
are higher for regulating each emitter individually around the world. In contrast, a market-based 
instrument requires much less of a watchdog role and avoids the administrative financial burden. 
3.2 Carbon tax 
Both carbon trading and a carbon tax are market-based instruments, which originated from the 
same economic principle: internalising the negative environmental externality by price signals.   
3.2.1 Concept of a carbon tax 
There are many kinds of environmental protection taxes with different specific objectives. In the 
area of climate change, the environmental protection tax is a carbon tax. Taxes levied on carbon 
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content of fuels have been considered in many OECD countries as a possible policy instrument 
to reduce carbon dioxide emissions in order to prevent or slow global warming.88  
A carbon tax is a price-based policy instrument that works to increase prices of commodities 
(products or services) containing carbon content of fossil fuels, and in turn, to decrease demand 
for those commodities. By imposing a carbon tax, the negative externality of carbon emissions 
and its abatement costs can be internalized to the producers and consumers. In other words, by 
raising the prices of carbon-based energy, the carbon tax creates incentives to reduce energy use, 
stimulate demand for more energy-efficient products and promote a shift to cleaner fuels and 
renewable energy.89  
From the producers’ point of view, increased production costs force them to reduce the use of 
carbon-intensive energy and utilize environmentally friendly energy-saving materials during 
production process. From the customers’ point of view, although a carbon tax increases 
commodity prices and may become burdensome, the higher prices decrease demand and spur 
customers’ to change their consumption behaviours. Consequently, over the long term, a carbon 
tax can influence consumers to demand fewer and fewer carbon-intensive products and 
producers to reduce or even remove carbon content in products to stabilize product prices. Once 
new technology is applied in production processes, GHG emissions may gradually decrease. 
3.2.2 Features of a carbon tax 
3.2.2.1 Cost certainty 
The literature includes extensive discussion on the cost certainty of a carbon tax, especially when 
comparing it to a cap-and-trade programme. By introducing cap and trade here, cost certainty of 
a carbon tax becomes more understandable. ‘Cap and trade’ has the merit of achieving a certain 
environmental target within a specified period because it sets a cap, or a specific limit, on GHG 
emissions. However, a carbon tax cannot ensure the certainty of GHG emissions reduction.  
In other words, a carbon tax yields certainty in the price of carbon at the expense of certainty in 
environmental outcome. Likewise, a cap-and-trade programme yields certainty in environmental 
outcome at the expense of certainty in the price of carbon.90 
Therefore, the choice between a carbon tax and emissions trading depends on whether the 
priority is certainty of environmental outcome or certainty of the cost of carbon. Policymakers 
must decide based on their country’s specific situation. 
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A carbon tax system is simple because the legal relationship exists only between the taxation 
authority and the taxpayers. Procedures for a carbon tax can be summarised as: define the tax 
rate level; determine the types of products or services to be taxed and decide when to tax and the 
procedures of managing the tax revenue. Compared with the complicated design of an emissions 
trading system, a carbon tax system seems much easier. However, it really depends on the 
specific country’s circumstances. 
In most countries, the taxation administrative authority and legal sources already exist and 
procedures for imposing taxes already have been set in legal regulations. Once the legal basis for 
a tax is established, resources and institutions in taxation field can be used immediately. Some 
countries also have experience in imposing a carbon tax. For instance, Finland (1990), Sweden 
(1990), Norway (1991) and Denmark (1992) were among the first to launch a carbon tax to curb 
emissions. A fewer years later, they were followed by the Netherlands (1996), Slovenia (1997), 
Germany (1998) and the United Kingdom (U.K.) (2000).91 Imposing other environmental taxes 
in these countries may be easier than in countries with no such experience. 
3.2.2.3 Revenue 
Revenue for governmental control and management can eventually result from imposing a 
carbon tax. Theoretically, a carbon tax has regressive effects.92 Accordingly, a carbon tax is a 
heavier burden for the poor than the rich. Addressing the regressive effects of a carbon tax is a 
high priority for its revenue objectives. Governments can use revenues to reduce other inefficient 
taxes, thereby cutting the economic costs of carbon abatement, or they can use the money to 
compensate lower-income consumers who are hit disproportionately hard by higher fuel costs.93 
In addition, a carbon tax is called a revenue-neutral tax, which means that when levying a carbon 
tax, the taxes elsewhere are reduced. It other words, a tax proposal is revenue neutral if it neither 
increases nor decreases existing tax revenues. A revenue-neutral tax yields the same amount of 
money for the government despite changes in tax laws.94 
                                                           
91 Mikael Skou Anderson, ‘Environmental and Economic Implications of Taxing and Trading Carbon: Some 
European Experiences’, (2008) 10 Vermont Journal of Environmental law 63. 
92 Definition of a Regressive Tax, <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regressive_tax> accessed 24 October 2010. A 
regressive tax is a tax imposed in such a manner that the tax rate decreases as the amount subject to taxation 
increases. In terms of individual income and wealth, a regressive tax imposes a greater burden (relative to resources) 
on the poor than on the rich — there is an inverse relationship between the tax rate and the taxpayer's ability to pay 
as measured by assets, consumption, or income.  
93 ‘Doffing the Cap: Tradable Emissions Permits are a Popular, but Inferior, Way to Tackle Global Warming’ (The 
Economist, 14 June 2007) <http://www.economist.com/node/9337630> accessed 16 May 2010. 
94 Definition of Revenue Neutral, <http://www.investorwords.com/8338/revenue_neutral.html> accessed on 16 May 
2010. The government may lower taxes for one particular group of people, but raise taxes for another group. This 
allows the revenue that they receive to remain unchanged (neutral). 
46 
 
In reality, how to use the revenue depends on a country’s legal regulations or traditions. 
Policymakers must pay attention to the function of revenue from carbon tax, rather than consider 
the revenue as government earnings. 
4. Types of emissions trading systems 
Various ETSs have different legal frameworks and features. To achieve the emissions reduction 
targets, policymakers must choose the appropriate design based on the typical circumstances 
within a limited geographic area. According to different criteria, three types of emissions trading 
design options are discussed in this section. 
4.1 Cap-and-trade (absolute ETS) versus rate-based relative ETS 
Emissions trading can be either absolute or relative, according to how the cap is set. In an 
absolute ETS, the cap is set in such a way that the emissions reductions target is a fixed amount 
of carbon emissions within a specific period. For instance, the cap-and-trade system is a typical 
absolute regime with a fixed amount of carbon emissions reduction targets. 
In a relative ETS, the emissions reductions target is set as an emissions baseline or emissions rate 
with a limited amount of emissions reduction, rather than an absolute target. The target set as a 
baseline is called ‘credits and trade’, while that set as an emission rate is ‘rate-based trading’. 
Credits and trading will be analysed later will when comparing it to the allowances-based trading 
model, and only the relative ETS based on target emission rate is discussed in this section. 
A relative cap that is targeted as the emissions reduction per unit of output, like Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) or other forms of economic activity, is called an emission rate. Under a rate-
based trading approach, the regulating authority determines a performance standard (for example, 
an amount of emissions allowed per unit of output) for a sector (such as tonnes of a pollutant per 
kilowatt hour of electricity generated).95 If a firm produces less than the required emissions 
performance standard, it can sell its ‘unused’ trading quotas or units. The number of these units 
is calculated as the difference between the actual emissions per units of activity and the relative 
standard, multiplied by the size of the activity.96 Firms that are not in compliance with the 
required performance standard must purchase transferable units to offset the excess. 
Both an absolute and a relative ETS have their advantages and disadvantages. Policymakers must 
understand the importance of the cap-setting issue, which refers to the approach of achieving the 
target, the design and structure of the MRV (monitoring, reporting and verification) system and 
the competitiveness in the linkage between the types of ETSs. Therefore the merits and 
drawbacks of both systems must be considered. 
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First in theory, an absolute ETS can provide clearer certainty of an emissions reduction target 
than a relative ETS. An absolute cap is a fixed and compulsory emissions reduction target, which 
can assure environmental certainty. Similarly, a relative ETS does not provide the certain 
environmental outcome of an absolute regime. Instead, a relative target is decided by two 
elements including the total amount of emissions reduction and the output of energy 
consumption or the activities of energy consumption. In other words, the output of energy 
consumption can influence the calculation of the relative target. Rate-based targets give less 
certainty to governments about future emission levels of sources and may require adjustments to 
policies covering other sectors in order to achieve compliance with fixed national targets.97  
Second, the monitoring systems of the two systems are different. For a relative system, 
monitoring procedures are more complex and difficult than for an absolute regime, in which the 
main data to monitor are emissions from emitters. However, in a relative regime, not only must 
emissions data be monitored, but also the output of energy consumption. Therefore, more 
administrative costs are incurred because of different calculations of output across different 
sectors and industries.  
Third, relative regimes can provide more flexibility for emitters at the company level in order to 
achieve emissions reduction targets. Companies that need to achieve the emissions rate can 
manage the proportion of emissions reduction compared with output of energy consumption. In 
contrast, companies in an absolute ETS can only find solutions that reduce their actual carbon 
emissions; otherwise, they must purchase allowances from other facilities. Because a relative 
ETS provides greater flexibility to companies and facilities in achieving emissions targets, firms 
tend to favour it.  
In addition, an absolute ETS requires participants to obtain the trading units before entrance to 
the market. However, rate-based trading mechanisms allow entry and expansion at no extra costs 
as long as emissions per unit of output or input are below the relative target.98 New entrants have 
to meet the same relative cap as incumbent firms, which mean there is no entry barrier, but rather 
an incentive for new firms to enter the market.99 Therefore, participants in an absolute trading 
system may pay higher costs for entrance in the market than those in a rate-based trading system. 
In summary, an absolute ETS requires compulsory emissions reduction targets and is preferred 
when countries seek to ensure certain environmental outcomes. A relative ETS has a much less 
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strict target and is preferred by countries that do not have a specific reduction commitment under 
the Kyoto Protocol. A relative ETS sets an emissions reduction target based on emissions 
amount and output; hence, this approach has been criticized because it does not ensure absolute 
reduction of emissions if GDP grows faster than intensity declines.100 
4.2 Upstream ETS versus downstream ETS 
An ETS can be either upstream or downstream according to the point at which emissions are 
regulated. In an upstream ETS, emissions are related to the characteristics of the product, while 
in a downstream ETS, emissions are regulated when they are emitted into the atmosphere. For 
example, an upstream sector produces imports or sells commodities or products that will release 
the GHG when they are consumed; a downstream sector directly emits the GHGs.101 More 
explicitly, in an upstream ETS, the carbon emissions are regulated when they are consumed by 
the producers and importers of fossil energy, not when they are released into atmosphere. 
Because the limitation on emissions is related to the content of fossil products, and carbon 
emissions result from burning fossil fuels, it is possible to estimate and calculate carbon contents 
before emissions are released into atmosphere. Hence, using alternative fuels or low-carbon fuels, 
applying low carbon intensive technology and producing and importing low carbon intensive 
products are ways to reduce carbon emissions.  
Essentially, the decision between an upstream or a downstream design is an issue about where to 
set the cap in the stream of extraction, production, distribution and consumption.102 An upstream 
design sets the regulation near extraction while the downstream regulates the consumption 
procedure. All emission sources in a downstream design are required to hold emission permits. 
In contrast, far fewer and much bigger firms participate in an upstream design.103 Both upstream 
and downstream designs have advantages and disadvantages, which can help policymakers to 
make reasonable decisions.  
First, an upstream ETS is acceptable when procedures and importers are restricted to a few large 
companies or in specific sectors within one country. Therefore, the monitoring system does not 
cover all emission facilities in every sector, and it is much easier to estimate the total emissions 
according to the proportion of the carbon content in a specific product. These features make the 
upstream model more attractive among governments because administrative costs are much 
lower. In a downstream model, all the emissions facilities can be covered because the calculation 
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of carbon emissions is monitored when emissions are released into the air. However, monitoring 
equipment or systems must be installed in all emissions facilities. Therefore, the calculation of 
emissions under the downstream model is more accurate than the upstream, but the 
administrative costs are much higher. The accuracy of carbon emissions can secure the accuracy 
of the ‘cap’ and the demand of the carbon market, but administrative costs significantly impact 
companies’ production costs. Based on these features, policymakers should balance the desire for 
accuracy of the carbon emissions and the level of administrative costs.  
Second, concerning monitoring systems, countable participants in an upstream ETS are fewer 
than in a downstream ETS, and it is easier to monitor emissions from sources in an upstream 
regime. On the other hand, establishment of monitoring systems for sources in a downstream 
system will be very difficult because all covered emissions sources release carbon emissions into 
the air and all must hold permits. A standardized monitoring system cannot be set up across all 
the different sectors and entities.  
Third, concerning objective achievement, an upstream model may not achieve the emissions 
reduction target as effectively as a downstream model. Because suppliers of fossil fuels have few 
options for reducing the carbon content of fuel, the carbon cap in an upstream regime is actually 
a fuel cap.104 To enforce a fuel cap means changing consumption patterns through price setting. 
However, if no reasonable alternative to fuel products is available, the end-users and consumers 
still pay the additional cost, which does nothing to reduce emissions from fuel suppliers.  
Fourth, the coverage of sources is different in an upstream and a downstream ETS. An upstream 
ETS is related to the carbon content of fossil fuels, which can cover many sources – including 
fuel oil, natural gas and gasoline – and many sectors – including residential, commercial, small 
industrial and transportation.105 As a result, upstream emissions can cover up to 90 per cent of 
emissions and could be designed to cover almost all energy-related carbon emissions in some 
schemes.106 However, downstream systems would probably cover only large facilities in major 
energy-intensive industries (electricity generation, refining, iron and steel, building materials and 
pulp and paper).107 
Therefore, the design of these two models can influence the coverage of emissions, the 
difficulties in monitoring and management of participants, the stability of carbon prices and the 
liquidity of the carbon market. The upstream ETS can cover more emissions sources, but fewer 
participants than the downstream ETS. However, the downstream ETS can cover many sectors, 
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which can create divergent abatement options for participants. Furthermore, monitoring and 
assessment costs of an upstream ETS are less than those of a downstream because the upstream 
has fewer participants. 
How can the policymakers make the proper decision based on the reality that both an upstream 
and downstream ETS have advantages and disadvantages? When there is a choice concerning the 
point of regulation, the preferred point is a compromise among the following considerations: 
focusing the regulation on the entities best able to reduce the emissions; ensuring all potential 
emissions reduction actions can be used; keeping the number of participants manageable; 
imposing the compliance obligations; and covering as large a share of total emissions as 
possible.108 
4.3 Allowances-based model versus projects-based model 
Based on the trading units in carbon transactions, there are two trading models, the allowances-
based model (also called the cap-and-trade model) and the projects-based model. The latter can 
be divided into the credit-and-trade model and the offset programme. 
4.3.1 Allowances-based model 
The allowances-based trading model, or cap-and-trade, is based on creation and transactions of 
allowances. With this model, administrative regulators set an absolute ‘emissions cap’, which is 
the total amount of carbon dioxide that participants are allowed to emit during a certain period. 
The emissions cap is distributed into trading units, or ‘allowances’, which are the authorization 
or the right to emit one tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent. Before transactions begin, 
participants obtain a certain amount of allocated allowances for free or by auction. The total 
amount of allocated allowances is the allowable emissions amount. Because various facilities 
have divergent abatement costs, the allowable emissions levels and actual emissions among 
those facilities are also divergent. Hence, emission facilities can achieve their emissions 
reduction targets either by reducing their emissions or purchasing allowances.  
Theoretically, an allowances-based ETS is attractive to policymakers because it has a certain 
environmental outcome established by the absolute cap settings and its highly efficient trading 
design. Cap-and-trade seems especially appropriate for countries that undertake compulsory 
emissions reduction commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. However, the prerequisites for 
adopting cap-and-trade are complex and strict, and the preparation for implementing this system 
is complex. Many elements should be involved in a well-designed allowances-based ETS. A 
reasonable cap-setting and allocation approach can assure the emission reduction target is 
reached at the national and installation levels. A MRV system must be established to confirm 
accurate, authentic and transparent emissions statistics and transaction information. Also a strict 
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compliance system will ensure that emitters achieve their emissions reduction goals, or face high 
penalties. In addition this system establishes a dynamic and transparent market in which 
regulations are set in advance for new companies entering the carbon trading market and old 
companies withdrawing from it. All of these prerequisites are necessary to ensure the cost-
effectiveness, transparency and fairness of the trading system. 
However, not all countries are capable of establishing these requirements. Therefore, 
policymakers should consider their country’s capability of establishing each of these elements 
and prepare adequately when proposing implementation of a cap-and-trade system. Otherwise, 
even if the framework is established, inadequate preparation can ruin the efficiency of carbon 
trading. 
4.3.2 Projects-based trading model 
The projects-based trading model is based on credits that result from projects, and is also known 
as ‘credit trading’ or ‘offset trading’. This model can be used to offer emission sources the 
flexibility to seek lower-cost emission offsets from sectors outside a regulatory programme.109 
Unlike the allowances-based trading model, projects-based trading is based on the credits 
purchased to reach an emissions baseline.  
Projects-based trading is based on purchasing credits that result from emissions reduction 
projects. Two main concerns in applying projects-based trading are how to set the baseline 
appropriately and how to pass the additionality test. These problems also are at the core of 
assuring qualification of the credits and achieving the environmental outcome with assured 
emissions reductions. Legal regulations and procedures are necessary to define procedures for 
these two issues, as well as to establish administrative authorities. 
Credits can be used to offset emissions; however, offsets do not lead to greater emissions 
reductions beyond the cap because projects-based credits will likely be used for compliance 
purposes under an ETS. But credits may help reduce overall costs, which is why some believe 
that offsets should be transitory only and pave the way for future broader systems.110 
In a credit-trading system, regulators set the emission baseline for participants, and then compare 
the actual emissions level to the defined emission baseline. Participants whose emissions are 
lower than the baseline receive credits, while participants whose emissions exceed the baseline 
must purchase credits equal to the excess emissions to achieve compliance.111 
In practice, credit-trading is operated by ‘offset programmes’. Offsets are credits from projects-
based mechanisms that could be generated from abroad (such as through the clean development 
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mechanism, CDM) or from domestic projects outside of the scheme.112 These offsets or credits 
are used to compensate for the additional emissions from facilities that may be new emission 
sources or expansions of existing facilities. In other words, the offsets are used to fill the gap 
between the allowable emissions baseline and the actual emission level to help participants to 
achieve the baseline. 
A credit-trading system is applied widely to achieve mandatory or voluntary emissions reduction 
targets. Unlike a cap-and-trade system, there is no cap setting in a credit-trading system, which 
provides more flexibility to facilities than limitations on emissions only. Also, developed 
countries can be attracted to make investments in developing countries, where 67 per cent of 
potential global GHG emissions abatement is located.113 A credit-trading system is political 
acceptable because of the strong economic incentive in developing countries and the urgent 
demand for emissions reduction in developed countries. 
However, some issues still need to be addressed when considering a credit-trading model.  
4.3.2.1 Additionality 
The first issue is how to ensure the ‘additionality’ of projects and credits. In the context of 
climate change policy, ‘additionality’ was originally relevant to the issue of activities 
implemented jointly under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC).  
(1) Concept of additionality 
In pursuant to the provisions of the UNFCCC, the developed countries may jointly implement 
policies and measures on the mitigation of climate change with other parties included in Annex I 
to the Convention, and may assist other Annex I parties in contributing to the achievement of the 
objectives of the convention.114 The Conference of the Parties (COP) makes decisions regarding 
criteria for joint implementation.115  In the Berlin Mandate of COP1, the COP decided that 
activities implemented jointly should bring about real, measurable and long-term environmental 
benefits related to the mitigation of climate change that would not have occurred without such 
activities.116 Financing of jointly implemented activities is in addition to the financial obligations 
of Annex II to the convention, within the framework of the financial mechanism.117 Hence, 
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additionality means ‘the environmental benefits relevant to the mitigation that wouldn’t have 
occurred in the absence of such mitigation activities’.  
The Kyoto Protocol refers to additionality when defining the clean development mechanism 
(CDM) and joint implementation (JI). According to the Kyoto Protocol, emissions reductions 
resulting from each CDM project activity shall be certified by operational entities to be 
designated by the COP/MOP on the basis of ‘real, measurable and long-term benefits related to 
the mitigation of climate change’ and ‘reduction emissions that are additional to any that would 
occur in the absence of the certified project activity’.118 In defining jointly implemented projects, 
the protocol refers to additionality in a project as that which ‘provides a reduction in emissions 
by sources, or an enhancement of removals by sinks that is additional to any that would 
otherwise occur’.119 
The above statements define additionality as the same concept in different mechanisms. 
Therefore, additionality refers to an environmental benefit that results from specific projects, in 
which the benefits are in addition to results that would occur in the absence of the same project 
or with the application of an alternative policy.  
In the light of the Kyoto Protocol and as further elaborated by the CDM modalities of the 
Marrakesh Accords, additionality can be understood as the ‘requirement that GHG emissions 
after implementation of a CDM project activity are lower than those that would have occurred in 
the most plausible alternative scenario to the implementation of the CDM project activity’.120 
This alternative scenario may be the business-as-usual case (that is, the continuation of current 
emission levels in the absence of the CDM project activity), or it may be some other scenario 
that involves a gradual lowering of emissions intensity.  
(2) Difficulties in assessment 
Not all the credits created by projects can be used in an offset programme. Proponents of projects 
must prove that a real emissions reduction will result in order for credits from these assessed 
projects to stand for a real amount of carbon emissions reduction. However, the project and its 
credits cannot pass the additionality test if: (1) the project does not actually result in real 
emission reductions, or (2) the proponents cannot prove the project will produce real emission 
reductions or the administrator denies that that the project will result in good environmental 
outcomes. If either of these situations is true, credits are inappropriate to be used in an offset 
programme.  
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Taking the CDM, the world’s first international offset programme as an example, the single 
largest reason for rejection of proposed CDM projects is the inability of project proponents to 
credibly demonstrate additionality: the second most common reason is the improper use of an 
approved baseline and monitoring methodology.121 
4.3.2.2 Baseline 
The additionality requires that a baseline be set to show the additional benefits of a programme 
or project. Taking CDM projects as an example, the baseline for these project activities is 
defined as ‘the scenario that reasonably represents the anthropogenic emissions by sources of 
GHGs that would occur in the absence of the proposed project activity’.122 
Reviewing the baseline can be contentious and resource intensive because it is extremely 
difficult to define with certainty what would happen in the absence of a project.123 As defined, 
setting the baseline requires estimation of a project. In other words, the emissions at baseline 
level result from a hypothesis in which no such project exists. In addition, a baseline must be set 
for every project, which increases administrative costs. 
Taking CDM as an example, a baseline was established by project participants according to 
provisions for the use of approved and new methodologies contained in decisions 17/CP.7, the 
current annex and relevant decisions of the COP/MOP. A baseline must be established in a 
transparent and conservative manner on a project-specific basis, taking into account relevant 
national and/or sectoral policies and circumstances.124 The COP decision provides that project 
participants select a baseline methodology for a project activity in combination with guidance 
from the Executive Board.125 
4.3.3 Comparative study between projects-based and allowances-based ETSs 
Both allowances-based trading models and projects-based trading models are applied widely in 
the world. If policymakers are confronted with a choice between these two trading models, the 
following comparative research may be helpful. 
First, allowances and credits are different. Trading units in an allowances-based model are 
allowances that are granted, while credits in a projects-based trading model are purchased. In an 
allowances-based trading model, one allowance stands for authorisation to release one tonne of 
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carbon dioxide, but allowances are real emissions transferable in the carbon market like a 
commodity. 
However, credits are not real carbon emissions. Only credits that resulted from projects with 
additionality effects can be purchased. They can stand for emissions only if they are shown to 
have had additional effects on mitigation. 
Second, the ‘cap’ in allowances-based trading is different from the ‘baseline’ in projects-based 
trading. The cap is the amount of emissions reduction within a limited period. The calculation 
standard of the cap is the number of tonnes of carbon dioxide or other GHGs. Essentially, this 
cap is the amount of emissions that are allowed to be released, or a maximum allowable 
emissions ceiling on the regulated emitters. In contrast, the ‘baseline’ is a scenario that represents 
the GHG emissions in the absence of the proposed projects, and therefore, is not an accurate 
emissions reduction target. In essence, the baseline is the expected emissions without the 
application of the proposed projects, and how to calculate the baseline is important. The 
authorised regulators must regulate the procedures and standards of defining a baseline for 
different types of projects. 
Third, the results of the two trading models are different. In allowances-based trading, once the 
cap is achieved, a certain amount of real emissions are eliminated, which means a certainty of 
environmental outcome can be achieved. But in projects-based trading, real emissions come only 
from projects that have additional effects on emissions reduction targets, compared with the 
baseline scenario. Proving additionality of credits is difficult because it is based on a beforehand 
hypothesis. If emission reductions from a project are not additional, there is a risk that these 
reductions could dilute an emissions goal and lead to increased emissions compared with a case 
in which no offsets are allowed.126 Hence, the environmental outcome of projects-based trading 
model is not as certain as that of an allowances-based trading model. 
Fourth, the two systems provide different flexibilities for participants to reduce carbon emissions. 
Allowances-based trading requires participants to achieve their reduction target. If their actual 
emissions exceed the required target, they can purchase allowances directly from other 
participants. But projects-based trading works differently. Projects-based trading produces 
credits that can be purchased in the carbon market, participants can invest in these projects and 
obtain the credits. Then participants can use these credits to offset emissions. 
Fifth, regulators will intervene to some extent in reduction activities in projects-based trading, 
but not in the allowances-based trading. In the latter model, regulators take responsibility for 
accurately defining the ‘cap’, distributing the target into the sub-branch level (sectoral or 
installation levels), setting up a trading information platform to provide transaction information 
and establishing the MRV system for collecting emissions statistics accurately. In other words, 
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regulators focus on assuring and improving the transparency and accuracy of the ETS, which is 
relevant to the compliance of participants in an allowances-based trading model. Whether the 
emitters are in compliance with the obligatory emissions reduction target is determined by 
comparing the emitters’ actual emissions to the allowable emissions. Thus, the accuracy and 
transparency of actual emissions is highly important. 
In projects-based trading, regulators do not intervene in the emitters’ decisions regarding in 
which reduction activities to become involved. The supply and demand of the carbon market 
spurs participants to make optimum decisions to reach their emissions reduction targets at the 
lowest costs. 
In comparison, authorised regulators may intervene in different aspects of a projects-based 
trading model. Because projects elicit carbon credits, the projects-based trading model is closely 
connected to project activities. Therefore, two questions are important in operating projects-
based trading: Will the project activities result in real carbon credits and how many carbon 
credits can be produced on project-by-project basis? To answer the first question, standards and 
procedures are necessary to judge whether project activities will produce real carbon offsets. 
Regulators must provide these standards and procedures to set a baseline and establish 
additionality test. To answer the second, regulators must establish and calculate the linkage 
between the project and the amount of carbon credits. Therefore, in projects-based trading, 
regulators focus on assessment of project activities themselves. Credits that participants may be 
issued are decided by comparing real emissions reductions from the projects to the baseline (the 
real emissions in absence of projects). If the projects produce results above the baseline scenario, 
credits can be issued. 
5. Background study: emissions trading at international level  
The Kyoto Protocol is an international agreement linked to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which commits its Parties by setting internationally 
binding emission reduction targets.127  The UNFCCC aims at stabilizing the greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system.128 The Protocol was adopted on 11 December 1997 and 
entered into force on 16 February 2005, containing 28 articles and 2 annexes. It covers six types 
of GHG emissions, including Carbon dioxide (C02), Methane (CH4), Nitrous oxide (N20), 
Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), Perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and Sulphur hexafluoride (SF6).  
After recognizing that developed countries are principally responsible for the current high levels 
of GHG emissions in the atmosphere because of more than 150 years of industrial activity, the 
Convention categorizes its parties as Annex I countries and non-Annex I countries based on the 
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principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’. Annex I countries include the 
industrialized countries that were members of the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development) in 1992 and the countries in transition including the Russian 
Federation, the Baltic States and several central and eastern European States. 129  Annex I 
countries are required to ensure their CO2 equivalent emissions do not exceed their assigned 
amounts in Annex B to the Protocol.130 These emissions reduction commitments undertaken by 
the Annex I countries are with legally binding force. In contrast, non-Annex I countries are 
mostly developing countries, who do not undertake legally binding commitment according to the 
Protocol.  
In order to support Annex I countries to achieve their compulsory targets, the Kyoto Protocol 
defines three flexible mechanisms, and allows transfer of emissions reduction units under Article 
17, 12 and 6. Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol sets out the mechanism called ‘emissions trading’, 
which allows countries to sell their excess emission units to others that need more to achieve 
their targets. These emission units are called ‘assigned amount units’ (AAUs): emissions targets 
for countries with commitments according to Annex B to the Protocol. The emissions trading 
mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol has been recognised and implemented worldwide and as 
such stand as models for various other markets and initiatives.131For instance, the EU ETS is a 
typical emissions trading system triggered by the Protocol, as an instrument to fulfill the EU’s 
committed target. Article 12 of the Protocol defines the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), 
which allows the Annex I countries with emission-reduction commitments to use emission-
reduction projects in developing countries (non-Annex I countries) in order to obtain purchasable 
credits called ‘certified emission reduction (CERs)’. Each unit of a CER equals to one tonnes of 
carbon dioxide. Article 6 of the Protocol defines ‘Joint Implementation (JI)’, allowing Annex I 
countries to purchase emission reduction units (ERUs) from an emission-reduction or emission 
removal projects in Annex I countries. In contrast to CDM, to make use of JI, both the producer 
country and the acquired country of the ERUs must be Annex I countries with emission 
reduction commitments.  
Under the Kyoto Protocol’s emissions trading system, emission units including the AAUs, CERs 
and ERUs are equally transferable. It lays down the basis for Annex I countries to establish their 
own emissions trading systems, and provides the possibility to link the emissions trading system 
with projects that can produce emission units. 
Chapter 2 introduced the concept of emissions trading and its theoretical framework. The 
comparative study between the emissions trading and other policy options provides a better 
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understanding of the pros and cons of an ETS. Based on a literature review and desktop work, 
this chapter described and analysed emissions trading from the perspective of design theory. This 
chapter also gave a brief overview of the international emissions trading system established by 
the Kyoto Protocol, which prompted individual emissions trading system in the Annex I 
countries. However, in practice, an ETS may not be as cost-effective as discussed in this chapter. 
The framework of an ETS in different jurisdictions may not be the same as that described in this 
chapter. Various circumstances and uncertainties may cause changes in the elements and 
outcomes of ‘utopian’ ETSs in different countries. 
The next two chapters include research on the ETSs in the EU and in China from a critical 
perspective. To show how a theoretical design of an ETS may become unpredictable, unstable 
and risky in practice, the next chapter scrutinises the development and implementation of the EU 
ETS, compares the reality of each element at different commitment periods and sheds light on 




Chapter 3 The European Union Emissions Trading System: Emergence, Implementation 
and Expansion 
1. Emergence of the EU ETS 
An ETS was not the EU’s first choice when considering economic instruments for its climate 
policy. A proposal for an EU-wide carbon tax in the 1990s was rejected when policymakers 
shifted their focus to the feasibility of an ETS. 
1.1 Failure of the EU-wide carbon tax proposals 
The impossibility of finding common ground between the European institutions and the Member 
States on the introduction of any kind of taxation or fiscal regulation related to energy products is 
not only due to the limitation of the EC Treaty provisions, but also due to the Member States 
having shown on many occasions their inability to find common agreement on these themes.132 
The failure of the proposal for a EU-wide carbon tax in 1990s is a case in point. 
The European Commission proposed a carbon tax on non-renewable energy sources such as oil 
and coal, which release CO2 into the atmosphere. The European Parliament finally determined 
the measure of such a carbon tax as a call for a 50-50 tax on both specific CO2 emissions and 
general energy (coal, oil, natural gas and nuclear),133 but the European Council rejected that 
proposal. The failure to achieve an agreement among the EU Member States has several reasons. 
First, from a legal perspective, an EU-wide carbon tax belongs to issues that require unanimous 
agreement among the Member States rather than ordinary legislative procedures, according to 
the EC Treaty. In principle, environmental protection falls within the jurisdiction of ordinary 
legislative procedures. Article 191 (1) (ex 174 TEC134) of the TFEU135 deals with environmental 
objectives on the environment, including protecting and improving the quality of the 
environment, as well as promoting measures at international level to deal with regional or 
worldwide environmental problems, in particular combating climate change.136 To achieve these 
objectives, the European Parliament (EP) and the European Council (EC) shall decide what 
action is to be taken by the Union by following the ordinary legislative procedure (co-decision 
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procedure137).138 Hence, actions aiming at improving the quality of the environment, particularly 
combating climate change must be determined by the ordinary legislative procedures among the 
EU institutions. Article 294 of the TFEU provides this ordinary legislative procedure. 139 
However, a special legislative procedure must be followed if the EU wishes to adopt primarily 
fiscal provisions ‘significantly affecting a Member State’s choice between different energy 
sources and general structure of its energy supply’.140 Accordingly, the European Council must 
act unanimously, 141  a requirement that poses a challenge to adopt a policy regarding the 
environment and energy that affects Member States’ fiscal natures. The proposed carbon tax 
qualified as having a primary fiscal system requiring the adoption of a carbon tax by 
unanimously.  
Second, the European Council rejected the EU carbon-tax proposal after some Member States 
opposed the proposal on various grounds. Citing their lower levels of industrialization and 
energy use, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland objected to the tax and sought to have it 
moderated for their circumstances.142 The UK rejected the tax proposal based on the principle of 
national sovereignty and proposed an internal increase in the value added tax (VAT) on domestic 
power and road fuel rather than a tax on emissions or energy.143 In addition, some Member States 
had already established a carbon tax system domestically, including Denmark, Norway, Sweden, 
Finland and The Netherlands, and maintained that an EU-wide tax would be unfair for the 
companies and enterprises in their countries and would undermine healthy competition. In the 
end, the proposed carbon tax did not gain unanimous agreement, and therefore, was not adopted 
at the EU level. 
In developing an European climate policy, the EU sought to modify its policymaking from a 
carbon tax programme to a cap-and-trade system. But even as the EU ETS was implemented in 
2005, a carbon tax proposal was raised again, but for different reasons than in the 1990s. 
Likewise, the reasons to veto this proposal were also different. In 2010 the EU Commission 
considered an amendment to the 2003 Energy Taxation Directive (Council Directive 
2003/96/EC). Taxation and Customs Union Commissioner Algirdas Šemeta suggested a tax of 
20 euros per tonne of CO2 contained in fuels 
144 and proposed to impose carbon taxation in 2013. 
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By introducing a carbon element, the Commission hoped to bring energy taxation in line with the 
EU’s commitments on climate change.145 The measure would address two significant polluting 
sectors, transportation and agriculture, which were originally exempted from having to pay for 
their emissions.146 However, this European tax proposed by the Commission was voted down.147  
In April 2011, the Commission presented to the Council a proposal for a Council directive 
amending Directive 2003/96/EC (ETD), which sought a framework for CO2 taxation to 
complement the carbon price signal established by the ETS, while avoiding overlaps between 
these two instruments.148 However, the presidency note of the Economic and Financial Affairs 
Council149 (ECOFIN) indicated that a compromise could not be reached, and Member States 
could decide individually by whether to introduce a CO2 related tax.
150 Member States could not 
reach agreement on a carbon tax. The opponents – including Germany and Poland where much 
of Europe’s heavy coal and steel industries operate – fear being disproportionately affected by 
such a tax. The UK and Ireland resent any compulsory tax being introduced by Brussels.151 In 
response to Member States who argue that they have already implemented a carbon tax 
domestically, the Commission said that national CO2 taxes may fill in gaps or avoid overlap 
between the ETS and the current Energy Taxation Directive, but they do not address distortion 
within the internal market and therefore, a harmonised EU carbon tax is necessary.152 The French 
Constitutional Court rejected the French government’s proposal for a carbon tax on fossil fuel, 
stating that the proposed measure was inefficient and unfair because 93 per cent of emissions 
from industrial installations were already covered by the EU ETS and would be exempt from the 
tax.153 
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In addition, the negative impact of the financial crisis of the early 2000s still lingers in the euro-
zone, which makes carbon taxation at the EU-level even more politically unacceptable. In short, 
different dependencies on carbon-intensive products and resources among Member States, 
different domestic taxation policies on carbon products, concern for competitiveness as well as a 
lingering financial crisis are the main reasons for rejecting the amendments on the Energy 
Taxation Directive. 
1.2 Adoption of the EU ETS: from Green Paper to Directive 2003/87/EC 
The creation of the EU ETS fulfils the EU’s compulsory emissions reduction commitment under 
Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol. The EU ETS is the first regional greenhouse gas ETS, created 
even before the international ETS based on the Kyoto Protocol was active. The legislative 
development of the EU ETS lays out how the idea emerged, how the system was established and 
what were the motives behind it. 
1.2.1 The Green Paper 
In June 1998, the term ‘EU-wide approach to emissions trading’ was first mentioned in the 
Commission’s communication on the EU’s post-Kyoto strategy.154 This communication indicates 
that the existence of the EU bubble does not prevent the EU community from fully participating 
in international emissions trading, and states that further rules or guidelines from the community 
are necessary, such as an EC-wide approach to emissions trading that could facilitate the 
administrative implementation of an ETS and prevent new barriers to trade. The EU bubble was 
established based on Article 3 155  and 4 156  of the Kyoto Protocol that allows industrialised 
countries to take joint action to fulfil their reduction targets. The EU indicated that its Member 
States would take advantage of this joint action provision, which provided flexibility in 
implementing by allowing the wealthier Member States to accept much of the burden of reaching 
the overall EU target, while other Member States may increase their emissions.157 Hence, the EU 
bubble paved the way for achieving the EU burden-sharing agreement. As for EU and Member 
State participation in an international ETS, the Commission suggested a step-by-step approach to 
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establish a comprehensive trading system across sectors based on the proper functioning of the 
internal market.158 
After research and assessment,159 the Green Paper was published in March 2000 and aimed to 
launch a discussion on GHG emissions trading within the EU and the relationship between 
emissions trading and other policies and measures to address climate change.160 The Green Paper 
provides policy options related to designed elements of an EU ETS, including the scope, the 
initial allocation of emission allowances, the synergy with other policies and measures, 
compliance and enforcement. 
Only two years passed between when the concept of ‘emissions trading’ was raised to the 
publication of a document on its feasibility. The working staff of the Commission’s Climate 
Change Unit, including the head of the unit, changed their position after adoption of the Kyoto 
Protocol161. The Commission launched the European Climate Change Programme (ECCP) to 
identify and develop all necessary elements of an EU strategy to implement the Kyoto Protocol. 
The first ECCP (2000–2004) involved all relevant groups of stakeholders working together, 
including representatives from the Commission’s various departments (known as DG, the 
Directorates-General), the Member States, industry and environmental groups.162 The ECCP 
Working Group I released its interim report on flexibility mechanisms in October 2001.  
The Green Paper and the ECCP are closely related. First, the Green Paper initiated the 
discussions within EU institutions, while the ECCP provided a platform for different interest 
groups to join EU institutions to discuss the feasibility of adopting an emissions trading approach. 
Second, the ECCP meetings in some ways held parallel discussions on the Green Paper. The 
ECCP focused on the interaction between the EU ETS and the flexibilities of the Kyoto Protocol, 
while the Green Paper emphasized the design of the ETS itself.  
1.2.2 The adoption of Directive 2003/87/EC 
1.2.2.1 Motives behind the adoption  
Following the activities of ECCP Working Group I, the European Commission released in 
October 2001 a proposal for a framework directive for GHG emissions trading within the EC 
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COM (2001) 581.163 After the co-decision procedures stipulated in Article 251 TEC, Directive 
2003/87/EC established a scheme for GHG emission allowance trading within the Community. 
Directive 2003/87/EC is the cornerstone for establishing an emissions trading system at the EU 
level. 
One reason for the speedy adoption of the Direction was external political pressure arising from 
successful climate change negotiations. Adopted in 1997, the Kyoto Protocol suggests 
establishing three flexible mechanisms, one of which is emissions trading. After that, the EU 
started to raise concerns regarding its capacity to comply with the Protocol commitments. In 
addition, when the United States rejected the Kyoto Protocol in 2001, the EU became the 
flagship leader in moving the negotiation process forward. The United States had raised the idea 
of integrating the emissions trading approach into the three flexible mechanisms under the Kyoto 
Protocol, but EU countries rejected that approach at first in fear that Europeans would regard 
emission certificates as a ‘right to pollute’ or as ‘trading in indulgences’. Also, establishing this 
new and complex instrument seemed to be impossible within the specified time period.164  
But the EU seems to have made a compromise because the United States considered the 
emissions trading approach to be a prerequisite for its agreement to the Kyoto Protocol. The EU 
would have liked to accept the ETS application on the condition that the ETS would be 
considered supplementary to domestic measures and policies, and the flexible mechanism would 
be used only to fulfil a maximum of 50 per cent165 of national obligations. However, the rejection 
of this EU proposal in negotiations of COP 6 in The Hague in 2000 reframed the EU position 
and strategy in climate negotiations. It left the EU with virtually no leeway to strike a bargain 
with other countries over their respective demands, abandoning the demand for an upper limit on 
the use of emissions trading in favour of the legally weaker formulation that Annex I countries 
would meet their reduction obligations chiefly through national measures.166 Thus, the EU’s 
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compulsory commitment under the Kyoto Protocol and the withdrawal of the United States are 
the external reasons for the quick adoption of the EU ETS. 
1.2.3 Legal Basis for applying ET  
1.2.3.1 Legal Responsibility under the Kyoto Protocol 
On 31 May 2002, the EU ratified the Kyoto Protocol, thus declaring the EU’s acceptance of the 
terms of the agreement and reaffirming the EU and all its Member States’ commitment to pursue 
multilateral solutions to issues of global concern.167 In addition, the European Council decision 
of 25 April 2002 stipulated that the European Community and its Member States jointly fulfil 
their commitments under Article 3(1) of the Protocol.168 This decision indicated that the Council 
approved on behalf of the European Community the Kyoto Protocol signed on 29 April 1998. 
Because this Council decision was addressed to each Member State, the EU and all Member 
States accepted their legal obligations to fulfil the emissions reduction commitments as 
established in Annex II to the Kyoto Protocol. 
1.2.3.2 The EU burden-sharing agreement 
The EU burden-sharing agreement was made legally binding under Community law through its 
inclusion in Annex II to Council Decision 2002/358/CE. This agreement established the legal 
basis for the EU and its Member States to implement the Kyoto Protocol jointly. The EU-15 
Member States determined to achieve a GHG emissions reduction target of 8 per cent, based on 
the 1990 emissions level, by dividing this joint target into individual targets for each Member 
State. In doing so, the EU and Member States are behaving as an EU bubble in implementing the 
Kyoto Protocol. 
The main objective for adopting the burden-sharing agreement was to strengthen the EU’s 
negotiation position and to meet the target collectively with a cost-effective approach. Because 
each EU Member State has different circumstances in economic development demands and 
energy consumption, their addressing climate negotiations individually would be more complex. 
Therefore, cooperation of Member States improves the EU’s position and makes agreement more 
feasible. 
The EU burden-sharing agreement originated from an approach called the ‘Triptych Approach’ 
proposed by experts in the Netherlands. The Triptych Approach separates the national economy 
into three sectors: the domestic sector, the energy-intensive export-oriented sector and the 
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electricity generation sector. Using this approach, emissions from these sectors in each Member 
State were analysed and each country’s contribution to the overall emissions reduction target was 
calculated. This approach makes it possible to calculate in a relative simple way what 
contribution individual countries can ‘reasonably’ be expected to make to an overall emission 
reduction target.169 In addition, the differences among the EU Member States could be taken into 
account, such as starting-points, approaches, economic structure and resources, capital, the need 
to maintain strong and sustainable development, available technologies and other individual 
circumstances, defined by Article 4 (a) of the UNFCCC. Although the final allocation of the 
emissions reduction target was reached by political negotiations, the Triptych Approach had a 
decisive influence on the burden-sharing agreement.170  
The expansion of the EU also may influence GHG emissions reduction targets under the EU 
burden-sharing agreement; however, expansion does not change the EU-15 Member States’ 
commitment to the Kyoto Protocol. Article 4.4 of the Kyoto Protocol stipulates that, if parties 
acting jointly and together with a regional economic integration organization, any alteration in 
the composition of the organization after adoption of the Protocol shall not affect existing 
commitments. Applied to the EU’s circumstances, accession of new EU Member States cannot 
change the Kyoto commitments of the EU Member States; therefore, new EU Member States’ 
participation may affect the EU burden-sharing agreement, but the emissions reduction target of 
8 per cent cannot be altered. 
In summary, under the Kyoto Protocol, the legal responsibilities of reducing GHG emissions by 
8 per cent, based on the 1990 emissions level, provided the legal basis for the EU and its 
Member States to apply emissions trading. This responsibility is the main reason that the 
European Commission launched discussion on the feasibility of an EU ETS even before the 
implementation period of the Kyoto Protocol.  
Second, the principle of cooperation in the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol provides the basis 
for the EU Member States to meet commitment as an EU bubble. It also provides feasibility for 
the EU ETS to collaborate with other ratified parties, for instance, in linkages between the EU 
ETS and ETSs from other ratified parties. 
Third, the EU burden-sharing agreement, made through the Annex II to the Council Decision 
2003/358/CE, indicated that the EU and its Member States are duty bound by the Kyoto Protocol. 
The EU burden-sharing agreement provides the legal basis for EU Member States to coordinate 
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collectively. Though the participation of new EU Member States may impact the EU’s Kyoto 
target, it cannot change the previous Kyoto target of EU-15.  
1.2.4 Economic basis for an ETS in the EU 
The UNFCCC notes that climate policies and measures should ensure global benefits at the 
lowest possible economic cost. Explicitly, the cost-effectiveness principle requires climate 
policies and measures to consider different socioeconomic contexts and to cover all relevant 
sources of GHGs in all economic sectors.171 As a signatory party of the UNFCCC, the EU must 
adopt climate policies and measures based on cost-effectiveness. Accordingly, the justification of 
the EU ETS was derived from studies that indicated that costs could be reduced by allowing 
industry to take part.172 
In reality, allowances-based trading, or cap-and-trade, has proven to be cost-effective in the EU. 
The scheme should allow the EU to achieve its Kyoto target at a cost of between 2.9 billion and 
3.7 billion euros annually, which is less than 0.1 per cent of the EU’s GDP.173 Without the 
scheme, compliance costs could reach up to 6.8 billion euros a year.174 
1.3 Development of the EU ETS 
1.3.1 Linkage period of the EU ETS: Directive 2004/101/EC 
Article 30 (3) of the EU Directive 2003/87/EC states that linking to projects-based mechanisms 
can increase the cost-effectiveness of the Community’s ETS. Based on experiences from Phase I 
of the EU ETS and the implementation of the 2003/87/EC Directive, the Commission must 
report the use of the credits from project mechanisms. The Commission presented a proposal to 
link the Kyoto Protocol’s project mechanisms in July 2003, and based on this proposal, 
2003/0173 (COD), EU Directive 2004/101/EC was drafted and adopted. 
There are several reasons for linking the EU ETS with the IETS. From an economic perspective, 
linking with other ETSs can increase the economic efficiency of the carbon market. Because 
linking different ETSs enlarges the carbon market and involves more participants with divergent 
abatement costs, more abatement choices are available in the market and regulated emitters are 
able to find the lowest abatement method. The linkage between the EU ETS and the IETS 
connects allowances-based trading and projects-based trading. On one hand, more divergent 
compliance options are available, and thus, emitters can find the cheapest compliance approach, 
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and as abatement costs decrease, carbon prices also decrease. On the other hand, the linkage 
makes allowances and projects-based credits transferable to each other, which improves market 
liquidity between the EU ETS and the IETS. Annual compliance costs in the period 2008 to 2012 
for covered installations in the enlarged EU were estimated to be reduced by more than 20 per 
cent and allowance prices in the enlarged EU with the proposed linkages, were estimated to be 
lowered by about half.175  
From the perspective of environmental protection, linking different ETSs creates a single carbon 
market with one carbon price, which can ensure actual emissions reductions. Under the 
individual and small-sized carbon market, the costs for companies located in country A applying 
an ETS may be more than that those for companies in country B without an ETS. Therefore, 
higher production costs may drive companies in country A to move to country B. This 
phenomenon is called ‘carbon leakage’, which occurs when efforts to control emissions in one 
place cause the emissions-producing activity to shift to a location without an emissions control 
policy.176 If the carbon leakage happens in large industries, the EU ETS will not cover sources 
outside the EU although GHGs will still be released. However, with the same carbon price in a 
linked carbon market, abatement costs can be equalized and companies will not have the same 
incentive to relocate to escape emissions reduction responsibilities.  
1.3.2 Expansion period of the EU ETS 
1.3.2.1 The EU climate and energy package 2007 
In March 2007, EU leaders endorsed an integrated approach to climate and energy policy that 
aimed to combat climate change and increase the EU’s energy security while strengthening its 
competitiveness.177 Accordingly, the European Council established the well known ‘20-20-20’ 
targets for climate and energy policy. One of the ‘20-20-20’ targets is a reduction in EU GHGs 
by at least 20 per cent below 1990 levels by 2020.178 In addition, this target could be 30 per cent 
if other developed and developing countries commit with comparable emissions reduction targets 
under international agreement. 
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To achieve the EU ‘20-20-20’ targets, four pieces of legislations were promulgated, two of 
which refer to the EU ETS. The first legislation revises the existing EU ETS based on EU 
Directive 2003/87/EC. Another set the ‘effort-sharing decision’ achieved by the European 
Council. The details of these two legislations are discussed in the following section. 
Obviously, the EU climate and energy package significantly influenced the EU’s climate policy. 
First, it imposed concrete GHG emissions targets and energy consumption targets for the post-
2012 period at EU level, which applied pressure on Member States. Second, it initiated updated 
legislation at the EU level to achieve the EU ‘20-20-20’ targets, regardless of international 
commitments at that time. Since 2013, implementation of the EU ETS has been independent 
from commitment requirements under the Kyoto Protocol. 
1.3.2.2 Aviation Directive 2008/101/EC 
The European Council emphasised that the EU is committed to transforming Europe into a 
highly energy-efficient and low GHG-emitting economy and made a firm independent 
commitment for the EU to reduce GHG emissions to at least 20 per cent below 1990 levels by 
2020.179 The limitation of GHG emissions from aviation is an essential contribution to this 
commitment.180 
According to the Aviation Directive 2008/101/EC, emissions from all flights that depart from an 
aerodrome situated in a Member State that arrive in an aerodrome in a third country are covered 
by the EU ETS. The international community challenged this directive (see Chapter 2, section 4 
‘The EU ETS case law and its influences’).  
The EU aviation directive would enter into force in 2013, but the EU decided to suspend its 
enforcement temporarily in order to allow time for the International Civil Aviation Organisation 
(ICAO) to reach a global agreement to tackle aviation emissions, The enforcement of the EU 
ETS requirements for flights operated from or to non-European countries was temporarily 
suspended in April 2013, while continuing to apply the legislation to flights within and between 
countries in Europe.181 Finally, the ICAO Assembly agreed to develop a global market-based 
measure (MBM) to address international aviation emissions by 2016, which will apply by 2020. 
As a response to the ICAO’s promise, the European Commission proposed a revision of the EU 
ETS to include these provisions: (1) emissions from flights between airports in the European 
Economic Area (EEA, covering 28 EU Member States, plus Norway and Iceland) would 
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continue to be covered; (2) emissions from flights to and from countries outside the EEA would 
be fully exempted for 2013; (3) since 2014, flights to and from countries outside the EEA would 
receive a general exemption only for the proportion of emissions that occur outside EEA airspace; 
(4) flights between the EEA and the least developed countries, low-income countries and lower-
middle income countries that benefit from the EU’s generalised system of preferences and have a 
share of less than 1 per cent of international aviation activity, would be fully exempt from the EU 
ETS.182 
1.3.2.3 Directive 2009/29/EC (phase III) 
One of four pieces of legislation under the EU Climate and Energy Package, Directive 
2009/29/EC revised the previous 2003/87/EC Directive to improve and extend the EU’s emission 
allowance trading scheme, based on experiences in the first two phases (2005–2007 and 2008–
2012), for the post-2012 period. The Directive was passed in two stages: Stage 1 on 31 
December 2009 and Stage 2 at the end of 2012. 
Consequently, several revisions have been made in the new EU ETS. A discussion of the 
concrete differences between the new EU ETS and the previous one are included in section 2.2 
of chapter 3 ‘Implementation of the EU ETS’. 
1.3.2.4 Effort-sharing agreement: Council Decision 406/2009  
Council Decision 406/2009, adopted jointly by the European Parliament and the European 
Council on 23 April 2009, is known as the ‘efforts-sharing agreement’. In comparison to the 
EU’s ‘burden-sharing agreement’, the efforts-sharing agreement gives the EU a more active role 
in making climate law and policy. The EU burden-sharing agreement demonstrated the EU’s 
concern about fulfilling international obligations during the first commitment period under the 
Kyoto Protocol. Comparatively, the effort-sharing agreement indicates the EU’s self-constraint 
in the endeavour to achieve its own ‘20-20-20’ targets during the post-2012 period. 
This initiative change also explains differences in the way EU Member States share emissions 
reduction targets. First, the EU effort-sharing agreement expanded emissions reduction targets to 
non-ETS sectors. The EU ETS includes large GHGs sources, like electricity plants and major 
industrial installations, which cover 40 per cent of all EU-27 GHG emissions. But the remaining 
60 per cent of EU GHG emissions, which come from small-scale industries, including transport 
(cars, trucks), buildings (in particular heating), services, smaller industrial installations, 
agriculture and waste, also must be reduced.183 The burden-sharing agreement applies emissions 
reduction targets only in the ETS sectors. 
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Coordinating contributions from the ETS sectors and non-ETS sectors can help the EU reduce 
emissions from all sectors and sources. In the end, the EU-wide cap for current ETS sectors set 
reductions at approximately 21 per cent of 2005 levels by 2020; the sectors not covered by the 
EU ETS would need to reduce emissions by around 10 per cent compared with 2005. Second, the 
EU effort-sharing agreement sets the reference year to 2005 not 1990. Therefore, Member States 
must limit GHG emissions by 20 per cent compared to 2005 levels by 2020.184 This change in 
reference year occurred because a better comparison was required between GHG reductions in 
the future and current period. In addition, 2005 is the only year for which reliable verified 
emission data are available for both the EU ETS and the overall GHG emissions of Member 
States, as reported to the UNFCCC. Third, the effort-sharing agreement provides the following 
flexibilities for Member States in transactions of allocated allowances: (1) The Member State 
may carry forward (borrow) up to 5 per cent of its annual emissions allocation from the 
following year; (2) A Member State may carry over to the subsequent years the part of its annual 
allocated emissions that exceeds its GHG emissions in that year, until 2020; (3) A Member State 
may transfer the part of its annual emission allocation that exceeds its GHG emissions for that 
year to other Member States, if the sender Member State has met its annual target; (4) Member 
States also can acquire credits from CDM and JI projects in developing countries and Eastern 
European countries.  
Most important, the EU effort-sharing Decision represents a binding commitment under EU 
law.185 In contrast, the 1998 burden-sharing agreement represented the EU’s concern about how 
to achieve its commitment under the Kyoto Protocol, which was more about the Member States’ 
collective decisions on coordination of implementation.  
In conclusion, as part of the EU’s new climate policies, the effort-sharing decision contributes to 
a significant centralization and Europeanization of climate and energy policies.186 The legislative 
development of the EU ETS demonstrates a progression in the idea of allowances-based trading 
from rejection to adoption and expansion. During 1990s, the EU seemed to prefer an EU-wide 
carbon tax rather than carbon trading. However, the carbon tax proposal was rejected because 
Members States could not achieve unanimous agreement as required. This rejection forced the 
EU to consider other instruments, besides a carbon tax. 
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Adoption of an allowances-based trading scheme also found support in the Green Paper and the 
ECCP. After the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol, the EU expressed concern for the EU’s capacity 
to achieve Kyoto commitments. The Green Paper launched a discussion concerning how to 
achieve the targets cost-effectively, and the ECCP provided a platform for various stakeholders 
to join the discussion. Both the Green Paper and the ECCP were triggered by the Kyoto 
commitment, which was the basis for the allowances-based trading scheme at the EU level. 
Other reasons for the adoption of the EU ETS include the work of staff members at the EU 
Commission climate change unit who supported economic instruments and the U.S. withdrawal 
from the Kyoto Protocol, which made the EU the leader in climate negotiations. In addition, the 
EU decided to fulfil the international commitment under the Kyoto Protocol by following the 
principle of cooperation in the form of a burden-sharing agreement among Member States. 
Finally, the features of the allowances-based trading scheme can achieve the emissions reduction 
target at the lowest cost. 
Once the EU ETS was adopted, the work of linkage and expansion began, as the EU sought to 
improve the cost-effectiveness of carbon trading, to decrease of abatement costs of emissions 
reduction and to prevent carbon leakage. The European Council’s decision in 2007 required the 
expansion of the EU ETS. This decision resulted in the EU climate and energy package that 
defined the ‘20-20-20’ targets, one of which set emissions reduction targets for at least 20 per 
cent, based on 1990 emissions levels, by 2020. The EU climate and energy package established 
the legal basis for emissions reduction targets during post-2010 period. In addition, the EU 
effort-sharing agreement in 2009 provided the means for the Member States to cooperate 
collectively to achieve the emissions reduction target, on the basis of the EU climate and energy 
package.  
2. Implementation of the EU ETS and its experiences 
The details of the EU ETS – the laws, regulations and administrative guidance – must be 
developed and experimented with over time.187 Since its start in 2005, the EU ETS has gathered 
eight years of experience that can be evaluated. The emergence of such a large carbon market, by 
means of the government setting up the process and letting entrepreneurs and capital providers 
figure out on their own how to solve environmental concerns in a distributed and non-centralised 
process is a testament to self-organising systems.188 Both design and implementation of the EU 
ETS is important for the carbon market to work and to address climate change, although the 
development of the EU ETS was not always stable and predictable. In my opinion, instability of 
the carbon market indicates that something is wrong that must be fixed. Therefore, an analysis of 
fluctuations in the EU carbon market can illuminate gaps between theory and practice. 
                                                           




This section describes each element of the ETS framework, from Utopian design to cruel reality. 
A comparative method is used to conduct a critical review of the EU ETS. Following a timeline 
of the different pilot periods, the design and modification of the EU ETS framework are outlined 
and compared. Through three research questions, this section seeks to discover whether the EU 
ETS has performed well. The first question is how do relevant laws define the framework of the 
EU ETS? This part examines the main elements of the EU ETS under EU law, including EU 
directives, regulations and guidelines, during the implementation phases. Second, how far has 
implementation moved forward in practice? This part examines EU ETS’s practices and the 
problems or crises it has encountered. Third, what lessons can be learned from the 
implementation? This part looks at the specific solutions or legal sanctions that have emerged in 
response to implementation problems.  
2.1 Common features on the implementation 
2.1.1 Learning-by-doing progress 
Three phases were employed for gradually implementing the EU ETS. The first period from 
2005 to 2007 was ‘the pilot phase’ before the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, 
during which time the market was tested. Because there has no experience with an ETS at the EU 
level, the design of the EU ETS framework needed to be assessed. After this period, the EU ETS 
was able to create a self-contained independent regional carbon market. Also, the EU considered 
the pilot phase a way to ensure compliance with the Kyoto Protocol.189 The EU was expected to 
collect experiences from the pilot phase and to improve its mitigation capacity in the second 
phase.  
The second phase of the EU ETS coincides with the first commitment period of the Kyoto 
Protocol from 2008 to 2012. With the pilot phase, the EU gained familiarity with the response of 
the carbon market, which increased confidence in fulfilling the international obligation to reduce 
GHG emissions by 2012. In addition, the linkage between the EU ETS and the IETS became 
feasible based on the legal provisions under EU directives and the Kyoto provisions. These 
experiences in the second phase also were the foundation for linking with other ETSs in the 
future.  
The EU ETS continues during the post-2012 period. As mentioned, the EU climate and energy 
package set the well-known ‘20-20-20’ targets during the post-2012 period, and the cornerstone 
of the new package is a reformed EU ETS.190 The target of the third phase is the unconditional 
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commitment to reach at least a 20 per cent reduction in emissions by 2020, through strict 
implementation of the ETS. Therefore the EU ETS implementation in these three phases includes 
the experiences of establishing a self-contained ETS, linking to other ETS and expansion of the 
carbon market, respectively. 
2.1.2 Participants 
All 27 EU Member States are included in the EU ETS. Based on the EU burden-sharing 
agreement, the original EU-15 Member States cooperate as an ‘EU bubble’ to fulfil the Kyoto 
target of 8 per cent GHGs emissions reduction. On 1 May 2004, 10 new Member States joined 
the EU, and on 1 January 2007, Bulgaria and Romania also joined. The original EU ETS, as well 
as the revised EU ETS directive, are addressed to the Member States, which means that all 27 
must comply with the directives and translate them into their national laws. 
2.2 Implementation of the EU ETS 
After more than seven years of implementation, the EU ETS has become the world largest 
regional carbon market. To some extent, contributions of the EU ETS have been recognised. For 
example, the ETS reduced carbon emissions by 120 million to 300 million metric tonnes, or 
roughly 2 to 5 per cent below the ‘business-as-usual’ scenario.191 Despite coinciding with the 
global economic recession, Phase II introduced tighter emissions targets and achieved additional 
reductions of approximately 340 million metric tonnes in its first two years (2008–2009), or 
roughly 8 per cent below projected business-as-usual emissions. 
2.2.1 Regulated sources, GHGs and coverage 
In this section, an examination of how the EU ETS has regulated GHG emissions and their 
sources will show that the carbon market’s requirements for high efficiency and competitiveness 
have changed the definition of GHG sources from Phase I to Phase III.  
In the first phase, the EU ETS covered CO2 emissions from high-emitting installations in the 
power and heat-generation industries and in selected energy-intensive industrial sectors, such as 
combustion plants, oil refineries, coke ovens, iron and steel plants and factories making cement, 
glass, lime, bricks, ceramics, pulp and paper.192 As for the regulated GHG type, the EU ETS 
covered only CO2 instead of all the six GHGs as defined in Directive 2003/87/EC. Also, the ETS 
applied only to carbon-intensive power and heat-generation industries, and covered installations 
included approximately 11,500 individual installations in 25 Member States. Altogether, the EU 
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ETS covered about 45 per cent of the EU’s total CO2 emissions and about 30 per cent of the 
EU’s overall GHG emissions.193 
In the second phase, the EU ETS was expanded to include other GHGs and a geographical area 
that extended beyond the 27 EU Member States to include Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway.194 
Finally, around 50 per cent of the EU’s total CO2 emissions and about 40 per cent of its overall 
GHGs emissions were covered.195 
Since the third phase from 2013, the EU ETS expanded to include installations undertaking the 
capture, transport and geological storage of GHGs: CO2 emissions from petrochemicals, 
ammonia and aluminum sectors; nitrous oxide emissions from the production of nitric, adipic 
and gloyoxylic acid; and perfluorocarbon emissions from aluminium production. 196  These 
covered installations are regulated in the Directive 2009/29/EC. In addition, GHGs emissions 
from aviation activities have been regulated since 2012. Meanwhile, Member States can exclude 
small installations197 from the EU ETS if fiscal or other measures are in place that will achieve 
equivalent GHG emissions reductions as the EU ETS. The third-phase expansion will include net 
additional emissions equivalent to 120–130 million tonnes of CO2 per year from 2013, extending 
the ETS’s coverage from around 40 per cent to 43 per cent of total EU GHG emissions.198 
2.2.1.1 Summary of lessons learned 
 The EU ETS took a phase-in approach when defining its covered sources. From the pilot to the 
third phase, the amounts of regulated GHG types and sources have increased, and coverage has 
expanded from 30 per cent of the EU’s total GHG emissions to 43 per cent. Furthermore, in the 
beginning, the large release-point sources were the main regulated target. Afterwards, the 
transportation sector, including aviation, was also included. The GHG type, the regulated sources 
and the coverage during the first phase set strict limitation on the EU ETS’s specific elements. 
The design of the ETS seemed to indicate that the EU did not wish to establish a comprehensive 
or complex system in the pilot phase for several reasons.  First, the EU ETS introduced a brand 
new, complex concept to the EU that made it difficult to establish a comprehensive ETS all at 
once. Obviously, the EU ETS during the first phase focused on obtaining experience in how to 
design and implement such a system under the EU’s circumstances. Second, with a prudent step-
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by-step approach, the EU ETS could initially be confined to large, fixed-point sources of carbon 
dioxide where monitoring and supervision were more feasible.199 On one hand, regulating only 
CO2 made it easier for the EU to explore the establishment of relevant pillar systems, like MRV 
systems. On the other hand, targeting only CO2 made achieving environmental outcomes easier 
to define at this stage, because CO2 emissions constitute approximately 80 per cent of the 
community’s GHG emissions. With this prudent attitude, the EU was able to learn how to 
establish a self-contained ETS, while simultaneously lowering the market risks. 
The expansion of the ETS is an evitable trend. Bear in mind that emissions trading is an 
economic instrument that requires cost-effectiveness and the prevention of discrimination in 
competitiveness. Expansion of participation and coverage can lower the risk of manipulating 
market power and ensure that the carbon price reflects the actual relationship between supply and 
demand. Also, expansion can trigger divergent abatement options for the participants. Once 
participants can reduce GHG emissions at the lowest cost, cost-effectiveness is achieved. 
The EU ETS is a downstream ETS because it sets the regulation at the point that the carbon 
emissions are released into the atmosphere. Based on Directive 2003/87/EC, the allowances-
based ETS is a cap-and-trade programme. The cap is set for each Member State, and then 
divided into minimum transferable units called ‘allowances’ that are allocated initially to the 
participants. One allowance is the authorisation to emit one tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent 
during a specific period, and the number of allowances emitters may acquire is limited. Thus, 
with cap-setting and limited allowances, emissions release is regulated, which defines the EU 
ETS as a downstream ETS. 
The comparative research on downstream and upstream ETSs in the previous chapter indicates 
that neither is perfect. Then why was the EU ETS designed as a downstream rather than an 
upstream system? The main reason is that an upstream ETS would have looked too much like a 
tax.200 Although a CO2 tax imposed ‘upstream’ in the fossil fuel supply chain has administrative 
advantages because it affects a limited number of entities, it passes the cost of allowances 
forward into fuel prices, similar to an upstream ETS.201 In addition, an upstream ETS like a 
carbon tax aims to increase fuel prices and avoid carbon leakage, simplifying the systems 
without consideration of CDM and JI.202 For these political and legal reasons, the EU rejected 
the EU-wide carbon tax proposal and decided against the quasi-tax, upstream design for its ETS.  
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The EU ETS applied a sectoral approach, as stipulated in the Directive 2003/87/EC and 
Directive 2009/29/EC, explicitly. The regulated sectors are the carbon-intensive emitters in 
industry. Another design approach is the ‘spatial approach,’ which relates to the position, area 
and size of things. Applied to an ETS, a spatial approach would calculate the ETS’s coverage 
according to the position, area and size of the released carbon emissions, rather than according to 
economic sectors. Obviously, the sectoral approach is simpler because it uses sector emissions as 
the only standard for calculating carbon emissions, no matter where the emissions occur. The 
number of regulated sectors increased from Phase I to the Phase III, which also followed the 
‘learning-by-doing’ process. Thus, the pilot phase was very simple, covering a few sectors, 
which helped the EU Community to learn how to develop the ETS. Over time, more sectors were 
included in the trading scheme, and EU participants had more opportunities to find the most cost-
effective abatement options. 
2.2.2 Cap-setting 
As one of the most important elements of a cap-and-trading scheme, the cap is the engine of the 
ETS vehicle. The cap’s essential nature is a limitation on authorisation to release carbon 
emissions. The cap can be calculated as tonnes of carbon emissions. According to the 
requirements of the EU ETS, the cap must be distributed into minimum units, called ‘allowances’ 
and then allocated to companies. Allowances obtained by companies stand for the amount of 
carbon emissions the company is allowed to release. Thus, the cap determines the total amount 
of allowances for the EU Member States and their companies. The cap and the allowances create 
economic scarcity in the carbon market. 
From an economics perspective, cap-setting is related to the stability of the carbon market. The 
cap is not the actual carbon emissions; instead, it is a result of an evaluation based on historical 
emissions levels. If the cap is lax compared to actual emissions, then the allowable emissions are 
higher than actual emissions, more allowances are available in the market and the carbon price is 
decreased. If the carbon price decreases continually without any boost, companies may doubt 
participating in the market because the economic benefits are uncertain. Therefore, cap-setting is 
important in establishing an ETS. Without comparatively accurate and ex-ante evaluation of the 
cap, the carbon price may not reflect the real value of the allowances, and the incentive to 
participate can be discounted.  
2.2.2.1 Phase I 
In Phase I, the main difficulties in setting the cap stemmed from the unavailability of emissions 
data and too much flexibility in allocation. A critical factor that can make cap-setting more 
accurate is historical emissions data from installations of regulated sectors. However, in practice, 
it is difficult for the government to gain access to emissions data of regulated installations. The 
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limited availability of historical data ruled out the possibility of using certain base years for 
which no data existed.203 Because Member States do not have accurate emissions data, the ex-
ante evaluation of the cap may be not accurate. Therefore, before emissions trading starts, there 
is a risk of uncertainties in the cap-setting. 
 The second feature of the EU ETS in the pilot phase is its decentralised distribution of the cap. 
Each EU Member State was required to set the total number of allowances and allocate those 
allowances to each installation.204 The total allowances each Member State intended to allocate 
and the allocation method had to be stated in each Member’s national allocation plan (NAP).205 
Generally, the original EU ETS directive determined how Member States that to make by 
establishing criteria for their NAPs. The total quantity of allowances had to be consistent with 
the Member State’s obligation to limit its emissions, based on the EU burden-sharing agreement 
and the assessments of actual and projected progress toward its obligations. 206 Besides, the total 
quantity of allowances had to be consistent with the potential – including the technological 
potential – of activities covered by this scheme to reduce emissions.207 In addition, the total 
quantity of allowances to be allocated could not be more than what was likely to be needed for 
strict application.  
According to these provisions, two requirements were necessary to define the quantity of 
allowances. First, the quantity of the total allowances was limited, and could not exceed the 
quantity that was likely to be needed. Second, the objective of setting this ex-ante quantity was to 
fulfil the Member States’ obligations for emissions reduction. However, these provisions did not 
provide the Member States with a concrete standard to evaluate whether a quantity was likely to 
be needed or not, and it was also difficult to tell the difference between a necessary amount and 
an excessive amount of allowances by judging their final objective. Using the objective of 
emission reduction as a standard to evaluate the necessary quantity of allowances was not 
appropriate, because allowances themselves are the authorisation to release GHGs, and the 
limitation on the amount of allowances is intended to curb GHG emissions. These ambiguous 
and inappropriate criteria originated from the learning-by-doing process. The Commission’s own 
NAP assessment criteria purposely reflected relatively modest reduction goals, with the primary 
focus on learning-by-doing.208 The pilot phase’s main objective was to create a carbon market 
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and to prepare to achieve the Kyoto’s target; therefore, cap-setting in the pilot phase was not 
very strict.  
The unavailability of emissions data, together with a decentralised allocation resulted in much 
more flexibilities and inaccuracy in cap-setting, and finally, over-allocation in the pilot phase. 
According to verified data, emissions were much lower compared with the allocations the 
installations received.209 In 2005 and 2006, the number of allowances allocated was 2,093 and 
2,062 million tonnes of CO2, respectively, but only 1,990 and 2,018 million tonnes were verified. 
Thus, the carbon market was long210  by 95 and 50 million tonnes, respectively (based on 
installations where data on both allocated EU emission allowances, or EUAs, and verified 
emissions for both 2005 and 2006 were available), which represented 4.5 percent and 2.4 percent 
of the allocated allowances.211 
Two additional reasons accounted for the over-allocation. First, the allowances were initially 
based on more than two dozen NAPs submitted by individual Member States and approved with 
rudimentary oversight by the European Commission. 212  Second, one economics scholar 
explained that it is conceivable that the observed allocation discrepancies – the difference 
between allocated EUAs and the verified emissions – resulted from abatement efforts.213 
2.2.2.2 Phase II 
Difficulties encountered in the pilot phase were recognised, and corresponding countermeasures 
were imposed in the second phase. Firstly, based on implementation of the EU ETS in the pilot 
phase, emissions data for regulated installations were available for the next phase, and it was 
then possible to consider the emissions level for 2005 as the base year when setting caps. 
Secondly, regarding distribution of the EU cap, EU Member States must devise NAPs to state 
their allocation quantities and methodologies in a decentralised way. However, the EU 
Commission took a more active role in reviewing NAPs in Phase II, forcing a number of 
Member States to revise their NAPs, which led to reduced emission budgets.214  
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Following its assessment of draft NAPs from Member States, the Commission required revisions 
of the quantity of allowances set in the NAPs. The Commission accepted only three out of 19 
NAPs. 










Austria 33.0 33.4 32.8 30.7 
Belgium 62.1 55.58 63.3 58.5 
Czech Republic 97.6 82.5 101.9 86.8 
France 156.5 131.3 132.8 132.8 
Hungary 31.3 26.0 30.7 26.9 
Germany 499 474 482 453.1 
Greece 74.4 71.3 75.5 69.1 
Ireland 22.3 22.4 22.6 21.15 
Latvia 4.6 2.9 7.7 3.3 
Lithuania 12.3 6.6 16.6 8.8 
Luxembourg 3.4 2.6 3.95 2.7 
Malta 2.9 1.98 2.96 2.1 
Netherlands 95.3 80.35 90.4 85.8 
Poland 239.1 203.1 284.6 208.5 
Slovakia 30.5 25.2 41.3 30.9 
Slovenia 8.8 8.7 8.3 8.3 
81 
 
Spain 174.4 182.9 152.7 152.3 
Sweden 22.9 19.3 25.2 22.8 
UK 245.3 242.4 246.2 246.2 
TOTAL 1815.7 1672.54 1821.54 1650.75 
Source: European Commission (IP/07/501) Date: 16/04/2007215, the figures are in million tonnes 
of CO2. 
The Commission introduced rather quietly and almost unnoticed a more centralised model for 
setting caps in the EU ETS.216 Basically, the Member States were left with an installation-level 
allocation.217 The EU Commission’s stringency in reviewing the NAPs was necessary to avoid 
over allocation and to maintain the stability of the carbon market in order to achieve the Kyoto 
commitments and to gain environmental benefits.218 Therefore, the Commission assessed the 
second phase plans to ensure a correct and consistent application of the criteria in the Directive 
and to guarantee a sufficient scarcity of allowances in the EU ETS.219  Consequently, the number 
of emission allowances permitted in the second phase was cut to 6.5 per cent below the 2005 
level.220 
2.2.2.3 Phase III 
After 2013, the EU ETS received a new GHG emissions reduction target, based on Directive 
2009/29/EC to achieve the emissions reduction target of at least 20 percent below 1990 levels. 
This target means the emission allowances allocated to installations have to be 21 per cent below 
their 2005 emission levels by 2020.221 In reality, the EU quantity of allowances will decrease by 
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a linear factor of 1.74 per cent compared with the average total annual allowances issued by the 
Member States according to their NAPs for 2008–2012.222 
The objective of the revised EU ETS differs from that of the second phase which aimed to 
achieve the Kyoto target. The third phase aims to create a long-term climate policy. The single 
EU-wide cap on emissions allowances replaced the individual 27 national caps submitted by the 
Member States. For the first time, the revised EU ETS truly can be considered as a harmonised 
ETS that will help guarantee the emissions reduction targets for 2020. Experience gained from 
the pilot phase indicated that this more harmonised approach would provide stronger guarantees 
that the EU’s GHG emissions reduction targets for 2020 will be achieved. In the first phases, 
decentralised cap-setting and the lack of emissions data prevented the Member States from 
making accurate ex-ante predictions of their emissions. As a result, allowable emissions exceed 
actual emissions, sharply decreasing the carbon price and creating less economic incentive for 
long-term investments in carbon trading. Therefore, to avoid this situation in the third phase, a 
single EU cap replaced individual carbon caps. Consequently, the third phase of the EU ETS, 
which will last for eight years beginning with 2013, has an ambitious EU-wide GHG emissions 
reduction target, according to the revised EU ETS directive. The ambitious long-term plan of the 
EU ETS can strengthen investments in carbon allowances and keep the stability of the carbon 
market.  
2.2.2.4 Lessons learned from EU cap-setting 
Historical GHG emissions data are important to assess the emissions situation of a company and 
to predict the abatement capacity. This data also is the basis needed to determine whether issued 
allowances are over-allocated or not. In practice, the unavailability of historical emissions data 
made it difficult to estimate possible emissions amounts. Not only did the government lack 
experience in collecting emissions data before adopting the ETS, but also companies were 
reluctant to report actual emissions data to the government, once they knew the ETS would place 
value on each allowance. Large emitters were confronted with stricter limitations on GHG 
emissions, and therefore, these companies were more likely to hide or falsify the data to avoid 
increased production costs. The importance of historical emissions data was recognised during 
the pilot phase of the EU ETS. Without adequate historical emissions data, GHG emission 
projections were used to calculate emission levels of business-as-usual (BAU); however, these 
projections proved to be particularly prone to error, not only because of the inherent uncertainty 
of such predictions, but also because of the poor quality of the data and the absence of prior 
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modelling of the installations included in the EU ETS.223 So the access to actual historical 
emissions data is necessary to estimate the capacity for GHG emissions reduction and to set caps.  
Secondly, the carbon price is the value of each allowance that releases one tonne of carbon 
dioxide or CO2 equivalent, and reflects the relationship between supply and demand of the 
allowances. The issuing authority determines the supply of the allowances. The authority, and 
not the market, determines the initial allocation based on the emissions projections. The emitters’ 
actual emissions situations and their emissions reduction capacity can affect the demand of 
allowances. The stability of the carbon price can significantly impact the investors’ confidence in 
the market and trigger economic incentives for abatements. A low carbon price can neither 
attract potential participants nor encourage industries to decrease their abatement costs. As a 
long-term climate policy, the EU ETS must strive to maintain a stable carbon price. The 
following graph tracking carbon prices during the pilot and second phases indicates price 
volatility. The spot price surprisingly increased and remained stable at above 20 euros per tonne 
since July 2005, then peaking at over 30 euros in April 2006. After the 2005 verified emissions 
data were released in April 2006, the price plummeted from over 30 euros to less than 10 euros 
per tonne. By the end of 2006, and into early 2007, the Phase I EU ETS market had slid even 
further to levels at or less than one euro, as utilities hedged their positions for the entire Phase 
I.224 
 
Figure 1: Spot price of the EUAs for January 2006 – March 2007225 
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resulted in over-allocation of allowances, not only because the EU Commission’s ambiguous 
criteria for the NAPs, but also because of Member States’ generosity. Therefore, after the second 
phase, the EU Commission was more stringent in reviewing the NAPs and insisted on reducing 
the allowances budgeted in the NAPs. Finally, an EU-wide harmonised cap was accepted in the 
third phase.  
Why didn’t the EU start the ETS with a in a harmonised framework in the first place? 
Understandably, the decentralised approach received EU Member States’ political support in the 
beginning when the priority was to create the market. Member States needed to gain first-hand 
experience with an ETS and also solve problems or reduce risks through domestic laws and a 
trading infrastructure. The best way to gain this experience was to authorise adequate authority 
to the Member States for establishing the ETS. But reality showed that the decentralised model 
didn’t work well. For one reason, the time for the EU Member State to prepare allocations was 
tight. Member States were required to submit their NAPs by 31 March 2004, and to determine 
the allocation quantity and approach at the installation level at least three months before the first 
period began.231 Thus, Member States had only six months to collect historical emissions data, 
establish emissions projection levels, determine the quantity of allowances and allocate 
allowances for each installation – definitely a challenge! In addition, decentralised cap-setting 
and allocation decisions lack transparency at the domestic level. The Member States based their 
emissions caps on business-as-usual projections that could be overestimated because of more 
optimistic assumptions about economic growth.232  
2.2.3 Allocation methodology 
This section focuses on the allocation methodology of the EU ETS during the three phases to 
address several research questions. First, what type of allocation methodology was applied in 
each phase and why? Second, what were the difficulties or risks when implementing the specific 
allocation methods in each phase? 
2.2.3.1 Phase I and Phase II 
During the pilot phase, the allocation method was a combination of grandfathering and auction. 
At least 95 per cent of the allowances were allocated free of charge (grandfathering),233 and the 
remaining 5 per cent were allocated by auction. The economic literature repeatedly indicates the 
                                                           
231 Directive 2003/87/EC, art 9.1, art11.1. ‘The NAPs shall be submitted before 31 March 2004, the allocation issues 
at the installation level in each Member States should be determined by 30 September 2004 (three months before 1 
January 2005 when the EU ETS starts)’. 
232 United States Government Accountability Office, Report to Congressional Requesters, International Climate 
Change Programme, ‘Lessons learned from the European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme and the Kyoto 
Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism’ November 2008, 18-19. 
233 Directive 2003/87/EC, art 10. 
86 
 
efficiency of auctioning and inefficiency of grandfathering; nevertheless, grandfathering was 
considered the main method responsible for the largest percentage of total allowances allocated.  
The attitudes of potential participants and stakeholders were important in making the decision on 
an allocation method. In the 2005 review of the EU ETS, nearly 75 per cent of all respondents 
indicated that that allocation to new entrants should be free of charge, with less than 20 per cent 
opposed. 234  Reasons for favouring grandfathering include the following. First, operators of 
regulated installations prefer grandfathering, because they can receive valuable allowances for 
free. Grandfathering reduces the costs of participating in the EU ETS, compared with auctioning. 
Second, grandfathering makes the EU ETS simpler, which was a priority in the pilot phase. 
Comparatively, auctioning entails the challenges of setting up a new system and stipulating the 
function of the revenues from auction.  
In the pilot phase, free allocation based on benchmarking was not considered. According to the 
Directive 2003/87/EC, the EU Commission was required to report the practicality of developing 
communitywide benchmarks as a basis for allocation,235 and in that report, the Commission 
noted that communitywide benchmarks were not practical for the first NAP.236 The difficulty in 
achieving common agreement on the benchmark, significant divergences among the production 
processes and the lack of historical emissions data 237  contributed to the unfeasibility of 
benchmarking in the pilot phase. 
The allocation methodology in Phase II was also a combination of grandfathering and auctioning, 
with slightly different proportions applied. This time, at least 90 per cent of the allowances were 
allocated free of charge,238 and the remaining 10 per cent were auctioned. The combination of 
allocation methods in the first two phases presented potential risks in windfall profits and market 
discrimination. Windfall profits are a type of gain that can occur due to unforeseen 
circumstances in a product’s market, such as unexpected demand or government regulation.239 
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Windfall profits are generally reaped by an entire industry sector, but can also be reaped by an 
individual company.240 Then, how do windfall profits come about under the EU ETS? 
In the first two phases, companies received emission allowances for free (grandfathering); 
however, these allowances had value in the market. Companies could pass on carbon costs of 
grandfathered emission allowances to the consumers.241 In other words, companies could earn 
benefits by passing the price of allowances to consumers, although the companies paid nothing 
for these allowances. The countries most affected were those with high-carbon sources of peak 
electricity and weak regulation of electricity prices, which enabled utilities to bill their customers 
for the ‘opportunity costs’ of not selling emissions allowances that the utilities had received for 
free.242 In some cases, windfall profits were very significant, for example, reaching to 300-600 
million euros per year in the power sector of the Netherlands.243 Windfall profits for the coal, gas 
and oil sectors in Europe were estimated to total $16.6 billion (11.4 billion euros) for Phase I.244  
The literature indicates that companies generally do not pass through the full opportunity 
costs,245 which vary by Member State and sector.246 Windfall profits were concentrated in a few 
countries, especially those with deregulated electricity markets and high-carbon sources of peak 
electricity supply.247 Companies were estimated to have passed through 38 to 83 per cent of the 
opportunity costs of the free allowances. 248 However, there is no doubt that grandfathering 
improved the covered companies’ profitability, at least in comparison to what would have been 
the case if allowances were auctioned.249 
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Although grandfathering attracted support from industries for an ETS, negative impacts also 
resulted from grandfathering in relation to the expected achievement of the original objectives. 
Due to discrimination between new entrants and incumbents of the EU carbon market, after the 
initial allocation, regulated operators of installations become the incumbents, in contrast to ‘new 
entrants’ that were produced because of changes in the nature, functioning or extension of the 
installation. Under the EU ETS, incumbents received a large percentage of the free allowances, 
raising a question regarding how to issue allowances to new entrants. If a different allocation 
approach is applied to new entrants, such as requiring them to pay for the allowances, unfair 
treatment among participants results. The EU Commission required Member States to regulate 
how to treat incumbents and new entrants, but required only that Member States provide access 
to allowances for new entrants.250 Thus, how new entrants are allowed to participate in the EU 
ETS was within the discretion of the Member States’ NAPs.251 In practice, most governments set 
aside free ‘new entrant reserves’, which economically amounted to an investment subsidy by 
which the governments helped to support new construction. However, giving free allowances in 
proportion to the carbon intensity of new plants can bias the incentive towards more carbon-
intensive investments.252 
2.2.3.2 Phase III 
The allocation method was revised in Directive 2009/29/EC. First, the allocation method moved 
toward full auctioning instead of grandfathering. Since 2013, no free allocations are given to 
electricity generators, to installations for capture of CO2, to pipelines for transport of CO2, or to 
CO2 storage sites.
253 Free allocations were decreased from 80 per cent, and will be eliminated 
completely in 2027.254 The shift towards auctioning was inspired by the need to address market 
inefficiency. As noted previously, grandfathering produced market inefficiency in the form of 
windfall gains and competitive distortions. These revisions authorised Member States to decide 
how to use revenue from auctioning for specific environmental objectives. However, auctioning 
is still not the only allocation method. Exceptions to the basic principle of auctioning enable free 
allowances to be given as preferential treatment to certain sectors and to offset ‘carbon 
leakage’.255 Certain sectors, unlike electricity, that are unable to pass on additional costs of 
emission trading through higher prices may receive free allowances based on EU-wide product 
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benchmarks.256 In addition, free allowances may be given to offset relocation risks that sectors 
may face when they are affected by carbon leakage. The European Commission decision of 24 
December 2009 sets criteria by which to recognize these sectors,257 which may be exposed to a 
significant risk of carbon leakage if the sum of direct and indirect additional costs caused by the 
emissions trading leads to a substantial increase in production costs, calculated as a proportion of 
the gross added value of at least 5 per cent.258 The list applies only for 2013–2014, subject to the 
outcome of the international negotiations.259 
The second feature of Phase III’s allocation method was the use of benchmarking to give free 
allowances in certain sectors. A benchmark is a threshold for the level of free allowances for an 
individual installation. In principle, installations that meet the benchmarks (and therefore are 
among the most efficient installations in the EU) receive all allowances they need, while 
installations that do not meet the benchmark incur a shortage of allowances and must either 
lower their emissions or purchase additional allowances to cover the excess emissions. 260 
Benchmarking was not used in the first two phases. Because of the absence of common 
agreement, significant heterogeneity in production processes (even for the same output) and 
severe data limitations, current emissions were used as the default option in the first two phases 
for calculating the reference point for allocations.261 After the EU ETS’s first two phases, more 
emissions data was available, which made benchmarking possible. Since 2013, free allowances 
were allocated based on ambitious benchmarks, calculated on a value reflecting the average 
GHG performance of 10 per cent of the GHG efficient installations in 2007 and 2008, for which 
data were collected.262 Exact product benchmarks were defined in the April 2011 European 
Commission decision. The benchmark was established on the basis of the principle that ‘one 
product equals one benchmark’, which means that the benchmark methodology did not 
differentiate by technology or fuel used or by an installation’s size or geographical location.263 
Third, the revision also shifted allocations from a decentralised to a more centralised allocation 
style. Member States rightfully realised that the benefits, if any, of developing 27 distinct NAPs 
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were clearly outweighed by the drawbacks of competition distortion and market inefficiency.264 
Thus, an EU-wide allocation plan and method was required.  
Fourthly, the European Commission took an action of ‘back-loading’ of auctions in the third 
phase. Due to a huge amount of excess allowances in the market in the second phase, the surplus 
allowances from the use of international credits for compliance, and the economic recession in 
2009, carbon price was below €10, in coincidence with the accelerated build-up of a surplus 
allowances and international credits.265 Without this intervention, structural surplus will persist 
and even rapidly increase. The back-loading is a short-term measure to the EU ETS. According 
to the back-loading decision adopted by the Parliament and the Council, the auctioning of a 
maximum number of 900 million allowances is postponed until 2019-2020.266 Back-loading does 
not reduce the overall number of allowances to be auctioned during phrase 3, only the 
distribution of auctions over the period: the auction volume will be reduced by 400 million, 300 
million and 200 million in 2014, 2015 and 2016 respectively.267 
2.2.3.3 Lessons learned from the EU  allocation practice 
2.2.3.3.1 Policy options of allocation methods 
Theoretically, allowances can be allocated by grandfathering, auction or benchmarking. Each has 
attractive political value for policymakers and other stakeholders. When policymakers determine 
an allocation method, they must consider the pros and cons of each method as well as the 
attitudes of stakeholders. Adoption of a specific allocation method is a compromise between 
policymakers and stakeholders. From the perspective of implementation, there is an obvious gap 
between theoretical requirements and real circumstances. Policymakers also must consider 
whether a reasonable legal design can fill that gap. 
Grandfathering, which allocates allowances for free based on historical emissions data, is a 
method that regulated sectors welcome because no additional production costs are added. 
Grandfathering also alleviates the fierce negotiation pressure between regulated industries and 
regulators. However, grandfathering has drawbacks. First, competitive distortion may occur if 
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some operators receive free allowances while others do not. Second, grandfathering requires high 
administrative costs for the government to get access to necessary historical emissions data from 
installation operators. Without the access to this data, grandfathering may cause discrimination in 
the market. Also, some sectors can pass the opportunity costs of windfalls to consumers, and 
finally grandfathering can be counter to the polluters-must-pay principle. 
The second allocation methodology, auctioning, awards allowances to operators with the highest 
bid. Two advantages are obvious: Operators pay for the allowances – a policy that fits the 
polluters-must-pay principle – and the government receives revenue from the auction. Common 
opinions in the economics literature support auctioning. Unlike grandfathering, which allows 
firms to capture scarcity rent, an auction socializes the scarcity rent and allows it to be used to 
curb pre-existing taxes or produce public good. 268  This policy may increase welfare and 
employment, based on the strong double-dividend hypothesis.269 Besides, an auction has fewer 
governmental costs compared with grandfathering, and best fits the polluters-must-pay 
principle.270 Therefore, hardly an economist does not deplore the limited use of auctioning and 
the concomitant extensive use of free allowances in the EU ETS.271 
Benchmarking, the third allocation approach, is well known as ‘output-based’. Installation 
operators receive allowances based on their production capacity, or in other words, regulators 
use production capacity as the standard to issue allowances. Under benchmarking, an average of 
emissions per unit of output is established, and allocations are made on the basis of historic, 
current or expected output quantities.272 
The pros and cons of each allocation method and other issues can be applied when considering 
how the EU made allocation decisions. To some extent, the EU’s experience with national 
allocations is reflective of the European Union’s unique political status 273  and may not be 
directly applicable to other political entities. The EU has a super-national legal personality, 
within which each Member State has independent sovereignty. This decentralised character 
presented obstacles for negotiating and achieving a uniformed ETS in the beginning because 
Member States were cautious and sought national benefits. Therefore, setting an EU-wide 
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benchmark was not acceptable in the pilot phase. In addition, benchmarking requires historical 
carbon emissions data that was difficult to acquire from all EU Member States. More 
obstructions awaited in negotiating a uniform benchmark. At the start, a large amount of 
auctioning was unpopular because Member States did not want to take a risk until they believed 
the theoretical effectiveness of the ETS system. Therefore, grandfathering was the simplest, most 
secure and most acceptable compromise in the early phases of the EU ETS. 
2.2.3.3.2 To avoid windfalls 
To overcome windfalls, we first must understand their causes. Windfalls are created when free 
allowances are allocated and companies can legally pass the price of the allowances price to 
customers and over-allocation occurs. Hence, to avoid windfalls, the allocation method should 
not include free allowances, sectors, such as electricity and power, should not be allowed to pass 
through allowance prices to customers and the total amount of allowances should not be 
overestimated.  
Auctioning, in which companies pay for allowances, eliminates windfalls. Although this method 
was not welcomed at the start of the EU ETS, it became more acceptable the system moved 
forward. By the third phase, at least 50 per cent of allowances will be auctioned after 2013, and 
most EU Member States will auction 100 per cent.  
Another way to avoid windfalls is to prohibit companies from passing allowance prices to 
customers. In the EU, electricity prices are largely determined in a deregulated electricity market, 
in which utilities are allowed to raise electricity rates and reap windfall profits.274 Academia has 
suggested learning from experiences in the United States. For instance, the California Public 
Utilities Commission (CPUC) approves electricity prices that will compensate utilities for their 
operating costs, infrastructure investments, and provide a reasonable return.275 As an alternative, 
the CPUC can adjust other parts of its regulatory programme to balance any windfall from free 
allowances through a decrease in other compensation mechanisms.276 
2.2.3.3.3 Competition law issue: State aid 
The application of grandfathering rules results in unequal treatment of new entrants and 
incumbents, and therefore, researchers have examined the competitive issue and market 
discrimination caused by grandfathering, particularly regarding state aid rules provided in the EC 
Treaty. 
Academic literature is unclear whether grandfathering is liable to constitute state aid, but a strong 
argument can be made that it does. The legal requirements of state aid must be introduced 
                                                           





necessarily, and the grandfathering allocation method must be tested accordingly. Article 87 (1) 
of the EC Treaty provides that ‘save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid granted by a 
Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to 
distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, 
insofar as it affects trade among Member States, be incompatible with the common market.’ This 
statement means that state aid is incompatible with the common market, 277 and state intervention 
measures that constitute state aid are prohibited because they do not fulfil the basic objective of 
establishing an internal EU market free of competition distortion. 278  Therefore, a state aid 
measure itself contravenes the EC Treaty. 
Angus Johnston 279  and Stefan Weishaar 280  have explained the specific criteria for state aid 
differently. Based on the case law and decisional practice of the Commission, they noted 
following criteria must be met for a payment to constituted state aid: 
 An ‘advantage’ has been conferred, 
 which was granted by the State or through State resources, 
 by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods or services,  
 which distorts or threats to distort competition 
 and which affects or may affect trade between EC Member States. 
Grandfathering of emission allowances can be assessed based on these criteria to see whether it 
constitutes state aid. First, free allowances are valuable in the carbon market, which means 
grandfathering confers financial advantages. Second, the allowances are granted through an 
institution associated with the state or directly or indirectly affecting public accounts, which falls 
within the meaning of Article 87(1), and meets the second criterion281 because allowances are 
allocated by Member States to participants in the EU ETS. Third, grandfathering is potentially 
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selective because a Member State has the discretion to allocate allowances to particular 
entities.282 Fourth, competition can be distorted and affect trade between Member States because 
incumbent companies can obtain free allowances while new entrants cannot; therefore, 
incumbents can obtain competitive advantage over new entrants.  
However, the assessment of these competitive advantages and whether their effects on 
competition constitute state aid need more concrete explanation. European Commission 
Regulation No. 1998/2006 provides a de minimis ceiling in Article 2.283 Aid of no more than 
200,000 euros granted over three years is not regarded as state aid within the meaning of Article 
87(1) of the EC Treaty. Thus, any aid involving tradable permits below this threshold is 
presumed to be incapable of distorting competition and adjudged to be compatible with the 
common market.284 
Weishaar indicated that differences in reference period and the entry requirements for 
participation in the EU ETS, may cause different treatment towards comparable companies from 
the same sectors but located in different Member States; different closure and transfer rules also 
can hinder free movement of production capacity and competition. According to the EC Treaty, 
aid is incompatible with the common market unless exempted by derogations provided in Article 
87 (2) & (3). Hence, a national measure that constitutes state aid may be justified by granting an 
exemption under this specific provision. 
Even if grandfathering constitutes state aid that is prohibited under the EC Treaty, it may fall 
within the exemptions stipulated by Article 87 (3) (c), which states ‘aid to facilitate the 
development of certain economic activities or of certain economic areas, where such aid does not 
adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest’ may be 
considered to be compatible with the common market.285 
Johnston concluded that strong arguments support the free emission allowances provided under 
the various NAPs involve an element of state aid, which the Commission has neither received 
formal notification for nor has given clearance under the EC Treaty.286 While Weishaar indicated 
that grandfathering systems are likely to constitute state aid.287 
In 2008, the European Commission Guidelines addressed the issue of state aid and the EU ETS 
for the first time. Point 55 and 139 of these Guidelines provide that tradable permit schemes 
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involve state aid when permits and allowances are granted for less than their market value, and 
such granting is imputable to Member States. 288  Indeed, grandfathering allocates emission 
allowances priced below market value, and the allocation method is ascribed to the Member 
States’ behaviour. Therefore, grandfathering constitutes state aid, according to these guidelines. 
More concretely, Point 55 provides the basis for the Commission’s assessment of situations in 
which tradable permits may constitute state aid during the trading period ending 31 December 
2012. If the global amount of tradable permits granted by the Member State is lower than the 
global expected needs of undertakings, the overall effect on environmental protection will be 
positive.289 In other words, if the allocated amounts of tradable permits are less than the expected 
amounts from the individual companies, companies will apply more effort either to purchase 
emissions allowances or decrease their actual release, which will help to achieve the GHG 
emissions reduction target. To the contrary, if the tradable permits are over allocated free of 
charge by Member States, compared with expected demand of the carbon market, no one will 
pay the environmental negative externality. Therefore, to limit distortion of competition, Point 
55 indicates that no over-allocation of allowances can be justified and provisions must be taken 
to avoid undue barriers to entry. 
Conditions that may form exemptions to the prohibition on state aid in tradable permit schemes 
are stipulated clearly in Point 140 and 141 of the Guidelines. State aid involved in tradable 
permit schemes may be declared compatible with the common market under Article 87 (3) (c) of 
the EC Treaty, provided that the conditions in Point 141 and the following criteria are fulfilled: 
(1) The tradable permits schemes must be set up to achieve environmental objectives; 
(2) The allocation must be carried out in a transparent way, based on objective criteria and on 
data sources of the highest quality available, and the total amount of tradable permits or 
allowances granted to each undertaking for a price below their market value must not be higher 
than its expected needs; 
(3) The allocation methodology must not favour certain undertakings or certain sectors, 
unless justified by the environmental logic of the scheme itself or where such rules are necessary 
for consistency with other environmental policies; 
(4) In principle, new entrants shall not receive permits or allowances on more favourable 
conditions than existing undertakings operating in the same market; granting higher allocations 
to existing installations compared with those for new entrants should not result in creating undue 
barriers to entry.290 
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Point 141 of the Guidelines also defines how the European Commission will assess the necessity 
and the proportionality of state aid involved in a tradable permit scheme. State aid may be 
justified as compatible with the common market if the Commission finds it is necessary and 
proportional, according to these criteria of Point 140: 
(1) The choice of beneficiaries must be based on objective and transparent criteria, and the 
aid must be granted in principle in the same way for all competitors in the same sector/relevant 
market if they are in a similar factual situation; 
(2) Full auctioning must lead to a substantial increase in production costs for each sector or 
category of individual beneficiaries; 
(3) Substantial increase in production costs cannot be passed on to customers without leading 
to important sales reductions; to evaluate whether the cost increase from the tradable permit 
scheme cannot be passed on to customers, estimates of lost sales as well as their impact on the 
profitability of the company may be used; 
(4) It is not possible for individual undertakings in the sector to reduce emissions levels in 
order to make the price of the certificate bearable. Any undertaking reaching the best performing 
technique can benefit at most from an allowance (corresponding to the increase in production 
cost from the tradable permit scheme using the best performing technique, which cannot be 
passed on to customers). Any undertaking having worse environmental performance shall benefit 
from a lower allowance, proportionate to its environmental performance.291 
2.2.4 Monitoring, reporting and verification system 
A monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) system plays an incredibly important role in a 
cap-and-trade programme because it provides accurate emissions statistics from regulated 
emitters. Under an ETS, each covered installation is obligated to surrender emission rights that 
are at least equal to actual emissions during a certain well-defined period.292 However, some 
emitters may deliberately choose not to comply with this obligation when such behaviour is 
profitable and when, for instance, the possibility that the illegal conduct will be detected is 
presumed to be low.293 In this case, regulated emitters may provide inaccurate, underestimated or 
falsified emission data. To prevent such illegal behaviour, an MRV system is necessary to collect, 
track and verify the data.  
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2.2.4.1 Monitoring and reporting 
MR emissions are the preconditions for participants’ acquiring emissions permits. In pursuant to 
Article 6 of the 2003/87/EC Directive, the competent authority issues a GHG emission permit if 
the authority is satisfied that the operator is capable of monitoring and reporting emissions. 
Accordingly, the operator’s MR capacity is the legal prerequisite for acquiring an emissions 
permit, and obtaining a permit can be used as an inspection tool294 to assess the operator’s 
capability of monitoring and reporting emissions. 
Then, why is the emissions permit necessary in the EU ETS? According to Article 4 of the 
2003/87/EC Directive, the emissions permit allows installations to undertake the regulated 
activities in Annex I, which are those that release GHGs into the atmosphere. Since 1 January 
2005, an installation cannot perform such activities without an emissions permit issued by a 
competent authority. In addition, an emissions permit grants authorisation for operators to emit 
GHGs from all or part of an installation.295 In practice, one operator can have one installation, 
and a permit may cover several installations on the same site operated by the same operator.296  
In sum, the emissions permit is the authorised permission that allows the regulated emitters to 
release GHGs, and include the following:  
(1) The operator’s name and address;  
(2) A description of the installation’s activities and emissions; 
(3) Monitoring requirements, specifying the methodology and frequency; 
(4) Reporting requirements; 
(5) An obligation to surrender allowances equal to the total emissions of the installation in each 
calendar year. 
From the operator’s perspective, acquiring an emissions permit ensures its MR capability. 
Provision of Article 4 stipulates two requirements: (to monitor and report actual emissions 
according to specified methodology and frequency); and one obligation: (to surrender allowances 
equal to the installation’s total emissions each calendar year). Thus, the legal consequence of the 
emissions permit is that the operator is capable of monitoring and reporting emissions once the 
permit is obtained. From the regulator’s perspective, the application for an emissions permit 
from an operator gives the competent authority an opportunity to assess whether the installation 
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is capable of proper monitoring and reporting of actual emissions. Article 5 of the 2003/87/EC 
Directive stipulates that applications for emissions permits must include the installation and its 
activities, the technology used, raw and auxiliary materials that may lead to gas emissions, 
sources of emissions from the installation and the measures planned to monitor and report, based 
on guidelines in Article 14. In summary, the MR requirements are necessary and irreplaceable in 
acquiring an emissions permit, which is the legal requirement for emitters to perform regulated 
activities that can release GHGs.  
The European Commission adopted in 2004 Guidelines for MR, and required the Member States 
to take responsibility to ensure emissions are monitored according to it.297 The 2004 Guidelines 
adopted in 2004 stipulate more explicit principles for MR emissions, including completeness, 
consistency, transparency, accuracy, cost-effectiveness, materiality, faithfulness and 
improvement of performance. Completeness requires that all process and combustion emissions 
from all regulated sources belonging to Annex I activities regulated by the 2003 Directive are 
included in MR. Consistency requires the operator to use the same monitoring methodologies 
and data sets so that MR emissions information is comparable. Changes in methodologies may 
be allowed if the accuracy of the reported data is improved, but the Member State’s competent 
authority must approve the changes. Transparency requires the operator to record, comply, 
analyse and document the relevant emissions data in a manner that enables the verifier and 
competent authority to access the relevant data and reproduce the findings. Accuracy requires 
that any uncertainties in emission calculation and measurement be reduced as far as practicable 
by using the appropriate monitoring methodologies established in the 2004 Guidelines. In 
addition, testing equipment used to report monitoring data must be appropriately operated 
(applied, maintained and calibrated and checked), and tools used to store and manipulate 
monitoring data must have no errors. Cost-effectiveness is applied in selecting a monitoring 
methodology. Monitoring includes the methodologies used to determine emissions, including 
either calculation and measurement and the applied tiers, 298  which are specific ways for 
determining activity data, emission factors and oxidation or conversion factors.299 The higher the 
number of tiers applied, the higher the level of accuracy.300 Theoretically, the monitoring method 
with the highest possible number of tiers should be preferred, but monitoring at the highest tier 
may not be technically feasible or may lead to unreasonably high costs, and therefore, a 
competent authority may be satisfied with a less accurate measure.301 The cost-effective principle 
requires balancing accuracy with cost. The principle of materiality requires emission reports and 
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related disclosures contain no important misstatements, avoid bias in selection and presentation 
of information and provide a credible and balanced account of the installation’s emissions.302 
In summary, the principles of MR emissions are more concrete in the 2004 Guidelines than in 
the 2003 Directive. The Guidelines require emissions data to be complete with all required 
activities and GHGs, consistent in monitoring methodology and transparent. Because a Member 
State’s competent authority must assess operators’ capacity to MR in order to grant emissions 
permits, the operators’ selected methodology are subject to that authority’s implementation of 
the Commission Guidelines at the national level. Member States must ensure that each operator 
reports emissions to the competent authority.303 They also must take measures to coordinate 
reporting requirements with any existing requirements to minimise the burden on business and to 
reduce extra costs.  
2.2.4.2 Verification 
Article 15 of the 2003 Directive requires a verification procedure, and accordingly, Member 
States must ensure MR procedures are verified, based on the criteria in Annex V. If an operator’s 
report has not been verified by 31 March of each year, the operator cannot participate in 
emissions trading until the report is verified satisfactorily. The Directive specifies the minimum 
competence qualifications for verifiers. For example, the verifier must be independent of the 
operator and perform soundly and professionally. The verifier must understand the 2003 
Directive and related guidelines and standards; the legislative, regulatory and administrative 
requirements of GHG emissions activities; and how all information related to the emissions 
sources of the installation is generated (such as the collection, measurement, calculation and 
reporting of emissions data). 
According to Annex V of the 2003 Directive, the verification procedure must include all Annex I 
activities included in the applicant’s installation and the operator’s emission MR, including the 
reliability, credibility and accuracy of the monitoring system and the reported data. In addition, 
reported emissions may only be validated if reliable and credible data and information allow the 
emissions to be determined with a high degree of certainty.304 The verifier must be given access 
to all sites and information related to the subject of the verification, and the verifier must 
consider whether the installation is registered under the community’s eco-management and audit 
scheme. A verified emissions report must be trustworthy and must faithfully represent the 
situation at the installation, according to the Guidelines. In addition, applying the principle of 
improvement, verification of emission reports must be an effective and reliable tool to support 
quality assurance and quality control procedures, providing information an operator can apply to 
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improve performance in MR emissions.305 At the end of the verification procedure, the verifier 
prepares a report that the competent authority uses to judge whether the operator’s emissions 
report is satisfactory.306  
2.2.5 Temporal flexibility: Banking and borrowing 
Economic theory suggests that as long as there is no risk of ‘temporal hot spots’, a cost-effective 
tradable permit system must have full temporal flexibility, implying that allowances can be both 
borrowed and banked.307 Banking and borrowing rules allow entities to shift the timing of their 
emissions and abatement activities to reduce their costs.308 Banking rules allow the regulated 
emitter to reserve emission allowances for future use, while borrowing rules allow the emitter to 
borrow emission allowances from the future for current use. Obviously, these rules give 
regulated emitters more flexibility in timing their use of allowances. Temporal flexibility is 
useful when the regulated emitter has surplus emission allowances or cannot reach its emissions 
reduction target. Also, even if an emitter can reach the emissions reduction target, it may make 
use of banking and borrowing rules to make an investment decision and motivate technological 
improvements. Theoretically, banking involves the potential risk of creating intensive emissions 
rights within a limited time period. Since clustered emissions can cause more danger than 
dispersed emissions, regulators have chosen to restrict the temporal use of permits despite the 
reduction in cost-effectiveness.309 Some argue that the detrimental effects on the environment 
from clustered carbon emissions may be much less than SO2 emissions;
310 however, long-term 
accumulation of GHG emissions can threaten human life and health and the environment as well. 
Another concern is that a large amount of banking may cause a future emissions spike. With no 
limit on when emission allowances can be used and how many can be banked, regulated emitters 
may release more and more GHGs and not be able to achieve their future emissions reduction 
target. However, this threat can be addressed by giving allowances a long, but limited life or by 
limiting the overall number of banked allowances.311 Bearing these concerns and solutions in 
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mind, we can examine how the EU ETS dealt with banking rules and whether those rules may 
help to achieve the effectiveness of emissions trading. 
2.2.5.1 Phase I and Phase II 
The EU ETS sets no restriction on banking of allowances within the trading period; allowances 
are issued annually, but they are valid for any year within the trading period.312 In other words, 
banking surplus allowances for future years is allowed within the compliance period.313 However, 
banking allowances between the pilot phase and the second phase were not clearly stipulated, 
and the EU Commission left the decision on banking during the inter-phase to the Member States. 
In practice, all Member States decided not to allow banking between the first phase and the 
second phase, except France and Poland.314 
As a result, the widespread decision not to allow banking during the inter-phase strongly 
contributed to price volatility.315 Because of the restriction on banking allowances from the pilot 
phase to the second phase, allowances allocated from the pilot phase could not be used in the 
next, which meant the surplus allowances were not valuable in the second phase. Therefore, 
holders of allowances were faced with the urgency to sell off the allowances before they were 
useless. After April 2006, the oversupply of allowances in the pilot phase caused the carbon 
price to decrease; then the price continued to drop and could not be stabilised because of the 
banking restriction during the inter-phase. During 2007, the last year of the pilot phase, the 
carbon price reached less than one euro per tonne. As a result, the ban on banking allowances 
during the inter-phase has been described as one of the trial period’s major flaws.316 
With these lessons learned, the EU ETS allowed banking allowances during the interim between 
the second and third periods and the carbon price was more stable, rising significantly above the 
2006–2007 historic lows (see Figure 3).317 Thus, the EU ETS can assure long-term carbon price 
stability and help drive the shift to lower CO2 emitting technologies. 
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Figure 3:318 Carbon price during the period from April 2008 to April 2010
Unlike banking rules that allow banked surplus allowances 
allows the regulated enterprise to use 
obligations. The consequence is obvious
emissions are postponed. The EU ETS applied 
Each year’s allowances were 
preceding year and could be used to cover shortages in the preceding year.
2.2.5.2 Phase III 
During Phase III, banking and borrowing 
banking during the inter-phase was allowed, based on 
between trading periods was 
auctions starting in 2012 were 
2013 allowances cannot be borrowed to surrender against 2012 emissions.
2.2.5.3 Lessons learned on banking and borrowing
The ban on banking combined with a generous 
resulted in inefficient abatement choices and overall costs well above the theoretical optimum.
In contrast, banking during inter
since the second phase. A stable 
                                                          
318 Alexandre Kossoy and Philippe Ambrosi, ‘
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCARBONFINANCE/Resources/State_and_Trends_of_the_Carbon_Market
_2010_low_res.pdf> accessed 13 October 2012. 
319 Directive 2003/87/EC, art 11 and art 12.
320 Glowacki Law Firm, ‘Borrowing of Carbon Units under the EU ETS, California and Australia Emissions Trading 
Schemes’ <http://www.emissions-euets.com/borrowing> accessed 15 October 2012.
321 Joachim Schleich and others, ‘Banning Banking in EU Emissions Trading’ (2
to be used in 
future allowances to fulfil current 
: The real abatement measures that reduce carbon 
borrowing allowances from 
issued two months prior to the surrender of allowances for the 
319
were allowed within a certain trading period, and 
lessons learned. How
not allowed and, as a consequence, allowances 
barred from compliance use in the second period.
 
 
allowance allocation when the 
-phases helped stabilised the carbon price
carbon price reflects confidence in the EU ETS among 




006) 34 Energy Policy 119.
102 
 
the future, borrowing 
emissions reduction 
one year in advance. 
 
ever, borrowing 
sold in early 
320 Therefore, 
EU ETS began 
321 





enterprises and also can initiate investments in alternative low carbon-intensive technology. 
Policymakers should consider whether a limitation on banking rules is necessary. As experience 
with the EU ETS has shown, limiting banking between time periods does not create an effective, 
free-carbon market over a long-term time period.  
Borrowing can help achieve a reduction target in a given period in exchange for allowable 
emissions in the future. When an emissions reduction target cannot be achieved, borrowing from 
future allowances can be a way to reach the target. However, borrowing puts stress on reducing 
carbon emissions in the future, and over-borrowing in a given year makes it more difficult to 
meet caps later and may pressure the government to issue additional allowances.322 Therefore, 
borrowing rules can have more risks for achieving an emissions reduction target, which suggests 
that rules should be set to limit the amount and time frame for borrowing. 
2.2.6 Compliance 
Effective compliance and enforcement are very important issues in designing an emissions 
trading system. Sources covered by a trading programme must recognise that there is significant 
risk associated with failure to achieve emissions reduction targets.323 Without a legal sanction for 
noncompliance that significantly exceeds the cost of purchasing allowances, emissions reduction 
targets will not be achieved mandatorily.324 At the very least, the penalty must be as high as the 
marginal cost of abatement or entities will find it cheaper to pay the penalty than to comply.325 
In the EU ETS’s pilot phase, the penalty for noncompliance was 40 euros per tonne of excess 
CO2 emissions; in the second phase, the penalty was increased to 100 euros per tonne.
326 Since 1 
January 2013, the penalty was increased in accordance with the European index of consumer 
prices.327 In addition, regulated entities are required to fulfil their emissions reduction obligations 
in addition to paying any penalty. Specifically, the 2003 EU Directive stipulates that ‘the 
payment of the excess emissions penalty shall not release the operator from the obligation to 
surrender an amount of allowances equal to those excess emissions when surrendering 
allowances in relation to the following calendar year’. Companies that fail to comply with their 
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respective caps also have their names publicly published, thereby shaming a noncompliant entity 
into compliance.328 
3. Linkage issues of the EU ETS 
Carbon trading has developed widely at the national, regional and international levels, and 
emissions trading is generally considered an indispensable pillar of climate change mitigation 
that can be expected to continue with future international climate policy.329 Along with the EU 
ETS, many countries and regions have started a national-level ETS. For instance, New Zealand, 
Australia, Switzerland, Canada and Japan have domestic emissions trading systems; in the 
United States, state and regional programs include the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
(RGGI), California Air Resources Board’s Initiative, the Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Accord 
and the Western Climate Initiative (WCI), which includes Canadian provinces. At the 
international level, the Kyoto Protocol and the Marrakesh Accords adopted by the Parties to the 
Kyoto Protocol established an intergovernmental ETS from 2008 through 2012.330  
As ETSs develop worldwide, linking these systems has become a key trend. Why is linkage of 
ETSs important and what are the results? From an economic point of view, linkage increases the 
economic efficiency of carbon markets because more participants are involved in carbon trading, 
which creates a larger market with greater choice in emissions control costs.331 More divergent 
abatement alternatives are available and the least costly means to reduce carbon emissions can be 
achieved. Thus, linkage is a factor in improving cost-effectiveness of an ETS. In addition, 
linkage of ETSs can result in increased market liquidity, more stable carbon prices, and less 
chance for positions of dominance to lead to abusive behaviour.332 Linkage also can produce a 
uniform carbon price signal that removes the incentive to shift production,333 thus avoiding 
‘carbon leakage’. Moreover, linkage among ETSs can involve more countries in mitigating 
climate change. For example, ratification of the Kyoto Protocol or a successor agreement may be 
impossible for the United States; however, emissions trading programs that currently exist in 
some U.S. states and regions could be linked to the EU ETS, which could be an important step in 
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involving the United States in the international mitigation process.334 Furthermore, the Stern 
Review indicated that, enabling the EU ETS to link with other emerging ETS, could develop 
mechanisms to allow the use of carbon reductions from developing countries, could improve 
liquidity and also establish the nucleus of a global carbon market.335 If the credits from the CDM 
and JI projects were transferable in the international carbon market or the EU carbon market, 
developing countries would have the incentive to initiate linkages to the EU ETS and the 
international ETS. 
Consequently, linkage between the EU ETS and other ETSs is plausible because of its 
advantages, including increased market liquidity, stable carbon price, decreased compliance 
costs and less carbon leakage. 
3.1 Linking theory 
Certain questions must be addressed to link the EU ETS to other ETSs, such as whether the 
linkage will direct or indirect, what type of agreement will establish the linkage, and what type of 
ETSs to include. The following section addresses these theoretic questions, the existing linking 
experiences between the EU ETS and other ETSs, the legal basis for linkage and linkage forms 
and conditions. 
3.1.1 Linking direction 
3.1.1.1 Direct linkage 
Linking ETSs means to establish a connection between two previously unrelated systems, which 
requires someone to take the first step. Who initiates the connection determines the linkage 
direction, either unilaterally or mutually. A unilateral initiative is called a one-way linkage and a 
mutual initiative achieves a two-way linkage; these may also be called bilateral or multilateral 
linkages. Once the connection is established, trading units can be transferrable between the ETSs; 
therefore, these two types of connections are called direct linkage. Linkage of ETSs implies 
recognition of allowances by the participants unilaterally, bilaterally or multilaterally. In a direct 
one-way linkage, ETS 1 recognises the use of allowances from ETS 2, but ETS 2 does not 
recognise the allowances from ETS 1. In a direct two-way linkage, ETS 1 and ETS 2 recognise 
the other’s allowances.  
Before policymakers propose a linkage, they must explore the influences on the carbon market 
and the environmental outcomes. For example, consider the effects of a direct two-way linkage. 
First, a direct linkage can affect the carbon price in both ETSs. The difference between carbon 
prices of the two ETSs will be reduced because entities in the ETS with the higher carbon prices 
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will buy allowances from the other ETS with a lower price, and the extra allowances in the 
higher-priced market will drive down the price. Second, a direct linkage may affect actual 
emissions within the two jurisdictions. Emissions in the ETS with the higher carbon price may 
increase because compliance costs will decrease as entities buy cheaper allowances from the 
other ETS. In a direct one-way linkage, if the ETS with the higher carbon price recognizes the 
allowances from the ETS with the lower price than the effect is the same as described above. 
However, if the ETS with the lower carbon price bilaterally recognises the ETS with the higher 
price, no trading or redistribution of emission reductions will result because participants will 
have no incentive to purchase higher-priced allowances.336  
These effects of linkage on carbon price stability and environmental outcomes can be limited 
through rules and procedures. For instance, various restrictions or conditions can be placed on 
linkages that would limit intersystem trading, thereby limiting the allowance price convergence. 
In addition, the following measures may be applied: (a) Limiting the quantity of allowances from 
another system that an entity can use to demonstrate compliance in its own system; (b) Setting an 
‘exchange rate’ for allowances.337 The legal issues that this measure raises are addressed in 
section 3.1.2 ‘types of linkage agreements’.   
3.1.1.2 Indirect linkage 
Even if neither ETS initiates a connection or recognises the other’s allowances, two ETSs may 
still be linked indirectly through their separate direct connections with a common third system.338 
Unlike a direct linkage that requires either one-way or two-way recognition of allowances from 
another ETS, an indirect linkage establishes a connection without linkage initiative. Series of 
bilateral linkages among several ETSs or even two unilateral linkages to one common ETS can 
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Figure 4 depicts bilateral links among ETS 1, ETS 2 and ETS 3, which will cause allowance 
prices to converge across all three systems even though ETS 1 and ETS 3 are not directly 
linked.339 In addition, any change in carbon price in ETS 1 or ETS 3 will affect the others. 








As shown in Figure 5, in an indirect linkage created by unilateral linkages, both ETS 1 and ETS 
2 recognise allowances from ETS 3 for domestic compliance. ETS 3 becomes a supplier of 
allowances for ETS 1 and ETS 2, and the ETS 3 carbon market obtains a powerful bargaining 
position. However, as ETS 1 and ETS 2 compete for allowances from ETS 3, changes in one 
system’s demand for the third system’s allowances will affect the supply of allowances available 
to the other system.340 
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3.1.2 Types of linkage agreements 
Fundamentally, linkage may occur when one ETS recognises transferability and validity of 
allowances originating from the other ETS. In other words, two national ETSs are linked if 
participants in one country’s scheme can use allowances from another country directly or 
indirectly for compliance purposes.341 Therefore, the key is how the allowances are recognised. 
The recognition of the allowances can be made through, political arrangements, legally binding 
treaties, private contracts, mutual reciprocal commitments and unilateral linkages. All of these 
linkage forms have pros and cons, which provide policymakers must consider when choosing the 
appropriate form of agreement.  
3.1.2.1 Political cooperation arrangements 
Political cooperation arrangements made between parties that are not legally binding take many 
forms, such as joint statements or declarations of intent, memoranda of understanding (MOUs) 
and statements of cooperation.342 A political cooperation arrangement reflects the willingness or 
intent of parties for a specific aim, but lacks concrete substantive provisions on how to achieve 
the objective. Therefore, the language and contents of a political cooperation arrangement may 
be more ambiguous and political, without providing legal authority and obligations to the parties.  
Creating a political cooperation arrangement is neither difficult nor complicated. The 
arrangement is a political solution based on informal consultations and has the benefit of 
obviating lengthy negotiation and ratification procedures343 because its content does not need to 
be explicit legal to be implemented. Correspondingly, the political cooperation arrangement has 
more flexible modification and withdrawal procedures, but cannot provide legal certainty or 
transparency. Because of these characteristics, a political cooperation arrangement cannot 
adequately support linkage of emissions trading schemes. Without explicit provisions for linkage 
procedures, legal obligations of participants, legal authority of regulators, linkages in carbon 
markets cannot work well. Traders cannot take economic risks under such legal uncertainty and 
non-transparency. However, a political cooperation arrangement can be the first step toward 
linkage through establishing a negotiation platform and providing background information about 
the feasibility and necessity of recognising allowances. 
                                                           
341 Erik Haites, ‘Harmonization between National and International Tradable Permit Schemes: CATEP Synthesis 
Paper’ (2003) Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD working paper) 
<http://www.ucd.ie/envinst/envstud/CATEP%20Webpage/Papers/haitesparis.pdf.> accessed 20 October 2012. 
342 M.J.Mace and others, ‘Analysis of the Legal and Organizational Issues Arising in Linking the EU Emissions 
Trading Scheme to other Existing and Emerging Emissions Trading Schemes’ (May 2008) Foundation for 
International Environmental Law and Development, Institute for European Environmental Policy and World 
Resource Institute <http://www.field.org.uk/files/Linking%20emission%20trading%20schemes_0.pdf.> accessed 18 
October 2012. 
343 Michael A. Mehling, ‘Bridging the Transatlantic Divide: Legal Aspect of a Link between Regional Carbon 
Markets in Europe and the United States’ (2007) 7 (2) Sustainable Development Law and Policy Journal 47. 
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3.1.2.2 Treaties with legally binding force 
A treaty is an international agreement concluded between states in written form and governed by 
international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments 
and whatever its particular designation. 344  A treaty is an agreement between two or more 
countries or international organizations that creates legally binding rights and obligations for 
parties, which is governed by international law as to its validity, application, interpretation and 
enforceability.345 
Compared with a political cooperation arrangement, a treaty reflects many features of hard law. 
According to the principle of pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be kept), every treaty in 
force is binding upon the parties to it and must be executed in good faith.346 The violation of 
obligations under a treaty is a breach of international law that results in state culpability.  
In summary, a treaty is a good alternative for a linkage agreement because of its features of 
having legally binding force and explicit legal provisions to ensure legal certainty and strong 
compliance. However, long-term negotiation, sophisticated structures and international 
procedures make achieving agreement through a treaty very difficult. 
3.1.2.3 Private contract 
Emissions trading involves implementation of transactions made by participants who are natural 
persons or legal persons able to sign contracts. One ETS may establish a linkage with another 
ETS through transactional contracts; however, the scale of movement between ETSs based on 
private arrangements likely will to be limited because of the range of contract terms that must be 
developed to protect contracting parties’ interests (for example, price, volume, delivery date, 
provisions for force majeure, default, choice of laws and liability).347 Therefore, a private law 
approach will not be able to achieve the free flow of allowances that is possible through a direct 
linkage between schemes and may fail to secure cost-effectiveness and provide the necessary 
transparency and certainty required by market participants.348 
3.1.2.4 Mutual reciprocal commitments 
A mutual reciprocal commitment causes linked ETSs to achieve ‘a mutual, parallel commitment 
to adopt reciprocal legislation within their separate jurisdictions’. 349  A mutual reciprocal 
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commitment can be applied when two or more entities do not have the capability or do not wish 
to enter into a legally binding agreement, but still seek mutual recognition of each other’s 
regulatory frameworks or accreditation system.350 Essentially, a mutual reciprocal commitment is 
a quasi-political agreement that does not have legally binding force and cannot bind parties’ 
behaviours. It allows for unilateral amendment or termination of the trading link without consent 
of the other parties, 351  which is more flexible than a treaty. However, it can bring about 
reciprocal legislation in the various parties’ jurisdictions. A mutual reciprocal commitment can 
be expressed in a joint declaration or in unilateral declaration, but should be implemented and 
enforced through domestic legislation of the countries where the linked ETSs are located. 
A mutual reciprocal commitment provides more legal certainty than a political cooperation 
arrangement. If the parties of a mutual reciprocal commitment consider linkage of ETSs as 
advantageous, the reciprocal legislation will work well; otherwise, unilateral termination of the 
mutual reciprocal commitment will cause the linkage to fail. A typical example of a mutual 
reciprocal commitment is the Regional GHGs Initiative (RGGI) in which the U.S. states of 
Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York and Vermont (the 
signatory states) have committed to propose for legislative and/or regulatory approval a CO2 
budget trading programme352 aimed at stabilising and then reducing CO2 emissions within their 
areas, and then to implement a regional CO2 emissions budget and allowances trading 
programme to regulate CO2 emissions.
353  
3.1.2.5 Unilateral linkages 
A unilateral linkage is obviously a one-way linkage. Whether an ETS can be linked to another 
ETS unilaterally depends on whether the former recognises the allowances from the latter, which 
may require legislation to allow the linkage possibility. 
3.2 Issues of linking the EU ETS to other ETS 
This section applies the previous theoretical background on linkages to the EU ETS to consider 
the legal basis for the EU ETS’s linkage to other ETSs, the forms of linkage that may be 
achieved, who has the competence to determine linkages and other conditions or requirements. 
 
                                                           
350 Ibid. 
351 Mehling (n 343), 47. 
352 Memorandum of Understanding of Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, art 2. (20 December 2005) 
<http://www.rggi.org/design/history/mou> accessed 8 November 2012. ‘The framework of CO2 budget trading 
programme has been made in the MoU of the RGGI, including programme adoption, regional emissions cap, State 
emissions caps, scheduled reductions, compliance period and safe valve, offsets, allocation of allowances, early 
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353 Ibid, art 1. 
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3.2.1 Linking initiative and conditions 
Article 25 (1) of Directive 2003/87/EC provides the possibility for linkages of the EU ETS with 
other systems.354 This provision on linkages includes the following contents: First, agreement 
should be concluded with Annex B countries to the Kyoto Protocol which have ratified the 
Protocol; second, the mutual recognition of each other’s allowances; and third, the process of 
concluding agreements must follow Article 300 of the EC Treaty. 
More concretely, an ETS to be linked by the EU ETS is described as ‘mandatory emissions 
trading systems capping absolute emissions in third countries or administrative entities by means 
of arrangements and agreements to provide for recognition of allowances between itself and the 
EU ETS’. 355  The objectives for such linkages are to improve and extend the EU ETS’s 
experience and ‘learning-by-doing’ with compatible cap-and-trade systems in other parts of the 
world.356 In 2007, the European Commission announced it had achieved an agreement with 
Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein to link to their respective ETSs. This agreement was the first 
time that the EU ETS had linked with non-EU countries and extended the systems to 30 
European countries.357 Experiences of this linkage have shown that the following criteria should 
be applied: Systems must be mandatory and set absolute limits on emissions and they must have 
robust registry systems and stringent monitoring and compliance provisions in place.358  
Consequently, two amendments were made to Directive 2009/29/EC. First, the ETS linked to the 
EU ETS should be a compatible mandatory GHG ETS with absolute emissions caps established 
in any other country or in a sub-federal or regional entity.359 Second, nonbinding arrangements 
may be made with third countries or with sub-federal or regional entities to provide for 
administrative and technical coordination related to allowances in the EU ETS or other 
mandatory ETSs with absolute emissions caps.360 In short, the requirements of the “to be linked” 
ETS are clarified.   
                                                           
354 Directive 2003/87/EC, art 25 (1). It stipulates that ‘Agreements should be concluded with third countries listed in 
Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol which have ratified the Protocol to provide for the mutual recognition of allowances 
between the Community scheme and other GHG ETSs in accordance with the rules set out in Article 300 of the 
Treaty’ 
355 European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Directive 2003/87/EC so as to Improve and Extend the Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading System of the 
Community’ COM (2008) 16 Final, 10. 
356 Ibid, 42. 
357 European Commission, ‘Emissions Trading: Commission Announces Linkage EU ETS with Norway, Iceland and 
Liechtenstein’ (EUROPA, 26 October 2007) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-07-1617_en.htm> accessed 12 
October 2012. (2007 Linkage announces) 
358 Ibid. 
359 Directive 2009/29/EC, art 25 (1) a. 
360 Ibid, art 25 (1) b.  
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3.2.2 Procedural issues of the EU ETS linkage agreement 
3.2.2.1 Legal procedures for agreements with the EU 
The procedures of conclusion of agreements between the EU and one or more third countries or 
with an international organisation are stipulated in Article 300 TEC, which sets out the 
responsibilities of the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament. 
The Commission shall make recommendations to the Council and conduct negotiations in 
consultation with special Council-appointed committees.361 The Commission organises these 
negotiations with authorisation from the Council. The Council must decide on the signing and 
the conclusion of the agreement, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the 
Commission according to Article 310 (2) TEC. When the agreement covers a field of which 
unanimity is required for the adoption of internal rules and for the agreements362 referred in 
Article 310 TEC, the Council must act unanimously.363 The European Parliament only must be 
informed on the decision concerning the provisional application or the suspension of agreements, 
or the establishment of the EU’s position in a body set up by the agreement based on Article 310 
TEC. Also, the European Parliament must be consulted with the Commission before agreements 
are concluded, except for agreements stipulated in Article 133(3) TEC364. The agreement covers 
a field for which the procedure referred to in Article 251 TEC (co-decision procedure) or Article 
252 TEC (cooperation procedure) applies. 365  In this case of consultation, the European 
Parliament must deliver its opinion within a certain time limit; otherwise, the Council may act in 
the absence of an opinion. 
                                                           
361  The EC Treaty (n 134), art 300 (1). It stipulates that ‘where this Treaty provides for the conclusion of agreements 
between the Community and one or more States or international organisations, the Commission shall make 
recommendations to the Council, which shall authorise the Commission to open the necessary negotiations. The 
Commission shall conduct these negotiations in consultation with special committees appointed by the Council to 
assist it in this task and within the framework of such directives as the Council may issue to it’. Later consolidated 
and incorporated into Lisbon Treaty as art 207 and art 218.  
362 Ibid, art 300 (2). These agreements may be concluded by the Community with one or more States or international 
organisations, establishing an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special 
procedure.  
363 Ibid, art 300(2). 
364 Ibid, art 133 (3). It was later consolidated and corporated into Lisbon Treaty as art 207 (3). It stipulates: 
Where agreements with one or more States or international organisations need to be negotiated, the Commission 
shall make recommendations to the Council, which shall authorise the Commission to open the necessary 
negotiations. The Council and the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring that the agreements negotiated are 
compatible with internal Community policies and rules. 
The Commission shall conduct these negotiations in consultation with a special committee appointed by the Council 
to assist the Commission in this task and within the framework of such directives as the Council may issue to it. The 
Commission shall report regularly to the special committee on the progress of negotiations. 
The relevant provisions of Article 300 shall apply. 
365 Ibid, art 300 (3). Article 251 TEC was consolidated into Lisbon Treaty as art 291.  
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Some agreements require assent from the European Parliament. These include all agreements 
referred to in Article 310 TEC, those establishing a specific institutional framework by 
organising cooperation procedures, those having important budgetary implications for the 
Community and those entailing amendment of an act adopted under the procedure referred to in 
Article 251 TEC.366  
3.2.2.2 Legal procedures for linkage agreements with the EU ETS  
The legal procedures of concluding a linkage agreement between an ETS and the EU ETS is 
based on Article 300 TEC and Article 25 (1) of Directive 2003/87/EC. 
According to Article 251 (1) TEC, the European Parliament and the Council adopted Directive 
2003/87/EC. Article 251 (1) TEC establishes a legislative co-decision procedure that requires the 
Commission to submit proposals to the European Parliament and the Council; after obtaining the 
Parliament’s opinion, the Council may act by a qualified majority.367 According to Article 300 (2) 
TEC, the Council can conclude an agreement by qualified majority on a proposal from the 
Commission.  
However, opinions regarding the Parliament’s role in concluding agreements differ, and it is 
uncertain whether the Parliament must merely be consulted or has the capacity to reject a trading 
linkage.368  
Where an agreement covers a field for which the procedure referred to in Article 251 applies, the 
Council must conclude agreements after consulting the European Parliament. 369  Directive 
2003/87/EC was adopted according to procedures in Article 251 TEC; therefore, concluding a 
linkage agreement can fall within Article 300 (3) TEC, because both of the Directive and the 
agreement cover the field of environmental protection. Accordingly, the European Parliament 
must be consulted by the Council, and must deliver its opinion within a certain time limit set by 
the Council, depending on the urgency of the matter. In this case, the Council cannot conclude 
agreements without considering the European Parliament’s opinion. However, according to 
subparagraph 3 of Article 300 (3) TEC, agreements referred to in Article 310 TEC, which 
‘establish an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special 
procedures, shall be concluded after the assent of the European Parliament has been obtained’370. 
In this case, if a linkage agreement with the EU ETS establishes new bodies, such as a joint 
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369 The EC Treaty (n 134), art 300 (3). 
370 The EC Treaty (n 134), art 310. 
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council, a technical commission and/or joint registry, the European Parliament’s approval is 
necessary.371  
3.2.3 Competence among the EU and EU Member States on linkage 
According to Article 1 of the Lisbon Treaty, Member States confer competence on the European 
Union only for attaining common objectives.372 This principle is reiterated in Article 5 (2) of the 
Lisbon Treaty, which states, ‘Under the principle of conferral, the Union shall act only within the 
limits of the competence conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the 
objectives set out therein. Therefore, the EU may act only in areas in which Member States have 
given it authority to do so. Before the Lisbon Treaty, this competence was difficult to distinguish 
and each case had to be analysed. Afterwards, three types of competencies were stipulated 
including, exclusive competence, shared competence and competence only to take supporting, 
coordinating or supplementary action. These competencies are analysed later in this chapter. EU 
competence can affect the process of linking ETSs. The EU’s competence to conclude 
agreements determines whether the legislation power is exclusively authorised to the EU, or 
must be shared between the EU and its Member States. More concretely, can the EU, Member 
States or both of them make the final decision to conclude linkage agreements? Can the Member 
State take the initiative to link to an ETS in another country or region? Both of these questions 
depend on whether the EU has exclusive competence in linkage agreements. 
3.2.3.1 Theory: Exclusive competence or shared competence 
Prior to the Lisbon Treaty many external powers were shared between Member States and the 
EU through mixed agreements in which power to conclude agreements was shared with Member 
States. The EC Treaty did not confer sufficient competence on the EC to ratify the agreement in 
its entirety, thereby requiring allocation of power between the EC and Member States for 
reaching international agreements with non-member states. 
Article 2 (1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides that only 
the European Union may legislate and adopt legally binding acts in specific areas within the its 
exclusive competence. 373  Therefore, Member States do not have autonomous legislative 
competence and cannot adopt any acts with legally binding force in these specific listed areas:  
(a) Customs union 
(b) The establishing of the competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market 
(c) Monetary policy for the Member States whose currency is the euro 
                                                           
371 Mace (n 342). 
372 Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union (The Maastricht Treaty, TEU) [2012] OJ C 326/13, art 1. 
373 TFEU (n 137), art 2 (1). 
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(d) The conservation of marine biological resources under the common fisheries policy 
(e) Common commercial policy.374  
The EU is also qualified375 to have exclusive competence to make international agreements, 
provided that the conditions in Article 3 (2) TFEU are met.376 In this case, exclusive competence 
is conferred to the EU in three instances: when a legislative act provides for the conclusion of an 
international agreement; when an international agreement is necessary to enable the Union to 
exercise its internal competence; and when the conclusion of an agreement may affect common 
rules or alter their scope.377 In addition, Article 216 TFEU stipulates more circumstances under 
which the EU has exclusive competence.378 The EU can conclude an agreement with one or more 
third countries or international organisations where the treaties provide so or where the 
conclusion of an agreement is necessary to achieve the objectives in the treaties. 
However, the result is different if another legal basis is applied. Article 174 (4) TEU does not 
prohibit Member States from making international agreements. It stipulates that the EU Member 
States and Community can cooperate with the third countries to conclude an international 
agreement based on Article 300. 379  Accordingly, Article 191 TFEU mentions a ‘mixed 
agreement’ with ‘concurrent competence’, meaning the agreement forms a certain whole or 
totality that is indivisible or cannot be separated into two parts.380 A mixed agreement can mean 
either an agreement to which the EU and one or more Member States are parties, or an 
agreement in which the EU or the Member States share competence, even if only Member States 
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can be parties.381 Mixed agreements are concluded especially in environmental areas entailing 
both the EU and some or even all of its Member States individually become parties to the 
international environmental agreement,382 because the environment falls within the EU’s shared 
competence based on Article 4 TFEU. In shared competence areas, both the Member States and 
the EU possess, and continue to possess, the power to adopt rules on specific issues falling in 
these areas, such as environmental issues; however, if and when the EU exercises its power to 
legislate in shared competence areas, Member States may no longer exercise theirs.383 
A linkage agreement between the EU ETS and other ETSs satisfies the legal requirements of 
Directive 2003/87/EC and Directive 2009/29/EC. Therefore, based on Article 3 (2) TFEU, 
linkage agreements theoretically falls within the EU’s exclusive competence.   
Article 3 (2) states ‘where the conclusion of an international agreement is provided for in a 
legislative act, the Union will have exclusive external competence’; therefore, express external 
empowerment to conclude an international agreement is taken to mean exclusive external 
competence, with the corollary that Member States are pre-empted from concluding any such 
agreement independently, and from legislating or adopting any legally binding act.384 In this case, 
the pre-emption rule, specifically field pre-emption, is introduced. Field pre-emption refers to 
areas in which EU law is considered to have a jurisdictional monopoly, and in which a national 
law, irrespective of whether it conflicts with EU measures, can be enacted only with the 
authorisation of EU law.385 However, field pre-emption does not prohibit Member States from 
independently concluding an international agreement so long as the agreement is authorised by 
EU law.  
Applying this explanation of exclusive competence to the linkage issue, we see that the EU has 
taken exclusive external empowerment to conclude international agreements on linking the EU 
                                                           
381 Dominic McGoldrick, International Relations Law of the European Union (1st edn, Longman 1997), 98. Dominic 
also indicates that, “if complete in the subject matter of a Treaty lies partly with the European Community and partly 
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382 Lena Gravik, ‘Incomplete Mixed Environmental Agreements of the Community and the Principle of Bindingness’ 
Martti Koskeniemi (ed) International Law Aspects of the European Union (Brill Nijhoff, 1997) 255.  
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Daniela Obradovic and Nikos Lavranos (eds) Interface between EU Law and National Law (European Law 
Publishing, 2007). 
384 Craig and de Burca (n 376), 82. 
385 Damian Chalmers, Gareth Davies and Giorgio Monti, European Union Law: Cases and Materials (2nd edition, 
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ETS to other ETSs outside the EU. Member States are pre-empted from concluding such 
agreements independently unless authorised by EU law. 
3.2.3.2 Competence problems clarified in the EU ETS Directive 
Article 25 of Directive 2003/87/EC states that linkage agreements must be concluded in 
accordance with the rules set out in Article 300 of the EC Treaty. In this respect, the European 
Community has the competence to conclude a linkage agreement. Specifically, the European 
Commission takes responsibility for organising a negotiation with third countries, and the 
European Council makes the final decision. The European Parliament acts either as consultant to 
the Council or provides necessary assent to conclude an agreement.  
Article 25 (1) of Directive 2009/29/EC, as an amendment to Directive 2003/87/EC, provides 
more explicit conditions regarding ETS that are ‘to be linked’. Provisions of the 2009 Directive 
add more details about the conditions for ETSs that may be linked and do not repeal the 
provisions in the 2003 Directive. Therefore, conclusion of a linkage agreement must also follow 
the rules in Article 300 TEC. 
However, new conditions stipulated in Article 25 (1) do not fall within Article 300 TEC. For 
example, Article 25 (1) points out that a linkage agreement may be made between the EU ETS 
and an ETS established in any other country or in sub-federal or regional entities. Article 300 
TEC can be used as the legal base for concluding a linkage agreement between the Community 
and outside countries, but it does not appear to be the proper legal basis for agreements with an 
ETS established in sub-federal or regional entities. 
Consequently, according to the EU ETS Directives in 2003 and 2009, conclusion of linkage 
agreements between the EU ETS and other ETSs established in the third countries falls within 
the competence of the EU. If the linkage agreement between the EU ETS and another ETS 
creates a new joint institution, then the Council must acquire assent from the European 
Parliament before the agreement is signed. However, if the linkage agreement is not an 
international agreement between the EU and the third countries, but an agreement with sub-
federal or regional entities, then several questions remain unclear, including the legal procedures 
for concluding this type of agreement and its legal nature. 
3.2.4 Existing examples of linkage to the EU ETS 
The legal analysis in the previous sections provides a blueprint for linkage agreements between 
the EU ETS and other ETSs, although some theoretical challenges still exist. For instance, few 
legislative rules have been established for linkages between the EU ETS and ETSs in sub-federal 
or regional entities. With these limitations in mind this section describes the practice of linkage 
between the EU ETS and other ETSs. 
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The EU ETS is designed to allow the international carbon market to develop through ‘bottom-up’ 
linkage of compatible ETSs and recognition of units from a linked system for compliance 
purposes.386 Many national or sub-national systems have been developed worldwide, including 
in Australia, Japan, New Zealand and the United States, and systems are planned in China, South 
Korea and Switzerland.387 EU ETS linkages with these other ETSs would allow the EU to 
achieve emissions reduction targets at reduced costs, and would increase market liquidity, 
stabilise the carbon price, level the international playing field and support global cooperation on 
climate change.388 Linkages already exist between the EU ETS and the projects-based ETSs 
under the Kyoto Protocol and between the EU ETS and countries in the European Economic 
Area (EEA) such as Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. An analysis of these existing linkages 
can answer questions concerning the form of linkage arrangements and can provide experiences 
and lessons for future linkages. 
3.2.4.1 Linking the EU ETS to projects-based ETSs under the Kyoto Protocol 
3.2.4.1.1 Linking Directive: From Directive 2003/87/EC to Directive 2004/101/EC 
From a global environmental point of view, the place where emissions reductions occur is 
secondary so long as real emission reductions are achieved.389 Based on this rationale, the Kyoto 
flexible mechanisms allow the parties to achieve their mandatory emissions reduction targets by 
using credits that have been created in CDM or JI projects in other countries at lower cost than at 
home. As an important party to the Kyoto Protocol, the EU is allowed to use credits from CDM 
and JI projects for compliance purposes. Annex I parties may use CERs and ERUs that are 
supplemental to domestic actions for achieving emissions reduction commitments. 390  This 
provision, confirmed and clarified in the Marrakesh Accords as the principle of supplementarity, 
requires Annex I countries to use the flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol as supplemental 
actions, which can constitute a significant portion of their efforts to meet emissions reduction 
targets under the protocol.391  
According to Directive 2003/87/EC, linkages between the EU ETS and projects-based 
mechanisms, including JI and CDM, are desirable and important for reducing global GHGs and 
                                                           
386 ‘Introduction of International Carbon Market’ (EUROPA) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/linking/index_en.htm> accessed 10 April 2014. 
387 Ibid. 
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389 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending the Directive 
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increasing cost-effectiveness. 392  Accordingly, project credits allow EU operators to meet 
obligations under the ETS by investing in projects to reduce emissions outside the EU.393 In this 
way, EU companies can acquire credits from investments in CDM or JI projects for compliance 
in the EU ETS. In addition, unlimited use of CDM and JI credits is estimated to cut the carbon 
price by half to 13 euros per tonne of CO2; however, in the second pilot phase with the ‘no policy 
change’ scenario, the carbon price was estimated to be 26 euros per tonne.394 Therefore, carbon 
credits from the projects-based mechanism can benefit targeted companies and lower the carbon 
price.  
The use of the credits must follow provisions adopted by the European Council and European 
Parliament on a proposal from the European Commission,395 which must draft the rules for use 
of credits from project mechanisms. 
In November 2004, Directive 2004/101/EC was adopted to regulate admission of credits created 
from Kyoto flexible mechanisms into the EU ETS. By recognising credits resulting from CDM 
and JI projects, this EU Linking Directive established an indirect link between the EU ETS and 
the projects-based ETS under the Kyoto Protocol. The EU Linking Directive is a unilateral 
arrangement that establishes an indirect link between the EU scheme and the projects-based 
ETSs. The Linking Directive stipulates that operators are allowed to use certified emission 
reductions (CERs) and emission reduction units (ERUs) from project activities, thus importing 
credits into the EU ETS and convert them to allowances. The Linking Directive can be 
considered as the EU’s domestic implementation of the principle of supplementarity. 
Domestic supplemental action is a broad concept that does not clarify whether CERs and EURs 
are equivalent to allowances; however, it implies that credits from project activities can be used 
in supplemental actions, for instance, in the EU ETS within the EU. In short, an indirect linkage 
was established through a common element396 – the EU Linking Directive’s recognition of 
Kyoto credits and the de facto recognition of credits based on the Kyoto Protocol. 
3.2.4.1.2 Legal procedures on linking the EU ETS to projects-based ETSs under the Kyoto 
Protocol 
Implementation of projects-based ETSs based on CDM and JI is different from that of the 
allowances-based ETSs (also called cap-and-trade) in the EU. CDM and JI are project-specific, 
based on a baseline and credit approach with an ex-post verification of emissions reduction 
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achieved. On the other hand, the EU ETS is a ‘cap-and-trade’ programme on ex-ante allocation 
of emission allowances to covered installations. In the cap-and-trade programme, the emissions 
reduction target is set before the actual emissions reduction occurs, which means the cap is an 
estimated environmental outcome. In contrast, in a projects-based programme, the environmental 
outcome is calculated after the emissions reduction project is implemented. As a result, the 
procedures and framework of these two systems are very different, which raises the question of 
how the EU cap-and-trade programme can adapt to a projects-based ETS. 
The EU Linking Directive sets the first important move as mutual recognition of transferable 
units. European operators can obtain allowances either by converting CERs or EURs or by 
purchasing them from the carbon market. Conversion provides more certainty to EU ETS 
participants because the companies can use allowances converted from CERs and EURs in 
exactly the same manner as any other allowances they were initially allocated or have acquired 
to fulfil their obligations. The Linking Directive is based on trust vis-à-vis the Kyoto system and 
the competent institutions, in particular the CDM Executive Board and the Article 6 Supervisory 
Committee. The EU Linking Directive emphasises that environmental integrity should be 
achieved through sound modalities and rules and guidelines for the mechanisms. It also requires 
the EU to consider the issues of non-permanence, additionality, leakage, uncertainties and 
socioeconomic and environmental impact, including impact on biodiversity and natural 
ecosystems associated with afforestation and reforestation project activities.397Therefore, even if 
the procedures of the Kyoto projects are different from those of the EU ETS, an indirect link can 
be established. Under indirect linkage, this research focuses on the recognition conditions or 
prerequisites of projects credits rather than a comparative study of the EU ETS and a projects-
based ETS. 
Qualitative conditions set restrictions on the origin of credits, in particular the types of projects 
that can produce credits. The type of project refers to the quality of credits, meaning whether the 
credits are qualified as convertible to EU emission allowances (EUAs). There are exemptions 
from certain types of project activities: 
(1) According to the EU linking directive, CERs and ERUs from land use, land use change and 
forestry activities (LULUCF) cannot be used in the EU ETS,398 for several reasons. First, with 
LULUCF activities399 carbon is stored temporarily and then released into the atmosphere, which 
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is not consistent with the EU ETS’s objective to reduce actual carbon emissions absolutely and 
permanently and to improve abatement in the long-term. Second, calculating and monitoring 
emission removals of sinks is uncertain under the Kyoto Protocol, under JI and CDM, and at the 
country and project levels. Also, it is unclear how the temporary and reversible nature of 
LULUCF carbon sequestration can be reconciled with entity-level emissions trading.400 Third, 
CDM and JI projects should elicit technology transfer (for example, through promotion of new, 
cleaner technologies and improvements in energy efficiency); however, afforestation and 
reforestation activities (relevant to carbon sinks) do not result in technology transfer or 
development. Credits from these activities are cheaper than from other CDM and JI projects that 
do result in technology transfer, and therefore allowing credits from sink projects to be converted 
would be at the expense of promoting technology transfer to other industrialised and developing 
countries, which is key to the JI’s and CDM’s success.401 
(2) Nuclear activities: According to the Linking Directive, Member States cannot use CERs and 
ERUs generated from nuclear facilities to meet their commitments under the Kyoto Protocol 
through 2012402 because of the possible negative social and environmental impact of nuclear 
projects. After the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period (2008–2012), this policy was 
reviewed. The European Parliament wanted to extend the nuclear ban, but France and its allies 
sought to block that prohibition, and the ban was only secure until 2012.403  
(3) Hydropower projects: Credits from hydropower projects are allowed only if the hydro power 
project has a capacity greater than 20 megawatts and complies with relevant international criteria 
and guidelines, including those in the report by the World Commission on Dams of November 
2000, Dams and Development – a New Framework for Decision-making.404 Large hydropower 
plants may have a negative environmental and social impact;405 therefore, Member States must 
assess whether the hydropower project qualifies environmental and social impacts before using 
credits from this type of project. However, the interpretation of Article 11b (6) of the Linking 
Directive varies among Member States which has led to the fragmentation of the carbon market 
and uncertainty for its participants. 406  To harmonise the procedure in relation to large 
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hydropower projects, the Commission Guidelines on a common understanding was achieved in 
2008. At last, a document entitled “Compliance Report Assessing Application of Article 11b (6) 
of Emissions Trading Directive to Hydroelectric Project Activities Exceeding 20 MW (further 
referred to as the Compliance Report Template)” set out the assessment criteria selected by 
Member States.407 
(4) Industrial gas projects: Projects relevant to the destruction of trifluoromethane (HFC-23) and 
nitrous oxide (N2O) are called industrial gas projects. From 1 January 2013, the use of 
international credits from projects involving the destruction of HFC-23 and N2O from adipic acid 
production in the EU ETS is prohibited.408 An exception shall be allowed until 30 April 2013, if 
the credits are from the existing projects that took place during 2012 and are used before 2013.409 
Industrial gas projects are mostly located in advanced developing countries that enable to finance 
these reductions themselves, and the revenues they gained in the past should suffice to finance 
them. Together with the reasons that this type of project results environmental concern by 
making HFC-23 projects moving from the EU to third countries, and that the international credits 
from industrial gas projects do not contribute to technology transfer or to the transformation of 
energy system in developing countries.410 
In addition, a decentralised approach to the recognition of project-based units has been replaced 
by a more harmonised approach from Directive 2003/87/EC to Directive 2009/29/EC. Variant 
types of projects caused uncertainty and fragmentation in the market, as project developers are 
not always certain their credits will be accepted by all Member States. 411  Thus, Directive 
2009/29/EC stipulates that “from 1 January 2013, measures may be applied to restrict the use of 
specific credits from project types”.412 Accordingly, the Member States are required to report on 
quantitative restrictions limit the number of CDM and/or JI credits that can be transferred in the 
EU ETS.  
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The Member State’s NAP must specify the maximum amount of CERs and ERUs that operators 
may use in the EU ETS, allocating a percentage of the allowances to each installation.413 
Allowing CDM and JI credits to be converted for use in the EU ETS provides more options to 
emitters to reach their targets. Under this condition, one credit from CDM and JI projects is the 
same as one allowance, or the authorization to emit one tonne of GHG. Therefore, to achieve the 
emissions reduction target, the emitters may use both allowances from the EU ETS and the 
carbon credits from the CDM and JI to cover their emissions. 
If there were no limitation on the amount of allowable carbon credits, regulated companies and 
Member States would count heavily on investing in CDM or JI projects in developing countries 
and be reluctant to participate in the EU ETS or find abatement solutions to reduce carbon 
emissions. Even worse, they might obtain many more credits and exceed the amount they needed. 
So to prevent outsourcing, quantitative restrictions on credits are necessary. 
(2) Maximum amount of carbon credits 
According to the Kyoto Protocol, the maximum percentages of carbon credits must be consistent 
with the Member State’s supplementarity obligations. 414  The supplementary obligations 
comprise both government purchase as well as private sector use of CDM and JI credits. The 
European Commission is merely responsible for assessing private sectors’ use of CDM/JI credits 
according to Annex III, Directive 2003/87/EC. According to the Commission’s guidance,415 the 
level of effort to reduce GHGs is determined by assessing the reductions a Member State is 
required to undertake in relation to emissions in 1990 (the Kyoto base year), 2004 and 2010. 
Then, 50 per cent of the highest of those reductions is used as the maximum overall amount of 
CDM/JI credits that a Member State can use in addition to domestic actions.416 This formula 
fixed an effective ceiling of 50 per cent on the number of CDM/JI credits to be used by a 
Member State with respect to their ‘reduction effort’.417 By allowing Member States to rely on 
the highest reduction effort, the Commission was able to account for the large diversity of 
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Member States’ emission paths since 1990 and to reduce potential for conflict arising from 
interpretation of the supplementarity principle.418 However, the Commission's interpretation has 
been criticised as being based on weak legal foundations because neither the Kyoto Protocol nor 
any EU instrument contains a numerical definition of the supplementarity requirement.419  
The same Commission's guidance states that a Member State may be able to use CDM/JI credits 
only up to 10 percent, which is a minimum threshold installations should be allowed to use.420 
Such a threshold indicates a reasonable balance between domestic reductions and providing an 
incentive to invest in projects in developing countries, though this explanation from the 
Commission has been challenged.421 To conclude, setting a minimum amount of carbon credits 
that can be used is a compromise between the Member States that demand credits necessarily 
and those that demand them less urgently; also, the Commission’s strategy is to compensate 
Member States who reduce their proposed caps.422  
A certain minimum of international credits that can be used by operators or aircraft operators is 
set from 2008 to 2020. (a) Each operator of a stationary installation can use international credits 
from 2008 to 2020 up to the amount allowed in the period of 2008 to 2012, or to an amount 
maximum of 11 per cent of its allocation in the period of 2008 to 2012, after the operator 
received a free allocation or an entitlement to use international credits from 2008 to 2012423; (b) 
If the operator received neither a free allocation nor an entitlement to use international credits 
from 2008 to 2012, it can use credits in the period of 2008 to 2020 up to a maximum of 4.5 per 
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cent of its verified emissions in the period from 2013 to 2020424; (c) Two types of operators 
enable to use international credits in the period of 2008 to 2020, up to the amount allowed to it 
from 2008 to 2012, or to 11 per cent of its allocation from 2008 to 2012, or up to a maximum of 
4.5 per cent of their verified emissions from 2013 to 2020. The first type is the operator of a 
stationary installation with a significant capacity extension according to Article 20 of Decision 
2011/278/EU. The second type is the operator of a stationary installation which received a free 
allocation from 2008 to 2012 and carrying out activities in Annex I of Directive 2009/29/EC but 
not in Annex I of Directive 2003/87/EC 425 ; (d) Aircraft operator shall be entitled to use 
international credits up to a maximum of 1.5 per cent of its verified emissions during the period 
from 2013 to 2020.426 
(3) Timing 
CERs obtained from 2000 through 2008, could be used to achieve compliance in the first 
commitment period.427 Phase I of the EU ETS was from 2005 to 2007, so allowances allocated 
during this period could be exchanged for CERs issued after 2005. Phase II and the first 
comment period of the IETS were implemented simultaneously. Therefore, CERs could be 
exchanged for allowances allocated initially in the EU ETS during the same period, 2008 to 2012. 
In summary, the linkage between the EUAs and CERs was feasible from 2005 through 2012. 
However, this time frame is not the same for credits issued by the JI. No credits can be issued 
before 2008, which means JI credits only exist after the beginning of the first Kyoto commitment 
period. Therefore, the linkage between the EUAs and the JI credits is feasible only from 2008 
through 2012. In phase III, in the absence of an international agreement, only CDM credits from 
projects registered before 2013 can be used by ETS operators after 2012, unless the project is in 
a Least Developed Country (LDC).428 The Directive 2009/29/EC confirmed the certainty of 
accepting credits from projects started in LDCs after 2012, because LDCs are especially 
vulnerable to the effects of climate change, and are responsible only for a very low level of 
GHGs.429 Developing countries, other than the LDCs, can only supply credits from new activities 
according to bilateral or multilateral agreements concluded within Article 11a (5) of the 
Directive 2009/29/EC.430 Once an international agreement on climate change is reached, only 
                                                           
424 Ibid, art 1 (2). 
425 Ibid, art 1 (3). 
426 Ibid, art 1 (4). 
427 The Kyoto Protocol, art 12 (10). 
428 Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying document to the Commission decision on applying use 
restrictions on international credits (from HFC-23 and N2O projects) pursuant to Article 11a (9) of Directive 
2009/29/EC, Impact assessment, SEC (2010), 7. 
429 Directive 2009/29/EC, para 31. 
430 Ibid, art 11a (5). It stipulates that “… in the event that the negotiations on an international agreement on climate 
change are not concluded by 31 December 2009, credits from projects or other emission reducing activities may be 
126 
 
credits from projects from third countries which have ratified that agreement shall be accepted in 
the EU ETS from 1 January 2013.431 
In conclusion, linkages between the EU ETS and projects-based trading (CDM and JI) have been 
set indirectly. Although the EU ETS and the Kyoto flexible mechanisms, specifically CDM and 
JI, are different types of ETSs, recognition of Kyoto credits unilaterally helps to link them. 
Therefore, convertible recognition between EU allowances and credits from CDM and/or JI is 
the most important move for linkage. In recognising credits from CDM and JI, the European 
Commission proposes to include qualitative restrictions, quantitative restrictions and time limits 
for using credits.  The Linking Directive aligns all restrictions and EU ETS objectives. The 
Commission set a minimum threshold in Directive 2004/101/EC; however, Member States are 
authorised to make their own decisions on the amount of credits from CDM and JI. 
3.2.4.2 Linking the EU ETS to other regional ETSs: EEA countries 
On 26 October 2007, the European Commission announced an agreement with the European 
Economic Area (EEA) countries on linking their respective ETSs, which was the first 
international agreement of its kind for emissions trading.432 Before this agreement, ETSs had 
been developed the EEA countries of Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein, and this international 
agreement for linkage established mutual recognition between the EU and these three countries, 
respectively. 
The linkage was established through incorporating Directive 2003/87/EC into the European 
Economic Area Agreement using existing cooperation frameworks (council, joint committee, 
subcommittee and working groups) to extend Community rules to the EEA European Free Trade 
Agreement (EFTA) states.433 The next step was for national approval in Norway, Iceland and 
Liechtenstein. For instance, Norway’s ETS, like the EU ETS, applied a cap-and-trade model, and 
was implemented in installations from the same sectors and combustion installations as the EU’s 
system. The Norwegian system covered around 40 per cent of the country’s GHG emissions, but 
took a tougher stance than the EU ETS by allocating fewer pollution permits to industries.434 
Under these stricter conditions, the carbon price in Norway was expected to increase higher than 
the EU level.  
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According to Directive 2003/87/EC and an EEA joint committee decision, Norway was required 
to develop an NAP establishing the framework for allocation of allowances, which had to be 
approved by the EFTA Surveillance Authority before Norwegian installations could transfer 
allowances between accounts in the EU ETS.435 Subject to the necessary approvals in the EEA 
states and Norway, the Norwegian scheme is directly linked to the EU ETS.  
As a leader in mitigating climate change in the world, the EU acknowledges that an international 
carbon market must be built by linking compatible domestic cap-and-trade systems over the long 
term. The European Commission envisages developing an OECD-wide market by 2015 and an 
even broader market by 2020. In light of progress the EU has achieved so far, this goal should be 
included in outreach to Japan and Australia.436 
3.2.4.3 Linking the EU ETS to Australia’s carbon pricing mechanism 
On 28 August 2012, the Australian Minister for Climate Change and Energy Efficiency and the 
European Commissioner for Climate Actions announced that Australia and Europe will be 
linking their ETSs.437 Accordingly, a full two-way linkage between Australia’s carbon pricing 
mechanism (CPM) and the EU ETS will commence no later than 1 July 2018438, after a formal 
agreement is concluded between the two parties. In this case, a mutual recognition of the 
allowances between the two systems will make carbon trading possible. And carbon units of both 
the CPM and the EU ETS can be used for compliance in each other’s system. However, currently 
the linkage is a one-way direction, only allowing the EUAs to be used in the CPM from 1 July 
2015 until a full linkage is established.439 Before a full linkage is established, carbon units from 
the CPM cannot be used in the EU ETS.  
To facilitate linking, two changes will be made to the CPM. First, the price floor in the CPM will 
be removed.440 Secondly, a new sub-limit applied to the use of eligible Kyoto units was set. 
Participants in the CPM still can use maximum 50 per cent of their overall allowed emissions. 
Within this 50 per cent limit, a restriction of 12.5 per cent on the use of the Kyoto units is 
mandatory.441 The sub-limit setting of using Kyoto units protects the ACUs from an influx of 
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cheap international units and to ensure the demand for EUAs in Australia is not undercut by 
those cheaper Kyoto units.442 In addition, the CPM will move to an emissions trading system 
before linking to the EU ETS. The CPM has two stages including fixed-price period and flexible 
price period. Price of each Australian carbon unit (ACU) is fixed from 1 July 2012 to 30 June 
2015.443 The price will be set by the market since 1 July 2015 when the interim one-way linkage 
with the EU ETS is expected. 
The linkage has been implemented by bringing EUAs and Australia Issued International Units 
(AIIUs) within the definition of ‘eligible international emissions unit’ in the Clean Energy Act 
2011.444 As such, a mutual recognition of the trading units is achieved. Two ways are possible to 
transfer the EUAs to Australia, one is the Clean Energy Regulator could issue AIIUs to ‘shadow’ 
EUAs in the EU ETS Registry, or the EU ETS Registry could be prescribed as a ‘foreign registry’ 
in the Australian National Registry of Emissions Units Regulations 2011.445  Regarding the 
registry linkage, the European Commission and the Australian Government issued a joint 
consultation paper on registry options of the linkage. 446  They will work to agree registry 
arrangements for the interim link by mid-2013.447  
4. The EU ETS Case Law and its Influences 
4.1 Introduction 
Alongside implementation of the EU ETS described in previous sections, the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (CJEU) and the Court of First Instance (CFI) are developing their 
jurisprudence on the EU ETS. As various entities such as the European Commission, Member 
States and private companies bring cases to these Courts, these cases form the basis of legal 
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analysis on EU ETS case law. Some academic researchers have begun to study EU ETS case law 
through categorising cases by phases of development,448 or by applicants.449  
This section categorises EU ETS cases by core legal issues and provides an analysis of the 
arguments and judgments of some of them, based on a literature review and case study. I 
examine the opinions of the CJEU and CIF regarding specific issues and look at the influence 
these decision may have on the EU ETS’s future development. 
4.2 Core issue 1: Legal challenge to the Commission decision on the National Allocation 
Plans 
4.2.1 United Kingdom v Commission450 
4.2.1.1 Facts 
Following public consultation and publication of a draft NAP, the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland (UK) submitted its provisional NAP and notified the Commission. 
The total allowances set in the UK’s provisional NAP for the first phase were subject to further 
revision because of on-going work. Following an initial examination, the Commission informed 
the UK that its notification was incomplete and requested information necessary to define the 
Commission’s position on the proposed plan. The Commission is required to define its position 
no later than three months after receipt of the additional information. Despite the UK’s 
explanation regarding finalisation of its energy and emissions projections, the Commission 
adopted a negative decision concerning the proposed NAP by the UK.451 The UK provided 
additional information and requested that the Commission considered its amended NAP. 
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emission allowances notified by United Kingdom in accordance with Directive 2003/87/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council, C(2004)2515/4 final, 7 July 2004. Generally, main contents of this decision are, (1)  
the UK NAP’s information on in which manner new entrants participating in the EU ETS is incompatible with 
criteria 6 of Annex III to Directive 2003/87/EC; (2) the UK NAP fails to specify installations situated within the 
territory of Gibraltar, and the quantities of allowances to be allocated to each such installation, is incompatible with 
criteria 10 of Annex III to Directive 2003/87/EC; (3) the Commission requested the UK to provide additional 
information mentioned in foregoing two points by 30 September 2004 at the latest, no objection shall be 
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The Commission Decision C (2005) 1081 adopted on 12 April 2005 stated:  
(1) The UK was not entitled to submit a provisional NAP, according to Article 9(1) of Directive 
2003/87/EC. (2) The UK was only entitled to amend its NAP to address incompatibilities 
identified in the Commission’s Decision C (2004) 2515/4452, according to Article 9(3). (3) 
Article 3 (1) of the Decision C (2004) 2515/4 excludes an increase in total allowances; therefore, 
the UK’s proposed amendments (on 10 November 2004 to increase allowances to 756.1 million 
tonnes of CO2 and on 18 February 2005 implying an increase by 19.8 million tonnes of CO2) 
were inadmissible. 
In response, the UK brought the case to the court and asking that the decision be annulled. The 
UK challenged the Commission’s decision regarding the UK’s right to amend the draft NAP and 
the Commission’s right to reject amendments to the draft NAP.  
4.2.1.2 Findings of the Court 
First, the CFI examined the roles and powers allocated to the Commission and Member States 
respectively under the Directive, particularly Articles 9, 10 and 11, to determine whether the 
Commission was entitled to reject the UK’s amendments. In other words, the Court analysed the 
competence of the Commission and of a Member State to implement those articles. 
Based on Directive 2003/87/EC, each Member State was obligated to develop an NAP stating 
the total quantity of allowances to be allocated for Phase I. Also, the Member State had to 
publish its NAP and notify the Commission and other Member States by 31 March 2004. In 
addition to the total allowances, Member States were obligated to decide how the allowances 
were to be allocated to each installation. Both decisions were required by 1 October 2004, based 
on its NAP, developed pursuant to Article 9, in accordance with Article 10. The Commission’s 
competence was clarified in Article 9(3) of the same Directive. The Commission may reject the 
NAP within three months of notification by a Member State, if the NAP is incompatible with 
criteria in Annex III or with Article 10. This provision is the legal basis for the Commission’s 
ability to reject a Member State’s NAP. In addition, no other ground for rejection of an NAP 
besides incompatibilities with criteria in Annex III or with Article 10 is provided in the 
Directive.453  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
raised;......(4) on 10 November 2004, the UK notified to the Commission, proposed to increase the total quantity of 
allowance in the draft NAP. The Commission indicated the UK’s proposed amendments were inadmissible at the 
meeting on 2 December 2004. 
452 Commission Decision of 7 July 2004 concerning the national allocation plan for the allocation of greenhouse gas 
emission allowances notified by United Kingdom in accordance with Directive 2003/87/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council (7 July 2004) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/pre2013/nap/docs/uk_final_en.pdf> C(2004)2515/4 final. 
453 United Kingdom (n 450), para 54. 
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A Member State’s decision on total allowances, discussed under Article 11 (1), is subject to the 
condition contained in Article 9(3), that any amendment to the NAP requires Commission 
acceptance.454 However, Article 9(3) does not lay down any limit to allowable amendments. The 
Commission must accept any amendments to an NAP, whether proposed by the Member State or 
raised by the Commission to overcome any incompatibility, before a final decision is made on 
the NAP, under Article 11(1) of the Directive.455 Therefore, the UK was entitled to submit 
amendments to its NAP. In addition, the Court emphasised that the Member State must take into 
account public comments when setting the quantity of allowances in their NAPs, in accordance 
with Article 11(1). Therefore, amendments to a NAP also may be raised following the public 
consultation (after initial notification to the Commission and before the definite adoption). If 
amendments to the NAP are made after the three-month period expires or after the Commission’s 
decision and these amendments are limited in the Commission’s expectation, then the public 
would be deprived of its effectiveness.456 Finally, the court analysed the right to amend the NAP 
based on the objectives of the EU ETS. It determined that the Commission must assess whether 
the Member State’s proposed amendments are compatible with the criteria in Annex III or with 
Article 10, because the EU ETS’s cost-effectiveness is based on accurate emissions data and 
information for market functioning. Consequently, based on the directive and the general 
structure and objectives of the EU ETS, the CFI decided that the Commission could not restrict a 
Member State’s right to propose amendments or the categories of amendment.457 
Then the Court analysed the Commissions’ review power in Article 9(3) of the 2003/87/EC 
Directive. The Court held that it is immaterial whether the UK’s NAP was characterised as 
‘provisional’ once it was clear that the UK was entitled to propose amendments to the 
Commission after the expiry of the three-month period or after a rejection decision, according to 
Article 9(3).458 The Commission argued that the three-month review period should begin only 
after the Member State had provided all information that the Commission required to consider 
the NAP as complete, because without all necessary information, the Commission could not 
begin the review process. The Commission maintained that a Member State cannot submit an 
incomplete NAP to postpone the Commission’s decision. Correspondingly, the Court accepted 
this argument, and held that because the UK had announced its NAP as ‘provisional’, the 
Commission was entitled to reject the NAP, and to oblige the UK to notify regarding a new and 
complete NAP before 30 November 2004. In addition, the Court noted that the Commission must 
review the UK’s NAP according to the criteria, rather than assuming the UK’s was seeking to 
stop the three-month review process. 
                                                           
454 Ibid, para 56.  
455 Ibid, para 56. 
456 Ibid, para 57. 
457 Ibid, para 61. 
458 Ibid, para73. 
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In summary, the CFI’s ruling appears to ‘clip the wings’ of the Commission which perhaps 
sought to carve out a more dynamic role for itself in the NAP process; therefore, the Commission 
is limited to reviewing only NAPs and amendments against the criteria of Article 10 and Annex 
III.459 
4.2.2 Germany v Commission 
4.2.2.1 Facts and arguments 
The German NAP included some ex-post adjustment measures, such as: (1) de facto closure 
rules; (2) transfer rules; (3) rules for the existing installation; (4) rules for new entrants; and (5) 
cogeneration installations’ rules.460 
(1) The de facto closure rules state that an operator who terminates an installation must return 
any unused allowances, which become excess allowances,461 and if an installation produces less 
than 10 per cent of its average annual emissions, the operator must terminate the installation. If 
emissions are less than 60 per cent of the average annual emissions, its emissions reduction will 
be applied to the portion of allowances issued for the year under discussion; for following years, 
the amount of allowances to be allocated will correspond to the initial allocation decision.462 (2) 
The transfer rules stated that if an operator opens a new installation within three months from 
closure of an old one, any unused allowances allocated to the closed installation need not be 
returned. This rule encourages operators to close old inefficient installations and open new more 
efficient ones. (3) The rules for existing installations applied to those whose operations began in 
2003 or 2004. The quantity of allowance to be allocated was adjusted based on the change in 
actual production volume. The actual production volume was compared with the declared 
production volume used to calculate the initially allocated allowances. The increase of the 
production volume resulted in additional allowances drawn from the reserve. (4) The rules for 
new entrants applied to installations beginning operation on 1 January 2005, or existing 
installations whose production capacity increased. The quantity of allowances was adjusted 
based on the actual activity of the installation in question. The actual activity level was compared 
with the declared activity level used for calculating the initially allocated allowances. (5) The 
rules for cogeneration installations stated that emission allowances would be acquired through 
special allocation in the first allocation year according to the actual volume of electricity 
                                                           
459 Ghaleigh (n 448).  
460 Case T-374/04, Federal Republic of Germany v Commission of the European Communities [2007] ECR II-4431 
para 31. 
461 Directive 2003/87/EC, art 3 (f), (g).’Operator means any person who operates or controls an installation. The 
“person” means any natural or legal person’.  
462 Germany (n 460), para 31. In this way, an ex-post adjustment proportional to the reduction by using the 
production capacity is made. It means the allocated allowances are corresponding to the emissions reduction in the 
year in question. Then the allocation of allowances will follow the initial allocation decision.  
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production. In subsequent years, the amount of allowances may be corrected on the basis of 
electricity production established in the following year.  
The Commission rejected the German NAP in Decision C (2004)/2 Final, because it considered 
certain ex-post adjustments as incompatible with Criteria 5 and 10 of Annex III to Directive 
2003/87/EC. According to Criteria 5, a Member State must not discriminate between companies 
or sectors in such a way as to unduly favour certain undertakings or activities, in accordance with 
requirements of the Treaty.463 Therefore, in the German NAP, the ex-post adjustments measures 
for ‘new installations’ in the ‘transfer rules’ were found to be impairment. According to Criteria 
10, a Member State’s NAP must contain a list of installations covered by the Directive with the 
quantities of allowances allocated to each.464 The Commission decided that following the ex-post 
adjustments465 in the German NAP did not fit the criteria: allowances transfer from a closed 
installation to a new one (‘transfer rules’), lower than foreseen production capacity utilisation 
(‘de facto closure rules’, lowering the actual emissions than annual average emissions level), 
substantial reductions in production utilization (‘rules for existing installations’, based on actual 
production volume) and the rules of cogeneration installations. Germany disagreed with the 
Commission’s decision C (2004) 2515/2, on its NAP and asked that it be partially annulled, in 
particular regarding the provisions related to ex-post adjustments.  
4.2.2.2 Findings of the Court 
The Court’s finding firstly is around the competence between the Commission and the Member 
State in allocation issue. In this case, the CFI considered the competence division between the 
Commission and Member States, including the extent of the Commission’s power of review and 
decision under Directive 2003/87/EC and the extent of the Member States’ freedom of action 
when transposing the directive into national laws, as required by Community law.466  
The Court referred to the third paragraph of Article 249 TEC, which stipulates that ‘a Directive 
shall be binding upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national 
authorities the choice of form and methods’. When the Directive does not prescribe the form and 
methods for achieving a particular result, the Member State’s freedom of action regarding the 
appropriate forms and methods for obtaining the result remains complete, in principle.467 In this 
case, the German NAP provided allocation methods and measures for implementing Directive 
2003/87/EC to achieve the emissions reduction target. In addition, both Germany and the 
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Commission agreed that the question of permissibility of the ex-post adjustments is not expressly 
addressed in the directive. Therefore, adopting the ex-post adjustments would seem to fall within 
the Member State’s freedom of action because these measures were allocation methods for 
implementing the Directive. However, according to EU case law, Member States are required to 
choose the most appropriate forms and methods to ensure a directive’s effectiveness, and 
therefore, the issue relating to ex-post adjustments and Directive 2003/87/EC falls within the 
Commission’s and Germany’s shared competence. The Community can take action only if and in 
so far as the proposed objectives cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can 
be better achieved by the Community, by reason of scale or effects.468 As a supervisor, the 
Commission has the power to review the Member State’s forms and methods and to prove that 
the Member State’s instruments are contrary to Community law, pursuant to Article 211 TEC469 
and 226 TEC.470 So the Commission has the task of proving to the required legal standard that 
the instruments used by the Member States are contrary to Community law, where exercising its 
supervisory power.471 Accordingly, the Commission has the power to review whether the ex-post 
adjustments adopted by Germany NAP are consistent with criteria 5 and 10 of Annex III to 
Directive 2003/87/EC.472 Therefore, Germany had two ways to justify its request to annul the 
Commission’s decision on the NAP, either by arguing that the Commission did not fulfil the 
obligation of burden of proof pursuant to Article 226 TEC and 253 TEC, or by arguing that the 
German NAP did not infringe on the criteria of Annex III to Directive 2003/87/EC.  
Secondly, the Court reviewed the Criterion 10 of Annex III to Directive 2003/87/EC Directive. 
(1) Literal interpretation: the Court upheld that the terms ‘intend to allocate’ did not imply a 
requirement of an exact amount of allowances to be allocated in any language. Various language 
                                                           
468 Ibid, para 79. 
469 Article 211 TEC (now art 244). It stipulates that, in order to ensure the proper functioning and development of the 
common market, the Commission shall (1) ensure that the provisions of this Treaty and the measures taken by the 
institutions pursuant thereto are applied, (2) formulate recommendations or deliver opinions on matters dealt with in 
this Treaty, if it expressly so provides or if the Commission considers it necessary, (3) have its own power of 
decision and participate in the shaping of measures taken by the Council and by the European Parliament in the 
manner provided for in this Treaty, (4) exercise the powers conferred on it by the Council for the implementation of 
the rules laid down by the latter. 
470 Art 226 TEC (now art 258). It stipulates that, if the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfil 
an obligation under this Treaty, it shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the matter after giving the State concerned the 
opportunity to submit its observations. If the State concerned does not comply with the opinion within the period 
laid down by the Commission, the latter may bring the matter before the Court of Justice. 
471 Germany (n 460), para 78. 
472 Ibid, para 82. The Court states that ‘the conduct of this review depends firstly on determination of the meaning of 
the relevant rules of law and entails only secondly complex economic and ecological assessments, in particular 
where the practical consequences of those adjustments for the functioning of the allowances trading scheme are to 
be assessed’… ‘Thus, it is appropriate to examine firstly whether the Commission observed the limits of the relevant 
rules of law, in order to determine whether the contested decision is vitiated by an error of law’. And then ‘the 
second question arises to whether its assessment on the factual and economic level is plausible or vitiated by a 




expressions of Criterion 10 cannot result in the Commission requiring the NAP to contain the 
exact amount of allowances be allocated to each installation, nor can they provide wide 
discretion to the Member State. However, the Member State’s discretion in altering the quantity 
of allowances is not entirely precluded, which gives the legislator a degree of flexibility. 
(2) Contextual interpretation: The Court used a contextual interpretation to analyse Article 9, 11 
and Criterion 9 to Annex III. The Court observed that the Member State’s allocation decision, 
provided by Article 11 (1), is not subject to the Commission’s specific examination like the 
review provided by Article 9.473 Decisions on allocation amounts and methods mentioned in 
Article 11(1) are based on the Member State’s NAP, instead of the Commission’s review 
competence mentioned in Article 9(3). Therefore, later alterations of allocations to an installation 
listed in Criterion 10 are not necessarily precluded.   
In addition, Article 11(1) and with Criterion 9 474  of Annex III refer to a second public 
consultation475 that may produce possible modifications in the NAP following the Commission’s 
review pursuant to Article 9 and before the Member State’s final decision pursuant to Article 11 
(1). Criterion 9 of Annex III mandates public consultation, and a Member State must inform the 
Commission regarding any intended modifications following the public’s participation, after 
publication and notification of the NAP and before the Commission’s final decision pursuant to 
Article 11.476 The ex-post adjustments in the German NAP may result in modifications of the 
allocation quantity and method, according to Criterion 9. Following the second public 
consultation Germany should inform the Commission regarding any changes after publication 
and notification and before the final decision on its NAP. Therefore, the Court held that the ex-
post adjustments (possible amendments following the conclusion made under Article 9[3]) were 
liable to neutralise the Commission’s review, establishing an absolute prohibition on amending 
the individual allocation in the NAP, and held that the exclusion of the ex-post adjustments 
would compromise the practical effect of the second mandatory public consultation.477 In other 
words, if the second public consultation works effectively, alterations will occur. Therefore, the 
Commission’s argument that the Criterion 10 of Annex III prohibits ex-post adjustments was 
misconceived. 
                                                           
473 Germany (n 460), para 105. The Court held a different opinion in the case of United Kingdom v the Commission, 
which found that, the allocation decision mentioned in Article 11 (1) is subject to Article 9. 
474 Directive 2003/87/EC, criterion 9 of Annex III. It stipulates that, “the national allocation plan include provisions 
for comments to be expressed by the public, and contain information on the arrangements by which due account will 
be taken of these comments before a decision on the allocation of allowances is taken”. 
475 Directive 2003/87/EC, art 9(1). ‘The NAP shall be based on objective and transparent criteria, and criterion of 
Annex III, taking due account of comments from the public’. Regarding the public comments, it is interpreted that, 
if appropriate, they can be taken into account when developing NAP. It is emphasised in document COM (2003) 830 
final that, the first round of consultation of the public on the basis of draft plan should have been integrated into 
NAP before the notification of the plan to the Commission and to the other Member States.  
476 COM (2003) 830 final (n 236), para 93, 96. 
477 Germany (n 460), para 105. 
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Besides, the Court observed that Article 11(1) does not expressly prohibit a subsequent 
amendment of the amount of allowances allocated individually; therefore, amendments to the 
NAP and allocation decisions may be possible. Second, Article 9(1) allows the NAP to establish 
other allocation criteria other than the criteria of Annex III, if they are objective and 
transparent. 478  Therefore, the Commission’s review power under Article 9(3) is necessarily 
restricted and limited to the additional criteria of the Member State, based on objectivity and 
transparency. The Court added that, the subsequent amendments of the individual allocations 
occurring under Article 11(1) do not cause the Commission lose all possibility of review (the 
permanent supervision for management and verification under Regulation No 2216/2004) and 
the general supervisory power authorised under Article 211 EC and 226 EC.) 
(3) Teleological interpretation: Applying a teleological interpretation, the Directive’s objectives 
and the provisions of the general system can be analysed to determine whether the objectives can 
be achieved effectively. The principal objective of Directive 2003/87/EC is to reduce GHG 
emissions substantially in order to fulfil the commitments of the European Community and its 
Member States under the Kyoto Protocol. Achievement of this principal objective can be 
determined through some sub-objectives including, maintenance of cost-effective and 
economically efficient conditions, safeguarding economic development and employment and 
preservation of the integrity of the internal market and of conditions of competition.479 Therefore, 
criterion 10 should be analysed on the basis of these sub-objectives. 
The core argument between Germany and the Commission was about the consequences of the 
ex-post adjustments. The Commission stated that ex-post adjustments affect the operators’ 
incentives to reduce emission rates, create uncertainty, prevent operators from investing in 
technology improvements and reduce the amount of emissions reductions that can be achieved. 
On the other hand, Germany contended that ex-post adjustment could prevent operators from 
over-assessing their need for allowances and thus avoid over-allocation, which fits the EU ETS’s 
principal objective. Germany considered the ex-post adjustments to be linked to actual 
production and estimated production, and argued that ex-post adjustments can affect operators’ 
decisions to purchase allowances because of their link to production volume, but cannot affect 
operators’ incentive or certainty. 
The Court listed four relevant analytical criteria, including the relationship between production 
volumes and emission rates, the reconciliation between the principal objective to reduce 
emissions and the sub-objectives to maintain cost-effective and economically efficient conditions, 
the objective of reducing emissions through improvements in technologies and the objective of 
preserving the integrity of the internal market through competition. As a result, the Court held 
that the Commission misconstrued the effect of Criterion 10. Considering the mere fact that the 
ex-post adjustments prevent operators from reducing their production volume, the operators’ 
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emissions rates are not sufficient to doubt the legality of the contested adjustments. 480 
Furthermore, because of the lack of clarity and precision in defining ex-post adjustments in the 
Commission’s guidance on NAPs, the Commission cannot legitimately raise against the Member 
State’s objection on prohibiting the ex-post adjustments. Instead, the Commission should review 
whether the ex-post adjustments are contrary to other provisions of Community law,  
Then, the Court reviewed the application of Criterion 5 of Annex III to Directive 2003/87/EC, 
which requires applying the normal state aid rules stipulated in Article 87 and 88 EC, meaning a 
Member State’s NAP may not discriminate between companies or sectors in a manner unduly 
favouring certain undertakings or activities. The Commission stated that Germany’s ex-post 
adjustments regarding allowance quantities for new entrants were contrary to criterion 5 because 
new entrants are unjustifiably favoured over operators who did not benefit from such 
adjustments. 481  The prohibition on discrimination also involves criterion 6, which obligates 
Member States to explain how new entrants may participate in the EU ETS applying a guiding 
principle of equal treatment. According to EU case law, the methodology that a Member State 
uses to allocate allowances to new entrants must be the same as that used with comparable 
incumbents.482 Therefore, a comparison of the allocation methodology for new entrants and 
incumbents is necessary to assess any discrimination. 
First, the Court found that the de facto closure rules in the ex-post adjustments applied to both 
new entrants and incumbents. But the Commission could not determine why and to what extent 
new entrants were in similar or different situations compared with other operators, and thus 
failed to recognise the ex-post adjustment rules for incumbents. Second, the Court found that the 
allocation method of benchmarking might result in over allocation when rules for existing 
installations are applied to installations beginning operation in 2003 or 2004. However, no such 
risks were identified among installations operating since at least 2002, based on grandfathering 
because this method was based on relatively reliable data. Thus, the Commission argued that 
overestimated allowances in the former situation with ex-post adjustments could bring about 
advantages compared with the latter situation without them. The Court rejected the Commission’ 
argument because the allocation of allowances is not an advantage if they are not required or will 
be returned. In addition, the Court rejected the Commission’s argument that the ex-post 
adjustments created incentives to over-estimate because over-estimation is speculative.483 Finally, 
the Court said the Commission committed a legal error in its application of criterion 5. 
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4.2.3 Poland v Commission 
4.2.3.1 Facts 
Interactions between the Commission and Poland concerning Poland’s NAP followed a clear 
timetable:484 
(1) On 30 June 2006, Poland notified the commission regarding its first NAP. (2) On 30 August, 
2006, the Commission stated that Poland’s NAP was incomplete and was incompatible with 
criteria 2 and 5 of Annex III, and required Poland to add more information within 10 working 
days. (3) On 30 October 2006, Poland asked for an extension to December 2006. (4) On 29 
December 2006, Poland replied to the Commission’s statement and sent the required additional 
information on 09 January 2007. (5) On 26 March 2007, the Commission made a decision on 
Poland’s NAP.  
In Decision C (2007) 1295 of 26 March 2007, the Commission required several changes to 
Poland’s NAP, stating that once the required modifications were made, the plan would be 
approved automatically, but if not, the plan would be rejected.485 Among the Commission’s 
required changes were a decrease of the annual emissions allowances, the elimination of ex-post 
adjustments, additional information on how new entrants will be treated and limitations on the 
use of Kyoto credits. Poland refused the Commission’s ultimatum and requested the CFI to annul 
the Commission’s decision.   
Arguments between the parties fell within two issues: the legitimate adoption of the 
commission’s contested decision after the expiry of the three-month review period and 
infringement of the duty to state reasons (Article 9 [1] and [3]). Regarding the first issue, Poland 
stated that the Commission’s decision was made after the expiry of the three-month period, and 
therefore should be annulled. According to the timetable cited above and Article 9(3), Poland 
maintained that the three-month period began on 30 June 2006, the Commission should have 
started the review since then and provide reasons for any objection,486 but the Commission’s 
decision came out in March 2007, well beyond the three-month period. However, the 
Commission held that the start date of the three-month review period was when the complete 
NAP with all additional information was received on 9 January 2007, by the decision of 26 
March 2007 was within the three-month period.  
                                                           
484 Case T-183/07, Republic of Poland v Commission of the European Communities [2009] ECR II-03395, para 10-
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485 Commission Decision of 26 March 2007, Concerning the National Allocation Plan for the Allocation of 
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adopt a decision before 30 September 2006. 
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In addition, Poland argued that the Commission did not provide adequate evidence for rejecting 
the NAP. First, Poland maintained that the Commission excluded Poland’s data analysis 
provided in its NAP. The Commission claimed that ‘the actual emissions were overestimated by 
reason of the emissions figures for earlier years’ and ‘the data in the NAP disproportionately 
inflated the actual levels of gas emissions’. However, Poland stated that the Commission did not 
have adequate evidence that the data used in the NAP was not reliable.  
Second, Poland maintained that the Commission was not entitled to replace the data in Poland’s 
NAP with its own data obtained from its own method of economic analysis.487 However, the 
Commission stated that the application of the ‘GDP method’ can help assess the conformity of a 
NAP in the light of criteria 2 and 3 of Annex III to the Directive, rather than the ‘sectoral method’ 
applied in Poland’s NAP. In addition, the Commission did not consider itself obligated to use the 
same analysis method that the Member State used in the NAP. The Commission emphasised that 
the most objective and reliable data resulted from a single method of economic analysis for all 
Member States for the assessment of a NAP, pursuant to Article 9(3).488 Based on the equal 
treatment principle, the Commission argued that the same assessment method should be identical 
for all Member States. Poland pointed to the cooperation principle and considered the 
Commission’s action contrary both to the Commission’s guidelines concerning developing a 
NAP and its decision making practices in the matter relevant to other Member States.489 Because 
the Commission did not allow the Member State to submit any observations during the 
assessment of the NAP, Poland argued that the Commission infringed on the principle of 
cooperation between the Community institutions and Member States.490 
Third, Poland accused the Commission of infringing on Article 9(3) of the Directive by setting a 
ceiling for total allowances to be allocated. The quantity of annual allowances in Poland’s initial 
NAP was 279.7 million tonnes of CO2-equivalent emissions, which the Commission stated 
should be reduced to 208.5 million tonnes, a change of more than 26.7 per cent.491 Poland 
refused to accept the Commission’s decision on the quantity of allowances, arguing that because 
the Polish power industry depended on Soviet-era coal, its NAP deserved special treatment. 
However, the Commission stated that Poland’s NAP would result in over-allocation of 
allowances, arguing that a correct assessment of an NAP based on Article 9(3) must avoid a 
surplus of allowances, thereby preventing from risk of a ‘collapse in the market’ as occurred 
during the first phase.492 Therefore, only a sufficient scarcity of allowances can support the 
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Community’s emissions trading scheme. The Commission proposed reducing the quantity of 
annual emissions allowances based on three indicators, verified data for actual GHG emissions in 
2005, forecasts for GDP growth in 2010 and carbon intensity trends for 2005 to 2010.493 Thus, 
the Commission enabled to justify its proposed reduction of annual emissions allowances in 
Poland’s NAP. 
4.2.3.2 Findings of the Court 
The CFI annulled the Commission Decision C (2007) 1295 regarding the allowances allocation 
stipulated in Poland’s NAP for the second phase based on the following analysis. 
4.2.3.2.1 Legality of adopted decision after the expiry of three-month period: The 
Commission’s review power under Article 9(3) 
Regarding the legality of Commission’s decision adopted after the expiry of the three-month 
period, the Court needs to answer the only question whether the three-month review period starts 
on 30 June 2006, even though the NAP was incomplete. The CFI held that, there is no reason to 
suppose that, where an incompatible NAP is notified, the three-month period cannot be started; 
otherwise, the Member State may postpone the Commission’s decision indefinitely by notifying 
an incomplete NAP.494 The Court considered the review period for Poland’s NAP to have begun 
from the notification date on 30 June 2006. 
Next, the Court assessed the effects of the Commission’s letter of 30 August 2006. The Court 
held that review under Article 9(3) does not necessarily result in an authorising decision.495 The 
Commission may not intervene except when considered necessary to raise objections to parts of 
the notified NAP, and to reject the plan if the Member State refused to amend its NAP. If the 
objections and the rejection decision do not occur during the three-month review period 
(implying after the expiry of the review period), the notified NAP becomes definitive and enjoys 
a presumption of legality which permits the Member State to put it into effect. 496  If the 
Commission intervened to raise objections or to request additional information before the three-
month period expired, the three-month period would be suspended until the Member State 
amended its NAP.497 In this case, the Commission’s letter on 30 August, 2006 expressed its 
objections to certain aspects of Poland’s NAP, stating the NAP was incomplete and incompatible 
with criteria 2 and 5 of Annex III. The Commission also required Poland to provide more 
information within 10 days. Therefore, the three-month period was suspended by the 
                                                           
493 Poland (n 484), para 62. 
494 Ibid, para 35. This conclusion is based on the ruling of the court judgements from United Kingdom v 
Commission. It is cited that the amendments to a draft NAP cannot stop the Commission’s review procedure, 
according to art 9(3) of Directive 2003/87/EC. 
495 Ibid, para 41. 
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Commission’s letter and started to run since the Commission received Poland’s additional 
information in January 2007. So Poland’s first plea was dismissed. 
4.2.3.2.2 The Commission’s competence in estimating and setting annual emissions 
allowances 
The Court found that Poland’s second plea consisted of two parts. First, Poland accused the 
Commission of imposing a single economic analysis and excluding the method Poland used in its 
NAP without reasons and ‘without a relevant statement of reasons’; second, Poland accused the 
Commission of infringing on Article 9(1) and (3) of the Directive by replacing Poland’s 
economic analysis method and data in its NAP with the Commission’s own, and by imposing a 
ceiling on the quantity of allowances.498 
For the first part, the Court considered that the Poland accused the Commission of infringing the 
duty to state reasons under Article 253 TEC499.500 Accordingly, the Commission must give 
reasons for its decision on rejecting part of Poland’s NAP by excluding the Poland’s economic 
analysis. The Commission’s fulfilment of this obligations is important, because the exercise of 
the Commission’s power of review under Article 9 (3) of Directive 2003/87/EC entails complex 
economic and ecological assessments, and review by the Community judicature of the legality 
and merits of those assessments is restricted.501 The Commission is empowered only to verify the 
conformity of the Member State’s measures with the criteria in Annex III and Article 10 of 
Directive 2003/87/EC. Furthermore, Article 14 (1) of Directive 2003/87/EC requires the 
Commission to adopt guidelines for the surveillance and declaration of GHGs based on Annex 
IV to the Directive. The Court considered that Article 14 (1) cannot be interpreted as ‘the 
Commission has the power to determine the method of economic analysis and calculation of data 
and impose to the Member State’s NAP’. 502  Thus, the Commission must explain why the 
instruments of economic analysis and GHGs calculation in the Poland’s NAP were incompatible 
with the criteria in Annex III and Article 10 of Directive 2003/87/EC.503  
Regarding the competence of deciding the quantity of emissions allowances, the Court held that 
Member States alone have the power to draw up an NAP and to make the final decision on the 
                                                           
498 Ibid, para 70. 
499 The Treaty of establishing European Community (n 358), art 253. It stipulates that ‘regulations, directives and 
decisions adopted jointly by the European Parliament and the Council, and such acts adopted by the Council or the 
Commission, shall state the reasons on which they are based and shall refer to any proposals or opinions which were 
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total number of allowances to allocate, according to case law.504 Therefore, the Court determined 
that the Commission had exceeded its power margin in setting total amount of emissions 
allowances for Poland. 
Concerning Poland’s accusation that the Commission replaced Poland’s method and data in its 
NAP, the Court admitted that the Commission does have discretion when carrying out complex 
economic and ecological assessments, which cannot be challenged unless it leads to a manifest 
error of assessment.505 However, the Commission cannot replace data in an NAP with its own 
assessment method and data. In addition, the Court found that the Commission can merely 
compare the number of allowances proposed by Poland’s NAP with the results of its own 
calculations, and judge whether an overestimation has occurred.506 Therefore, the Commission 
replaces the proposed quantity of emissions allowances in Poland’s NAP by its own assessment, 
which was annulled by the Court.507  
4.3 Core issue 2: Locus standi of a private company in the CJEU and the CIF 
4.3.1 EnBW Energie Baden-Württemberg AG v Commission 
4.3.1.1 Facts 
EnBW Energie Baden-Württemberg AG as the applicant in this suit complained that the transfer 
rule stipulated in the German NAP gave an unfair advantage to its principal competitor, RWE.508 
The applicant first stated that RWE had acquired an excessive quantity of emission allowances 
by replacing old conventional combustion installations with new ones, in comparison with the 
quantity of allowances the applicant obtained when it closed and replaced its nuclear power 
stations. Therefore, the applicant asked the Commission to reject the German NAP and initiate a 
formal review procedure of state aid. More precisely, the applicant emphasised that RWE 
acquired a significant over-allocation of allowances because four years of emission allowances 
could be allocated to the new installations based on the needs of the earlier combustion 
installations that had been replaced. In addition, the applicant could not receive an equivalent 
advantage by applying the special allocation rule on closing and replacing a nuclear power 
station. The applicant claimed unfair treatment between the combustion sector and nuclear sector 
and that the unfair treatment constituted state aid. 
                                                           
 
505 Ibid, para 89, 102. 
506 Ibid, para 146. The Commission has the discretion of developing its own assessment method. The results from 
comparing the total amount of emissions allowances in Member State’s NAP and the Commission’s own estimated 
emissions allowances, which can give a sign on whether the over-allocation exists. If the overestimation of the 
NAP’s proposed emissions allowances exists, only under this circumstance, the Commission can set aside the data 
set by the Member State’s NAP.  
507 Ibid, para 153. 
508 Case T-387/04 EnBW Energie Baden-Württemberg AG v Commission, [2007] ECR II 1195, para 36. 
143 
 
The Commission rejected the sections of the German NAP related to the ex-post adjustments 
(Decision C [2004] 2515/2 Final of 7 July 2004 [the contested decision]), declaring them 
incompatible with the criteria 5 and 10 in Annex III to the directive. 509  However, the 
Commission’s declaration of incompatibility did not include the subject of the applicant’s 
complaint, and thus, the applicant brought the case to the CFI, seeking an annulment of the 
contested decision. As the defendant, the Commission was supported by Germany and argued 
that the contested decision was not covered by state aid rules, and therefore, the applicant could 
rely on case law concerning the admissibility of actions, based on Article 87 and 88 EC. In 
addition, the Commission argued that the applicant’s plea infringed on the fourth paragraph of 
Article 230 EC because the applicant was neither directly nor individually concerned. Finally, 
the Commission said the applicant had no legitimate interest in seeking annulment of the 
contested decision. 
4.3.1.2 Findings of the Court 
4.3.1.2.1 Theory of locus standi 
Locus standi means the right to bring an action or to appear before a court.510 The right to bring 
an action referred to as locus standi, is not the same for all applicants according to Article 230 of 
EC Treaty (Nice Treaty). Three groups of applicants can be distinguished: privileged applicants 
face now standing restrictions, semi-privileged applicants need to demonstrate that the action is 
intended to protect their prerogatives, and non-privileged applicants have to show that, unless a 
decision is addressed to them, they are directly and individually concerned by a Community 
act.511  
In this case, the controversial issue referred to the interpretation of non-privileged applicants. 
Natural and legal persons are non-privileged applicants because they can bring an action only 
under the conditions stipulated by Article 230(4) TEC. This provision sets extremely strict 
conditions for the standing requirements that private applicants must satisfy. Article 230(4) TEC 
provides that ‘any natural or legal person may, under the same conditions, institute proceedings 
against a decision512 addressed to that person or against a decision which, although in the form of 
a regulation or a decision addressed to another person, is of direct and individual concern to the 
                                                           
509 Ibid, para 38. 
510 Bryan A. Garner (ed), Black’s law Dictionary (third pocket edition), West, a Thomson, 2006 437. 
511 Alexander H. Turk, Judicial Review in EU Law (Edward Elgar, 2009, UK and USA) 40. 
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former’.513 By the reform of the Lisbon Treaty, which led to the formulation of Article 263(4) of 
the TFEU, modified the standing requirements for non-privileged applicants only marginally, 
dispensing with the need to show individual concern in relation to a regulatory act that does not 
entail an implementing measure.514 In addition Article 263(4) of the TFEU states that a natural or 
legal person may bring an action for annulment only in some specific circumstances, namely in 
cases of challenges ‘against an act addressed to that person or which is of direct and individual 
concern to them, and against a regulatory act which is of direct concern to them and does not 
entail implementing measures’. 
In the case of EnBW Energie Baden-Württemberg AG v Commission, the contested decision was 
addressed to the German government regarding the German NAP, adopted as a Commission’s 
decision. Therefore, the Commission’s contested decision on the German NAP fit the 
circumstance for non-privileged applicants: If the decision is of individual and direct concern to 
the applicant and the act or decision is addressed to a third party, the applicant has acquired 
standing, if he can prove his ‘individual and direct concern’ according to Article 230 (4) TEC.  
EU case law has established that direct concern implies a direct link between the challenged 
measures and loss or damage that the applicant has suffered; moreover, if the measure gives 
national authorities in the Member State discretion as to how the measure should be implemented, 
the applicant will not be considered to be directly concerned.515 Accordingly, the burden of proof 
falls on the applicant who must prove he has suffered loss or damage directly because of the 
decision addressed to a third party, and the decision cannot give the Member State discretion to 
exclude from the directive. 
Individual concern was first defined in the Plaumann case, which remains the reference for 
interpretation. That case said that applicants must show that the decision ‘affects them by reason 
of certain attributes which are peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances in which they are 
differentiated from all other persons and by virtue of these factors distinguishes them 
individually, just as in the case of the person addressed’.516 This Plaumann formula is known for 
its narrow interpretation and strict approach. The Plaumann formula has been changed and 
challenged by EU case law. First, the CFI indicated that there was no compelling reason to 
interpret individual concern in such a way as to require that an individual seeking to contest the 
validity of a measure of general application be distinguished from all other persons affected by 
                                                           
513 Juha Raitio, in Francisco Laporta, Alexkasander Pecznik and Frederick Schauer (eds) The Principle of Legal 
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the measure in the same way as the addressee.517 Second, the CFI developed the standing test 
when it held that ‘a natural or legal person is to be regarded as individually concerned by a 
Community measure that concerns him directly, if the measure affects the applicant’s legal 
position, in a manner which is both definite and immediate, by restricting his rights or by 
imposing obligations on him’.518  
Based on the interpretation of Article 230(4) TEC formed under EU case law, in particular the 
interpretation of direct and individual concern, the Court had to assess whether the 
Commission’s decision on the German NAP was of direct and individual concern to the 
applicant company in order to establish standing for EnBW Energie Baden-Württemberg AG. 
More explicitly, the Court had to assess whether the contested decision brought damage or loss 
to the applicant company.  
4.3.1.2.2 The Court’s finding 
The CFI held that an action for annulment brought by a natural or legal person is admissible only 
to the extent that that person has an interest in the annulment of the contested measure, and such 
an interest presupposes that the annulment will be advantageous to the applicant.519 So the 
relationship between the applicant and act is the key point to assess whether the act addressed to 
a third party can affect the applicant through individual and direct concern.  
The Court held that locus standi depends first on the legal nature of the Commission’s review 
procedures and its decision-making power under Article 9(3) of Directive 2003/87/EC, and 
second on whether the contested decision contains an authorisation of the whole NAP.520  
(1) Review of the Commission’s power under Article 9(3) of Directive 2003/87/EC  
The applicant insisted that the Commission’s review power could grant authorisation to a NAP; 
however, the defendant objected to the applicant’s opinion, and noted that the Commission has 
power only to object to certain parts of the NAP or to reject it. The Court noted that the 
procedure for reviewing NAPs constitutes a prior review and does not imply that the procedure 
must lead to a decision creating rights concerning the lawfulness of the measures as notified or 
the possibility of putting them into effect.521 The Commission may not intervene, except as 
necessary to raise objections to certain aspects of the NAP and, if the Member State refuses to 
amend its NAP, to rejecting the plan.522 Therefore, the Commission’s intervention is limited to 
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these two circumstances. Furthermore, a time condition applies. If the objection or rejection 
occurs after the expiry of the three-month review period, the NAP becomes definitive and enjoys 
a presumption of legality and the Member State may enact it. Under this circumstance, the 
Commission’s review is based on a presumption that the NAP is lawful, even if the measure of 
the NAP is subject to a temporary prohibition on being put into effect. So the Commission’s 
decision based on its review power cannot be considered an authorisation in terms of causing 
rights because the NAP does not require any authorisation523. The NAP is presumed to be 
legitimate and can be put into effect without any general authorisation by the Commission.524 
In addition, the Court applied a teleological method in interpreting Article 9(3) of Directive 
2003/87/EC and held that the purpose of the Commission’s review is to provide legal certainty 
for Member States and to ensure how to allocate emissions allowances and manage the 
allowance trading scheme, based on the NAPs. Both the Commission and the Member State have 
a legitimate interest in quickly resolving disputes concerning the NAP and in having the NAP go 
unchallenged by the Commission under Article 226 EC.525  
(2) Legal effects of the annulment of the contested decision 
The Court decided that annulment of the contested decision would procure no advantage for the 
applicant. First, the Court held that the contested decision rejected only certain ex-post 
adjustments to the German NAP, and not the transfer rule as the applicant claimed. Therefore, 
annulment of the contested decision could not achieve the applicant’s purpose.  
Second, the 9th and 10th recitals in the preamble to the contested decision referred to the 
Commission’s assessment on the compatibility of the transfer rule,526 but the Court held that this 
assessment could not be the subject of an application for annulment according to Article 230 EC. 
A regulation or a decision addressed to another person could be subject to the Court’s judicial 
review. According to case law, only enacting terms of a decision can produce legal effects, 
adversely affect a person’s legal interests527 and be subject to judicial review, except these 
recitals are the grounds for an act (regulation or decision) and the basis for its enacting terms. In 
this case, there was no legally binding position regarding the transfer rule adopted in the enacting 
terms of the Commission’s decision, and the reasons stated in the contested decision regarding 
the transfer rule and its compatibility based on State aid rules are not subject to the judicial 
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review under Article 230 EC. 528  Thus, those reasons establishing the transfer rules in the 
contested decision cannot form the basis for the applicant’s locus standi.  
Finally, the Court held that Directive 2003/87/EC could not constitute a lex specialis permitting 
the review of state aid according to the review procedure under Article 9(3). If the Member State 
does not comply with this prohibition, an individual may rely on the direct effect of the third 
sentence of Article 88(3) EC529 before the national courts.530 In other words, if the Member State 
insists on initiating the review procedure of state aid, based on Directive 2003/87/EC, natural or 
legal persons can bring an action to national court based on Article 88(3) EC. Although criterion 
5 in Annex III to Directive 2003/87/EC mentions the principle of non-discrimination when 
creating an NAP based on Article 87 and 88, the Court emphasised that review of state aid 
cannot be established based on this criterion because criterion 5 aims at stipulating a general 
obligation to comply with Community law, but not implying an administrative procedure which 
is carried out according with all the relevant procedural and substantive rules.531 As a result, the 
Court maintained that the review procedure of state aid regarding the transfer rule could not be 
initiated based on Article 9(3). If the Member State insists, then the applicant can bring action to 
national court and temporarily prohibiting implementation of the contested state measure. 
The Court held that the Member State’s decisions are what affect the legal status of individuals 
concerned, pursuant to Article 11(1) of Directive 2003/87/EC. The Member State’s decisions 
based on Article 11(1) will determine the total allowances to be allocated and the allocation 
method of its NAP, which affect individuals because emissions rights are granted to individual 
installations directly. The Court held that the only remedy for the applicant was before national 
courts under national law,532 rather than the Community judicature. 
4.3.2 US Steel Košice v Commission 
4.3.2.1 Facts 
US Steel Košice v Commission533 involved US Steel Košice located in Košice, Slovakia and the 
European Commission. As the applicant, US Steel Košice sought annulment of the 
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Commission’s decision of 20 October 2004 (the contested decision534) regarding Slovakia’s NAP 
for the first phase. Slovakia notified the Commission of its NAP on 6 July 2004 and stated the 
total amount of allowances to be allocated. After review, the Commission proposed that the 
initial amount of allowances be reduced. The Slovakian government accepted the Commission’s 
view and amended its NAP to reduce the allowances. Then on 20 October 2004, the Commission 
adopted a decision mentioning Slovakia’s decision to reduce the total the allowances to be 
allocated. Against this background, US Steel Košice alleged infringement of Article 9(3) and 
criteria 1 and 2 of Annex III of Directive 2003/87/EC on the grounds that the contested decision 
approved an NAP while limiting the allowances amount in the notified NAP. In addition, the 
applicant criticised that the negotiations between the Commission and the Slovakian government 
were not authorised by Directive 2003/87/EC, and were neither transparent nor objective. For 
these reasons, the applicant asked the Court to annul the contested decision. 
The plea of inadmissibility by the Commission was as the same as in EnBW Energie Baden-
Württemberg AG v Commission, in which the Commission argued that the contested decision 
was not of direct or individual concern to the applicant, within the meaning of the fourth 
paragraph of Article 230 EC.  
4.3.2.2 Findings of the Court 
First, the Court held that it was appropriate to consider whether the contested decision could 
have legal effects on the applicant, and then, whether the contested decision could be challenged 
by raising an action for annulment before analysing whether the legal effects of the decision 
were of any direct concern. 
(1) Assessment of legal effects producing by the contested decision 
A decision that produces binding legal effects that affect an applicant’s interests by changing the 
applicant’s legal position may be the subject of an action for annulment under Article 230 
TEC.535 Therefore, the Court needed to assess whether the contested decision could change the 
                                                           
534 Commission Decision of 20 October 2004 concerning the national allocation plan for the allocation of 
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US Steel Košice’s legal position and affect its interests. The Court held that the Commission’s 
decision not objecting Slovakia’s NAP did not affect the applicant’s interests, on the grounds of 
the legal nature of the Commission’s decision-making power and its review procedures under 
Article 9(3) of Directive 2003/87/EC.536 The Court held that the Slovakian government raised the 
issue of decreased allowances during the bilateral discussion, which indicated that the quantity 
had been fixed before the Commission’s decision. Therefore, lowering the quantity of 
allowances did not result from the Commission’s decision, but from the Slovakian government 
itself.537 Even if the Commission had pressured the Slovakian government during the discussion 
and forced it to accept the decreased allowances, the applicant could have challenged the 
government’s performance under domestic law.538 
(2) Assessment of ‘of direct and individual concerned’ 
The Court held that even if the contested decision were a challengeable act under Article 230 EC, 
the act would not be of direct and individual concern to the applicant.539 Direct concern means 
the legal situation of the person or organisation is directly affected by a Community measure that 
leaves no discretion to the addressees (to whom receive and implement the measure), such 
implementation being purely automatic and resulting from Community rules alone without the 
application of other intermediate rules. 540  Persons cannot be individually concerned by a 
Community measure unless they are affected because of certain attributes peculiar to them or 
because of a factual situation that differentiates them from others and distinguishes them 
individually in the same way as an addressee.541 
The applicant challenged the lawfulness of the contested decision, because the decision 
decreased the total quantity of allowances to be allocated. The Court stated that the total quantity 
of emission allowances allowed to be emitted by all the Slovak installations in the NAP cannot 
be of individual concern to the applicant542, because the total amount of allowances does not 
naturally affect specifically on the applicant’s acquired amount. 
US Steel Košice argued that it had a direct concern because the company would inevitably 
receive fewer individual allowances than the initial NAP had provided because the total 
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allowances had been lowered. The Court disagreed with the applicant’s argument for the two 
reasons: (1) The Court held that the contested decision could not affect the amount of allowances 
allocated to individual installations, and a decrease in total allowances did not necessarily result 
in a decrease in allowances allocated to an individual installation543; (2) The Court held that 
neither Directive 2003/87/EC nor the contested decision effects an automatic distribution of the 
total quantity of allowances among the individual installations.544 The allocation method and 
amount fall within the Member State’s discretion, so Directive 2003/87/EC cannot directly 
concern to the applicant. Additionally, the Court found that the contested decision does not result 
the reduction of the amount of allowances to be allocated, but the exercise of the Slovak 
Government’s discretion in allocation regime.545 
4.3.3 The second US Steel Košice v Commission 
4.3.3.1 Facts 
In the second US Steel Košice v Commission case,546 US Steel Košice asked for an annulment of 
the Commission’s decision of 29 November 2006 (the contested decision) regarding Slovakia’s 
NAP for the second phase. In the November 2006 decision, the Commission stated that 
Slovakian authorities must reduce the total annual quantity of allowances by more than 10 
million tonnes of CO2 equivalent, consistent with the assessments of actual and projected 
emissions reduction.547 However, US Steel Košice argued that the Commission’s decision had 
imposed an amount of allowances on the Slovakian government, and therefore had usurped 
powers reserved for Member States, according to Article 9(3) and Article 11(2) of Directive 
2003/87/EC.548 Also the company claimed that the contested decision was unlawful because the 
Commission had applied an abstract mathematical formula without public consultation and that 
disregarded factors specific to Slovakia could affect emissions in the second phase.549 In addition, 
US Steel Košice claimed that the Commission misused its power in order to cause a shortage of 
allowances and to increase the carbon price.550  
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In response, the Commission argued that the applicant’s case was inadmissible because the 
contested decision did not have a direct concern to the applicant under Article 230 EC. The 
admissibility of the applicant’s claim depended on whether the commission’s contested decision, 
which was addressed to a third party (Slovakia) was of direct and individual concern to the 
applicant. Without this direct and individual concern, the applicant’s claim would be dismissed. 
Therefore, the issue in this case also centred on whether the Commission’s contested decision 
could be challenged under Article 230 EC. 
4.3.3.2 Findings of the Court 
The CFI recalled two criteria for direct concern under Article 230 EC. First, the measure must 
directly affect the legal situation of the person concerned.551 Second, the measure must leave no 
discretion to its addressees who are entrusted with the task of implementing it, such 
implementation being purely automatic and resulting from Community rules alone without 
application of other intermediate rules.552 The second criterion is also satisfied if addressees’ 
failure to enact the community measure is purely theoretical and their intention to conform is not 
in doubt.553 The Court recalled that the national authority’s decisions on allocation of allowances 
to installations have a direct effect on individual operators’ legal situation, according to Article 
11(1) and (2) of Directive 2003/87/EC. In addition, the Court pointed out that the contested 
decision already expressly confirmed that the Slovakian government had discretion in allocating 
allowances to individual installations as long as the limit on total allowances was not exceeded. 
Therefore, the Court objects the applicant’s fear that the decrease of the total quantity of 
allowances imposed by the contested decision can lead to a reduction in the quantity of its 
individual allowances.554 
The applicant also argued that the NAP had been rejected because it resulted in state aid,555 
according to recitals 17 to 21 of the contested decision, which caused the applicant to have direct 
concern.556 However, the Court held that the contested decision did not cause doubt about the 
authorisation of state aid. Furthermore, although the Commission disagreed with the applicant’s 
interpretation of the production limits, the Commission focused only on the aspect of allocating 
allowances and addressed the issue of state aid only in a purely provisional and preliminary 
                                                           
551 Ibid, para 54-55. Also Case C-386/96 P Dreyfus v Commission [1998] ECR I-2309, para 43, and Case T-69/99 
DSTV v Commission [2000] ECR II-4309, para 24. 
552 Ibid. Dreyfus v Commission, paragraph 44; see also, to that effect, Case 11/82 Piraiki-Patraiki and Others v 
Commission [1985] ECR 207, para 7 – 10. 
553 Ibid. 
554 US Steel Košice (n 546), para 62-64. 
555 The state aid in the contested decision consists of a tax exemption granted the applicant under primary 
Community law, namely point 2(a) of Title 4 of Annex XIV to the Act of Accession, up to an amount of USD 500 
million.  
556 US Steel Košice (n 546), para 67. 
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manner. The Court considered that this provisional assessment of production caps in the light of 
the rules on state aid could not be interpreted as a definitive decision. Such a decision on Article 
9(3) of Directive 2003/87/EC allowed the Commission to conduct only a prima facie assessment 
of state aid, and such a decision cannot result in legal consequences as a decision based on 
Article 88 EC. Therefore, the applicant can claim the inadmissibility of the decision resulted 
based on Article 88 EC according to EU case-law, however, it cannot claim the annulment of the 
decision based merely on Article 9(3) of Directive 2003/87/EC.557 
4.4 Core issue 3: Inclusion of the aviation sector 
4.4.1 Facts 
From an economic and environmental viewpoint, EU Member States recognised that the aviation 
sector should be included in the EU ETS. As a result, Directive 2008/101/EC was adopted to 
provide amendments to Directive 2003/87/EC to include aviation activities in the EU ETS 
beginning on 1 January 2012, and thereby reduce aviation’s impact on climate change. 558 
Accordingly, emissions from aviation activities listed in Annex I 559  which depart from an 
aerodrome situated in territory of a Member State and those which arrive in such an aerodrome 
from a third country shall be included in the EU ETS.560 Simply put, emissions from flights that 
depart from or arrive in an aerodrome in a Member State to which the treaty applies will be 
included in the EU ETS. 
Several American and Canadian airlines and airline associations contested the measures to 
implement Directive 2008/101/EC (the contested Directive) in the United Kingdom. They 
contended that the directive infringed the Chicago Convention, the Kyoto Protocol, and in 
particular, the Open Skies Agreement because it imposed a form of tax on fuel consumption. In 
addition, they argued the Directive violated certain principles of customary international law by 
attempting to apply the EU allowance trading scheme beyond the EU’s territorial jurisdiction.561 
According to settled case law, national courts do not have the power to declare acts of EU 
institutions invalid; therefore, Article 267 of the TFEU562 confers jurisdiction to the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) to determine the validity of an act of the European Union, 
                                                           
557 Ibid, para 73 
558 Directive 2008/101/EC (n 179), para 14. 
559 Ibid, para 1 of Annex. The title “the categories of activities to which this Directive applies” replaces the original 
one in the Annex I to Directive 2003/87/EC. Besides, category of activities, together with the exemption of aviation 
activities is added. 
560 Ibid, art 1. 
561 Court of Justice of the European Union, ‘The Directive Including Aviation Activities in the EU’s Emissions 
Trading Scheme is Valid’ (21 December 2011) Press Release No. 139/11 
<http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2011-12/cp110139en.pdf> accessed 27 December 2012, 1. 
562 TFEU (n 137), art 267. 
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such as Directive 2008/101/EC.563 Accordingly, the High Court of Justice of England and Wales 
asked the CJEU to determine the validity of the contested Directive.  
To do so, the Court needed to ask following main questions: First, which principles of customary 
international law and provisions of international treaties may be relied upon for a preliminary 
ruling on the validity of the contested Directive? Second, is the contested Directive valid in the 
light of customary international law and international treaties?  
4.4.2 Findings of the Court 
4.4.2.1 Customary international law  
The CJEU held that the following three international legal principles can be applied to assess the 
validity of the contested directive: (1) Each state has sovereignty over its airspace; (2) no part of 
the high seas may come under the sovereignty of a state; and (3) freedom to fly over the high 
seas is guaranteed. 
4.4.2.2 International treaties  
The High Court of Justice of England and Wales asked the CJEU to determine which 
international treaties were applicable to the contested directive.564 In making its determination, 
the court had to ascertain whether certain conditions were satisfied in the case. 565  These 
conditions included:  
(1) The European Union must be bound by the international law.  
(2) The Court can examine the validity of EU law in the light of an international treaty only 
when the nature and the broad logic of the treaty allows it; in other words, the treaty must 
‘establish rules intended to apply directly and immediately to individuals and to confer upon 
them rights and freedoms capable of being relied upon against states’.  
                                                           
563 Judgment of the Court in C-366/10 ‘Air Transport Association of America and others v. Secretary of State for 
Energy and Climate Change’ (21 December 2011) 
<http://curia.europa.eu/juris/celex.jsf?celex=62010CJ0366&lang1=en&type=NOT&ancre=> accessed 27 December 
2012 (Judgement of the aviation case), para 46-48. 
564 Ibid, para 45. The question 1 referred to the Court of Justice is, are any or all of the following rules of 
international law can be relied on: (a) the principle of customary international law that each State has complete and 
exclusive sovereignty over its airspace; (b) the principle of customary international law that no State may valid 
purport to subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty; (c) the principle of customary international law of 
freedom to fly over the high seas; (d) the principle of customary international law that aircraft overflying the high 
seas are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the country in which they are registered, (e) Articles 1, 11, 12, 15 and 
24 of the Chicago Convention; (f) Articles 7, 11(2)(c) and 15(3) of the Open Skies Agreement; (g) Article 2(2) of the 
Kyoto Protocol. 
565 Ibid, para 50. 
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(3) The provisions of the applicable international treaty must be unconditional and sufficiently 
precise; that is, the provision contains a clear and precise obligation that is not subject in its 
implementation or effects to the adoption of any subsequent measure.566  
These conditions were established in the Intertanko case, and last two are essentially the criteria 
for direct effect or direct application of the agreement within the EU’s legal order.567 
4.4.2.2.1 Whether the Chicago Convention can be relied upon 
Based on these conditions, the Court decided the Chicago Convention could not be applied to 
determine the contested directive’s validity because it did not satisfy the first condition. 
Although all EU Member States were contracting parties to the Chicago Convention, the Court 
held that the EU was not a contracting party and could not be bound by the convention.568 
According to Article 351 of the TFEU, the institutions of the EU must not impede Member 
States from performing the obligations stemming from the Chicago Convention; however, the 
Court explained that this duty does not bind the EU under this convention.569 In addition, the EU 
has not entirely assumed the powers of Member States to apply measures of the Chicago 
Convention because Member States retain powers under the Convention; therefore, the EU is not 
bound by the Chicago Convention.570 
The CJEU’s decision not to apply the Chicago Convention in this case was controversial because 
of the fundamental place the Convention holds in international civil aviation. 571 The Chicago 
Convention, often described as the ‘constitution’ of international civil aviation, established the 
ICAO as the global forum for cooperation among its 191 states in all fields of civil aviation, and 
is the primary source for of public international air law.572 
4.4.2.2.2 Whether the Kyoto Protocol can be relied upon 
The EU is a contracting party to the Kyoto Protocol, which satisfies the first of the three 
conditions for applying it to this case. Next, the Court considered, whether the nature and the 
broad logic of the Protocol precluded such examination, and whether its provisions, in particular 
                                                           
566 Ibid, para 51-55. 
567 Marise Cremona, ‘External Relations and External Competence of the European Union: the Emergence of an 
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Press, 2011) 242. 
568 Judgement of the Aviation Case (n 563), para 3, 60. 
569 Ibid, para 61-62. 
570 Ibid, para 70-71. 
571 Verki Michael Tunteng and others, ‘Legal analysis on the inclusion of civil aviation in the European Union 
emissions trading system’ (May 2012) CLSDL, centre for international sustainable development law 




Article 2(2), are unconditional and sufficiently precise to confer on individuals the right to rely 
upon the provisions in legal proceedings.573 
The Court held that Article 2(2)574 of the Kyoto Protocol was not unconditional and sufficiently 
precise to be relied upon. Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol stipulates that the parties shall work 
through the International Civil Aviation Organisation575  (ICAO) and International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) to reduce GHG emissions from aviation and marine bunker fuels. However, 
based on the content of this provision, the Court determined that this provision did not confer to 
individuals the right to rely upon the provision in legal proceedings, such as contesting the 
validity of the Directive 2008/101/EC. Therefore, the Court refused to review the contested 
Directive in light of the Kyoto Protocol. 
4.4.2.2.3 Whether the Open Skies Agreement can be relied on 
The EU approved the Open Skies Agreement 576 with the United States in Decision 2007/339577 
and Decision 2010/465,578 and its provisions form an integral part of the legal order of the EU579 
and have legally binding force, which satisfies the first of the three conditions. Next, the Court 
assessed whether the nature and the broad logic of the Open Skies Agreement could be used to 
determine the validity of the contested Directive.  
The Court found that Article 19 of the Open Skies Agreement establishes certain rules designed 
to apply directly and immediately to airlines, which thereby confers upon them rights and 
                                                           
573 Judgement of the Aviation Case (563), para 74. 
574 The Kyoto Protocol, art 2(2). “The Parties included in Annex I shall pursue limitation or reduction of emissions 
of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol from aviation and marine bunker fuels, working 
through the International Civil Aviation Organization and the International Maritime Organization, respectively”. 
575 Convention on International Civil Aviation, <http://www.icao.int/publications/Pages/doc7300.aspx> accessed 23 
December 2012. “The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) was founded in 1944 by the original 54 
Contracting States who signed the Convention on International Civil Aviation (The Chicago Convention of 1944).” 
576 The Open Skies Agreement means “the Air transport agreement between the European Community and the 
United States”. The contents can be found in the Decision 2007/339 and Decision 2010/465/EC. 
577 Decision of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States of the European 
Union, meeting within the Council of 25 April 2007 on the signature and provisional application of the Air Transport 
Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, on the one hand, and the United States of 
America, on the other hand OJ 2007 L 134 (Decision 2007/339). The decision was adopted on the signature and 
provisional application of the Open Skies Agreement, on 25 April 2007. This decision is the result of the first state 
air transport agreement. 
578 Decision of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States of the European 
Union, meeting within the Council of 24 June 2010 on the signing and provisional application of the Protocol to 
Amend the Air Transport Agreement between the United States of America, of the one part, and the European 
Community and its Member States, of the other part, OJ 2010 L 223 (Decision 2010/465/EU). The decision was 
adopted on signing and provisional application of the Protocol to Amend the Air Transportation Agreement between 
the United States of America, on 24 June 2010. It is the result of the second stage negotiation on the Air Transport 
Agreement between the US and the EU. 
579 Judgement of the Aviation Case (n 563), para 79. 
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freedoms that can be relied upon against the parties to the Agreement.580 According to Article 
19(1) of the Agreement, any dispute relating to the agreement’s application or interpretation may 
be referred to a person or body for decision by Agreement of the parties.581 If the parties do not 
agree, either party may request that the dispute be submitted to arbitration, according to Article 
19(2–8), which establishes the procedures for selecting tribunals and their obligations. Therefore, 
the provisions of this Agreement are precise and unconditional for its application. In addition, the 
Agreement’s nature and broad logic does not preclude its judicial application. As a result, the 
Court enables to analyze the validity of Directive 2008/101/EC in light of Articles 7, 11(1), 11(2) 
(c) and 15(3) of the Open Skies Agreement.  
(1) Article 7(1) 
According to Article 7 (1)582 of the Open Skies Agreement, the Court found that operators of 
commercial aircraft arriving at or departing from aerodromes in EU Member States are subject to 
the EU ETS because the aircraft use these aerodromes.583 Directive 2003/87/EC relates to the 
admission to or departure from Member States’ territory of aircraft engaged in international 
navigation (both European and transatlantic) and applies to the airport utilised by the airlines of 
the other party (the United States).584 In short, the Court found that Directive 2008/101/EC was 
valid based on Article 7(1) of the Open Skies Agreement. 
(2) Article 11(1) and (2)(c) 
The America Transportation Association (ATA) and others claimants contended that the 
contested Directive infringed the obligations established in Article 11(1)585 and (2)(c)586 of the 
                                                           
580 Ibid, para 84. 
581 Decision 2007/339/EC (n 571), art 19(1).  
582 The Open Skies Agreement, art 7 (1). It stipulates that ‘The laws and regulations of a Party relating to the 
admission to or departure from its territory of aircraft engaged in international air navigation, or to the operation and 
navigation of such aircraft while within its territory, shall be applied to the aircraft utilised by the airlines of the 
other Party, and shall be complied with by such aircraft upon entering or departing from or while within the territory 
of the first Party.’ 
583 Judgement of the Aviation Case (n 563), para 132-133. 
584 Decision 2007/339/EC (n 571), art 7(1).  The laws and regulations of a Party relating to the admission to or 
departure from its territory of air craft engaged in international air navigation ……shall be applied to the air-craft 
utilised by the airlines of the other Party, and shall be complied with by such aircraft upon entering or departing 
from or While within the territory of the first Party. 
585 Decision 2007/339/EC, art 11(1). It stipulates that ‘on arriving in the territory of one Party, aircraft operated in 
international air transportation by the airlines of the other Party, their regular equipment, ground equipment, fuel, 
lubricants, consumable technical supplies, spare parts (including engines), aircraft stores (including but not limited 
to such items of food, beverages and liquor, tobacco and other products destined for sale to or use by passengers in 
limited quantities during flight), and other items intended for or used solely in connection with the operation or 
servicing of aircraft engaged in international air transportation shall be exempt, on the basis of reciprocity, from all 
import restrictions, property taxes and capital levies, customs duties, excise taxes, and similar fees and charges that 
are (a) imposed by the national authorities or the European Community, and (b) not based on the cost of services 
provided, provided that such equipment and supplies remain on board the aircraft’.  
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Open Skies Agreement.587 These obligations require the EU to exempt an aircraft’s fuel load 
from taxes, duties, fees and charges of the other party’s aviation activities on the basis of 
reciprocity. However, the claimants contended that the expenses that would result from 
extending the EU ETS to aviation activities constituted a form of taxes, duties, fees and charges 
on fuel load. 
In considering this claim, the Court differentiated between the objective of Article 11 of the 
Open Skies Agreement and the objective of the EU ETS. The Court found that the objective of 
the former was to regulate the economic costs of air transport and to ensure equal conditions for 
airlines; on the other hand, the objective of the latter was to achieve a certain emissions reduction 
at the lowest cost and in turn, produce environmental outcomes.588 Next, the Court pointed out 
the differences between additional costs airlines may incur from participation in the EU ETS and 
obligatory levies on fuel possession and consumption, and found no direct link between the 
quantity of fuel held or consumed by an aircraft and the pecuniary burden on the aircraft’s 
operator as a result of participation in the EU ETS.589 The Court said the actual costs for the 
aircraft’s operator depend on the quantity of allowances initially allocated to the operator and the 
market price of the allowances rather than the quantity of allowances that must be allocated.590 
However, obligatory levies on fuel depend directly on the amount of fuel possessed or consumed 
by the airlines. Therefore, additional costs for the aircraft’s operator may incur from participating 
in the EU ETS, which do not constitute obligatory levies as meant in Article 11 of the Open 
Skies Agreement. In addition, the Court recognised that the additional costs from the EU ETS 
are different from duties, taxes, fees, or charges on fuel consumption. Additional costs from the 
EU ETS, as amended by the contested Directive, are not intended to generate revenue for public 
authorities, and therefore, unlike with obligatory fuel levies, there is no necessity for establishing 
in advance a basis for assessment and a defined rate.591  
Based on this analysis, the Court concluded that the contested Directive did not infringe on the 
obligations in Article 11(1) and (2) (c) of the Open Skies Agreement. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
586 Ibid, art 11 (2) (c): There shall also be exempt, on the basis of reciprocity, from the taxes, levies, duties, fees and 
charges referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, with the exception of charges based on the cost of the service 
provided: fuel, lubricants and consumable technical supplies introduced into or supplied in the territory of a Party 
for use in an aircraft of an airline of the other Party engaged in international air transportation, even when these 
supplies are to be used on a part of the journey performed over the territory of the Party in which they are taken on 
board. 
587  Judgement of the Aviation Case (n 563), para 136. 
588 Ibid, para 139-140. 
589 Ibid, para 142. 
590 The quantity of the allowances allocated initially can be different from the quantity of the allowances must be 
allocated. Here, calculation of the quantity of allowances that must be allocated is based on the fuel consumption, 
because only surrendering a number of allowances equal to their total emissions during the preceding calendar year, 
the emissions reduction target can be achieved most cost-effectively. 
591  Judgement of the Aviation Case (n 563), para 143. 
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(3) Article 15(3) 
The claimants contended that the contested Directive infringed on Article 15(3)592 of the Open 
Skies Agreement because: (1) the Directive’s provisions established an environmental measure 
that is incompatible with the ICAO standards; and (2) the provisions constituted a measure 
limiting the volume of traffic and frequency of service, which violates Article 3(4) of the Open 
Skies Agreement. 
The Court found that the claimants could not provide material indicating the Directive is 
incompatible with the ICAO standards. In addition, the Court noted that the Annex to the ICAO 
Resolution A37-19 provides the guiding principles for the design and implementation of market-
based measures (MBMs) for international aviation, including point (b) ‘MBMs should support 
the mitigation of GHG emissions from international aviation’ and point (f) ‘MBMs should not be 
duplicative and international aviation CO2 emissions should be accounted for only once’. 
Applying these principles, the Court found no indication that MBMs such as the EU ETS are 
contrary to the aviation environmental standards adopted by the ICAO. Also the Court noted that 
these guiding principles correspond to the objective underlying Article 15(7)593 of the Open 
Skies Agreement. 
The Court disagreed with the claimants’ second reason for finding a violation of Article 15(3) of 
the Open Skies Agreement. Article 15(3) and Articles 2 and 3(4) stipulate that when the parties 
to the Agreement adopt environmental measures, these measures must be applied to airlines in a 
non-discriminatory manner.594 The Court found that indeed the foregoing provisions do not 
prevent the parties from adopting measures that would limit the volume of traffic, when such 
measures are linked to environmental protection. In addition, recital 21 in the preamble to the 
contested Directive expressly provides for uniform application of the EU ETS to all aircraft 
operators on routes that depart from or arrive at an aerodrome in a Member State and seeks to 
comply strictly with the non-discrimination provisions of bilateral air service Agreements with 
                                                           
592Art 15(3) reads that, “when environmental measures are established, the aviation environmental standards adopted 
by the ICAO shall be followed, except where differences have been filed. The Parties shall apply any environmental 
measures affecting air services under this agreement according to Article 2 and 3(4) of this Agreement”. 
Art 2 of the OSA requires each Party to allow a fair and equal opportunity for the airlines of both Parties to compete 
in providing international air transportation.  
Art3(4) stipulates that, neither Party shall unilaterally limit the volume of traffic, frequency nor regularity of 
service……except as may be required for customs, technical, operational or environmental reasons (consistent with 
Article 15). 
593 Article 15(7) of the Open Skies Agreement, “if requested by the Parties, the Joint Committee, with the assistance 
of experts, shall work to develop recommendations that address issues of possible overlap between and consistency 
among MBMs regarding aviation emissions implemented by the Parties with a view to avoiding duplication of 
measures and costs and reducing to the extent possible and the administrative burden on airlines”. 
The contexts can be found in “protocol to amend the Air Transport Agreement between the US and the EU and its 
Member States, signed on April 25 and 30, 2007”. 
594  Judgement of the Aviation Case (n 563), para 154. 
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third states.595 The Court found that recital 21 indicates that the contested Directive does not 
violate Articles 2 and 3(4) of the Open Skies Agreement, and consequently, the contested 
Directive does not infringe on Article 15(3). 
4.4.3 Influence of the aviation judgement on international shipping 
With the CJEU judgment, the legality of including aviation activities into the EU ETS was 
confirmed, which raises the issue of whether the same legal arguments can be applied to include 
the maritime sector in the EU ETS. Although no international agreement has been reached to 
reduce CO2 emissions in the maritime sector, the European Commission proposed legislation to 
regulate CO2 emissions from ships in 2013.
596 The MRV proposal for the maritime sector597 was 
published in June 2013 which was considered as the first step to cut shipping emissions. It 
creates an EU-wide legal framework for collecting and publishing verified annual data on CO2 
emissions from all large ships (over 5,000 gross tonnes) that use EU ports, irrespective of where 
the ships are registered.598 Ship owners must monitor and report the verified CO2 emissions from 
the routes, including intra-EU voyages, voyages from the last non-EU port to the first EU port of 
call599 (incoming voyage) and voyages from an EU port to the next non-EU port of call (outgoing 
voyage). 600 This legislative proposal would enter into force on 1 July 2015601  and the first 
reporting period would start on 1 January 2018602. 
Three international agreements can be used to assess the validity of including the maritime sector 
into the EU ETS: the Kyoto Protocol, the International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS).  
 
                                                           
595 Ibid, para 155. 
596 Decision 406/2009/EC (n 181), recital 2; 2009 EU ETS Direct recital 3; European Commission, ‘White Paper on 
roadmap to a single European transport area—towards a competitive and resource efficient transport system’, COM 
(2011)144 final, para 29. This White paper on Transport states that shipping emissions need to be reduced by at least 
40 per cent in 2050. 
597 European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
Monitoring, Reporting and Verification of Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Maritime transport and amending 
Regulation (EU) No 525/2013’ COM (2013) 480 final. (Maritime sector MRV proposal) 
598 European Commission, ‘Maritime Transport: First Step to Reduce Emissions’, IP/13/622, 28 June 2013 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-622_en.htm> accessed 17 April 2014. 
599 Maritime sector MRV proposal (n 597), art 2 (b). It stipulates that ‘port of call’ means the port where a ship stops 
or load or unload cargo or to embark or disembark passengers, excluding stops for the sole purpose of refuelling, 
obtaining fresh supplies and/or relieving the crew. 
600 Maritime sector MRV proposal (n 597), art 2. 
601 Ibid, art 27. 
602 Ibid, art 6 (2). 
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4.4.3.1 Validity assessment in the light of the Kyoto Protocol 
Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol and the IMO can be a legal basis for including the maritime 
sector in the EU ETS, because this provision mentions the obligation of Annex I countries to 
work through the ICAO and the IMO in the pursuit of limiting or reducing GHG emissions. 
However, the CJEU is likely to reject using Article 2(2) because its provisions are not 
unconditional and sufficiently precise.  
Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol regulates only the obligation of Annex I countries, most of 
which are developed countries. However, the Subdivision for Legal Affairs of the IMO is of the 
opinion that mechanisms to reduce GHGs emissions in the maritime sector will be applicable not 
only to Annex I countries, but also to all contracting Parties to IMO, including developed 
countries and developing countries.603  
The obligation of ‘working with the IMO to limit or reduce GHGs emissions’ does not mean that, 
the outcomes of IMO’s decisions must apply exclusively to Annex I countries.604 Consequently, 
any measures to be adopted by IMO in connection with GHGs emissions reduction must be 
applied universally to all ships, as is the case of shipping regulations included in IMO treaties 
such as MARPOL.605 
On the contrary, a developing country may claim that inclusion of the maritime sector in the EU 
ETS violates the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR).606 States share 
a common obligation to protect particular environmental resources,607 such as the air. But states 
have made different historic contributions to climate change and have different capacities to 
solve the problem; therefore they have differentiated responsibility for taking mitigation and 
adaptation measures. As a contracting party to the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, the EU is 
bound by both. However, the Advocate General in the aviation case suggested that ‘neither the 
                                                           
603 Christopher Young, ‘Legal Aspects of the Organization’s Work on GHG Emissions from Ships in the Context of 
the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol’ (The third inter-sessional meeting of IMO’s Working Group on Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions from Ships, IMO’s London Headquarters, 28 March- 1 April 2011) 
<http://www.imo.org/ourwork/environment/pollutionprevention/airpollution/documents/third%20intersessional/11-
legal_final.pdf> accessed 5 March 2013. 
604 Ibid. 
605 Ibid. 
606 The UNFCCC, art 3(1); The Kyoto Protocol art 10. “Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of 
future and present generations of human kind on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but 
differentiated responsibility and respective capabilities”. 
607 The Centre for International Sustainable Development Law (CISDL), ‘The Principle of Common but 
Differentiated Responsibilities: Origins and Scope’ (26 August 2002) The World Summit on Sustainable 
Development <http://cisdl.org/public/docs/news/brief_common.pdf> accessed 6 March 2013. 
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UNFCCC nor the Kyoto Protocol contains specific provisions that could directly affect the legal 
status of an individual.’608  
To apply the CBDR principle in the maritime sector would exempt some ships from IMO 
regulation, which would be counterproductive for emissions reduction or limitation. As an 
example, the Subdivision for Legal Affairs stated, ‘A ship belonging to a ship owner 
incorporated in a developed country, but registered or flagged in a developing country, cannot 
presumptively be considered as a source of emission coming either from the developing or 
developed country’.609 In fact, three-quarters of the tonnage by deadweight of all merchant 
vessels engaged in international trade is registered in developing countries (non-Annex I 
countries of the Kyoto Protocol). ‘It would be ineffective for any regulatory regime to act only 
on the remaining portion, namely one-quarter of the world fleet’.610 
The IMO takes the position that is regulation be applied to all ships with appropriate differences, 
based only on factors like ship type, structure, manning and operational features, irrespective of 
the flag they are flying or the degree of industrial development of the flag State or the State of 
nationality of the owner or the operator.611 
4.4.3.2 Assessment in the light of the UNCLOS 
Presumably, the decision to include the maritime sector in the EU ETS will likely as the aviation 
sector be linked to all ships departing or entering a Member State’s territory. Generally speaking, 
even if specific ships are regulated, their emissions are not limited to a state’s territorial 
jurisdiction, but also occur on the high seas.  
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), as the cornerstone of 
international maritime law,612 plays the role as a ‘framework convention’.613 UNCLOS grants its 
members varying degrees of jurisdiction over the sea, such as sovereignty in ‘internal waters and 
                                                           
608 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott delivered on 6 October 2011, Case C-366/10 The Air Transport Association 
of America and Others < http://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/docs/2011100601_case_c366_10_en.pdf> para 82. 
609 Martine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC), ‘Prevention of air pollution from ships: legal aspects of the 
Organization’s work on Greenhouse Gas emissions in the context of the Kyoto Protocol’ (MEPC 58th session 
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610 Øyvind Buhaug and others, Second IMO GHG Study 2009 (International Maritime Organisation, London, April 
2009) 21. (2009 second IMO GHG Study) 
611 MEPC 58/4/20 (n 609). 
612 2009 second IMO GHG Study (n 610), 18. 
613 The Secretariat of the IMO, Implications of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea for the 
international Maritime Organization, LEG/MISC. 7, 19 January 2012, page 8. It follows that, the provision of 
UNCLOS can be implemented only through specific operative regulations in other international agreement...some 
provisions of UNCLOS requires States to implement the relevant international rules and standards developed by or 
through the competent international organization, such as IMO. 
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the territorial sea and the sovereignty rights in the exclusive economic zone’. The high seas are 
governed by the freedom principle and do not fall under territorial jurisdiction of coastal 
states.614  
UNCLOS also endorses the right of any sovereign state to have a ship register and become a flag 
state, which provides ships with the right to innocent passage through territorial freedom of 
shipping beyond the area. Thus, UNCLOS can explain state jurisdiction on the sea. 
As contracting parties to UNCLOS, the EU and Member States are bound by it. However, 
UNCLOS regulates affairs only between states and cannot be applied directly to individual 
ships.615 The CJEU has stated that UNCLOS lacks direct effect and therefore cannot be invoked 
to render provisions of EU secondary law invalid. 616  Hence, according to the same legal 
reasoning in EU case law, individual ships cannot rely on UNCLOS to challenge the legality of 
including the maritime sector in the EU ETS. 
The inclusion of shipping in the EU ETS and the compliance control will be by making use of 
port state jurisdiction. The relevant legal contexts here are Article 211(3)617, Article 227618 and 
Article 300619 of UNCLOS. 
Article 211(3) of UNCLOS provides that a Party may establish requirements for marine 
environmental protection as a condition for foreign vessels to enter its ports or internal waters. 
To do so, the Party must publicise the requirements and communicate them to the IMO. Based 
on this provision, the maritime sector could be included in the EU ETS as a particular 
                                                           
614 Aoife O’Leary, David Holyoake and Marta Ballesteros, ‘Legal Implications of EU Action on GHG Emissions 
from the International Maritime Sector’ (November 2011) ClientEarth <http://www.clientearth.org/reports/maritime-
ghg-measures-briefing.pdf> accessed 6 March 2013, 12. 
615 2009 second IMO GHG Study (n 610). 
616 Daniel Perez ‘The Inclusion of Shipping in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme: A Legal Analysis in the Light of 
Public International Law’ (October 30, 2012) Revista Catalanade Dret Ambiental (2012) III (2) 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2210858>accessed 8 March 2013, 25. 
617 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 
November 1994) 1833 UNTS 3 / [1994] ATS 31 / 21 ILM 1261 (1982) art 211 ‘Pollution from Vessels’ (3). It 
stipulates that, ‘States which establish particular requirements for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution 
of the marine environment as a condition for the entry of foreign vessels into their ports or internal waters or for a 
call at their off-shore terminals shall give due publicity to such requirements and shall communicate them to the 
competent international organization...... Every State shall require the master of a vessels flying its flag or of its 
registry, when navigating within the territorial sea of a State participating in such cooperative arrangements, to 
furnish, upon the request of that State, information as to whether it is proceeding to a State of the same region 
participating in such cooperative arrangements, and ….to indicate whether it complies with the port entry 
requirements of that State’. 
618 Ibid, art 227. It stipulates that ‘in exercising their rights and performing their duties under this Part, States shall 
not discriminate in form or in fact against vessels of any other State’. 
619 Ibid, art 300. It stipulates that ‘State Parties shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed under this 
Convention and shall exercise the rights, jurisdiction and freedoms recognized in this Convention in a manner which 
would not constitute an abuse of right’. 
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requirement for foreign vessels’ entry, with the objective of this requirement to implement 
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. 
Article 227 and Article 300 of UNCLOS set two limitations on applying requirements for entry 
of ports by foreign vessels. The requirements cannot discriminate against foreign vessels on the 
basis of its flag and the states must execute the requirements in good faith. In the aviation case, 
the Court considered the inclusion of the aviation sector in the EU ETS did not discriminate 
against foreign airlines, because airplanes from both inside and outside the EU are included into 
the EU ETS. Thus, inclusion of maritime sector into the EU ETS can be justified by the same 
legal reasoning. 
4.4.3.3 Assessment in the light of the MARPOL 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 73/78) is the 
main international convention to protect marine environment from operational and accidental 
causes by ships. Through the years, MARPOL has been amended, and new Annexes have been 
introduced. In particular Annex VI dealing with air pollution from ships is relevant for GHG 
emissions. In 2011, IMO adopted mandatory technical and operational energy efficiency 
measures that will reduce GHG emissions from ships. These measures are included in Annex VI 
and entered into force on 1 January 2013.620 The IMO introduced the Energy Efficiency Design 
Index (EEDI) for new ships and the Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP) for all 
ships. Along with the EEDI, four guidelines were adopted by the Marine Environment Protection 
Committee (MEPC) of the IMO with the aim to increase energy efficiency and reduce GHG 
emissions from international shipping.621  
The EEDI for new ships, the most important technical measure, promotes energy efficient 
equipment and engines. It is a non-prescriptive, performance-based mechanism that allows the 
industry to select the technology to use in a specific ship design.622 The SEEMP is an operational 
measure that establishes a mechanism to improve energy efficiency of a ship in a cost-effective 
manner. Thus, the EEDI encourages the design industry to innovate and apply energy-efficient 
technology, and the SEEMP encourages ship owners and operators to consider new technology 
to manage ship performance efficiency over time. 
Until now, there is no result from the IMO’s Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) 
discussion on market-based measures (MBMs). MBM proposals include (1) a contribution or 
                                                           
620 MARPOL and its amendments, <http://www.imo.org/about/conventions/listofconventions/pages/international-
convention-for-the-prevention-of-pollution-from-ships-(marpol).aspx> accessed 5 March 2013. 
621 IMO, ‘IMO Adopts Important Guidelines to Support Implementation of Mandatory Energy Efficiency Measures 
for International Shipping’ (MEPC 63rd session 27 February to 2 March 2012) 
<http://www.imo.org/mediacentre/pressbriefings/pages/09mepc63ends.aspx> accessed 6 March 2013.  
622 IMO, ‘IMO Technical and Operational Measures’ 
<http://www.imo.org/ourwork/environment/pollutionprevention/airpollution/pages/technical-and-operational-
measures.aspx> accessed 6 March 2013.  
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levy on all CO2 emissions from international shipping; (2) a levy only from those ships not 
meeting the EEDI requirement via emissions trading system; and (3) schemes based on a ship’s 
actual efficiency, both by design (EEDI) and operation (SEEMP). However, the MEPC agreed to 
postpone the debate on MBMs, particularly the discussion on the methodology and criteria for a 



















                                                           
623 IMO, Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) (64th Session 1-5 October 2012) 




Chapter 4 China’s emissions trading system: Emergence, implementation and expansion 
1. Emissions trading in China: From SO2 to CO2 
1.1 Introduction 
The success of cap-and-trade is attributed to two factors: First, it provides environmental 
effectiveness as it turns pollution reductions into marketable assets, creating tangible financial 
rewards for environmental performance. 624  Second, it prompts technological and process 
innovations that reduce pollution to required levels or below.625 The empirical results show that 
cap-and-trade can be used to direct resources more efficiently by combing the economics of a 
market-based system for emission rights and the regulations of an emissions reduction 
programme.626  
As the world’s largest carbon emitter, China has received international pressure to adopt 
mandatory emission reduction targets. Before the Copenhagen Conference in 2009, the Chinese 
central government pledged to lower its carbon intensity by 40 to 45 per cent by 2020 as 
compared to its 2005 level.627 This target is challenging without introducing a market-based 
instrument. Cap-and-trade can be an alternative for China to reduce its GHG emissions, due to its 
certainty of outcome and its cost-effectiveness in achieving reduction targets. The cap-and-trade 
is not new to China. It has been applied to control air pollution via an SO2 emissions trading 
programme (ETP).
628  China began trading SO2 emissions in the 1980s at both provincial and city 
levels. 629  Analysing the features of this Chinese SO2 ETP can shed light on cap-and-trade 
practice in China that may be relevant for carbon trading in terms of lessons learned and pitfalls 
to be avoided in a Chinese CO2 cap-and-trade system. Next section provides an overview of 
successes and failures of the Chinese SO2 ETPs based on an analysis of SO2 ETPs in ten 
provinces.630 
                                                           
624 Environmental Defense Fund, ‘The cap-and-trade success story’ 
<http://www.environmentaldefense.org/page.cfm?tagID=1085> accessed 27 July 2012. 
625 Ibid.  
626 Deatherage (n 187), 21. 
627 Jiankun He, Zhiwei Yu and Da Zhang, ‘China’s Strategy for Energy Development and Climate Change 
Mitigation’ (2012) 51 Energy Policy 8. 
628 Wang jinnan and others, ‘SO2 Emissions Trading Programme: a Feasibility Study for China’ 
<http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/international/china/feasibility.pdf> accessed July 2012.  , 4. 
629 Yang Jintian, Schreifels Jeremy, ‘Implementing SO2 Emissions Trading in China’ (OECD Global Forum on 
Sustainable Development: Emissions Trading, Paris, 17-18 March 2003) <http://www.oecd.org/env/cc/2957744.pdf> 
accessed 27July 2012. 
630 The 10 provincial governments include the provinces of Heilongjiang, Shaanxi, Jiangsu, Hubei, Shandong, 
Zhejiang, Hunan, Shanxi, Hebei, and the municipality of Chongqing. All of them had promulgated the local 
administrative regulation with the similar title ‘measures on implementation of the SO2 emission trading system in 
city or province’s name’. Here the term ‘municipality’ is different from city from an administrative perspective. In 
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1.2 China’s SO2 emissions trading programmes  
Although SO2 ETP started decades ago in China, a national SO2 emissions trading market has not 
been formed yet, and the trading pilots stayed at city and provincial level. In 1999, the cities of 
Benxi and Nantong launched their SO2 ETPs with help from the SAEP and the U.S. 
Environmental Defence Fund. In 2002, Taiyuan city, the capital city of Shanxi province was 
appointed to pilot a SO2 ETP with support from the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the 
Washington DC based Resources for the Future (RFF) and the Chinese Research Academy of 
Environmental Sciences (CRAES).631  After that, the SAEP launched a research programme 
called ‘4+3+1’, including four provinces, three cities and one state-owned enterprise as pilots for 
SO2 ETPs.
632 Until now, pilots for SO2 ETPs operate in local cities and provinces separately, 
without any linkage to each other.  
There are surely achievements made by the Chinese SO2 ETPs. Local SO2 emissions trading 
practice based on policy and legislation, revealed the necessary elements for a cap-and-trade 
system, such as setting absolute and limited emission amounts, defining allocation methods, 
setting flexible rules, establishing a monitoring and reporting program, and a compliance system. 
Firstly, an absolute emissions reduction target was introduced by a ‘total amount control’ (TAC) 
policy and by the Five-Year-Plans (FYPs).  The ‘total amount control’ (TAC) policy sets 
absolute limitations on the total allowable SO2 emissions in accordance with the Law on the 
Prevention and Control of Atmospheric Pollution (PCAP).633 The TAC policy applies to both 
general and specific major air pollution control zones. 634  The State Council, the highest 
administrative body, and the governments of 23 provinces, five autonomous regions and four 
municipalities identified the general zone. Only the State Council can identify the specific zones. 
The specific air pollution control zones identified consist of acid rain control areas and SO2 
emission control areas, and include the watersheds of the Wei, Hai and Liao rivers, and Lake Tai, 
Lake Dian and Lake Chao.635 In this manner, the SO2 ETP is implemented within specific 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
China, both of the municipalities and the provinces stay at the same administrative level, which are under the 
leadership of the central government. In China, there are only four municipalities: Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and 
Chongqing. 
631 Richard D. Morgenstern and others, ‘Emissions trading to improve air quality in an industrial city in the People’s 
Republic of China’ (April 2004) discussion paper 04-16 Resources for the Future <http://rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF-
DP-04-16.pdf> accessed 28 March 2014, 1. 
632 ‘4+3+1’ means, four provinces, Jiangsu, Shandong, Henan and Shanxi; three cities including Shanghai, Tianjin 
and Liuzhou; one state-owned enterprise namely China Huaneng electricity generator.  
633 The National People's Congress (2000), 中华人民共和国大气污染防治法 [The Law on the Prevention and 
Control of Atmospheric Pollution (PCAP)] (adopted April 29 2000) 
<http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=1661&CGid=>, art 15 para 1.    
634 The number of major air pollutants is not fixed. The number of regulated major pollutants decreased from 12 to 5 
from the 9th national FYP period to the 10th national FYP period. Now, the major air pollutants are SO2 and COD. 
635 Ge Chazhong, Chen Ji and Wang Jinnan, ‘China’s Total Emission Control Policy: a Critical Review’ (2009) 7 
Chinese Journal of Population, Resources and Environment 52. 
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geographic areas, rather than the whole country. The second instrument of the SO2 ETP, are the 
Five-Year-Plans (FYPs). From 1953 on, the Chinese FYPs are a series of five- year social and 
economic development plans that show the targets and strategy for the economy, culture, 
environment, education and so on. Attached to the FYPs are TAC plans, a list of emission 
reduction targets for each province. For instance, the TAC plan of the 11th FYP (2006-2010) 
stipulated the SO2 emissions to be reduced by 11.9 per cent by 2010 based on the 2005 emissions 
level (25.494 million tonnes), while not exceeding 22.467 million tonnes.636  
Secondly, the allocation methods are defined in local SO2 ETPs. Quotas for Chinese SO2 ETPs 
are either free of charge or require a payment to an authority. Local regulations require different 
allocation methods (see Table 2). 
Table 2: Allocation rules of emission trading in the 10 local legislations 
Provinces Initial allocation methods Responsible Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) 
Shanxi (2002) Inexplicit definition; EPA of the 
pilot cities determine the 
allocation method 
EPA of three pilot cities: Taiyuan, 
Datong, Yangquan 
Jiangsu (2002) Free of charge Provincial environmental protection 
agency (PEPA) 
Shandong (2007)  Free of charge PEPA 
Hubei (2008) Free of charge PEPA 
Heilongjiang 
(2009) 
Free of charge PEPA 
Zhejiang (2010) Payment to the authority for the 
polluting emissions 
PEPA; 
EPA at city level and county level 
Hunan (2010) Payment to the authority for the 
polluting emissions 
PEPA637; 
EPA of three pilot cities: Changsha, 
Zhuzhou and Xiangtan 
                                                           
636 State Council, the TAC plan of the 11th FYP (2006-2010), (23 August 2006) <http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2006-
08/23/content_368354.htm> accessed 8 April 2014. 
637 In the SO2 ETP in Hunan province, the PEPA is responsible for the emissions trading among power plants that 
have over 300kW electricity capacity. 
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Chongqin (2010) Inexplicit definition PEPA 
Shaanxi (2010) Payment to the authority for the 
polluting emissions 
PEPA 
Hebei (2011) Free of charge PEPA638; EPA at city level and county 
level 
 
Of the five provincial governments that allocated quotas free of charge, two stipulated an 
allocation method. In Shandong province, free allocation is based on its provincial TAC plan, 
with verified actual emissions data and reduction targets for polluters. In Hebei province, free 
allocation is based on the provincial TAC plan and local economic development demands. The 
three remaining provinces have not stipulated how they allocate quotas for free. In addition, the 
provincial governments in Zhejiang, Hunan and Shaanxi 639  have adopted a method called 
‘payment for emissions authorisation of emission quotas’, which translates as ‘paid-use of 
emission permits’ or ‘compensation use of emission permits’.640  
All local regulations stipulate that emitters should be charged for acquiring quotas from the 
Environmental Protection Agencies (EPAs). The fees constitute governmental revenues beyond 
taxation, which the EPAs collect and submit to the financial authorities. Therefore, the EPAs as 
the collectors and the financial administrative authorities are independent from each other. The 
EPA cannot use revenues from the payment for the SO2 emission quotas’ for other specific 
environmental objectives. 
                                                           
638 In the SO2 ETP in Hebei province, the PEPA is responsible for the emission trading between provincial 
infrastructure projects, crossing cities, and thermal power companies. 
639 Definition of “payment for the emissions authorisation” in Zhejiang, Article 3, “Interim Measures on Pilots of the 
Paid-use and Trading of Pollutants Emission Rights in Zhejiang province”: under the requirement of regional total 
amount control of pollutant emissions, the polluter entities and institutions can receive emission quotas after they 
pay the fee for use of emission rights.  
Definition of “payment for the emissions authorisation” in Hunan, Article 3, “Interim Measures on Pilots of the 
Paid-use and Trading of Pollutants Emission Rights in Hunan province”: under the requirement of satisfying the 
environmental quality and achieving the total amount control of pollutant emissions, the polluter entities and 
institutions can receive emission quotas by paying the fee for use of emission rights. 
Definition of “payment for the emissions authorisation” in Shaanxi is not stipulated as clearly as in Zhejiang and 
Hunan provinces. Article 1 of ‘Interim Measures on Pilots of the Paid-use and Trading of pollutants Emission Rights 
in Shaanxi Province’ only provides that the emission rights should not be acquired free of charge, but can be 
received by payment. 
640 This method seems similar to the rationale of the ‘pollution charge system’. It authorises companies to obtain 
emissions permits by paying to the government. This system is based on the principle that the natural resources are 




Thirdly, the banking rules are stipulated in the local legislations on trading SO2 emission quotas. 
All 10 local SO2 ETP have provided banking rules (see Table 3). 
Table 3. Banking rules of the SO2 ETP in the 10 local regulations 






Where to bank 
the quotas 
Shanxi (2002) Allowable Null Null EPA of the 
pilots cities 










Hubei (2008) Null  Null  Null  Null 
Heilongjiang 
(2009) 
Allowable  Extra quotas are 
valid only 
within the 11th 
FYP period 
(2006-2011), 
and cannot be 
banked for use 
in the next FYP 
period 





Zhejiang (2010) Allowable  The extra 
quotas are 
available for 
trading for three 
years 
Extra quotas from 
the closures 





Hunan (2010) Allowable  The quotas are 
available for 
five years 
Extra quotas from 
the closures 
acquired by free 
allocation and 
transactions 










Extra quotas from 
the closures, extra 








Shaanxi (2010) Allowable  
(1) incumbents  




trading for three 
years. After the 
fourth year, 
extra quotas 
must be banked 
Extra quotas from 
the closures 




Hebei (2011) Allowable  The extra 
quotas can be 
banked for two 
years 
Extra quotas from 
the closures 





Banking of available quotas from the closures is limited. The provinces of Hebei, Shaanxi and 
Hunan allow quotas acquired for free and purchased to be banked, but Heilongjiang, Shandong 
and Jiangsu allow banking only if the extra quotas are purchased. Zhejiang province allows 
banking quotas that have been acquired for free.  The trading period for the extra quotas is 
limited in the provinces of Shaanxi, Hebei and in Chongqing city. Once this period has expired, 
extra quotas received for free cannot be purchased anymore, and the EPA renders them null and 
withdraws them. If the quotas are received by purchase, the closure can purchase or bank them 
with the EPA. The limitation of the trading period demonstrates the EPA’s supervisory role in 
banking quotas. The reason for this role is that ownership of natural resources and the authority 
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to use them belongs to the state. Therefore, participants cannot trade quotas received for free as 
their private property when the quotas expire. 
Fourthly, monitoring and reporting requirements have been defined in national law and in 
national guidelines. The system of monitoring and reporting (MR) played an important role in 
establishing the SO2 ETP framework because it addresses the reliability, certainty and accuracy 
of emissions statistics. The Chinese State Administration of Environmental Protection (SAEP) 
enacted two administrative regulations regarding the MR system in 2007, including Measures on 
the Calculation of Total Emissions of the Major Pollutants (calculation measures) and Measures 
on the Assessment and Supervisory of Total Emissions Reduction of Major Pollutants 
(assessment measures). The calculation measures should provide an accurate total count of air 
pollutants, which have to be reported annually and in three-month emission reports.641 Three 
methodologies are used for calculating emissions: the method of monitoring emissions data, the 
material balance method and the emissions rate method.642 The assessment measures stipulate 
three mandatory indicators to assess emission reductions: 1. assessing the TAC target of major 
pollutants and its influences on the environmental quality; 2. assessing the establishment and 
operation of the environmental index system and the MR system; and 3. assessing the 
implementation of the measures and policies for reducing major pollutants. 643 If a participant 
fails to meet his assessment results, the single-vote veto system and the principal officials’ 
responsibility system will be enforced.644 Under the single-vote veto system, the SAEP may deny 
an environmental permission for new entrants or projects if these entities will release additional 
air pollutants. The principal officials’ responsibility system considers the assessments of local 
government performance and of chief officers who control emissions, as an important index for 
evaluating governmental performance.645 The chief officers can neither be promoted nor obtain 
rewards if they fail to meet the emissions control target. 646   Additionally, the SAEP has 
published technical standards and methods for monitoring SO2, which require the use of a 
Continuous Emission Monitoring System (CEMS). 647   A new guideline on the continuous 
                                                           
641 State Administration of Environmental Protection (SAEP), 主要污染物总量减排统计办法 [Administrative 
regulation on measures for the calculation of total emissions of the major pollutants] (in Chinese) (adopted 11 
November 2007) art 3.  
642 Ibid, art 4. The method of monitoring emissions data is applied in the ‘general industries and factories’. The 
material balance method is applied in the power plants, while the emissions rate method is applied in the chemical 
industry, chemical production manufacturing, paper production, and the metal smelting and textile industry. 
643 State Administration of Environmental Protection (SAEP), 主要污染物总量减排考核办法 [Administrative 
regulation on measures for the assessment and supervisory of total emissions reduction of major pollutants] (in 
Chinese) (adopted 17 November 2007) art 6.1.    
644 Ibid, art 9.1. 
645 Ibid. 
646 Ibid, art 9.2. 
647 State Administration of Environmental Protection (SAEP), 固定污染源延期排放连续监测系统技术要求及检
测方法 [Specifications and test procedures for continuous emission monitoring systems of flue gas emitted from 
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automated monitoring of air quality was published and entered into force on 1 August 2013.648 
Local regulations stipulate that resources are required to install CEM and that the data collected 
shall be reported to the EPA.649 
Fifthly, the responsibility of the regulator is clearly defined in the local SO2 ETPs. The regulators 
implement the SO2 ETP and have the following responsibilities. First, the EPAs issue emission 
permits and allocate quotas. An emission permit, which is the prerequisite for participation in an 
ETP, specifies the emissions volume, the pollutant type and the allowed emissions period. One 
emission quota is the authorisation to emit one tonne of SO2. Only after the regulated companies 
receive emission permits they can apply for emission quotas from the EPA. Second, the EPAs 
establish the emissions trading platform, which includes acceptance of trading applications from 
sellers and buyers, activating the trading accounts, publishing of emissions trading information, 
supervising and tracking the trading, and updating transaction information to the EPA. Trading 
platforms established by EPAs are not the administrative authorities. Third, the EPAs collaborate 
with other administrative departments to set the price for each tonne of SO2. In the marketplace 
of SO2 ETP, supply and demand do not define the price of emission quotas, but rather the EPA, 
the financial authority and the administration bureau for the price commodity define the price. 
The EPAs’ role in setting emission prices reflects its strong political intervention by the 
government.  
The SO2 ETPs seem to qualify as an ideal cap-and-trade system. The SO2 ETPs developed so 
reluctantly and stayed in small scale. Main reasons may come from pitfalls in the design and 
inefficiency of then administrative capability. Firstly, the emissions reduction target in TAC 
policy is not covered by the ETP. In fact, the TAC plan allows releasing 22.944 million tonnes of 
SO2, including 22.467 million for command-and-control policy and 0.477 million for piloting 
ETPs.650 When the central government’s report confirmed that the SO2 emissions would be 
reduced by 11.9 per cent, it did not include the 0.477 million tonnes into the total amount. Even 
the real emissions were decreased by 14.29 per cent, over-achieving the planned target learned 
that the contribution of the SO2 ETP is unknown. Academically, the SO2 ETP only consumed 2.1 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
stationary sources (on trial)] (in Chinese) section 1 ‘scope and coverage’ (entered into force 1 August 2007) 
(HJ/T_76—2007, to replace HJ/T 76—2001) 
<http://kjs.mep.gov.cn/hjbhbz/bzwb/dqhjbh/jcgfffbz/200707/t20070716_106786.htm> accessed 9 April 2014.  
648 The Ministry of environmental protection, 环境空气气态污染物（SO2, NO2, O3, CO） 连续自动监测系统安
装验收技术规范 [Technical guidelines on CEMS installation and check] (in Chinese) (entered into force on 1 
August 2013) <http://kjs.mep.gov.cn/hjbhbz/bzwb/dqhjbh/jcgfffbz/201308/W020130802493970989627.pdf> 
accessed 9 April 2014. 
649 Shandong provincial environmental protection bureau (2007), 山东省电力行业二氧化硫排污权交易暂行管理
办法 [Administrative regulation on the interim measures for the SO2 emissions trading pilots in power plant in 
Shandong Province] (in Chinese), art 20.  Heilongjiang provincial environmental protection bureau (2009) 黑龙江
省二氧化硫排污权交易管理办法（试行） [Administrative regulation on the measures for the SO2 emissions 
trading implementation in Heilong Jiang Province] (in Chinese), art 25.  
650 State Council (n 636). 
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per cent of the total emissions reduction target,651 which is a very limited coverage of the SO2 
ETP within the total amount of SO2 emissions. The exclusion of SO2 ETP’s makes the ETP’s 
contribution irrelevant to the achievement of the SO2 emissions reduction target in 2010. It 
indicates that the ETP was not the main tool to reduce SO2 emissions. This small percentage of 
the SO2 ETP’s could not trigger the interest of enterprises to purchase quotas. 
Table 4: Total amount of SO2 emissions reduction in 2005 and 2011 (million tonnes) 





25.494 22.467 11.9 % 14.29 % - 
SO2 ETP - 0.477 - - 2.1 % 
TAC target - 22.944 - - - 
 
Secondly, there are two challenges for ensuring accurate monitoring. Firstly, SO2 ETPs were 
launched without accurate emissions data. Although the CEMS guidelines provided technical 
standards on setting CEMS, it could not force the pilot ETPs to establish CEMS in time. Thus, 
enterprises were resistant to install and operate CEMS, because of its high costs. Without 
accurate emissions data, allocation cannot be fair and transparent, and the supply and demand of 
quotas were not available. Enterprises were reluctant to enter into trading programmes. For 
instance, the SO2 ETP in Henan province was launched in 2004
652, while the Henan provincial 
government required all power plants to install CEMS almost six years later, before the end of 
2010653. Thus, it is unsurprising that there was no single successful transaction in the Henan SO2 
ETP between 2004 and 2008. The second challenge was the reluctance of enterprises to regularly 
operate the system and to share data with local EPAs. Taking the SO2 ETP in Taiyuan city as an 
example, some major sources already used CEMs to track their emissions, but these devices were 
used either for purposes internal to the plant or intermittently by local environmental protection 
inspectors bureau’s in their periodic inspections.654Chinese experts also suggest that it does not 
                                                           
651 Ibid. 
652 河南排污权四年零交易[No Transaction since the Launch Date in Henan SO2 ETP]，The Eighth International 
Conference on China Urban Water Development and Expo of New Technologies and Facilities (in Chinese, 第八届
中国城镇水务发展国际研讨会与新技术设备博览会, 15 February 2008) 
<http://www.cuwa.org.cn/bbs/archiver/?tid-78779.html> accessed 9 April 2014.  
653二氧化硫交易为何止步不前 [Why does the SO2 emissions trading system reluctantly develop?] (信报财经新闻, 
13 June 2011) <http://www.cesd-sass.org/environment/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=4412> accessed 9 April 2014. 
654 Morgenstern (n 631), 24.  
174 
 
present much difficulty for enterprises to turn off CEMS if no operation standards are 
available.655 Thus, standards and rules about operating and calibrating CEMS are necessary to 
assure that the local environmental protection bureau has access to the emissions data on daily 
and even on hourly basis. 
The third challenge is the failure of the existing compliance rules. Only Taiyuan SO2 ETP 
included explicit compliance rules into its legislation. A penalty ranging from ¥3000 to ¥8000 is 
imposed if an enterprise releases more than its allowable emissions amount, 656  while the 
maximum penalty cannot exceed ¥30,000 per year.657 The penalty is nothing compared to the 
abatement cost.658 The stringency of this penalty level cannot threaten the enterprise and force it 
to be in compliance with the law, since enterprises prefer to pay the penalty.  The fourth 
challenge is lack of necessity to participate in trading SO2 quotas. Enterprises can achieve their 
target without trading quotas. Experts in Hubei province explained that major sources, such as 
fossil fuel power plants, do not need to buy quotas after having installed a desulphurisation 
installation that achieve their emissions reduction target.659 On the other hand, for those who had 
the available quotas, they did not sell their quotas but banked them for use in case of an 
enlargement of their production capacity. As a result, available quotas in the market remained 
very limited. Under the circumstances that both demand and supply of SO2 quotas are limited, 
the SO2 trading market cannot be very active. Several policy instruments work simultaneously, 
but send confused signals to the enterprises and even make them misunderstand the ETP. 
Together with the emissions trading, the other market-based mechanism proposed in the 11th 
FYP, was the pollution levy system (PLS). Enterprises whose emissions are higher than the 
allowable amount must pay for the extra amount. For example, the levy for SO2 emissions from 
power plants was raised from ¥200 per tonne to ¥630 per tonne in 2004, and it was doubled to 
¥1,260 per tonne in 2007660, without a limit on the maximum levy. The levy formed a special 
funding for pollution prevention and governance. This special funding aimed at financing 
innovative technology and to subsidize enterprises using pollution prevention equipment. In the 
                                                           
655 Tianbao Qin, ‘Climate change and emission trading systems: China’s perspective and international experiences’ 
(KAS-Schriftenreihe China, No. 102, 2012) <http://www.kas.de/china/en/publications/31160/>, 61. 
656 Government of Taiyuan city, 太原市二氧化硫排污交易管理办法 [Local legislation on the SO2 emissions 
trading programme in Taiyuan city], art 23. 
657 Ibid. 
658Guangdong Yudean Group CO., LTD., ‘Research on cost of desulphurisation installation in power plants’ (in 
Chinese), 17 January 2010 <http://www.gdyd.com/development/technology/papers/201001/33753.html> accessed 
For instance, the cost resulted from installing, operating and maintaining the desulphurisation equipment for twenty 
years can reach 1.8 million yuan. 
659 Xuelei Zhu, interview with expert from Wuhan optics valley united property rights exchange in Hubei province, 
newspaper article from China Energy News (中国能源报, 30 August 2010) 
<http://blog.china5e.com/hehaiting/archives/5166> accessed 10 April 2014, 18. 
660 JES, U.S.—China joint economic study: economic analyses of energy saving and pollution abatement policies for 
the electricity power sectors of China and the United States (summary for policy makers), Washington, D.C., and 
Beijing, by U.S. EPA and SAEP.  
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local SO2 ETPs, one allocation method requires the enterprises to pay for the quotas from the 
environmental protection bureaus. This allocation essentially requires a ‘payment for using 
emission quotas’. However, the enterprise confused the two payment systems, making the 
managers and even some administrators to misunderstand what a real emissions trading program 
should be like, while the SO2 ETP was considered as a half fee and half trading system.
661 Due to 
the few transactions and in some cases zero transactions resulting in an inactive market, 
enterprises doubted about the functioning of the SO2 ETP and preferred the traditional levy 
system. 
A fifth challenge is, to some extent, the limited enforcement power of the EPA at city level. The 
emissions reduction target was allocated from the central level to the provincial level, and then to 
the city level. Thus, the real supervisory and administrative body of the SO2 ETPs are the 
environmental protection bureaus at city level. But the enforcement power and capability of the 
environmental protection bureaus at city level are very limited, because of their low hierarchy 
and dependent position. In China, the environmental protection bureaus of cities are not 
independent in making their policy decisions, but need to follow orders and demands from the 
city’s government and the provincial environmental protection bureaus. If an environmental 
protection bureau at city level takes punitive actions that are not favoured by the latter two 
bodies, they may cause a financial or personnel crisis.662 Industry that is strongly supported by 
the city government contributes a lot to the city’s GDP, taxation, employment and other 
economic benefits. This political factor does not allow the environmental protection to correctly 
supervise or penalise this industry. A similar situation can happen between the environmental 
protection bureaus at city level and the central-controlled state-owned enterprises (SOEs). 
Central-controlled SOEs are managed and supervised directly by the central government, and 
even the provincial environmental protection bureaus cannot fully enforce their jurisdiction in 
case of violations. 663  Naturally, the environmental protection bureaus at city level are not 
qualified as regulator to limit the emissions from these SOEs. Consequently, this limited 
enforcement power of the environmental protection bureaus result in poor implementation of 
SO2 ETP, such as collecting complete and accurate data
664, impose penalties to the emitters that 
do not  achieve their emission reduction targets.  
                                                           
661 Zhen lu, ‘Emissions trading in China: lessons from Taiyuan SO2 emissions trading program’, (2011) 2 (1) 
Sustainability accounting, management and policy journal, 35. 
662 The reason for these financial and personnel crisis originated from the independence of the environmental 
protection bureaus. For the personnel part, the leaders of environmental protection bureaus are appointed by the 
government at same level, and proved by the local People’s Congress. For the financial part, local governments are 
responsible for the budget of the environmental protection bureaus. This strong connection makes the local 
environmental protection bureaus dare not make decision against the local government’s interest. 
663 Interview with Mr. Yuehui Xiong, conducted by Renmin News Agency, ‘why the local environmental protection 
bureaus dare not supervise companies in violation of environmental law’ (in Chinese) (26 May 2011) 
<http://env.people.com.cn/GB/14747997.html> accessed 10 April 2014. 
664 Qin (n 655), 64. Taking Taiyuan SO2 ETP as an example, ‘when participants released that they could not cover 
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Although the SO2 ETP and the carbon trading system are two independent systems, to conclude 
some experiences from the former system to the latter one is meaningful. The good lessons are 
useful for the success of the carbon trading. Meanwhile, the failure in the SO2 ETP may prevent 
the carbon trading from functioning inefficiently.   
2. Design and implementation of China’s carbon trading system 
2.1 Design of China’s carbon trading system: Legislation making 
China has signed the Kyoto Protocol, although it has not undertaken any mandatory emission 
reduction targets. Apart from the Annual Progress Report of China’s Policies and Actions for 
Addressing Climate Change (White Paper), various documents concerning the emission 
reduction issues have been published: (1) 12th Chinese Five-Year-Plan (FYP, 2011–2015) 
adopted by the National People’s Congress;665  
(2) Resolution of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Making Active 
Responses to Climate Change;666  
(3) 2012 Comprehensive Working Programme on Energy-Saving and Emission Reduction;667 
and  
(4) Emissions Reduction Working Programme on Greenhouse Gas during the 12th FYP Period, 
adopted by the State Council.668 
These documents represent China’s climate change policy and national actions. All are political 
documents in nature, except for numbers (3) and (4), which are normative documents 669 
(guifanxing wenjian). However, none of these documents stipulates the legal framework for 
China’s carbon trading system.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
their actual emissions in 2005, they cited special market conditions of that year and negotiated with the city’s 
environmental protection bureau for a liability exemption. After the negotiations, almost all the participants were 
cleared of liabilities’. This reflects the weak position of the city’s environmental protection that is required to be 
lenient.  
665 NDRC (March 2011), 中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十二个五年规划纲要 [12th Socio-economic 
Five-Year Plan of the People’s Republic of China] (in Chinese).  
666 Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (2009), 全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于积极应对气
候变化的决议 [Resolution of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Making Active 
Responses to Climate Change] (in Chinese).  
667 State Council (2012), 十二五节能减排综合性工作方案 [Comprehensive Working Programme on Energy-
Saving and Emission Reduction] (in Chinese).  
668 State Council (2011), 十二五控制温室气体排放工作方案 [Emissions Reduction Working Plan on the 
Greenhouse Gases during the Period of the 12th Five-Year-Plan] (GHG ERWP) (in Chinese) (issued 1 December 
2011) (GHG ERWP) para 2. 
669 Randall Peerenboom, China’s Long March toward Rule of Law (1st edn, Cambridge University Press, New York, 
2002) 261, 271.  
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2.1.1 Voluntary carbon trading in China670 
2.1.1.1 Introduction 
China has no international legal obligations to reduce carbon emissions, and instead, the central 
government has announced voluntary emissions reduction targets with the aim to establish an 
internal carbon market. Although China has historically accounted for only a relatively low 
percentage of globally cumulative GHG emissions (7.3 per cent from 1850 to 2000), its share 
increased to 14.8 per cent in 2003.671 However, this number has increased to 29 per cent in 
2011. 672  Recognising the serious threat posed by global warming to public health, natural 
resources and the environment, China’s government has taken steps to reduce the country’s 
GHG emissions. China has pledged to reduce its carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP by 40 
to 45 per cent by 2020, compared with the 2005 level;673 which is the domestic voluntary 
emission reduction (VER) target. China’s carbon trading has developed fast since the State 
Council674 announced this target. 
On 13 June 2012, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) adopted the 
Interim Measures on Voluntary GHGs Emissions Trading (2012 Interim Measures),675 as the 
ministry rules (bumen guizhang)676 which stay at higher legislative status than the normative 
documents. Ministry rules stipulate the legal framework for China’s voluntary GHG ETS.  
2.1.1.2 The Interim Measures on Voluntary GHGs Emissions Trading (2012) 
The 2012 Interim Measures contain six chapters with 31 clauses and one annex, including: (1) 
general principles: (2) management of Verified Emission Reduction (VER) projects: (3) 
                                                           
670 This section is an updated version of the publication: Ping Chen, ‘Interim Measures for Voluntary Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions Trading’ (2013) 4 IUCN Academy of Environmental Law E-Journal 117-123, 
<http://www.iucnael.org/e-journal/current-issue-.html> accessed 12 December 2013 
671 Miao Bo, ‘Emissions Trading: A Fantasy for China to Combat Global Warming?’ in M. Jeffery & K. Bubna-Litic 
(eds) Biodiversity Conservation, Law and Livelihoods: Bridging the North-South Divide (1st edn, Cambridge 
University Press, 2008) 400. 
672 Jos G.J. Olivier and others, ‘Trends in Global CO2 Emissions 2012 Report’ Join Research Centre of the European 
Commission and PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (July 2012) 
<http://edgar.jrc.ec.europa.eu/CO2REPORT2012.pdf> accessed 3 September 2013, 10. This report indicates the five 
largest emitters are China (29 per cent), the United States (16 per cent), the EU (11 per cent), India (6 per cent) and 
the Russian Federation (5 per cent).  
673 Kossoy and Ambrosi (n 318), 30.  
674 The State Council, namely the Central People’s Government, is the highest administrative executive organ of 
State power in China and the highest organ of State administration.  <http://english.gov.cn/2005-
08/05/content_20763.htm>  
675 NDRC (June 2012), 温室气体自愿减排交易管理暂行办法 [Interim Measures on Voluntary Greenhouse Gases 
Emissions Trading] (in Chinese) (Interim Measures).   
676 Peerenboom (n 669), 271. It follows that the Ministry Rules (bumen guizhang) passed by central-level ministries, 
commissions, agencies, or entities directly under the State Council. 
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management of the emission reductions created by the projects; (4) trading emission reductions; 
(5) validation and certification;  and (6) miscellaneous provisions. 
Chapter 1 contains general provisions with the aim to encourage projects-based voluntary GHGs 
emissions trading, and ensure that the trading transactions comply with the law (Article 1). CO2, 
CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs and SF6 are the targeted gases for China’s voluntary emissions trading 
transactions (Article 2). Voluntary ET should comply with the principles of transparency, 
equitability, impartiality and credibility; and the emissions reductions resulting from concrete 
projects should be authentic, measurable and additional (Article 3). The competent 
administrative authority at the national level is the NDRC (Article 4). Institutions, enterprises, 
organizations and individuals from China and other countries can participate in the voluntary 
ETS (Article 5). The official record system administers the voluntary ETS. Projects and the 
emission reductions created from these projects are registered by the NDRC (Article 6). The 
NDRC is responsible for establishing the national registry system (NRS). Authorised VER 
projects and their emission reductions should be registered in the NRS, including basic 
information, the recording, transactions and annulments (Article 7). Within 10 working days of 
completing the official recording procedures, the NDRC publishes the transaction information, 
provides an inquiry service based on NRS and supports transactions of trading emission 
reduction with features of credibility and authenticity (article 8). 
Chapter 2 deals with the management of VER projects, including provisions on methodology and 
applications for recording VER projects in official records. Methodologies provide guidance on 
how to set baselines, prove additionality, 677  calculate emission reductions and create a 
monitoring and measuring plan (Article 10[1]). These methodologies should be authorised by the 
NDRC and verified by a validation institution approved by the NDRC (Article 9). The NDRC 
may authorise methodologies approved by the CDM Executive Board (CDM EB) of the United 
Nations if they are shown to be appropriate by NDRC-appointed experts (Article 10[2]). For new 
methodology based on experts’ opinions, the NDRC may authorise the methodology if it satisfies 
the requirements of rationality and feasibility. Prior to the application for an official recording of 
a VER project,678 a qualified validation institution authorised by the NDRC must prepare a 
validation report for the project. The report must address validation procedures, the baseline and 
                                                           
677 Charlotte Streck, ‘The Concept of Additionality under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol: Implications for 
Environmental Integrity and Equity’ <http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/environment/docs/hong-
kong/The%20Concept%20of%20Additionality%20(Charlotte%20Streck).pdf> accessed 23 December 2012. It 
follows that the additionality is the ‘requirement that the greenhouse gas emissions after implementation of a CDM 
project activity are lower than those that would have occurred in the most plausible alternative scenario to the 
implementation of the CDM project activity’.  
678 This means the VER projects that are about to become recorded VER projects by the NDRC, after the application 
procedure. The VER projects are stipulated in article 13, including four types: (1) voluntary emissions reduction 
projects by using methodology recorded by the NDRC; (2) CDM permitted by the NDRC, but not registered in the 
UN CDM EB; (3) CDM permitted by the NDRC meanwhile can produce emissions reduction before registering in 
the UN CDM EB; (4) projects that are registered in the UN CDM EB but be rejected. 
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the accuracy of the emissions reduction calculation, additionality, the monitoring and 
measurability and the validation conclusion (Article 12). 
Enterprises domiciled under Chinese jurisdiction can apply for approval of voluntary GHG 
emission reduction projects and for an official registration of emissions reduction, based on the 
2012 Interim Measures (Article 6). State-owned enterprises involved directly in GHG emissions 
reduction projects can apply directly to the NDRC for VER registration.679 Other enterprises 
apply through the Development and Reform Commissions (DRC) at provincial level.680 The 
provincial DRC should submit the applications to the NDRC after commenting on their 
authenticity and completeness.681 
Chapter 3 focuses on management of emission reductions created through recorded VER projects 
and outlines the certification and decision procedures for the official recording of emission 
reductions. A qualified certification institution approved by the NDRC should certify the 
emissions reductions. The certification institution should provide a report that includes the 
contents of the certification procedures, the implementation of the monitoring and measuring 
plan and a conclusion (Article 18). Based on the experts’ technical evaluations, the NDRC 
decides whether an application for entry is placed on the official record. The application includes 
the application form, the monitoring and measuring report made by the project owner or 
consulting institution and the certification report. After official recording, emission reductions 
are referred to as ‘China’s certified emission reduction’ (CCER). 682  The CCER must be 
registered in the NRS and can be traded using the trading platform. The CCER must be annulled 
in the NRS after trading or use (Article 22). 
Chapter 4 describes the recording procedures within the trading platform. The trading platform is 
intended to document and support emissions reduction transactions; the electronic trading system 
must be connected with the NRS and must update transaction information (Article 23). The 
NDRC reviews all applications from trading institutions and decides within six months whether 
to record them as official trading platform. The requirements provided in Article 25 include: 1. 
Authorised share capital of the legal person domiciled in China and investing in Chinese capital 
with  not less than ¥100 million; 2. The business outlets, trading system, calculation system, 
business information and reporting; 3. The employees relevant professional information and 
experience; 4. The applicant’s internal inspection and supervision system, and his risk control 
system; 5. The rules on trading transactions have to  be integrated, explicit and operational. 
                                                           
679 Interim Measures (n 675), art 14 (1). The list of the state-owned enterprises managed by the State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration is attached to the Interim Measures. 
680 Ibid, art 14 (2). It defines “other enterprise” to mean those enterprises that are not in the attached list of state-
owned enterprises. Here, the “DRC” means the provincial Development Reform Commission of the place where the 
projects are located, not where the enterprises are domiciled. 
681 Ibid, art 14 (2). It stipulates the required documents for VER projects application in article 15. 
682 Ibid, art 21 (2).  One CCER means authorisation to release one tonne of CO2. 
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Improper transactions should be rectified according to NDRC requirements. If the impropriety is 
severe, the NDRC should publicise the trader’s default and cancel its record-keeping 
qualification (Article 26). 
Chapter 5 deals with the authorisation of validation and certification institutions. The 
independently qualified validation institution (Chapter 2) is responsible for validating the VER 
projects and for creating a validation report. The qualified certification institution (Chapter 3) is 
responsible for certifying the emission reduction and forming a certification report. The NDRC 
authorises qualified verification institutions and certification institutions (Article 27), based on 
the business license, the identity documents of the representative of the legal person, documents 
that prove the contributory performance of the verification work or certification work and 
auditors’ names and responsibilities. The NDRC takes a positive decision if the following 
requirements are met: 1. The establishment and operation of the institution is in compliance with 
Chinese law; 2. The institution has its performance formally regulated; 3. The institution has a 
good performance record in the verification or certification area; 4.The institution has adequate 
expertise with experiences and non-illegal records; and 5.The institution is solvent (Article 28). 
If there is improper behaviour in the validation or certification process, the NDRC orders the 
institution to correct it. If the behaviour is severe, the NDRC will publicise the trading platform’s 
illegal performance and cancel its qualification (Article 29). 
The promulgation of the 2012 Interim Measures on Voluntary GHGs Emissions Trading is a 
remarkable improvement. The Measures establish the legal framework for voluntary ET in China, 
which ought to lead to stronger legal enforcement and compliance. The Measures reflect the 
domestic concern for GHG ET and the government’s ambitions to reduce GHG emissions. The 
Measures will provide substantial and procedural provisions for GHGs ET, and ensure that a 
voluntary ETS will be established using the offsetting method. The official record of the project 
and its emission reductions, the trading platform, the validation institution and certification 
institution are all mandatory, indicating a strong administrative intervention from the NDRC 
regarding voluntary ET. 
However, there is room for improvement. The language of the 2012 Interim Measures is 
ambiguous. Articles 26 and 29 provide legal sanctions, but the term ‘severe illegal behaviour’ is 
too broad and too general to allow much flexibility in implementation. Specialist terminology 
should be more specific. For instance, does the term ‘t CO2 e’ mean ‘t CO2 equivalent’? What is 
the meaning of ‘additionality’ in Articles 3 and 12? What are the requirements for assessing 
whether a project is additional or not? Are CCERs transferrable with a CERs created from a 
CDM project? Essentially, one unit of CER and CCER both indicate the reduction of one tonne 
of GHG. Does this mean they are equivalent by linking the CDM project with the voluntary ETS? 
The legal responsibilities of the validation institution and certification institution have not been 
adequately specified. It is not clearly stipulated whether these two institutions are independent or 
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may be affiliated with the administrative competent authority. The policy should specify more 
clearly these institutions’ qualifications to ensure transparency, equitability, impartiality and 
credibility of trading transactions. In addition, it is not clear how to deal with the legal 
relationship between validation/certification institutions and the legal person who owns or 
develops the projects. The requirements in Article 28 must address more explicitly how to assess 
the concepts of ‘adequate expertise’, ‘good performance’ and ‘adequate solvent capacity’. 
2.1.2 Mandatory carbon trading in China at the local level 
In addition to the 2012 Interim Measures, local legislation and working programmes have been 
proposed for piloting carbon trading in six provinces and municipalities,683 including:  
(1) Beijing Municipality 
a. An implementation plan for piloting ET in Beijing Municipality (Beijing implementation 
plan), (promulgated 28 March 2012 
 
(2) Shanghai Municipality 
a. Suggestions for piloting ET in Shanghai Municipality (Shanghai Government’s 
suggestions ), promulgated 3 July 2012  
b. Interim measure on piloting ET in Shanghai Municipality (Shanghai interim measure), 
promulgated 18 November 2013 
 
(3) Guangdong Province 
a. An implementation plan for piloting ET in Guangdong province (Guangdong 
implementation plan), promulgated 7 September 2012 
b. Interim measure on piloting ET in Guangdong province (Guangdong interim measure), 
promulgated 17 December 17 2013 
 
(4) Shenzhen Specific Economic Zone (SEZ) 
a. Certain rules for ET in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (Shenzhen rules), 
promulgated 30 October 2012 
b. Interim measure on piloting ET in the Shenzhen SEZ (Shenzhen interim measure), 
promulgated 14 March 2014 
 
(5) Tianjin Municipality 
a. An implementation plan for piloting ET in Tianjin Municipality (Tianjin implementation 
plan), promulgated 5 February 2013  
                                                           
683 In China’s administration system, both provinces and municipalities are at provincial level. They are governed 
directly by the central government. 
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b. Interim measure on piloting ET in Tianjin Municipality (Tianjin interim measure) 
promulgated 20 December 2013 
 
(6) Hubei Province 
a. An implementation plan for piloting ET in Hubei province (Hubei implementation plan), 
promulgated 18 February 2013 
b. Interim measure on piloting ET in Hubei province (Hubei interim measure), promulgated 
17 March 2014 
However, the text of Hubei interim measure is not accessible. Thus, I include the draft of interim 
measure on the ET pilot in Hubei province in this thesis.  
The implementation plan for piloting ET in Chongqing has not yet been promulgated. In total, 
seven provinces and cities are appointed to pilot ET and six of them have made legal rules on its 
implementation.  
2.1.2.1 Certainties in the design 
This section analyses the contents of local legislation to identify the design of carbon trading in 
pilot programmes in municipalities and provinces. The analysis reveals factors that policymakers 
have considered, those they have adopted and those still under discussion. The ultimate objective 
of this analysis is to reveal the current development of China’s carbon trading system and the 
challenges it faces. Six pieces of local legislation in Beijing municipality, Shanghai municipality, 
Guangdong province, Shenzhen SEZ, Tianjin municipality and Hubei province are categorised 
based on the various factors of a carbon trading system.  
2.1.2.1.1 Legal basis 
The six local legislations are based on the GHG ERWP684, the National Development and 
Reform Commission’s Notification about Piloting Emissions Trading (NDRC’s notification 
about piloting ET).685 The GHG Emissions Reduction Working Programme (GHG ERWP) seeks 
to reduce carbon intensity686 by 17 per cent by 2015, compared with 2010 levels. An important 
tool to achieve this target is to explore how to establish an ETS and to include it into the GHG 
                                                           
684 State Council (2011), GHG ERWP (n 668). 
685 NDRC (October 2011), 国家发展改革委办公厅关于开展碳排放权交易试点工作的通知 [Notification of the 
General Office of the National Development and Reform Commission on Piloting Carbon Trading] (NDRC’s 
notification about the piloting ET).  
686 International Energy Agency (IEA), ‘CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion: Highlights’ (2012) 
<http://www.iea.org/co2highlights/co2highlights.pdf> accessed 25 October 2012. 
In China’s ETS, carbon intensity refers to the carbon emissions per GDP, calculated as the per centage reduction in 
CO2 equivalent per GDP. In the IEA 2011 edition, an indicator for CO2 emissions per kWh for the electricity and 
heat generating industries was useful as an overall carbon intensity measure of a country’s electricity and heat 
generating sectors. The IEA 2012 edition uses indicators such as CO2/GDP, CO2/capita, CO2/kWh rather than a 
general indicator, namely carbon intensity. 
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ERWP. The following three main elements have been confirmed in China’s ETS: 687  1. A 
voluntary ETS requires legislation on voluntary ET to create a national registry and a transparent 
data access system;  2. Starting ET pilots requires a cap-setting system, local experiments with 
ET and an allocation methodology; 3. Supportive tools for ET include a calculation method for 
carbon emissions reduction, supervision of the ET platform and an independent verification 
institution, a local registry, an electronic trading system and a monitoring, reporting and 
verification (MRV) system. 
The State Council announced the GHG ERWP, printed and distributed information to all 
provincial governments, ministries and departments under the leadership of the State Council. 
The programme provides a general blueprint for reducing carbon emissions through a number of 
approaches, including ET. The State Council’s announcement was essentially an administrative 
order that forced provincial governments, ministries and departments under the leadership of the 
State Council to implement the programme. 
The General Office of the NDRC announced the piloting of ET and distributed information 
specifically to the Provincial Development and the Reform Commissions (PDRC) in Beijing, 
Tianjin, Shanghai, Chongqing, Guangdong Province, Hubei Province and the Shenzhen Special 
Economic Zone. These seven provinces and cities were required to commence the ET 
experiments. The NDRC is a ministry under the leadership of the State Council and its 
notifications have legal force. Therefore, the governments of the seven provinces and 
municipalities were required to implement the NDRC’s notification including promulgating 
legislation on carbon trading. In addition, the appointed local governments must organise experts 
and professional teams, plan special funding, promulgate local legislation, measure local carbon 
emissions, make allocation plans, establish local registries and MRV systems and establish ET 
platforms. 
2.1.2.1.2 Phased-in approach 
Local legislation of Shanghai, Guangdong, Tianjin and Hubei stipulated explicitly a phased-in 
approach for ET. 
The Shanghai Government provided that the pilot period would last from 2013 to 2015, 
including Phase 1 (2010–2011) and Phase 2 (2012–2015).688 Phase 1 was the preparation period, 
during which there was no trading transactions, but only the development of supportive tools for 
ET, which were to be completed before 2012.689 These supportive tools set the total amount of 
                                                           
687 State Council (2011), GHG ERWP (n 668), art 5.  
688 Shanghai municipality government (2012), 上海市人民政府关于本市开展碳排放交易试点工作的实施意见 
[Government’s Suggestions on Piloting ET in Shanghai City] (Shanghai Government’s suggestions), art. 3.1. 
689 Ibid. Therefore, there is no official announcement about the progress of the establishment of supporting tools. 
Considering that Shanghai has launched carbon trading on 26 November 2013, it is reasonable that Shanghai has set 
up well-performed supporting tools. 
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carbon emissions; introduced the guidelines for monitoring company emissions and confirming 
participants; established the registry system and electronic trading system; proposed rules and 
clarified the power of supervision and verification.690 In Phase 2 a regional carbon market will be 
established before 2015, which entails that ET transactions were to begin in the latter half of 
2013. Under supervision and assessment of the Shanghai Commission of Development and 
Reform (DRC), 197 designated companies will be involved in transactions on the trading 
platform.691 Meanwhile, the Shanghai DRC will track, monitor and assess trading.  
The Guangdong implementation plan divides the experimental period into three phases, 
including the preparation phase (from 2012 until the first half of 2013), the implementation 
phase (from the second half of 2013 until 2014) and the improvement phase (2015).692 In the first 
phase, the main preparatory work involved setting guidelines and rules on carbon trading and 
establishing a carbon emissions MRV system, a registry system and an ET platform. In the 
second phase, feasibility research on trading transactions across the provinces and cities was 
begun. In the third phase, a review will be conducted on the ET, together with research on the 
implementation plan of ET for the 13th FYP period (2016–2020). 
The Tianjin implementation plan states that trading emissions experiments will be held in three 
phases. This plan aimed to establish supportive tools before 2013, form a regional carbon market 
prior to 2015, and start the linkage between regional and local carbon markets during the 13th 
FYP period.693 
The ET pilot in Hubei province includes four phases. Preparation work took place from 
December 2011 until June 2012. The initial phase includes a proposed implementation plan and 
interim measures, an inventory of regulated companies, establishment of a digital trading system, 
selecting a technical commission and a third-party verifier, and establishing allocation of 
allowances. The implementation phase began in August 2013 and will conclude in June 2015. 
The linkage between Hubei ETS and other piloting ETSs will be explored during this period. 
Finally, the ET pilot will be reviewed and experiences summarised in the final phase, July 2015–
December 2015. 
The above two provinces (Guangdong and Hubei) and two municipalities (Shanghai and Tianjin) 
have selected a phased-in approach to establish their local ETS. This decision indicates that 
China’s policymakers, or at least those from the local DRCs, have realised the complexity of the 
                                                           
690 Ibid, art 5.1. 
691 Ibid, art. 5.2. 
692 Guangdong provincial government (2012), 广东省碳排放交易试点工作实施方案 [An implementation plan for 
piloting ET in Guangdong province] (Guangdong implementation plan)] 7 September 2012, art 5.6. 
693 Tianjin municipality government (2013), 天津市人民政府关于天津市碳排放权交易试点工作实施方案的通
知 [Tianjin execution plan Execution plan of piloting ET in Tianjin city] (Tianjin implementation plan) 5 February 
2013, art 1.3. 
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ET framework and that the system cannot be established all at once. Furthermore, they are 
exploring the linkage between regional carbon markets. 
However, the flexibility of the phased-in approach is very limited in time. According to central 
and local legislation, China’s ET pilot provinces and municipalities must implement the State 
Council’s GHG ERWP before the end of the 12th FYP period in 2015. All six local legislations 
were promulgated in either 2012 in 2013, which means local governments have only a maximum 
of three years to establish a completed ETS, while the legal language is ambiguous, the level of 
legislative hierarchy is low and a potential enforcement system is weak.  
Nevertheless, academics are optimistic that China’s political system can enable a carbon market 
to grow faster than in any other country because once Chinese leaders have accepted a concept, 
opposition is steamrolled and changes are implemented more quickly and broadly than in 
societies in which policymaking is based on a balance of stakeholders’ interests. 694  The 
indication is that China’s ET can be adopted and implemented very fast because of the central 
government’s strong willingness to do so,  
2.1.2.1.3 Coverage 
The coverage is important when designing an ETS because coverage determines the ETS’s 
performance. An ETS needs to include an adequate amount of sectors, or the key GHG emitters, 
to perform well. Coverage should ensure diversity of mitigation abatement costs among sectors. 
Differences in mitigation abatement costs within a sector can provide regulated companies with 
two options for compliance, decreasing carbon emissions either through applying low carbon-
intensive technology or through trading carbon allowances. Variant mitigation abatement costs 
among different sectors can increase liquidity of trading quotas in the carbon market and help 
companies discover the most cost-effective way to achieve their emissions reduction targets. In 
addition, policymakers must consider the energy consumption in different geographic areas and 
identify the contributing factors to GHG emissions. Specifically, sectors and companies that are 
the main consumers of high carbon-intensive natural resources must be identified.  
Therefore, based on analysis of the existing local ET legislation, the key sectors covered by ETS 
in the pilot programmes are shown in Table 5. 
Table 5: Coverage of China’s local ET pilots 
Provinces and 
municipalities 
Regulated sectors Amount of regulated 
companies 
                                                           
694 Qiang Wang, ‘China has the capacity to lead in carbon trading’ (15 January 2013) 493(7432) Nature Column 
World View <http://www.nature.com/news/china-has-the-capacity-to-lead-in-carbon-trading-1.12212> accessed 12 
July 2013.  
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Beijing Municipality Sector type 1: Power and heat 
supply enterprises (power 
plants, heating plants, 
cogeneration plants and grid 
companies695); 
Sector type 2: manufacturing 
enterprises; 
Sector type 3: tertiary 
industry696. 
600 key energy users (list 
of participants is not 
published yet)697; 
435 companies in sectors of 
heat supply, power plant, 
cement, petrochemical, car 
manufacturing and public 
buildings. 
Shanghai Municipality698 Sector type 1 (industrial 
sectors): Iron and steel, 
petrochemicals, chemicals, 
non-ferrous metals, electric 
power, building materials, 
textile, paper, rubber, 
chemical fibre and other 
industry sectors; 
Sector type 2 (non-industrial 
sectors): aviation, ports, 
airport, railways, business, 
hotels and financial 
industries; 
Total 16 sectors including 10 
industry sectors, 6 non-
industry sectors. 
Company with annual 
carbon emissions of more 
than 20,000 tonnes of CO2 
in either 2010 or 2011 
within sector type 1; 
Company with annual 
carbon emissions of more 
than 10,000 tonnes of CO2 
in either 2010 or 2011 
within sector type 2; 
197 companies are included 
as first batch in the sectors 
of steel, petrochemical, 
chemical, non-ferrous 
metal, power, building 
materials, textile, paper, 
rubber and chemical fibre 
industry. 
Guangdong Province699 Sectors of electricity, cement, 
steel, ceramics, 
Company with annual 
carbon emissions of more 
                                                           
695 In China, the grid companies are state-owned enterprises that are in the sector of electricity generation and utility. 
See, for example, the State Grid Corporation of China (SGCC). 
696 Tongqing, ‘Progress and Perspectives on Beijing Emissions Trading Scheme’ (Tsinghua University) 
<http://ceem.unsw.edu.au/sites/default/files/event/documents/Tong.pdf > accessed 23 July 2013. 
697 Ibid. 
698 Shanghai Government’s suggestions (n 688), art. 3.1. 




ferrous metals, plastics, paper 
sectors 
than 20,000 tonnes of CO2 
in any year between 2011 
and 2014; 
827 companies are included 
as first batch in the sectors 
of power, cement, steel, 
ceramics, petrochemical, 




 26 sectors cover power, gas 
and water supply 
635 companies whose 
emissions exceed 5,000 
tonnes CO2 annually and 
197 public building. 
Tianjin Municipality701 Sectors of iron and steel, 
chemicals, electricity, heat, 
petrochemical, oil and gas 
exploitation 
Buildings for public use 
with annual carbon 
emissions of more than 
20,000 tonnes of CO2 since 
2009; 
Key companies from the 
covered sectors 
Hubei Province702 Sectors of iron and steel, 
chemicals, cement, 
electricity, paper 
Company with annual 
energy consumption of over 
60,000 tonnes of coal 
equivalent in either 2010 or 
2011; 
153 companies in the 
sectors of steel, chemical, 
cement, automobile 
manufacturing, power 
                                                           
700 Government of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (2010), 深圳经济特区碳排放管理若干规定 [Some rules of 
emissions trading in Shenzhen Special Economic Zone] (Shenzhen rules) art. 3. The list of participating companies 
will be made by the government of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone on the basis of the cap-setting and 
emissions situation of the participants. 
701 Tianjin implementation plan (n 693), art. 2.2. 
702 Hubei provincial government (February 2013), 湖北省碳排放交易管理暂行办法(征求意见稿) [Draft 




metals, glass, paper. 
Several findings can be summarised from Table 5. First, the covered sectors align with the listed 
sectors laid down by the State Council. The GHG ERWP defines specific sectors, including iron 
and steel, building materials, power plants, coal and oil, chemicals, non-ferrous metals, textiles, 
food production, paper production, transportation, railways and building, which are required to 
launch carbon emissions reduction programmes,703 but not specifically an ET programme. These 
sectors are the main contributors to increase carbon emissions, and therefore, the GHG ERWP 
lists a range of possible sectors to be regulated for implementing China’s ETS. The list is a 
reference for local ET pilots to determine their covered sectors. Based on this list, local 
policymakers may decide the covered sectors and the regulated companies on the basis of their 
consumption structure and carbon emissions in the different pilot jurisdictions. 
Second, the rationale for selecting the regulated companies is clear – they are largest carbon 
emitters. In the Hubei ET pilot, the emissions from the regulated companies comprise more than 
35 per cent of the total emissions. In Beijing, winter is long and temperatures are coldest from 
November to February, leading to heavy demand for heating and electricity. As a result, 67 per 
cent of the area’s electricity is imported from the Northern China Power Grid, which means that 
power and heating plants must surely be included in Beijing’s ETS. In the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen ET pilots, emissions from regulated companies account for 50 per cent704 and 38 per 
cent705 of the cities’ total emissions, respectively. Regulated sectors in the Tianjin ET pilot cover 
60 per cent of the whole city’s carbon emissions. The energy consumption of the 827 regulated 
companies in the Guangdong ET pilot comprises 62.7 per cent of energy consumption for the 
total provincial industry.706 
Third, both direct and indirect emissions are included in ET pilots in the municipalities of 
Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin. Inclusion of both direct and indirect emissions is a unique feature 
of China’s ET piloting. The direct emissions come from emissions directly released into 
atmosphere, and indirect are from power consumption. Direct emissions are from industrial 
sectors, including heating and power plants, iron and steel, chemicals, textiles, non-ferrous, 
paper, ceramic and plastic. Indirect emissions are from buildings for public use such as airports 
                                                           
703 State Council (2011), GHG ERWP (n 668), para 20. 
704 Shanghai DRC, ‘Shanghai Launches the Carbon Trading’ (in Chinese) 
<http://fgw.sh.gov.cn/main?main_colid=363&top_id=316&main_artid=21094> accessed 3 September 2013. 
705 Shenzhen News, ‘The First Mandatory Emissions Trading Pilot in China: Shenzhen ET Pilot’ (in Chinese) (19 
June 2013)<http://www.sznews.com/news/content/2013-06/19/content_8194318.htm> accessed 3 September 2013. 
Also, Shenzhen government, ‘Shenzhen Launches the Carbon Trading’ (18 June 2013) 
<http://www.sz.gov.cn/cn/xxgk/xwfyr/wqhg/20130521/> accessed 3 September 2013. . 
706 Xinhua News Agency, ‘827 companies are included into the Guangdong ET pilot’ (12 September 2012) (in 
Chinese) <http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2012-09/12/c_123705908.htm> accessed 23 September 2012. 
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and hotels, which also are to be covered because they are among the largest consumers of 
electricity and heating power. 
Implementation of the ETS pilot programmes has presented several challenges. The first 
challenge was how to translate indirect emissions to direct emissions. In a direct emissions ETS 
such as the EU ETS, the total amount of emissions is calculated from installations of covered 
companies. But that method does not work for an ETS of reducing indirect emissions, and 
therefore, some translation method is required. In China’s case, an equation between indirect 
emissions and electricity/heating consumption is necessary. Besides, further explanation for how 
to regulate indirect emissions in the ETS could not be found. The second challenge was how to 
avoid double counting allowances from two enterprises. Double counting can occur between a 
power sector/heating supplier and a building that consumes a large amount of electricity/heating 
because the ET regulates both suppliers and consumers. A certain amount of tonnes of 
allowances from the power plant (direct emissions) will overlap with the building’s electricity 
usage (indirect emissions). One solution is to keep the direct and indirect emissions markets as 
separate trade markets to avoid double counting.707 But then, the carbon market requires two 
systems to monitor and report both direct and indirect emissions, and therefore, two parallel 
policies with differently labelled but fungible credits are necessary.708  
2.1.2.1.4 Free allocation 
Six of the seven local ET pilots have clarified their allocation method, which are described in 
detail in Table 6. A common feature is free allocation at the start of the local ET pilots, with 
auctioning to be considered in the future. 
Table 6: Allocation methods in the China’s six ETS pilots 
ET Piloting in China Allocation method 
Beijing Municipality Allowances are allocated for free before December 2013, 
based on emission levels from 2009 to 2011.  
Allowances for 2014 and 2015 will be allocated for free, 
based on the emission levels in 2013 and 2014, respectively. 
Allowances will be auctioned within the 12th FYP period. 
                                                           
707 Xiaotang Wang, ‘Red China Going Green: The Emergence and Current Development of Carbon Emissions 
Trading in the World’s Largest Carbon Emitter’ (14 June 2013) Centre for Climate Change Law of Columbia Law 
School Working Paper <https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/climate-
change/files/Publications/Students/China%20ETS.pdf> accessed 12 September 2013, 11. 
708 Bryony, ‘Emissions Trading with Chinese and Korean Characteristics’ (Sandbag, 6 November 2013) 




Further information is unknown. 
Shanghai Municipality Based on historical emissions from 2009 to 2011, 
allowances for each year from 2013 to 2015 are allocated 
for free and in one-off way.709 
Benchmarking is used only to the companies that have 
adequate conditions. 710  Further information about these 
companies and adequate conditions are not clarified.  
The adequate conditions of applying benchmarking refer to 
benchmark value for different products, production capacity 
or output data for a fixed period.  
An auction method will be considered in future. 
Guangdong Province Based on historical emissions from 2010 to 2012 and the 
production capacity of industrial sectors, allowances for 
each year from 2013 to 2015 are allocated for free and in 
one-off way.711 
A specific portion of the total allowances can be bought 
from the Guangdong DRC. Further information is not 
clarified.  
Shenzhen Specific Economic 
Zone 
Allowances are allocated for free in the first phase from 
2013 to 2015. From 2014, allocation will be based on the 
production capacity of the company in the previous year.712 
Tianjin Municipality Allowances are allocated for free from 2013 to 2015.713 
Based on historical emission levels, auction will be 
considered in future. 
Further information about historical emission level is not 
clarified. 
                                                           
709 Shanghai Government’s suggestions (n 688), art 3.5. 
710 Ibid. 
711 Guangdong implementation plan (n 692), art 5.3. 
712 IETA, ‘The Chinese ETS Pilots: An IETA Analysis’ (June 2013) 
<http://www.ieta.org/assets/Reports/EmissionsTradingAroundTheWorld/china_casestudy_june2013.pdf> accessed 
13 October 2013. 
713 Tianjin implementation plan (n 693), art 2.3. 
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Hubei Province Allocation method is not clarified in the Hubei 
implementation plan. 
However, the draft for Interim Measures on Emissions 
Trading in Hubei Province714 stipulates that allowances are 
allocated for free before 30 June each year of 
implementation period. Besides, 5 per cent of the total 
allowances are reserved by the Hubei DRC for further 
adjustment in the carbon market. 15 per cent of the total 
allowances are reserved for new entrants. 
Local ET pilots prefer allocating free allowances at first because the method is more politically 
acceptable at an early stage. Allocation for free gives companies the flexibility to understand the 
new instrument without adding more expenses and simplifies the ETS. In addition, an auction 
method requires legal support and more complex rules, which were lacking at the beginning of 
an ET pilot. 
2.1.2.1.5 Trading platform for emissions exchange 
All six local legislations715 provide that trading transactions can take place only in the appointed 
local trading platforms. The ET exchanges are responsible for publishing trading information to 
manage and protect the trading accounts, and to develop a highly secure trading environment. 
Currently, there is no law on the supervision of the ET platforms. The China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) is expected to take responsibility for proposing legislation on 
ET platforms. The State Council has authorised the CSRC to regulate China’s financial 
instruments and futures markets to secure the market’s operation. Since the security and stability 
of emissions exchanges are incremental to the orderly operation of the carbon market, the CSRC 
has the authority to supervise the ET trading platform.  
All emissions exchanges (literally, ‘environmental exchanges’ in Chinese) are established by 
administrative orders from the local government and are supported financially by local equity 
exchanges that are state-owned enterprises. The purpose of local government support is to 
prepare for future carbon trading. For instance, the Tianjin Climate Exchange was established as 
China’s first ET platform by implementing the State Council’s order to ‘establish a clean 
development mechanism and carbon market’, and is supported financially by the China National 
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC)716 and the Tianjin Equity Exchange. The Shanghai municipal 
                                                           
714 Draft legislation on piloting the emissions trading in the Hubei Province (n 702), art. 7. 
715 Shanghai Government’s suggestions (n 688), art 3.8; Tianjin implementation plan (n 693), art.2.5; Shenzhen rules 
(n 700) art 6, Guangdong implementation plan (n 692), art 2.3, draft legislations on piloting the emissions trading in 
the Hubei Province (n 699), art 18. 
716 Tianjin Climate Exchange (TCE), ‘Introduction of the TCE’ 
<http://www.chinatcx.com.cn/tcxweb/pages/gywm/wm_exchange_resume.jsp> accessed 23 September 2013. 
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government approved the Shanghai Environment Energy Exchange, which received financial 
support from the Shanghai United Assets and Equity Exchange, China’s largest property 
exchange.717 The China Beijing Environmental Exchange (CBEEX) is established by the China 
Beijing Equity Exchange (CBEX) and was authorised by the Beijing municipal government.718 
Also emissions exchange in Shenzhen was established with the permission of the Shenzhen 
government.  
Until now, China has more than 100 other ‘exchanges’ either launched or under development, all 
of which aim to trade carbon in the future.719 These exchanges are currently establishing an 
electronic trading platform, developing standards and methodologies for ET and gather support 
for the necessary capacity building.720 As a result, officers from the Provincial Development and 
Reform Commissions (PRDCs) and experts in emissions exchanges are collaborating to establish 
ETSs. The experiences and knowledge that these experts acquire will be the foundation for 
working guidelines on emissions exchange. 
2.1.2.1.6 Compliance 
A compliance system is an important factor in a reliable ETS. Participants must realise the risk 
involved in emitting more emissions than their allocated quotas. Not all ET pilots have 
established compliance regulation. Legislations in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, Tianjin 
Municipality and Shanghai Municipality stipulate the compliance provisions. Currently, ET 
pilots in Hubei and Guangdong provinces have completed consultations with experts and public 
discussion, but compliance provisions in these two provinces are temporary and may be 
modified. Draft legislation in China must be published for public comments and opinions before 
being submitted to the People’s Congress. Both the Hubei ET pilot and the Guangdong ET pilot 
took one month to comply with this public discussion procedure.721 However, the time period 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) is an integrated international energy company. CNPC is China’s 
largest oil and gas producer and supplier, as well as one of the world’s major oilfield service providers and a globally 
reputed contractor in engineering construction, with businesses covering petroleum exploration and production, 
natural gas and pipelines, refining and marketing, oilfield services, engineering construction, petroleum equipment 
manufacturing and new energy development, as well as capital management, finance and insurance services.  
717 Shanghai Environment and Energy Exchange (SEEE), ‘Introduction of the SEEE’ (in Chinese) 
<http://www.cneeex.com/> accessed 23 September 2013. 
718 China Beijing Environment Exchange (CBEE), ‘Introduction of the CBEE’ (in Chinese) 
<http://en.cbeex.com.cn/article/Aboutus/Overview/> accessed 23 September 2013. 
719 Guoyi Han and others, China’s Carbon Emission Trading: An Overview of Current Development Stockholm 
Environment Institute (SEI) and Forum for Reforms, Entrepreneurship and Sustainability (FORES) (Study of SEI 
and FORES, Stockholm, 2012), 18. 
720 Ibid, 21. 
721 Hubei provincial government (August 2013), 关于征求《湖北省碳排放交易管理暂行办法》（征求意见稿）
修改意见的公告 [Notice of Collecting Public Opinion on Draft legislation on Piloting Emissions Trading in the 
Hubei Province] (in Chinese) (16 August 2013) 
<http://gkml.hubei.gov.cn/auto5472/auto5512/201308/t20130816_464414.html> accessed 24 September 2013. The 
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between public discussions on the draft legislation to the official promulgation is different from 
case to case. For instance, Shanghai took four months to publish the final legislation text (from 
21 July 2013 to 20 November 2013). 
A financial penalty and a performance correction are two compliance tools. In the Shenzhen ETS, 
a company is required to pay a penalty for emissions over its allowable amount,722 which is three 
times the carbon price of each emission quota. The Tianjin ET pilot has only adopted a 
performance correction, and not a financial penalty as its compliance tool. The Shanghai DRC 
sets deadlines and requires the regulated company to surrender allowances that are overdue, or 
the same amount of allowances will be removed from the company’s account in the registry.723 
As an additional alternative to allowance removal, the company may choose to pay a fine from 
¥50,000 to ¥100,000 (from €6054.4 to €12,108.8).724 In addition, the Shanghai DRC requires 
targeted companies to submit emissions reports for the previous year before 31 March of each 
compliance year. The regulated companies that provide fake emissions data, or hide actual 
emissions will be charged ¥10,000 to ¥30,000.725 The regulated companies that reject to submit 
their emissions date for the third-party verification will be charged ¥30,000 to ¥50,000.726 
Similar compliance provisions can be found in draft legislation for ET pilots in Hubei and 
Guangdong provinces. In the Hubei pilot, the financial penalty is designed in the same way as in 
the Shenzhen ETS, which a maximum penalty of ¥150,000.727 In addition, twice the amount of 
extra emissions quotas will be removed from the emissions quota to be allocated in the following 
year.728 The Guangdong ET pilot stipulates the same financial penalty and performance as the 
Shenzhen ET pilot.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
public discussion procedure for the Hubei ET pilots started from 17 August 2013 to 17 September 2013. 
Guangdong provincial government (July 2013), 广东省碳排放权管理和交易办法（送审稿） [Notice of 
Collecting Public Opinion on Draft Legislation on Piloting Emissions Trading in Guangdong Province] (in Chinese) 
(4 July 2013) <http://www.fzb.gd.gov.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/gdsfzb/lfyjzj/201307/9846.html> accessed 
24 September 2013. The public discussion procedure for the Guangdong ET pilot is from 4 July 2013 to 4 August 
2013. 
722 Shenzhen rules (n 700), art. 8. 
723 Shanghai municipality government (November 2013), 上海市碳排放管理试行办法 [Shanghai Interim Measure 
on Piloting Emissions Trading] (in Chinese) (adopted 6 November 2013, entered into force 20 November 2013) 
<http://sh.eastday.com/m/20130712/u1a7516883.html> accessed 1 December, art 39. 
724 Ibid. 
725 Ibid, art 38. The targeted companies that provide fake emissions data, or hide actual emissions will be charged 
¥10,000 to ¥30,000. The targeted companies that reject the third-party verification will be charged ¥30,000 to 
¥50,000. 
726 Ibid. 




Some ET pilots have included administration punishment for noncompliance. In the Tianjin pilot, 
companies that cannot surrender enough emissions cannot acquire high credit ratings. A high 
credit rating can help the company to get more policy support from the Tianjin government and 
more financial support from banks.729 The Shanghai ET pilot has included the same credit rating 
penalty in its legislation. In addition, the Shanghai DRC publishes a list of companies that cannot 
fulfil their emissions reduction target in an attempt to publicly shame these noncompliance 
performers. Moreover, these companies are not qualified to apply for subsidies and rewards from 
‘the special funding of the energy-saving and emissions reduction’730 in Shanghai, and these 
companies’ fixed assets projects cannot pass the energy-saving assessment because their 
applications will not be accepted. Projects are required to pass the energy-saving assessment to 
be allowed by the national or local DRCs to manufacture or operate.731 In the Guangdong ET 
pilot’s draft legislation, a company that cannot fulfil its emissions reduction target and rejects 
inclusion in the ETS cannot receive local DRC approval to start a new project and the company’s 
finalised project will fail the energy-saving assessment.732  
2.1.2.1.7 Carbon offsets 
Certified Emissions Reductions (CCERs) are stipulated in the 2012 Interim Measures 
establishing China’s voluntary ETS. One CCER represents one tonne of CO2 equivalent
733 that 
can be traded in the voluntary carbon market. 
Four of the seven Chinese ET pilots use China’s CCERs to offset emissions. Local legislations in 
Tianjin City and in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone confirm the inclusion of a carbon 
offset programme in their ETSs. In addition, draft legislation in Guangdong and Hubei provinces 
propose using carbon offsets. However, the Shanghai ET pilot does not include carbon offsets. 
The Tianjin ETS allows CCERs to offset a maximum of 10 per cent of the real emissions 
released by regulated companies.734 In the Shenzhen ETS, regulated companies can use CCERs 
                                                           
729 Tianjin municipality government, 天津市碳排放交易管理暂行办法 [Interim Measure on piloting ET in Tianjin 
Municipality] (in Chinese) (entered into force 20 December 2013) 
<http://www.tj.gov.cn/zwgk/wjgz/szfbgtwj/201312/t20131224_227448.htm> accessed 23 December 2013.  
730 Shanghai municipality government (June 2008), 上海市节能减排专项资金管理办法 [Management Methods on 
the Special Funding of the Energy-saving and Emissions Reduction] (in Chinese) (entered into force 6 June 2008) 
<http://news.eastday.com/eastday/zfgb/qk/node271314/node271315/node271316/u1a3697310.html> accessed 23 
December 2013, para 4. 
731 NDRC (September 2010), 固定资产投资项目节能评估和审查暂行办法 [The Interim Regulations on Energy-
saving Assessment and Examination to Fixed-asset Investment Projects] (in Chinese) (entered into force 1 
November 2010) <http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2011/content_1792048.htm> accessed 25 September 2013, 
art 3-4.)  
732 Guangdong provincial government (July 2013) (n 721), para 3, art 22.  
733 NDRC (June 2012) Interim Measures (n 675), art 21, para 2.  
734 Tianjin implementation plan (n 693), art. 2.7. 
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recognised by the local government to offset a fixed per cent of their real emissions.735 The 
source, scope and types of CCERs are not stipulated, but will be regulated by Shenzhen’s 
government. The draft proposal for the Shanghai ETS allowed carbon offsets at a maximum of 5 
per cent of total allocated allowances.736 However, the final legislation does not include carbon 
offset as a supplementary tool. The Hubei ETS proposes that regulated companies can submit 
their CCERs to offset their real emissions in the same year.737 The CCERs should only be 
produced by those companies not included in the Hubei Province ETS, and only at a maximum 
of 10 per cent of the total allocated allowances. The draft proposal for the Guangdong ET pilot 
allows CCERs at a maximum of 10 per cent of the total allocated allowances.738 The sources for 
the CCERs in Guangdong ET pilots are not defined. Interim measures in Hubei and Guangdong 
are waiting approval before being enforced. 
China’s carbon offset programmes are different from those in Western countries’ programmes, 
such as the EU ETS. In the EU ETS, credits resulting from a projects-based mechanism such as 
CDM and Joint Implementation (JI) can be used to achieve emissions reduction targets, although 
the quality and quantity of these carbon credits are restricted. Therefore, regulated companies in 
developed countries have the option of investing in CDM projects in developing countries to 
fulfil emissions reduction obligations. As long as the restriction rules are obeyed, carbon credits 
from CDM can be used to offset any emissions allowances within the EU. 
China has undertaken no mandatory emissions reduction target under the Kyoto Protocol. 
Therefore, acquiring allowable emissions by investing in CDM or JI projects is not possible for 
China’s participants, since only Annex I parties can invest in CDM and JI.739 Also, only CCERs 
can be used to offset emissions in China, and the source of the CCERs is restricted by Article 21 
of the 2012 Interim Measures.740 Existing legal provisions stipulate that CCERs are considered 
the offset tool for regulated companies in China’s local ETS to fulfil their targets.  
2.1.2.2 Uncertainties in the design 
2.1.2.2.1 GHG emissions reduction target 
China adopted a voluntary carbon intensity target of 40 to 50 per cent over the period from 2005 
to 2020. Critical review indicates that China’s diplomatic tactic was to utilise a voluntary target 
instead of mandatory and qualified emissions cuts in order and to cope with international 
pressure. 741  As China is still exploring an ETS mechanism, the question of how a carbon 
                                                           
735 Shenzhen rules (n 700), art 5. 
736 Shanghai municipality government (November 2013) (n 723), art 18.  
737 Hubei provincial government (August 2013) (n 721), art 9.  
738 Guangdong provincial government (July 2013) (n 721), art 9.  
739 The Kyoto Protocol, art 6, 12 
740 NDRC (June 2012) Interim Measures (n 675), art 21.  
741 Gang Chen, ‘Carbon Intensity: China’s Card for Climate Politics’ (2010) 2 (2) East Asian Policy 55-56. 
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intensity target fits into an ETS remains without a conclusive answer. China’s ET pilot 
programmes utilise a cap-and-trade model, but replace the cap with a ‘carbon intensity target’, 
which raises several uncertainties. 
First, a carbon intensity target makes it difficult to assess achievements of carbon emissions 
reductions. Carbon intensity targets at provincial level are allocated directly to companies 
included in the ET pilots. A company must fulfil its emissions reduction target based on its 
absolute emission quotas, but not its carbon intensity. In short, emissions reduction targets at 
provincial level are based upon carbon intensity, but achievement of emissions reduction targets 
at company level are calculated through absolute carbon emissions. As a result, there are two 
criterions in assessing the achievement of emissions reduction at two levels, respectively. 
Whether the final assessment is based on carbon intensity or absolute carbon emissions is 
unclear. Two options are proposed to allow comparison and assessment between provincial level 
and company level. One option is to translate the carbon intensity targets in all ET pilots into 
absolute emissions reduction targets before distributing to companies. The other option is to 
distribute provincial carbon intensity targets to enterprises, and then the achievement of 
enterprises are based on individual carbon intensity targets. However, the second option is likely 
impossible since all ET pilots already stipulate the assessment is based on emission quotas.  
Second, research indicates that carbon intensity targets can be translated into absolute caps. For 
instance, Scotney et al. translated China’s carbon intensity target into an absolute target. They 
estimated that the ET piloting programme in China would cover approximately 700 million 
tonnes of CO2 equivalent, representing the second largest carbon trading effort on earth by 
2014.742 Figure 6 below shows the estimated amounts of GHG emissions to be allocated to local 
cities and provinces.743 
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 Figure 6: Estimation of cap in the China’s seven ETS pilots 
The carbon intensity target reflects GHG emissions per unit of gross domestic product (GDP), 
measured as a percentage. More accurate estimations are based on both emissions data and 
economic development in terms of GDP. This translation of the 12th FYP national carbon 
intensity targets into absolute emissions targets for sectors covered by a future ETS makes 
assumptions about future Chinese economic activity in each economic sector and at the 
provincial level, which requires continuous monitoring.744 Monitoring and reporting in China’s 
ET pilots is under development, and therefore, many companies do not have records of their 
carbon emissions, which makes an accurate estimation almost impossible. Even if carbon 
intensity can be translated into an absolute amount, participants face risks in counting on 
academic estimation to make abatement plans and investment decisions. 
2.1.2.2.2 Clarification between grandfathering and benchmarking 
Free allocations may be awarded either through grandfathering or benchmarking. With 
grandfathering, allowances are allocated to the polluters based on their historical emissions. 
Historical emissions data are collected in a base year before the ET starts. Each participant’s 
emissions quota is then proportionally restricted to the level in that base year. Therefore, three 
main factors must be considered in a grandfathering approach: the base year, the emissions level 
of the base year and the proportional emissions restriction for each participant. 
With benchmarking, allowances are distributed according to some common emission rates, 
usually multiplied by historical output. The emission rate is often associated with the best 
available technology (BAT), or they can be an average emission rate for the sectors.745 Average 
benchmarks are calculated as the activity-weighted average of emission values for a particular 
group; therefore, benchmarks based on the average emission rate result in higher allocations for 
all companies than benchmarks based on BAT.746 Participants are able to acquire emissions 
quotas for free only if they meet the benchmark. 
Unlike allocations based on historical emissions, benchmarks allow distribution based on 
performance standards.747 Benchmarks may be uniformly applied to all installations in a group or 
differentiated according to fuel inputs, technologies or products. 748 In short, an average of 
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emissions per unit of output is established and allocations are made on the basis of historic, 
current or expected output quantities. 749  
When selecting an allocation method, local policymakers must consider the pros and cons of 
each approach, as well as whether preconditions can be met. Each allocation method can result in 
a different environmental outcome. For instance, benchmarking is more equitable and efficient 
than grandfathering, because benchmarking of existing installations accounts for early actions 
and may lead to desired distributional effects. However, benchmarking requires more stringent 
data and the formation of benchmarking groups.750 From the perspective of regulated enterprises, 
grandfathering is more politically acceptable and feasible than reaching agreement on 
benchmarking. 
According to existing legislation and draft legislation, six of all ET pilots used free allocation as 
the main method to distribute allowances at the beginning and will consider auctioning when 
certain conditions are met. These conditions include maturity of the Chinese carbon market, the 
readiness of auction rules and legislation and participants’ agreement. Only the Shanghai ET 
pilot mentions the use of benchmarking. Other ET pilots allocate allowances for free; however, 
policymakers do not point out specific method of free allocation between grandfathering and 
benchmarking. One reason may be a policymaking strategy. Conditions may not yet allow either 
benchmarking or auctioning. After emissions trading experiences, and when acquired and actual 
emissions statistics and allocation rules are available, benchmarking and auctioning may be 
applied.  
It is not exactly clear which free allocation method, grandfathering or benchmarking, is to be 
used in these six ETs. However, the ‘base period’ concept can play the role as the ‘base year’ in 
grandfathering. In theory, the term ‘base year’ indicates that emissions levels in that year are the 
basis for defining whether participants can acquire emissions quotas free of charge. However, 
provisions in China’s ET legislation and rules only mention the baseline as emissions levels from 
the base period. The question is whether emissions levels are the average of the base period or 
are from any year within this period. Defining the exact emissions levels in the Chinese ET pilots 
is difficult based on such lenient provisions. In grandfathering, the standard for participants’ 
acquiring free quotas is only their historical emissions levels in a base year. However, an 
accurate amount of allowable emissions quotas may be uncertain because good quality historical 
emissions data may not exist. Also, grandfathering cannot resolve the way in which new entrants 
enter the market 751  because new entrants do not have historical emissions. 752  If the 
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750 Joachim Schleich and Clemens Cremer, ‘Using Benchmarking for the Primary Allocation of EU Allowances’ 
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Research <http://www.isi.fraunhofer.de/isi-media/docs/e-x/working-papers-sustainability-and-
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grandfathering approach is applied without detailed provisions on allocation for new entrants, the 
carbon market will withdraw participation because of discrimination between the new entrants 
and incumbents. 
2.1.2.2.3 Establishment of a monitoring, reporting and verification system 
All six ETs recognize the importance of establishing a monitoring, reporting and verification 
(MRV) system; however, the way to establish the MRV system remains under discussion. This 
section reviews what China has done so far and what remains to be done. 
Monitoring and reporting requirements depend precisely on the scope and spatial coverage of 
GHG emissions (geography and sectors),753 and these factors are related whether the ETS is 
designed in an upstream or downstream mode. Theoretically, an upstream ETS regulates GHG 
emissions related to the characteristics of the product, which means potential carbon emissions 
are regulated when fossil resources are extracted or fuel is produced. A downstream ETS 
regulates GHG emissions when they are actually released into the air. In short, upstream and 
downstream modes are two ways of regulating emissions, which are strongly connected with 
coverage and scope of an ETS. Therefore, the adoption of one mode or the other determines the 
effectiveness of an MR system. 
Basically, China’s ET pilots are a mixed mode. All six ETs mainly cover sectors close to the 
consumption side, or those that are emitting carbon dioxide directly into the air. However, some 
ET pilots regulate indirect emissions, which can be monitored neither by an upstream mode nor 
by a downstream mode. ET pilots in Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen cover big consumers of 
electricity and heating, which are not sectors in the downstream mode. In addition, Tianjin 
includes the exploitation of natural gas and oil in its ET pilot. The exploitation sector is typically 
included in the upstream mode. The second issue in MR is who will be responsible for the 
system. In China, multiple government departments capture GHG-related data. The Local 
Development and Reform Commissions (LDRCs) collect economic data and the local 
Environmental Monitoring Station (EMS) collects ‘traditional’ pollution data. 754  However, 
China’s environmental law does not consider GHGs as a traditional pollutant.755 Hence, whether 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
and changes in production. Because benchmarking sets amount of emissions per unit of production, the allowable 
emissions quotas are surrendered according to actual production, not historic production’. 
752 Daniel Behn, ‘Methods of Allocating Allowances under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme: Assessing Their 
Interaction with EU State Aid Rules’ (September 2008) Centre for Energy, Petroleum and Mineral Law and Policy 
Gateway (CEPMLP) Annual Review Volume 13 
<http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/gateway/index.php?news=30836> accessed 20 April 2010, 6. 
753 Bellevrat (n 744), 8.  
754 International Carbon Action Partnership (ICAP), Summary Report of the China Conference on Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions Data Management in Energy Intensive Industries and the Power Sector, October 12–13 2009, Beijing 
China, p.7. 
755 The National People's Congress (2000) PACP (n 643). This law is the basic law on the prevention and control of 
air pollution in China. From chapters 3 to 5, regulated sources include air pollution from coal combustion and from 
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the local EMS has the authority to monitor the GHG emissions depends on the legal nature of 
GHGs in Chinese law. 
The first step is to challenge the definition of air pollutants in China’s environmental law and 
establish the legal basis for MR activities. The competent authority can set guidelines and rules 
for MR, and the EMS and environmental administrations at the central and local levels can 
establish the system and publish environmental reports for the public.756 The other way to figure 
out who takes responsibility for MR is to require regulated enterprises to monitor and report 
themselves and then have an independent third-party verifier assessing these reports. In this case, 
GHG audits at a company level are important. Energy audits have been introduced in China over 
the last 10 years and can form the basis for developing CO2 audits.
757 
Theoretically, verification should address the reliability, credibility and accuracy of monitoring 
systems, reported data and information relating to emissions.758 The role of the verifier is to 
confirm the monitoring report and the reported emissions of regulated enterprises to ensure 
accuracy and authenticity of data. To do so, an emissions statistics system must be established in 
the pilot provinces and in municipalities. 
In practice, as stipulated in the six Chinese ET pilots’ implementation plans, the third-party 
verifier is required to be independent and responsible for its verification. The rules also stipulate 
that the PDRC has the authority to supervise the verifier’s work to prevent any illegal actions. 
Drafts of interim measures for ET pilots in Shanghai and Hubei describe implications of a 
verifier’s non-compliance. Though not yet approved, these drafts are examples for other ET 
pilots. The draft interim measure for the Shanghai ET pilot provides that the third-party verifier 
is responsible for standardising the format and ensuring credibility and accuracy of the 
verification report. 759  The verifier must protect emissions data as confidential. If these two 
obligations are not achieved, the Shanghai DRC will require the verifier to correct his behaviour 
or withdraw the verification permit for three years; in addition, the verifier may be fined from 
¥30,000 to ¥100,000.760 In Hubei province, draft legislation stipulates oversight provisions for 
the verifier. The DRC requires the verifier to correct mistakes and will withdraw the verification 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
transportation, and air pollution by waste gas, dust and malodorous substances. Concrete sources of air pollution, 
which are only defined in the national Five-Year Plan, are sulphur dioxide and chemical oxygen demand (COD). 
GHGs are not considered as an air pollutant in Chinese law. 
756 The National People’s Congress (1989), EPL (n 634), art 11.  
757 Xin Wang, ‘Building MRV for a successful Emissions Trading System in China’ (December 2011) IDDRI 
Working Paper No. 16/2011 <http://www.iddri.org/Publications/Building-MRV-for-a-successful-emissions-trading-
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758 Ibid, 6. 
759 Shanghai municipality government (November 2013), Shanghai Interim Measure on Piloting ET (n 723), art 22.  
760 Ibid, art. 34. 
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permit and fine the verifier for non-compliance. Penalties in Hubei range from ¥50,000 to 
¥150,000.761  
2.1.2.2 Conclusion 
China’s carbon trading system is developing quickly. To achieve its voluntary emissions 
reduction targets and local carbon intensity targets through the ET pilots, central legislation has 
been promulgated almost simultaneously with local rules on carbon trading. In addition, local 
ETSs must be implemented during the 12th FYP period (2010–2015). 
China has pledged to explore the launch of a national carbon market during the 13th FYP period 
(2016–2020), which raised expectations worldwide. This pledge has been misunderstood as a 
commitment to launch a national ETS, where actually the central government’s announcement 
expressed its willingness only to consider the possibilities. China made no official promise to 
launch a national carbon market within this period. Therefore, ET pilots are very likely to be 
continued through all the years of 2016-2020, and may be expanded geographically. Expansion 
of ET pilots in China sends a positive message; however, attention to expansion and not the 
contents of ET pilots may not result in actual emissions reduction and damage the environmental 
integrity of the ET policy. 
Existing legislation and rules show that China’s policymakers have reached consensus on a well-
designed, high-performing ETS, including a consistent legal basis, a phase-in approach, some 
method of free allocation, a trading platform for emissions exchange and compliance provisions. 
However, some key factors have not been clarified such as the mixed use of carbon intensity 
targets at the provincial level and absolute targets at the company level, clarification between 
grandfathering and benchmarking and the rules for monitoring and review (see Table 7). These 
uncertainties may counter any optimism regarding the current development of China’s ETs.  















Beijing √ - √ √ √ √ - √ 
Shanghai √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Guangdong √ √ √ - √ √ - √ 
Shenzhen  √ - √ - √ √ √ √ 
                                                           
761 Hubei provincial government (August 2013) (n 721); Draft Legislation on Piloting the Emissions Trading in 
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Tianjin √ √ √ √ √ √ - √ 
Hubei √ √ √ - √ √ √ √ 
Chongqing √ - √ - - - - - 
 
China’s ET pilot programme is in its infancy and not all elements have been established in each 
pilot. As the local ET pilots develop at different speeds, disparities among them will widen.  
2.2 Implementation of China’s ETS: Practice and challenges 
In 2013, China’s ET pilots had gradually begun, and five of the seven had launched trading. The 
Shenzhen ET pilot started emissions trading on June 17, the first announced start date among the 
country’s regional carbon exchanges,762 followed by the Shanghai and the Beijing pilots on 26 
November763 and 28 November, respectively. By the end of 2013, the Tianjin and Guangdong 
pilots also had launched trading, 764 765 leaving only the Chongqing Municipality and Hubei 
Province.  
An analysis of the implementation of the Chinese ET pilots reveals the strengths and weakness 
of their design, and provides an opportunity to test theory in the down-to-earth context of China. 
As a result, some lessons learned can be drawn for a future mandatory nationwide ETS. Because 
these pilots are relatively new, detailed information on trading transactions is lacking and it is 
hard to tell whether the programmes are cost-effective in achieving their emissions reduction 
targets. Therefore, this analysis draws upon interviews conducted before the pilots were begun 
rather than information from their recent implementation. Based on these interviews, conducted 
from April to May 2013, designing and establishing a Chinese ETS is fraught with challenges 
and limitations. The challenges and limitations of legislation in particular can significantly 
impact application of ETS. 
2.2.1 Objective of China’s emissions trading 
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An understanding of the objectives of the ET in China is important to the corresponding design 
and implementation. The interviews uncovered different understandings about the China’s ET 
programme’s objectives, but three main opinions emerged.  
The first opinion was that the ET programme is a tool for economic reform rather than for an 
environmental protection. According to some interviewees, carbon trading may be officially 
defined as environmental protection, but its authentic objective is to restructure the economy 
from traditional coal-based to low carbon-based consumption.766 Applying absolute emission 
reduction targets would be unacceptable because it would increase production expenses and 
restrict China’s economic development. Maintaining accelerated economic development is 
always the central government’s first priority, and therefore, China will never sacrifice economic 
development to reduce carbon emissions. In addition, interviewees said climate change is not an 
urgent issue compared with domestic environmental pollution in China, and the Chinese 
government emphasises ways to address domestic environmental pollution first. At the last but 
not least, China is a developing country that does not wish to undertake any legally binding 
emissions reduction target. Therefore, interviewees said that the aim of the ET in China is not to 
mandate environmental protection, but to reform its economic structure to a sustainable economy 
and to reduce carbon emissions in the meantime. This opinion also can be found in the literature 
review. The ET pilot projects are coordinated by the NDRC, China’s top economic planning 
agency, whereas formal involvement of the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) is 
limited. Therefore, carbon trading is primarily an economic policy that may deliver some 
environmental benefits, rather than an environmental policy initiated or coordinated by a top 
environmental agency.767 China has made its intentions clear: It will use emissions trading as an 
incentive for low carbon growth.768  
Others interviewed expressed a second opinion, however, they stated that the ET does aim for 
environmental protection769  and the policy has received much attention because of its cost 
effectiveness as a mitigation measure. Then why is the NDRC the competent authority for 
implementing the ET, rather than the MEP? These interviewees cited the climate change 
negotiations from China’s standpoint. From the beginning, the NDRC took responsibility for 
conducting these negotiations and for proposing a climate policy, although the interviewees 
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thought the NDRC could not work well on climate policy without other departments’ support.770 
According to the interviews, the NDRC leads two main working groups. The internal group is 
responsible for domestic capacity building for emissions reduction and design and 
implementation of domestic emissions reduction policy (the ET); the external working group is 
responsible for international climate negotiations.771  
A third opinion from the perspective of some interviews was that ET is a policy relevant to 
environmental protection and economics, but is not an economic policy.772  
All interviewees agreed that the ET is one mitigation measures for addressing climate change 
and reducing carbon emissions. However, few considered the ET policy an environmental 
protection policy. One reason for this opinion is that the NDRC holds the valid and legitimate 
jurisdiction on climate change issues. Another reason is that China does not wish to undertake 
any absolute emissions reduction target with legally binding force.  
Some questioned the institutional capacity of the NDRC, noting that the internal working group 
of the NDRC may not be qualified to organise the carbon market. The internal working group of 
the NDRC is not high in the hierarchy of China’s administrative structure, so its capability and 
power may be limited. The NDRC itself is one department under the leadership of the State 
Council. To apply a new market-based instrument requires collaboration among different 
departments of the State Council, and therefore, a competent authority should be at least at 
departmental level. 
The fact that no absolute cap for emissions has been set in China’s carbon trading bolsters the 
view that ET is an economic reform policy. The Chinese central government treats the ET as a 
tool to transform its economic structure with the final objective to boost sustainable economic 
development. Reducing emissions reduction is simply a by-product.  
2.2.2 Low legislative hierarchy of ET pilot rules 
China’s legal hierarchy includes laws (falu, 法律) adopted by the National People’s Congress 
(NPC), administrative regulations (xingzheng fagui,行政法规) enacted by the State Council, 
local legislation adopted by local people’s congresses (difangxing falgui, 地方性法规 ), 
administrative rules (xingzheng guizhang, 行政规章 ) including ministry/department rules 
(bumen guizhang,部门规章) and local rules (difang guizhang, 地方规章) adopted by the 
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Figure 7 775  shows the hierarchy of the Chinese law system. Legislation can have different 
rankings on this hierarchy and the hierarchy of laws and the legal effect of legislation depend on 
the status of the issuing authority, 776either a legislator (People’s Congress) or an administrative 
body (government).777 The higher the legislative body, the higher the validity of the laws they 
make. From highest to lowest, the hierarchical order is the National People’s Congress, the State 
Council, the local people’s congresses, the departments of the State Council and the local 
governments.  
These basic principles apply to China’s legal system: First, the constitution is the supreme 
authority. Second, legislation enacted at a higher level prevails over that at a lower level. Third, 
department rules and local rules are at the same level, and if they conflict, the State Council 
makes the final ruling. 
 The hierarchy of the legislation governing China’s local ET local pilots can be divided into three 
categories. The first category contains the normative documents, which include the Beijing 
execution plan, the Shanghai government’s suggestions, the Guangdong execution plan, the 
Tianjin execution plan and the Hubei execution plan, which were made by local government. 
The second category contains the local rules, including the interim measures on the Shanghai and 
the Tianjin ET pilots, which were made by the local government and promulgated by the legal 
affair office of the local government. The third category contains the local regulations, which 
applies only to the ETS Rules of Shenzhen Specific Economic Zone, which were made by the 
Shenzhen People’s Congress. 
As time goes on, the legislation has developed from normative documents to local rules and local 
regulation. Thus, the legislative hierarchy of China’s ETS pilots increased, which reflects the 
Chinese government’s cautiousness in piloting emission trading. Without any experiences with 
an ETS, China faces greater risk in adopting a system through legislation at a higher level. 
Normative documents signal that the programme is a trial, mandatory at local level and needs 
more time to become a mature policy. The normative documents also serve as a blueprint for the 
pilot programmes and for establishing an ETS. The main elements of an ETS design are included 
in the working list; however, they explain only what to do and not how to do it. The language is 
ambiguous and difficult to enforce legally when it comes to process and procedural issues.  
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academic world. In order for better understanding, I use uniformed terms ‘administrative regulations’, ‘local 
regulations’, ‘administrative rules’, ‘Ministry rules’, ‘local rules’ and ‘normative documents’.  
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powers to the executive. However, in China, the State Council has the inherent authority to ‘adopt administrative 
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Information about how to establish an ETS is not clear until local rules (by the local governments) 
and local regulations (by the local people’s congresses) are made. These rules and regulations 
define the legal responsibilities and obligations of the various stakeholders, as well as the 
compliance measures. The absence of legislation at a higher level (law or administrative 
regulation) stunts motivation for participation in the local ET pilots. In the long term, higher-
level legislation is necessary, which would indicate the government’s ambitious and strong 
political determination to reduce China’s GHG emissions. National legislation would be a sign to 
local policymakers that more explicit procedural provisions and policies are needed. Such action 
would boost confidence among stakeholders and ET participants. 
Without legislation at higher level, the local government or local people’s congresses may not 
take the initiative to clarify the details. For one reason, local governments may not take the 
political risk of proposing legislation without permission of higher-level administrative bodies or 
legislatures. Second, without legally binding requirements of higher-level ETS, local ETs may 
not extend their trial periods. Only legislation at a higher level would create strong certainty for 
the ETs.  
2.2.3 Lenient cap-setting 
China’s national target is to reduce carbon intensity by 40 to 45 per cent from 2005 to 2020. 
Because China’s emissions reduction target is voluntary, the aim of carbon intensity pledge can 
be questioned. The policy can be interpreted this way: ‘China’s diplomatic tactic is to utilise 
voluntary carbon intensity-based targets to replace mandatory and qualified emissions cuts and 
ease international pressure’.778 This strategy is quite understandable because economic growth 
always has first priority in China’s policy. As a developing country, China seeks the right to 
develop, rather than sacrificing economic growth for the emissions reduction. Whether China’s 
carbon intensity target has the stringency, accuracy and credibility to meet the ET policy 
expectations has yet to be determined. An analysis of these three aspects of the carbon intensity 
target follows. 
2.2.3.1 Stringency 
Two tests can be used to examine the carbon intensity target’s stringency. The first test is 
whether the carbon intensity target is strict enough as an emissions control target in an ETS. A 
strict carbon intensity target is necessary to create scarcity in the emissions allowances market. 
An emissions reduction target that is more generous than the firms’ registered emissions will 
produce surplus emissions allowances in the carbon market. The second test is whether the 
intensity-based target is strict enough compared with China’s emissions reduction capacity. If 
China’s carbon intensity target is either too lenient or unachievable, the central government 
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stands to lose face in the international community and might have a weaker position in climate 
negotiations. 
A hidden result behind the carbon intensity target is to allow increased carbon emissions. A 
carbon intensity target will not limit economic growth and economic production; however, it is 
unlikely to result in an absolute decrease in emissions.779 China’s carbon intensity target cannot 
be considered as a cap in an ETS because it allows carbon emissions to grow.780 
Allowing an increase in carbon emissions has several negative impacts. First, an increase in 
emissions is counter to the aim of emissions trading. Second, an increase in emissions makes the 
demand for allowances in the carbon market unclear. If the actual emissions are much higher 
than the participants’ registered emissions and keep increasing, demand for emissions quotas will 
increase and the carbon price will rapidly increase. Therefore, regulated enterprises will face 
difficulties in reducing carbon emissions at the lowest abatement cost. 
In addition, China’s carbon intensity target is not ambitious enough to challenge the country’s 
emissions reduction capacity. Projections made by Western scholars suggest that China’s goal is 
close to or equivalent to business-as-usual trends. For instance, the U.S. Energy Administration 
Institute estimated that China’s carbon intensity would improve by 45 per cent by 2020 in a 
business-as-usual world, and China’s Energy Research Institute set the improvement at 47 per 
cent.781 A well-known energy outlook by the International Energy Agency (IEA-WEO 2009) 
forecast a very close carbon intensity figure (0.55), reinforcing the argument that the Chinese 
proposal entails measures additional to the baseline.782  
However, other scholars have different opinions. The IEA-WEO 2009 report also predicted that 
China’s energy-related CO2 emissions will be 8.4 GtCO2 by 2020 under the ambitious 450 parts 
per million (ppm) of CO2 equivalent scenario, 1.2 GtCO2 less than the baseline under the 
reference scenario.783 A scholar states that cutting carbon intensity by 40 to 45 per cent from 
2006 to 2020 would bring reductions of 0.46 to 1.2 GtCO2 in 2020.
784 Therefore, if China meets 
                                                           
779 Ibid.  
780 Interview with Mr. Bjorn Odenbro, Former General Manager, China at Tricorona, (now work as a Vice President 
of Greater China at Cleanergy AB) (Beijing, China, 16 April 2013). 
781 Climate Institute, ‘China’s Carbon Intensity Goal’ (December 2009) 
<http://www.climateinstitute.org.au/verve/_resources/34_(Attachment_to_doc_33)_Chinas_Carbon_Intensity_Goal_
December_2009.pdf> accessed 12 Jul 2013. 
782 Carlo Carrao and Massimo Tavoni, ‘Looking Ahead from Copenhagen: How Challenging is the Chinese Carbon 
Intensity Target?’ (Climate Science & Policy, December 28 2009) < 
http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/2009/12/looking-ahead-from-copenhagen-how-challenging-is-the-chinese-
carbon-intensity-target/> accessed 12 July 2013. 
783 International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook (OECD/IEA, Paris, 2009) Figure 9.36 China energy-related 
CO2 emissions 350 
784  ZhongXiang Zhang, ‘Assessing China's Energy Conservation and Carbon Intensity: How will the Future Differ 
from the Past?’(24 May 2010) (Fudan University, School of Economics) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1604867> 
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the high end of its proposed target, the reduction would align with the 450-ppm scenario.785 In 
short, the carbon intensity target is not as ambitious as China has pledged, but is not a mission 
impossible. 
Whether the 45 per cent reduction target will meet international expectations under the 450 ppm 
scenario depends on the speed of development of China’s GDP.786 If economic growth were 
faster than planned, a 40 per cent decrease in carbon intensity would result in total CO2 
emissions of 10,302 MtCO2 (1.0302 GtCO2) in 2020, while a 45 per cent decrease would amount 
to 9,943 MtCO2 emissions in 2020.
787  Neither of these emissions numbers can achieve 
expectations under the 450-ppm scenario.  
2.2.3.2 Accuracy 
Uncertainty about China’s GDP can impact the accuracy of the national carbon intensity target 
because the target is tied to the GDP, which private enterprises cannot predict. Academic 
researchers may translate the carbon intensity target into a cap, but enterprises will not trade 
based on speculation or estimation;788 they need explicit data about the supply and demand of the 
allowances in the carbon market to make investment decisions. In addition, the calculation of 
carbon intensity makes the data of supply and demand of the allowances in the carbon market 
ambiguous. According to Mr. Guoqiang Qian, carbon intensity is an ex post (after the fact) limit. 
China’s carbon intensity target is based on the country’s macroeconomics and is calculated by 
dividing total carbon emissions by the GDP.789 However, a national carbon intensity target is not 
the specific target of China’s carbon trading system. In practice, the total amount of carbon 
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786 Jiahai Yuan, Yong Hou and Ming Xu, ‘China 2020 Carbon Intensity Target’ (2012) 16 (1) Renewable and 
Sustainable Energy Reviews 4976. 
787 Ibid.  
788 Ibid. 
789 Interview with Mr. Guoqiang Qian, General Strategic Director of Sino Carbon Innovation & Investment Co., Ltd., 
(Beijing, China, 17 April 2013). 
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The competent authority defines the benchmark for each product in regulated sectors. The 
benchmark is a baseline of carbon intensity for producing the specific product. At the end of 
compliance period/year, each enterprise acquires its production capacity and carbon emissions 
and then its actual carbon intensity can be calculated. Enterprises whose actual carbon intensity 
is than their benchmarks must purchase allowances for compliance. 
As Table 8 indicates, Enterprises A and B both produce product X. Enterprise A emits 100t CO2 
to produce 1000 units of X, while B emits 120t CO2 to produce the same amount of units. The 
carbon intensity benchmark is 11 percent. Therefore, Enterprise B needs to buy 10 tonnes of CO2 
from some other regulated enterprises. 
 Enterprise A Enterprise B Benchmark 
CO2 Emissions 100t 120t 110t 
Production Capacity 1000 units 1000 units 1000t units 
Carbon Intensity 10% 12% 11% 
Table 8: Examples of carbon intensity calculation 
The supply and demand of carbon allowances are unclear until the end of compliance period/year. 
Variation can happen both in production capacity and carbon emissions, compared with the 
estimated amount that the enterprise reported at the beginning. Therefore, participants 
understandably do not have confidence in the carbon market because of the inaccuracy and 
uncertainties. 
2.2.3.3 Credibility 
The third concern is about the credibility of the carbon emissions data and China’s GDP figures. 
China’s statistics on energy use and carbon emissions have long been questioned, partly because 
calculations using top-down and bottom-up statistics do not match.790 The central government’s 
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) compiles energy data in a top-down mode and oversees and 
coordinates the corresponding statistical departments at the national and provincial levels.791 
Researchers compiled the CO2 emissions inventories for China and its 30 provinces for 1997–
2010 and compared them with the NBS data. They found that CO2 emissions calculated on the 
basis of these two publicly available official energy data sets differed by 1.4 gigatonnes for 
2010.792 According to one interviewee, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) resist providing emission 
data and local governments must guess about the emissions amounts.793 
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2.2.4 Environmental integrity of the CCERs 
The 2012 Interim Measures for Voluntary Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading seems to regulate 
a voluntary ETS, but the story is not as it seems. All interviewees gave an explicit explanation on 
the function and the aim of using the CCERs. They said the nature of the 2012 Interim Measures 
should not be judged by its title, but by its content.794 Essentially, the 2012 Interim Measures 
aimed to establish a Chinese offsetting programme, complementary to the mandatory ET pilots. 
Despite the title of this legislation, there will not be an independent voluntary ET market in 
China and use of ‘voluntary ET’ in the title originally referred to the voluntarily purchase of the 
carbon offsets. 
Promulgated by the NDRC, the 2012 Interim Measures is central legislation that brings about a 
design for a carbon-offsetting programme at national level. As a result, local governments do not 
need to design their own offsetting programmes. The seven ET pilots can link their programmes 
to this national offsetting programme. According to interviewees, the CCERs and the carbon 
emissions reductions in the mandatory ET pilots are transferrable. Once the mandatory carbon 
markets in the seven ET pilots will be established, the carbon offsets from China’s official 
offsetting programmes can be used to offset the carbon emission reductions in the pilot 
systems.795 
In the Chinese offsetting programme, the NDRC will play the role of supervisor to record 
projects, record the third-party verifier and establish the official methodology. The enterprises 
listed in the attachment to the 2012 Interim Measures can register projects with the NDRC to 
produce carbon offsets. The SOEs in the attachment can only register projects in the NDRC, 
while other enterprises can register in the LDRCs. Thus, the enterprises in the attachment list are 
not the ones included in the voluntary emissions trading, but are those that register programmes 
that can produce carbon offsets. 
2.2.4.1 Challenges 
Using the CCERs present several challenges. The first is the limitation on the amount of CCERs. 
The offsets are theoretically neutral with respect to impacts on GHG emissions reduction; 
compared with the surrender of allocations, the market effects are different. 796  Offset is 
considered a measurable reduction of GHG emissions from an activity or project in one location 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Letters of Nature Climate Change. 
793 Hidden name as the interviewee request. 
794 Interview with Mr. Guoqiang Qian, General Strategic Director of Sino Carbon Innovation & Investment Co., Ltd., 
(Beijing, China, 17 April 2013). 
795 Interview with Mr. Xikang Zhao, Senior Researcher & Research Director, Centre for environmental economic 
and policy research (CEEPR) of Guangdong Academy of Social Sciences (GDASS) (Guangzhou, China, 23 April 
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that is used to compensate for emissions occurring elsewhere.797 Therefore, carbon offsets do not 
increase GHG emissions over the long term. However, the amount of CCERs to be used can 
impact allowances in the carbon market in the short term.  
The fundamental role of offsets is to provide economic efficiency and cost containment within a 
regulatory cap-and-trade programme.798 ETS participants welcome offsets because purchasing 
them is a supplementary way to fulfil emissions reduction targets with lower costs and with the 
same environmental result. Therefore, using unlimited offsets runs the risk of companies buying 
their way out of their obligations and a failure to lower emissions.799  
The second challenge results from the uncertain cap in the seven ET pilots. Without explicit data, 
it is unknown whether the individual caps can cover the potential projects that produce the 
CCERs. Interviewees said that 3,000 to 4,000 projects have registered with the NDRC offsetting 
programme, including projects rejected by the UN EB. The NDRC would like to include these 
projects into the Chinese carbon offset programme because they have good qualifications,800 but 
a huge amount of CCERs would need to be purchased. With this huge amount of carbon offsets 
available in the carbon market as a potential supply of emissions quotas, a strict emissions 
reduction target will be needed to absorb these quotas. Otherwise, the oversupply of emissions 
quotas will result in fluctuation of the carbon price. Under such circumstances, the amount of 
CCERs should be limited. In practice, some mandatory ET pilots have set limits on allowable 
use of CCERs, as previously noted.  
The third challenge is about environmental integrity. As stated previously, the quality of the 
offsets determines the environmental integrity. Certain minimum qualifications should be met 
before verification, including additionality, authentic, measurability, enforcement and 
permanence.801 Therefore, uniform certification procedures, guidelines and methodologies are 
necessary. An independent verification and a certification standard with creditability and strong 
enforcement of legal rules must be in place. 
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The NDRC has issued several important documents and guidelines concerning China’s voluntary 
emissions reduction programme. Application templates, guidelines for certification and 
verification of voluntary emission reduction projects, trading platforms, methodologies of 
voluntary emission reductions and certification institutions are all in place, as listed below. 
 21 September 2012: application templates for the voluntary emission reduction project 
(NDRC climate department) 
 9 October 2012: guidelines for certification and the verification of voluntary emission 
reduction projects (NDRC General Office) 
 16 January 2013: official letters designating five trading platforms for purchasing CCERs 
– the Beijing Environmental Exchange, the Tianjin Climate Exchange, the Shanghai 
Environment and Energy Exchange, the Guangzhou Carbon Trading Exchange and the 
Shenzhen Emissions Exchange (NDRC General Office)802  
 5 March 2013: first group of methodologies for voluntary emission reduction (NDRC 
General Office); 803  to ensure the environmental outcome of the methodologies, the 
NDRC invited experts to evaluate the methodologies permitted by the CDM Executive 
Board (CDM EB), and selected 52 as China’s CCER methodologies, which were the 
most widely applied and suitable for China’s circumstances. 
 6 June 2013: China Quality Certification Centre (CQC) 804  and Guangzhou China 
Electronic Product Reliability and Environmental Research Institute (CEPREI) 
Certification Body 805  designated as institutions responsible for certification and 
verification (NDRC). 806  Both are registered and authorised by the Certification and 
                                                           
802 NDRC (January 2013), 国家发展改革委关于公布温室气体自愿减排交易机构备案的公告 [Notice on 
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Accreditation Administration of the People’s Republic of China. CQC is the largest 
professional certification body in China, while Guangzhou CEPREI is the earliest. 
However, only the CQC has published its procedures for certifying the CCERs,807 and the 
CEPREI has procedures only for certifying the CDM. 
2.2.5 External conditions to establish China’s ETS 
2.2.5.1 Legislation and policy basis 
China’s mandatory ET pilots are based on administrative policy and legislation at the local level. 
Since July 2013, the Specific Economic Zone Shenzhen and the direct-controlled municipality of 
Shanghai808 had enacted specific laws on their local ET pilots. Shenzhen was the first to propose 
legislation for the ET pilot because Shenzhen is authorised to have independent lawmaking 
power, which is not the case for ET pilots in other provinces and cities. 
Local policy and legal documents from other ET pilots rank lower in the Chinese legal hierarchy, 
which is reflected in the ambiguous and abstract language used. Also, legal provisions lower on 
the legal hierarchy lack enforceability. Laws at a high level are not appropriate for regulating ET 
pilots from a lawmaker’s perspective, with the ET pilots at the trial stage. Because the seven ET 
pilots will make rules on their own, a national law on local ET pilots is not necessary at this time. 
However, the seven ET pilots operate at different speeds in lawmaking and during the 
experimental phase no laws have binding force or have set deadlines. Interviewees said that 
legislation on a national ETS could be expected after carbon trading has proven to be cost-
effective and adequate experience has been gained from the ET pilots. Therefore, a breakthrough 
in adopting a national ETS is still on its way, and the local pilots are an important means to reach 
the breakthrough. However, the low-level legislative basis of local pilots is supposed to be 
replaced with a top-level design (ding ceng she ji) at the national level. 
2.2.5.2 Technological basis: Research and management capacity 
In Shenzhen, carbon auditing and MRV guidelines are already in place, and research institutes in 
China have established research capacity through external links with researchers from developed 
countries, particularly the Annex I countries. The external links include collaboration 
programmes with the United Kingdom SPF, the European Commission and the World Bank.809 
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Developed countries provide strong financial support to China’s endeavours to establish a carbon 
market. For example, the International Emissions Trading Association (IETA) launched the 
Business Partnership for Market Readiness (B-PMR) in 2012. The B-PMR brings together 
developed and developing countries to provide a platform for sharing experiences, fostering new 
and innovative market-based instruments and building market capacity for countries to scale up 
climate change mitigation efforts.810 The initiative has drawn $115 million in donations and 
pledges from participants who provide financial support to the B-PMR Trust Fund, including 
Australia, the European Commission, Denmark, Germany, Japan, The Netherlands, Norway, 
Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States.811 While, the PMR implementing 
country participants are the ones who receive PMR funding and explore carbon market 
establishment.  
As a B-PMR implementing country, China was awarded an $8 million grant in March 2013 to 
develop a national ETS that would begin operation between 2016 and 2020.812 The first step was 
to organise a series of workshops entitled ‘Emissions Trading Dialogue for Guangdong Industrial 
Enterprises’ in February and March 2013.813 More than 100 Chinese delegates representing more 
than 80 companies actively participated. Through the B-PMR programmes, participants have an 
opportunity to learn and share experiences and communication and networking among market 
stakeholders has begun. Thus, research and management capacity of enterprises can be improved.  
3 Expansion of China’s emissions trading system 
Expansion of China’s ETS is coming step by step through recent policy and legislative 
developments. This section discusses the possibilities and preconditions for linkages between 
China’s ET pilots. (Linkage between a Chinese national ETS and the EU ETS are discussed in 
Section 4 of Chapter 5.) China’s seven ET pilots are still developing and the national government 
is waiting to see the outcome of these local experiments. At the appropriate moment, linkage 
between appointed ET pilots may begin, as the projects are ready. Then, a national ETS could be 
expected between 2016 and 2020. The next step would be to explore the feasibility of a linkage 
between China’s ETS and other regional ETSs, such as the EU ETS. 
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3.1 Steps for expansion of China’s ETS 
Based on the development of China’s ET pilots, expansion may follow this order:  
Scattered local ET pilots to link the local ET pilots  to establish a national ETS 
According to local policymakers, Guangdong and Hubei province have common interests in a 
future linkage, but the details are unclear. Policymakers from both provinces announced that the 
highest priority is to establish a local programme and learn lessons on establishing a well-
performing ETS. Linkage would be the next move, but permission and support from the NDRC 
should be acquired first. 
3.2 Linkage between ET pilots in Guangdong Province and Hubei Province 
3.2.1 Linkage initiative, legal base and type 
The legal basis to link China’s ET pilots can be found in existing policy. Both the Guangdong 
and Hubei pilots proposed linkage of ET pilots in their executive plans, and these are the only ET 
pilots of the seven that have shown interest in linkage. The Guangdong ET pilot’s executive plan 
proposes linking to other provincial pilots between July 2013 and 2014, 814  and Hubei’s 
executive plan proposes linkages between August 2013 and June 2015.815 Therefore, the legal 
basis for linkage is in place and indicates that policymakers from a few ET pilots have a 
blueprint for the proposal and may consider linkage as an expansion possibility. However, 
linkage proposal remain in the stage of a proposal. The priority of China’s ET pilots is to 
establish a well-performed carbon market, rather than making linkages immediately. According 
to interviewees, the warm-up period for the ET pilots in China is three to five years. Only after 
this time will China’s ETS be mature enough to start linking in practice, comparable to the first 
pilot period in the EU ETS.816 In short, the linkage proposal will remain at theoretical level until 
the ETS is more mature. 
An analysis of the possible ways to establish linkage in the future is still meaningful. Two 
provinces have planned an ETS linkage, which therefore, would be a two-way direct link. As 
                                                           
814 Guangdong implementation plan (n 692), section 6 ‘time schedule for the period from 2012 to 2015’. 
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required, Guangdong and Hubei provinces have submitted a linkage proposal to the NDRC,817 
which has an optimistic attitude towards the proposal, but has not yet given permission.818 
As discussed in Chapter 3, there are five policy choices for a linkage agreement, including 
political cooperation arrangement, legally binding treaty, private contract, mutual reciprocal 
commitments and unilateral linkages.  A treaty, as an international agreement, seems not to apply 
here. Which other types of linkage arrangements would be suitable for the Guangdong and the 
Hubei ET pilots? 
Political cooperation arrangement lacks concrete provisions but reflects strong willingness of the 
Parties to launch the linkage. Therefore, a political cooperation arrangement can be considered as 
a blue plan for future linkage, but not an appropriate form to implement the linkage. 
A private contract is a linkage arrangement at company level. If a company in Guangdong 
Province wants to trade allowances with a company in Hubei Province, they theoretically can 
conclude a private contract on trading allowances. Such a contract would be regulated by private 
law in China, as with any sales contract. However, such a contract would be technically difficult. 
The two parties will need to specify details on the terms of the contract, such as general 
obligations, representations and warranties, allowances transfers, price, volume of allowances, 
transfer failure, force majeure clause and suspension event, default and consequences; limitation 
of liability provisions and so on.819 Different requirements are needed under Chinese contract of 
sales.820 Even if these legal terms are satisfied, the question remains whether the allowances 
would be considered as commodity/goods in the contract of sales, because the character of 
allowances is different from a traditional commodity/good. Allowances result from a 
governmental policy, and the demand for allowances comes from the legal obligation to reduce 
GHG emissions. The stability of the climate policy is quite important for the private contract. 
Participants need to determine whether they are capable of taking risks from possible changes in 
climate policy and law. In addition, the transfers of allowances cannot be as visible as transfer of 
commodities. A registry system and specific trading platform are required to record the amount 
of allowances that ET participants may hold. These institutions and tools to ensure the credibility, 
reliability and authenticity of purchase cannot be secured without formal linkage between the ET 
pilots in Hubei and Guangdong. Therefore, participants might find it difficult to conclude private 
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contracts to purchase allowances. They are likely to insist on a transparent, legally binding 
framework for transactions between their respective trading schemes, favouring the predictability 
of formal legislation over a contractual solution.821 
Unilateral linkage is a one-way linking arrangement, which is not suitable for a linkage between 
ET pilots in Guangdong and Hubei provinces. A bilateral linkage typically requires negotiations 
between legislators of all affected ETs, resulting in some form of mutual recognition of 
allowances through reciprocal rules in the domestic laws of participating jurisdictions.822  A 
mutual reciprocal commitment may be possible as a linkage agreement between ET pilots in 
Guangdong and Hubei. However, a reciprocal commitment is not legally binding for regulated 
parties and allows for unilateral amendment or termination. As a result, the mutual reciprocal 
commitment can be unstable.  
Considering China’s legal circumstances, reciprocal legislation or legislation from a higher 
legislative hierarchy may be the best solution to stimulate linkage agreements. With reciprocal 
legislation, Guangdong and Hubei could recognise each other’s allowances, although the 
question remains whether a provincial government has competence to make law on linking ET 
pilots. (This topic is explored in the following section.) 
Alternatively, legislation from a body higher on the hierarchy could authorise linkage between 
ET pilots in two provinces. In this case, the NDRC as the relevant authority can play an 
important role. Then the question would be whether NDRC permission is necessary or whether 
the provincial government can make a law on linkage without the NDRC’s consent. 
3.2.2 Legislative competences between central and local governments 
To determine whether law making for linking ETS belongs to the competence of the NDRC or to 
the local governments of the pilots requires examining their competences which are provided in 
the Law on Legislation of the People’s Republic of China.  
The State Council has retained significant law making power since the Communist Party 
launched its modernisation programme in 1979. 823  China’s constitution describes the State 
Council as the highest body of administrative power. Therefore, the State Council’s 
administrative regulations fall below laws made by the NPC, which is China’s highest legislative 
body. Furthermore, to implement laws, administrative regulations and orders, the State Council’s 
commissions and ministries enact administrative rules within the scope of their authority.824 
These administrative rules should implement, and cannot violate, laws passed by the NPC and 
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the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPCSC) and administrative 
regulations, decisions or orders of the State Council.825 Therefore, the NDRC has the competence 
to make departmental rules on linkage between the two ET pilots in Guangdong and Hubei, 
because the NDRC is a commission of the State Council and is the competent administrative 
authority responsible for addressing climate change issues. The NDRC also has promulgated 
rules and notices on piloting the ETS in China, which indicates that linkage of local ET pilots is 
within its authority.   
As for local governments, the Legislation Law provides that the provincial government can make 
local rules on two matters: (1) those that are necessary to implement the law, administrative 
regulations and local regulations; and (2) those within the regulatory scope826  of the local 
jurisdiction.827 Since no law, administrative regulation or local regulation has been made on 
linking ET pilots, the local government has no ability to make rules about linkage, under the first 
category. In addition, because linkage of two ET pilots does not pertain only to local issues, the 
local government does not have law making power regarding linkage. Incorporation of the ET 
rules from different jurisdictions would be required in linkage. Therefore, provincial 
governments cannot make local rules on linking ET pilots, based on Article 73 of the Law on 
Legislation. 
Table 9 shows the differences between the NDRC’s legislative competences and those of the 
provincial governments. 
Table 9: Legislative competence of the NDRC and the provincial governments 




Form of lawmaking Departmental rules Local rules 
Jurisdiction/scope of authority -Matters within scope of 
authority: to address climate 
change 
-Matters to implement 
legislation at higher hierarchy 
-Matters within local 
jurisdiction 
                                                           
825 Ibid, art 71.2. 




Legislative hierarchy Administrative rules Administrative rules 
 
Consequently, a linkage ET pilot at local jurisdiction (provincial ET pilots) does not fall within 
the local lawmaker’s competence for several reasons. First, the linkage involves more than one 
jurisdiction, and second the linkage is the basis to establish a national carbon market. According 
to the Law on Legislation in China, only the govern body at a higher level than the provincial 
level, meaning the NDRC would have the competence for making rules on linking provincial ET 
pilots.  
3.2.3 Linking conditions and procedural issues 
Once a departmental rule from the NDRC on linkage of ET pilots in Guangdong and Hubei has 
been promulgated, a direct link can be established. Detailed rules would be necessary to explain 
the linkage procedures. To establish these rules, an analysis is required of the ETS framework of 
Guangdong and Hubei provinces and the feasibility of linkage.  
This analysis will be only theoretical because data from the ET pilots is not yet available and 
more time is needed to establish mature provincial carbon markets, which are the basis for 
linkage. Table 10 shows the elements of the ETS framework in both Guangdong and Hubei 
provinces.  
For linkage to be successful the designed elements of the ET pilots should be at the same level of 
consistency and stringency, particularly in areas that pose technical challenges or that has 
political sensitivities.828  Therefore, the various elements of the ETs have been divided into 
different consistent categories according to their importance and effects. As the table indicates, 
the ET frameworks in both provinces are comparable, and both are based on the cap-and-trade 
model, though no cap has been set.  
Table 10: Elements of the ETS framework in both Guangdong and Hubei 
 Guangdong Province Hubei Province 
Carbon intensity target 19% reduction 17% reduction 
Coverage Direct emissions (fuel 
combustion and/or fuel 
production) 
Indirect emission (electricity 
Iron and steel, chemicals, 
cement, automobile 
manufacturing, electricity, 
non-ferrous metals, glass and 
                                                           
828 Mace (n 342), 51.  
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purchased from other places 
and heating power) 
Power, cement, steel, 
ceramics, petrochemical, non-
ferrous, plastics, paper, 
transportation and building 
sectors 
paper 
Allocation method Free allocation and purchase 
from government 
Free allocation and purchase 
from government 
Banking and borrowing Only banking is allowed, but 
need Guangdong DRC’s 
permission. 
Not allowed 
MRV MRV guidelines are not clear MRV guidelines are not clear 
Use of the CCERs Up to 10% Incumbents can use up to 15% 
of allocated emissions; new 
entrants can use up to 10% 
Trading platform Guangdong Carbon Emission 
Exchange 
Wuhan Optics Valley United 
Property Rights Exchanges 
Registry  To be established To be established 
Compliance system -Penalty of 3 times the market 
price 
-Order the company to comply 
-Rejection on new project 
application 
Penalty of 3 times the market 
price 
 
Several steps are necessary for linking these two ET pilots. First, both ET pilots must recognise 
the allowances of the other. In other words, allowances from the Guangdong ET must be 
transferable and fungible within the Hubei jurisdiction, and vice versa. In practice, one allowance 
in Guangdong can be transferable to one allowance in Hubei, because both ET pilots stipulate 
that one allowance means the right to emit one tonne of CO2. Therefore, the mutual recognition 
between Guangdong and Hubei would not be difficult. 
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The second challenge is the feasibility of linking the two carbon intensity targets. All of China’s 
seven ET pilots apply the cap-and-trade model, with trading based on allowances that are cap-
based units. However, there is means for trading intensity-based units in the carbon market, and 
to establish trading would require transforming the carbon intensity target into a fixed cap 
amount. A method to accomplish this transformation is a precondition to link carbon intensity 
targets. There are two methods to translate a carbon intensity target into an absolute target. One 
method is to determine the allowable emissions volume immediately prior to the commitment 
period (trading period), based on the GDP or other output projections.829 In this case, the cap is 
known before the trades start. The second method is for transfers taking place after the GDP or 
other verified output measures; then trade can take place through derivatives contracts (for 
example, futures or options) based on the expected amount of available allowances on a future 
date. In this case, the cap is known after the trades start. Which methods Chinese policymakers 
will take to transform their carbon intensity targets is still unclear. However, applying a 
uniformed method will result in better linkage. Both methods have been criticised because of the 
negotiations involved and the high bureaucratic costs, depending on the projections used for the 
transformation (drawback of the first method) and the uncertain impact on market liquidity and 
stability (drawback of the second method). Therefore, to apply the same transformation method 
narrows the diversities and uncertainties of the two ETs. 
Third, the coverage of the two ETs is different, and the different regulated sectors may result in 
competitiveness problems in the market. Both provinces include the cement, steel, paper and 
non-ferrous sectors but Guangdong’s pilot specifically includes the power, ceramics, 
petrochemical, plastics, transportation and building sectors (Group 1). Hubei’s pilot specifically 
includes the iron, chemical, automobile manufacturing, electricity and glass sectors (Group 2). 
Therefore, sectors in Group 1 are covered by the Guangdong ET but not covered by the Hubei, 
and sectors in Group 2 are covered by Hubei but not by Guangdong. Competitiveness can be a 
concern when sectors are covered sectors in one ETS regime and not in another. For example, 
companies in sectors covered by the Guangdong ET pilot but not by the Hubei pilot will face 
higher production costs and reduced competitive advantage compared to companies in Hubei, 
and vice versa. In addition, if the increased production costs are higher than relocation expenses, 
companies will have an incentive to move to Hubei Province, which is called carbon leakage. To 
avoid the competitiveness concern, free allocation in the initial allocation stage is strongly 
recommended to reduce expenses for companies in covered sectors. The other method is to send 
a uniform carbon price signal in the linked carbon market. The same carbon prices in the linked 
ET pilots reflect the same abatement costs in the linked market, which may prevent emitters from 
relocating. 
Fourth, linkage must include the registries in the two provinces in order for trades to occur 
between the regions. The registry system records the ownership of allowances and credits for the 




ET participants – the holding, transfer, annulment of allowances and credits – and detailed 
information about the allowances and credits. A well-linked registry system can speed 
transactions and avoid double-accounting and possible mistakes. The content and structure of 
both registries should be comparable for the best linkage. In addition, participants of both ETs 
should have access to the other ET’s registry system. As carbon registries in these two ET pilots 
are under development, policymakers may take linkage into consideration in their design. 
Fifth, the compliance system should be similarly stringent with strong incentives for reducing 
GHGs. The more stringent the penalty, the more likely the emissions reduction target can be 
achieved. A stringent compliance system is much more important than having identical 
provisions in the linked ETs. The Guangdong ET pilot stipulates that the penalty for non-
compliance includes monetary fines, the transfer of absent allowances and administrative 
rejection of new projects. The Hubei ET pilot stipulates only a monetary fine. Fines in both pilots 
have the same level of stringency. However, only the Guangdong ET pilot but not the Hubei ET 
pilot does regulate performance correction. For the same level of stringency, the Hubei ET is 
strongly recommended to adopt the same penalties regarding transfers of absent allowances, in 
order to link with the Guangdong ET pilot. 
Sixth, the allocation methodology must be considered as a linkage element. Both ET pilots 
require the initial allocation to be free allocation along with purchase from the government, 
which is a traditional means to acquire the right to release pollutants or to exploit and utilise 
natural resources in China, directly translated as ‘compensated-use’. Individuals or legal persons 
pay for the right to release pollutants or use natural resources as compensation to the 
environment. However, the allocation methodologies in the two provinces are ambiguous. First, 
the percentage of allowances acquired through the two methods is not provided. Second, the 
rules on purchasing allowances from the government are unclear. The allocation methods in the 
two ETs should be comparable and similar because of the impact on competiveness and the 
carbon prices. Also, differences in allocation methods can cause carbon leakage, instability of 
carbon price and may destroy the environmental integrity of the system.  
Finally, the MRV systems of these pilots remain unclear, which prevents an analysis of this 
element in a linkage proposal. 
3.3 Linkage between mandatory ET pilots and voluntary CCERs 
At this point, the seven ET pilots have made no move toward linking with the projects-based 
emissions generation system. The linkage between the seven mandatory ETSs and the use of 
CCERs cannot be considered an indirect link between the mandatory ETS market and the 
project-based emissions generation system. 
Several reasons can explain why. First, the use of CCERs is only an instrument to help the 
regulated companies achieve their targets, and is supplementary to carbon trading rather than an 
independent climate policy. Second, CCERs result from projects that cannot be projects-based 
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emissions generation system at international level. Otherwise, double accounting of credits from 
the same projects would destroy the environmental integrity of the ETS. Third, CCERs are 
recognised by the Chinese government at the national level and can be used only for domestic 
offsets in China. Therefore, CCERs cannot be exported to foreign countries. In short, the linkage 
between mandatory ET pilots and the CCERs indicates only policy support and is not an indirect 
link between the mandatory ETs and the national voluntary offsetting programme.  
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Chapter 5 Comparative study between the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
and China’s Emissions Trading Systems 
1. Introduction 
This chapter explores the feasibility and preconditions of possible future linkages between the 
EU ETS and China’s ETS based on a comparative study. This comparative study has two 
functions: to discover the extent to which the EU ETS and China’s ETS are comparable and may 
be feasibly linked and to uncover lessons and experiences in ET that China may have learned 
from the EU. 
The expression of “China’s ETS” is a generalised concept that acknowledges the expectation that 
China will establish a national ETS during the 13th FYP period (2016–2020), although no 
deadline has been set. At this time, China does not have a national ETS in place and a national 
carbon market has not yet been established.  For that reason a comparison is made between the 
EU ETS and China’s ET pilots. The latter will form the basis for an expected national ETS in 
China. After the implementation period (2013 to 2015), the ET pilots will be reviewed and the 
implications will be assessed for a further expansion to the national level. In addition, the 
NDRC’s preparation report already made the connection between the local ET pilots and a 
national ETS.830 Like the ET pilots, a national ETS would adopt a cap-and trade mode as its 
framework. The local ET pilots reflect the essential elements of a national ETS design, including 
cap-setting, sources and coverage, allocation method, an MRV system, banking and borrowing 
and a compliance system. 
This chapter focuses on the differences between the EU ETS and China’s ET pilots. The 
comparative research includes an external and internal perspective. The external aspect includes 
the ETS’s objective and its role, features of the markets, the energy consumption situation and 
legislation enforcement. An external comparative study refers to the political and social context 
under which an ETS is adopted. A fair legal comparative study requires an examination of the 
social context of the problem and the proposed solutions.831 The internal aspect covers the main 
element of the ETS framework itself. 
2. External perspectives of both ETS: Different contexts 
2.1 Obligations under international climate change law and policy 
Under the Kyoto Protocol, an ET policy is considered a flexible mechanism to help Annex I 
parties to achieve mandatory emissions reduction targets. Thus, an ET policy has an explicit 
                                                           
830 NDRC, ‘Market Readiness Proposal (MRP): Establishing a National Emissions Trading Scheme in China’ 
(February 2013) <http://www.thepmr.org/system/files/documents/China_MRP_final_19-02-2013rev_0.pdf> 
accessed 10 September 2013 (NDRC BPMR Report). 
831 Zweigert K. & Kötz, H. An Introduction into Comparative Law, Third Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
David Nelken, ‘Using the Concept of Legal Culture’ (2004) 29 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 1. 
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policy objective under international climate policy. Only Annex I countries (such as EU Member 
States) can benefit from a domestic ET in implementing the Kyoto Protocol (Article 17). Non-
Annex I parties, such as China, have no mandatory emissions reduction target and cannot benefit 
from ET as a flexible Kyoto mechanism. As such, China is not obligated to establish an ETS to 
fulfil an international obligation, but can do this for domestic purposes. This differentiation 
causes different incentives for establishing an ETS in the EU and in China. In addition, this 
differentiation can result in different levels of stringency in implementing an ETS. The EU 
ETS’s objective of reducing GHGs must match with the EU’s commitment under the Kyoto 
Protocol. Therefore, the EU ETS’s stringent, absolute emissions reduction targets are not 
surprising. But with no legally binding commitment on its emissions, China’s emissions 
reduction targets depend only on the decision of the Chinese central government. Even if the 
Chinese government were to pledge to reach a national emissions reduction target through a 
national ETS and were to mandate regulated enterprises to meet the target, these efforts would be 
binding only domestically. There will be no international legal consequences if the targets are 
not met. 
Therefore, the different obligations under international climate policy result in different levels of 
stringency when adopting ETSs in the EU and China. 
2.2 Expectations and environmental authority  
EU and Chinese policymakers also have different expectations. The EU and its Member States 
consider the ET policy as a way to mitigate climate change, and particularly to help the EU 
achieve its GHG emissions reduction target. Therefore, to achieve a specific environmental 
outcome by using cost effective measures has the highest political priority. In China, an ETS is 
rather considered an economic reform policy, and less an environmental protection policy or a 
policy relevant to environmental protection. Although there are different views (see Section 2.2.1, 
Chapter 4), Chinese academia and policymakers consider an ETS as a means to develop a low-
carbon economy and to reform the traditional Chinese economic structure.  
China and the EU also have different expectations regarding governance. With the EU ETS, the 
competent authority from each EU Member State is responsible for implementing ET at the 
national level. Usually, the competent authority refers to the ministries that oversee 
environmental protection in EU Member States, grouped at EU level in the Working Party on 
International Environment (WPIE) in preparation of the Council of Ministers of Environment. In 
China, the Ministry of Environmental Protection does not have competences in climate change 
issues. Instead, the NDRC and LDRCs are responsible for the design and implementation of the 
ETS, although these authorities must inevitably cooperate with other ministries under the State 





2.3 Nature of the market economy 
The markets in the EU and China also differ: The EU ETS operates in a free market economy 
and China’s ET pilots in a socialist market economy. A free market economy is one in which the 
overwhelmingly large part of economic activity is organised by private individuals and 
entrepreneurs for personal profit.832 Market participants make decisions for themselves regarding 
investments, production and distribution based on supply and demand.833 The price of goods and 
services are determined in a free price system rather than in a planned or manipulated system. In 
theory, the quantity of emissions is fixed in a market economy, but prices are allowed to 
fluctuate towards equilibrium, and a perfectly functioning market is necessary to produce 
efficient outcomes.834 The market equilibrium is a state of balance between supply and demand 
of allowances, which is the most efficient situation. A free market is a prerequisite to achieve this 
equilibrium. Unsurprisingly, the EU ETS has no safety valve for carbon prices, and even the 
price of the EUA has decreased sharply, almost to zero. However, the EU ETS has shown that 
the market power does exist. The power industry has proven it is able to engage in activities such 
as mark-up pricing, price discrimination and manipulation.835 Thus, the EU ETS’s free market is 
not omnipotent. 
On the other hand, China has adopted a socialist market model based on state-owned entities 
(SOEs) and an open-market economy. Mr. Deng Xiaoping first proposed this model to 
incorporate the market economy into the planned economy. After Chinese economic reforms in 
1978, China’s economic system was replaced by a Soviet-type centrally planned economy. In a 
socialist market economy, the government can intervene in the market. Taking the SO2 ETP as an 
example, China has demonstrated excessive state intervention in the emissions market.836 The 
Chinese government dominates the entire transaction process, including negotiations on trading 
price, trading volume and the terms of permit ownership.837 In addition, SO2 emission prices are 
largely modulated or instructed by the state depending on the discretion of individual 
government officials.838 A disadvantage to over-intervention in trading is non-transparency of 
transactions and a weak confidence of market participants. 
                                                           
832 Steven Kates, Free Market Economics: An Introduction for the General Reader (Edward Elgar Publishing 2011) 
1. 
833 Paul R. Gregory, Robert C. Stuart and Paul Gregory, Comparing Economic Systems in the Twenty-First Century 
(7th edn, George Hoffman 2004) 538. ‘Market Economy: Economy in which fundamentals of supply also demand 
provides signals regarding resource utilization.’ 
834 Lo (n 765). 
835 Clive L. Spash, ‘The Brave New World of Carbon Trading’, (2010) 15 (2) New Political Economy 169,195. 
836 Lo (n 765), 73. 
837 Ibid 
838 Julia Tao and Daphne Ngar-Mah, ‘Between Market and State: Dilemmas of Environmental Governance in China’ 
(2008) 27(1) Sulphur Dioxide Emission Trading’ Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 175. 
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2.4 Energy consumption structure 
The energy consumption structure impacts the degree of economic development in sectors 
relying on carbon-related resources, as well as the level of urgency to improve energy efficiency 
and to conserve resources. The energy consumption structure in the EU and China is different. 
Figures 8 and 9 show the EU’s and China’s energy mix, which refers to the distribution within a 
geographical area of consumption of various energy resources, such as coal, oil, natural gas, 
nuclear and renewable energy.839 The availability of usable resources in a specific territory and 
the energy needs must be considered to understand the energy mix.  
China’s energy mix has a structural problem. About 70 per cent of the country’s primary energy 
consumption comes from coal, which is inherently more polluting and more carbon intensive 
than oil and gas.840 However, China has struggled to curtail coal consumption because of limited 
domestic alternative energy resources.841 Available energy sources are mostly traditional fuels 
like coal, natural gas and oil, and much less are from the renewable energy like wind, solar or 
bio-fuels. Comparatively, the EU has more advanced technology for renewable and clean energy. 
Nuclear and coal energy make up half of the EU’s energy sources, but renewable energy and 
other non-traditional energy sources account for 18 percent of the total supply. Unlike in China, 
coal is not the main source of energy in the EU. 
 
                                                           
839 Definition of energy mix, be available at: http://www.planete-energies.com/en/the-energy-of-tomorrow/the-
energy-mix/the-energy-mix-definition-256.html accessed on 17 September 2013. 
840 Chen (n 741), 57.  
841 Brian Spegele, ‘China Pledges to Cut Coal Consumption: Beijing Will Stop Approving New Plants in Some 
Industrial Centres’ (The Wall Street Journal, 11 September 2013) 




Figure 8: China’s share of total primary energy supply in 2009842
 
 
Figure 9: EU energy production by fuel in 2009843 
 
Consequently, China faces a dilemma. On one hand, China is challenged to reduce carbon 
emissions through reaching a national carbon intensity target, and on the other hand, the Chinese 
economic development heavily depends on traditional energy resources. In fact, the central 
government has realised that reforming energy consumption is not only about climate change or 
                                                           
842 IEA Energy Statistics, ‘Share of Total Primary Energy Supply in 2009’ 
<http://www.iea.org/stats/pdf_graphs/CNTPESPI.pdf> accessed 17 September 2013. 
843 European Commission Directorate-General for Energy, ‘Market Observatory for Energy: Key Figures’ (June 



























EU energy production by fuel in 2009
230 
 
carbon emissions reduction, but also about sustainable development. In the long term energy 
scarcity could stymie development because of the nation’s increasing dependency upon imported 
oil and its lower-than-average per-capita energy resources.844  
In 2011 China’s CO2 emissions increased by 9 per cent, to an average of 7.2 tonnes per capita, 
bringing China with the range of 6 to 19 tonnes per capita emissions of the major industrialised 
countries.845 Comparatively, CO2 emissions in the EU dropped by 3 per cent to 7.5 tonnes per 
capita. Therefore, under China’s current energy consumption, controlling carbon emissions has 
become an urgent issue. 
2.5 Administrative structure and legislative enforcement 
The EU ETS was established on a super-national system: EU Member States are independent 
countries with sovereign territories. In comparison, a Chinese national ETS would be established 
in one sovereign nation, with all Chinese provinces included. Provincial governments can only 
implement rules from the central government and may not make rules or pass legislation on 
emissions trading. However, provincial governments are directly responsible to the central 
government for fulfilling commitments or obligations of an ETS.  
These differences in administrative structure between the EU and China affect the legislation 
process. Provisions in the EU legislation must be explicit and clarified. Matters that fall within 
the Member States’ competence and those within the European Commission’s competence must 
be clearly defined. As a result, a lengthy period of negotiations is necessary among Member 
States and EU institutions. On the contrary, China’s legislative system is centralised and top-
down with no competence division between the central government and local governments, or 
between the National People’s Congress (NPC) and local congresses. Competence issues arise 
only in the division and distribution of issues stipulated by the ranking of laws in the legislative 
hierarchy. Based on the implementation of other NPC laws, legislation language can be 
ambiguous. Because the 34 provinces have different conditions and backgrounds, policymakers 
always leave some flexibility for implementation of laws and regulations at the local level. 
Therefore, a key to a successful Chinese national ETS is the local implementation of a national 
law, rather than an explicit explanation and clarification at the lawmaking stage. 
2.6 Public participation/stakeholder consultation 
Public participation can impact legislative decision making, including input from individuals, 
non-state parties, experts, stakeholders, industry representatives and environmental non-
governmental organisations. 
                                                           
844 Chen (n 741). It says about half of China’s oil consumption is imported, and it has become a net coal and natural 
gas importer. 
845 Jos G.J. Olivier (n 672), 6. 
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Public participation impacted the adoption and reform of the EU ETS. Before the EU ETS was 
adopted, the Green Paper initiated two consultation processes: The first process disseminated 
information about the ETS design, which served the function of transparency. Some 70 non-state 
actors commented on the Green Paper, including stakeholders’ responses to the ten questions. 
The second process was initiated under the European Climate Change Programme Working 
Group I (ECCP WGI), which represented 70 organisations that had responded to the Green Paper 
and also included key stakeholders who supported the EU ETS.846 
Public participation in the initiation process ensured transparency of policy information and 
broadened the discussion among a variety of stakeholders. Equal access to information lays 
down a foundation for achieving common agreement. An intensive discussion schedule was 
implemented among stakeholders. The ECCP WGI had 10 meetings between 2000 and 2001, 
which deepened the discussion. Its interim report showed a common point of view: If properly 
designed and implemented, the ETS could significantly reduce the costs of meeting the Kyoto 
Protocol’s commitments.847 The second European Climate Change Programme (ECCP II) was 
launched to review the EU ETS pilot phase. As before, this programme was stakeholder-driven 
and involved working groups that met at various stages. The ECCP II included approximately 
100 participants from 27 Member States, amongst them experts, representatives of relevant 
business sectors, NGOs, academic experts and commission staff.848 Under EU law, the European 
Commission first proposes legislation and then the EU Council and Parliament make the final 
decision on whether to adopt new legislation. The consultation process narrows disparity among 
stakeholders’ opinions and helps to formalise the new legislation. 
In summary, the ECCP was an instrument used by the Commission to initiate consultation with 
stakeholders. It provided a cost effective, transparent platform for expressions and discussions on 
views among a wide range of stakeholders, representing many different interests.849 From a 
legislative perspective, the ECCP made new concepts known to the public and generated 
acceptance among stakeholders, playing an important role in formalising and preparing the legal 
proposal. 
In contrast, public participation has limited impact on China’s legislative processes. China’s 
legislative system is centralised and with a strict hierarchy. The NPC and people’s congresses at 
the provincial level and designated city levels are authorised to make laws and other forms of 
                                                           
846 Jon Birger Skjærseth, ‘EU Emissions Trading: Legitimacy and Stringency’ (2010) 20 (5) Environmental Policy 
and Governance 295, 299. 
847 European Commission, ‘Interim Report: ECCP Working Group I’ (25 October 2000) 
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848 European Commission, ‘Introduction of ECCP II Working Groups’ 
<http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/eccp/second/stakeholder/index_en.htm> accessed 20 September 2013. 
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legislation. The central government and local governments may make administrative laws and 
other administrative legislation, but legislative initiatives strongly depend on Congress and the 
government. Stakeholder consultation and participation in lawmaking is applied, but often has no 
substantial impact on final decisions. 
The Chinese legislative process has eight stages – agenda-setting, drafting, wide discussion, 
interdepartmental consultation, political (party) leaders’ approval ‘in principle’, decision making 
in Congress, publication and registration, and implementation through executive regulations850 – 
and the public can participate in several ways: investigation and research for lawmaking, 
providing written opinions, workshops, discussion conferences, hearings and a legislative project 
proposal.851  Investigation and research for lawmaking is open to public participation and occurs 
during drafting and text review stages. Legislatures may use this access to obtain first-hand 
materials and opinions from research institutions, implementation bodies and individuals. 
Written opinions may be requested from the country’s top law schools, the research institutions 
and legal experts. Normally, the Standing Committee of People’s Congress asks for an expert 
opinion, which usually occurs during the draft or discussion phase of a legal proposal. A request 
for opinions from the entire civil society may occur after a legal proposal has been published. 
Workshops may be held in which stakeholders discuss legal proposals, including difficulties, 
challenges and key issues. This method provides a platform for expression and is used in the 
draft and discussion stages. At the draft stage, opinions from experts and the public are collected 
to amend and formalising the final proposal. At the discussion stage, the Standing Committee of 
People’s Congress may invite interests group, institutions, stakeholders and experts to participate 
in workshops. Discussion conferences provide a forum to discuss technical and legislative issues, 
resolve legislative problems and test the feasibility and necessity of a legal proposal. Legislatures 
use hearings to collect and analyse information and public comments in the early stages of 
lawmaking. Hearings are held to discuss feasibility and necessity of legislation that strongly 
concerns stakeholders. Hearings are used at the agenda-setting, drafting or discussion stages. A 
legislative project proposal prepares legislation to be submitted to legislatures for discussion, 
review and adoption. This method allows the public to participate in lawmaking at the earliest 
stage. In addition, research institutions and think tanks may participate in the legislative process 
through drafting legal texts and undertaking projects.  
Among these means of participation, only workshops have a similar function as the ECCP in the 
EU ETS. Workshops can provide a platform for a wide range of stakeholders to express their 
views. However, the legislative process in China is exclusively internal, 852  which means 
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information and progress are not accessible to the public. Whether stakeholders’ opinions 
expressed through these means are adopted or whether they have any effect on legislation is not 
known. 
3. Internal comparative study: Different designs and content 
3.1 Target setting 
3.1.1 Continuous period 
The target-setting periods for the EU and China are different. The EU ETS was implemented in 
two phases and has entered into its third phase from 2013 till 2020. In the first phase between 
2005 and 2007, the EU ETS set a cap of 2,181 million tonnes of carbon per year, which was 
reduced to 2,083 million tonnes per year in the second phase from 2008 to 2012.853 In the third 
phase, more sectors and GHGs were included, and the 2013 cap for emissions from power 
stations and other fixed installations in the 28 EU Member States and the three EEA-EFTA states 
was set at 2,084,301,856 allowances. During phase 3 of the EU ETS (2013-2020), this cap 
decreases each year by 1.74 per cent of the average total quantity of allowances issued annually 
in 2008-2012.854 By 2020, carbon emissions are to be reduced by 20 per cent from the 2005 base 
year. This continuous schedule of implementation of the EU ETS has built confidence among 
participants and created stability. 
In comparison, the China’s ET pilots began during the 12th FYP period, from 2011 to 2015, after 
which China is expected to explore a national carbon market. However, official policy and 
legislation on trading emissions for after 2015 have not been promulgated yet. Therefore, 
participants may have reasonable doubts about the stability of the ET policy.  
3.1.2 Form of target setting 
The EU and China also have chosen different types of target setting. The EU ETS has an 
absolute target based on quantity of carbon allowances, but China’s ET pilots use a carbon 
intensity target, which is calculated by dividing the total amount of carbon emissions by the GDP. 
The parallel assessment system of the China’s ET pilots is a unique feature, compared with the 
EU ETS. The combination of a carbon intensity target at the governmental level and an absolute 
target at the company level aims to limit carbon emissions, while allowing increased economic 
development.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Studies (当代中国研究) (in Chinese) 5. 
853 Ellerman, Convery and Perthuis (n 191), 56, 270. 
854 Lucas Merrill Brown, Alex Hanafi and Annie Petsonk, ‘The EU Emissions Trading System: Results and Lessons 
Learned’ (Environmental Defense Fund, 2012) 
<https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/EU_ETS_Lessons_Learned_Report_EDF.pdf> accessed 23 July 2013, 2. 
234 
 
All of China’s ET pilots are based on a cap-and-trade model but without a precise cap. China’s 
carbon intensity targets at the national and provincial levels are defined in the State Council’s 
Working Programme on GHG Emissions Reduction for the 12th FYP period. However, these 
carbon intensity targets are to be achieved with comprehensive instruments, one of which is ET. 
Therefore, the precise carbon intensity target for an ET pilot is unknown. However, the 
allowances to be allocated are absolute in China’s ET pilots. The NDRC has designated the ET 
piloting provinces and cities and has authorised the LDRCs to allocate allowances to regulated 
companies. These companies cannot utilise more allowances than are allocated, but the allowable 
amounts have not been published except for the Shenzhen Specific Economic Zone, which has 
allowances of approximately 100 million tonnes of CO2.
855  
In summary, the Chinese government has changed the cap-and-trade model for its domestic 
policy. Two standards are working at the same time. The targets for ET pilots at provincial level 
are intensity based, while allocated allowances are the limits on companies’ emissions. Unlike in 
the EU ETS where the cap equals the total amount of allowable quotas, China has isolated the 
carbon intensity target from the total allowable emission quotas. In addition, China uses only the 
carbon intensity target to assess whether the ET pilots achieve their objectives. The first 
challenge is how carbon intensity targets can be translated into a company’s allowable emission 
quotas and whether this translation will equal the total amount of emission quotas? If not, where 
will the total allowances to be allocated come from? And how can the government ensure the 
accuracy of the translation and maintain environmental integrity? 
Taking Shenzhen ET pilot as an example, the 635 covered companies (including PetroChina and 
Huawei, a giant electronics firm) will get allocations of roughly 100 million tonnes of 
allowances over three years, which represents a 30 per cent cut in emissions per unit of output.856 
But the exact amount will depend on the companies’ production of goods and services, and an 
adjustment will have to be made at the end of the trading.857 
3.1.3 Responsibility for fulfilling the targets 
The EU ETS includes mandatory obligations to honour the caps set in each phase. After the 
national cap is distributed, companies have the responsibility to achieve their GHG emissions 
reduction targets. This responsibility is also provided in 2003 and Directive 2009/29/EC. In the 
first and second phases, if the companies did not achieve their emissions reduction targets, a 
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penalty of €40 and €100 per tonne was imposed on the company. Thus, implementation of the 
EU ETS is at the company level. 
In China, both the government and companies take responsibility for fulfilling the emissions 
reduction targets in the ET pilots. First of all, the government’s responsibility was defined in the 
State Council’s Notification of Working Programme on GHGs Emissions Reduction during 12th 
FYP period, which stipulates that achievement of the carbon intensity target must be included in 
the provincial five-year plans for social and economic development and be used to assess 
provincial governments’ and leaders’ performance.858 The same notification defined the carbon 
intensity targets for each provincial government. However, the government’s responsibility in 
this Notification from the State Council is ambiguous. Theoretically, penalties for violating the 
government’s responsibility can include decreased salaries for civil servants, failed competition 
among departments and even loss of jobs among the provincial government leaders. But at this 
early stage of the implementation period, it is difficult to know whether governments are taking 
proper responsibility. 
China’s FYP includes a series of social and economic development initiatives, which are the 
blueprint for the country for the next five-year period. After publication of the national FYP, 
provincial governments are required to establish local FYPs based on their own circumstances 
and the national FYP. Apparently, the government’s FYP is a political plan, rather than a legal 
obligation, which raises the question of whether the FYP is legally binding at all. The carbon 
intensity reduction is a type of ‘hard target’, first introduced in the 11th FYP, which officials are 
obliged to meet. 859  The inclusion of government responsibility into the FYP indicates the 
importance of GHG emissions reduction. 
3.2 Sources: From single CO2 to multiple GHGs 
China’s ET pilots and the first phase of the EU ETS targeted carbon dioxide emissions. The EU 
ETS targeted CO2 emissions during its warm-up phase because CO2 comprised of 80 per cent of 
the Community’s GHG emissions and CO2 emissions are the easiest of all GHGs to monitor 
accurately.860 Once the EU had gained some experience with its ETS,861 all six GHGs were 
included in the second phase from 2008 to 2012. 
The China’s ET piloting programmes are preparing to establish a national carbon market after 
2015, and keeping the system as simple as possible. Chinese policymakers have taken a cautious 
attitude toward including other GHGs. In addition, CO2 emissions constitute approximately 80 
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percent of the China’s GHG emissions. According to the Initial National Communication on 
Climate Change, China’s total GHG emissions in 2004 were about 6,100 million tonnes of CO2 
equivalent (5,600 million tons of net emissions), of which 5,050 million tonnes CO2, 720 million 
tonnes methane and 330 million tonnes nitrous oxide.862 In 2005, China’s total GHG emission 
was about 7,467 Gigatonnes CO2 equivalent of which CO2 accounted for 80.03 per cent, methane 
for 12.49 per cent, nitrous oxide for 5.27 per cent and fluorinated gases for 2.21 per cent.863 Thus, 
reducing CO2 should be the first priority targeted GHG. 
3.3 Coverage and scope 
This section compares the sectors included in the ETSs in the EU and China, analyses the 
differences and examines possible solutions to the challenges resulting from these differences. 
3.3.1 Industrial sectors, non-industrial sectors and end-users of electricity/heating 
During its first phase, the EU ETS covered six key industrial sectors, including electricity and 
heat production plants with a capacity of more than 20 megawatts, such as, oil refineries, coke 
ovens, metal ore and steel plants; factories making cement, glass, bricks, ceramics, paper and 
pulp.864 In the second phase, nitrous oxide from the production of nitric acid was included. In 
addition, in 2008 the geographical coverage of the EU ETS was extended beyond the EU 
Member States to include Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway.865 Since 2013, the scope of the EU 
ETS covers installations undertaking the capture, transport and geological storage of GHGs; CO2 
emissions from the petrochemical, ammonia and aluminium sectors, nitrous oxide emissions 
(N2O) from the production of nitric, adipic and glyoxylic acid; and perfluorocarbon (PFCs) 
emissions from aluminium production. 866  This extension in scope increased the EU ETS’s 
coverage from 40 to 43 per cent.867 
Industry sectors with high carbon emissions and those designated non-industry sectors are 
regulated under China’s ET pilots. China’s policymakers realised that the amount of carbon 
industries’ emissions is key to defining which sectors should be regulated under a national ETS. 
Accordingly, the NDRC’s B-PMR proposal states the ‘main GHG-emitting sectors should be 
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included in the ETS’.868 The NBS database indicates sectors with the largest energy consumption, 
such as ferrous metal smelting and processing, chemical materials and chemical products 
manufacturing, non-metallic mineral products manufacturing, production and supply of 
electricity and heating, nonferrous metal smelting and processing, coal mining and dressing, 
petroleum processing, coking and nuclear fuel processing.869 Academic research revealed that 
China’s total carbon emissions comprises emissions from ferrous metal processing (such as steel), 
non-metallic mineral products (cement), chemicals, nonferrous metal processing, petroleum and 
coking, textiles, paper and paper products, machinery, metal products, food and transport 
equipment.870 As a result, China national ETS should cover industrial sectors with high amounts 
of the carbon emissions. China’s ET pilots in three municipalities, Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin, 
also have a special category of sectors called the non-industries sectors, which include buildings 
for the public use and hotels. Buildings do not emit GHGs directly into the air directly, but are 
included in the system because they consume a large amount of electricity and heating. These 
non-industrious sectors are discussed in the next two parts.  
3.3.2 Direct emissions and indirect emissions 
China’s ET pilots include both direct and indirect emissions, unlike the EU ETS, which does not 
distinguish between these. The decision to include indirect emissions was based on a desire to 
include the largest companies in the market, many of which are large manufacturers with big 
electricity bills but few direct emissions.871 It is difficult to consider these enterprises as end-
users downstream because they do not emit significant CO2 into the atmosphere. But neither can 
they be treated as an upstream sector because their products are not related to carbon content. 
They were targeted because they are large consumers of electricity produced through fuel 
combustion. 
Coal consumption for electrical generation in China reaches over one billion tonnes annually in 
2012, about 50 per cent of China’s total supply.872 Coal-fired power makes up a relatively high 
share of China’s power structure. The installed capacity of coal-fired power in China has always 
remained over 70 per cent since 1949, and reached 78 per cent in 2006. In 2010, CO2 emissions 
due to the electricity and heat production sector accounted for 49.2 per cent of the total CO2 
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emissions from fuel combustion.873 Some people suggest to regulate the power stations and heat 
suppliers to control emissions downstream; however, regulating power and heating suppliers 
only will not constrain carbon emissions due to demands for economic development and the 
heavy reliance on electricity and heating. Therefore, China’s ET pilots require the surrender of 
allowances from power stations, heating suppliers and from consumers of electricity and heating.  
In China, production expenses for power stations and heating suppliers cannot be transferred to 
end-users of electricity and heating because of the limitations set by the price-control authority. 
Therefore, the regulation of power sectors and heating suppliers cannot ensure that the end users 
will apply mitigation measures since the end users’ demand for electricity and heating is not 
affected. However, if both the power sectors and heating suppliers and the largest consumers are 
regulated, consumption behaviour will be affected. The other incentive for this peculiar feature is 
to enlarge the number of participants in the ET and then increase the market liquidity.  
3.3.3 Challenges from indirect emissions 
The inclusion of indirection emissions brings some challenges. The first challenge is how to 
translate indirect emissions into direct emissions in the MRV system. In China’s ET pilots and 
the EU ETS, direct emission can be measured as the total emissions from all installations of 
covered enterprises. However, it is impossible to measure accurately the total indirect emissions 
from installations. Chinese policymakers may think about the equation relation between indirect 
emissions and the consumption of electricity.874  
The second challenge is how to avoid double counting allowances from two enterprises with 
direct and indirect emissions. Double counting can occur on the specific amount of allowances 
that result from power and heating suppliers and large consumers of power and heat (indirect 
emissions). The direct and indirect emissions markets must be kept as separately traded markets 
to avoid double counting, with CCERs available as offsets in both markets.875 Alternatively, the 
future carbon market could be made up of two parallel policies, each creating separately labelled 
but fungible credits.876 But neither of these solutions will keep the ETS as simple as possible. 
Another solution to double counting is a minus method. If a large consumer of electricity and 
heating surrenders X amount of allowances equating its indirect emissions, then the same amount 
of allowances may be reduced from the allowances of the power station and heating supplier.  
3.4 Participants 
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3.4.1 China’s SOEs: their economic relevance and carbon emissions 
Both the EU ETS and China’s ET pilots function at company level. The EU ETS defines 
participants by sectors, and China’s ET pilots follow the same rationale. However, Chinese state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) have specific economic, management and legal features unlike 
enterprises in the EU ETS. China’s SOEs include central and local SOEs. The State Council and 
local governments are obligated to invest in the SOEs and enjoy the interests.877 The difference 
between the central and local SOEs is not their geographic location, but the importance of their 
businesses and activities. The State Council defines large-sized state-invested enterprises in areas 
such as important infrastructure, natural resources or areas relevant to state security and the 
national economic lifeline,878 and these are controlled directly by the central government. Central 
SOEs may be located in both provinces and cities. There were 117 central SOEs in 2012,879 a 
number that has been narrowed through the years of reform from 196 in 2003. With their large-
size scale, central SOEs have a tremendous impact on the national economy and carbon 
emissions. All SOEs contributed to about 30 per cent of China’s GDP in 2010, with a net profit 
of ¥852.27 billion in 2010, 42.8 per cent higher than in 2009.880 In 2011, all SOEs represented 35 
per cent of all business activity in China, earning 43 per cent of the profits.881  Therefore, 
reducing carbon emissions from SOEs directly affects economic development and production 
capacity.  
SOEs are the major sources of the GHGs in China because most of them produce cement, iron 
and steel, generate power, are involved in manufacturing, building, petroleum and chemicals.882 
According to the 2013 NDRC report on establishing a national ETS in China, 50 per cent of 
China’s carbon emissions come from power plants, and 31.2 per cent from the manufacturing 
and building sector.883 China’s power generation sector is dominated by five SOEs – Huaneneg, 
Datang, Guodian, Huadian and the China Power Investment Corporation who own 50 to 60 per 
cent of generation assets; 10 other companies constitute a total of 450 gigawatts (GW) of 
installed capacity out of a total of 780 GW for the whole country in 2008, which contribute 1.4 
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884 Because the central SOEs account for such a large share of China’s total 
emissions, including them in the ETS is necessary as an instrument to reduce their carbon 
emissions. 
3.4.2 Challenges and solutions 
The management of SOEs and their legal status can present challenges to an ETS. 
3.4.2.1 Conflicts of management  
According to China’s company law, ownership of the SOEs belongs to the people, and the 
central and local governments represent the people to manage the SOEs. Also, these 
governments are the SOEs’ investors, a relationship that distinguishes them from private 
companies. Therefore, the central and local governments play the dual roles of administrators 
and investors for SOEs. To clarify these two roles and avoid administrative intervention in the 
SOEs’ management, the restructuring and re-organisation of SOEs was carried out as a reform. 
An outcome of this reform was the establishment of a body of supervision and management of 
SOEs in the central and local governments. This body is one governmental department that takes 
responsibility as investors in the SOEs and enjoys the benefits, excluding the responsibility for 
social management and administration. 885  At the central level, the State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) fulfils the 
obligations as investor. 886  Thus, the 117 central SOEs are supervised and managed by the 
SASAC, and the body with the same responsibility supervises and manages the assets of local 
SOEs. Accordingly, the SASAC supervises the property of the central SOEs. Emissions quotas, 
namely allowable emissions from the central SOEs can be transferable in the carbon market. 
They have financial value and are considered as the central SOEs’ property. Consequently, the 
SASAC supervises emission quotas.  
Installations of central SOEs are located around the country and contribute to local carbon 
emissions. As a result, a conflict can arise between the authority of the local government for an 
ET pilot and the authority of the SASAC to supervise allowances on behalf of the central SOEs. 
The reason for the conflict is that the allowances are owned by the central SOEs and supervised 
by the SASAC; at the same time, actual emissions are regulated locally. As shown in Figure 10, 
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the conflict arises over whether the local government c
central SOEs.  
Figure 10, The SASAC, the allowances and local carbon emissions
To resolve this conflict, the boundaries of SASAC responsibilities must be analysed. The 
SASAC has eight responsibilities, three of which 
ETS, which are discussed here.
(1) The SASAC must supervise the preservation and the increase of the SOEs’ assets, through 
establishing an assessment system and using a statistics and audit instrument.
be considered as an SOE’s assets; therefore, the SASAC must supervise any change in their 
value. Under this circumstance, local governments of an ET pilot cannot supervise the transfer of 
allowances from the central SOEs because only the SASAC has 
Comprehensive Working Plan on Energy Conservation and Emissions Reduction, the central 
SOEs are required to achieve targets.
included as factors in the performance assessment
under the supervisory authority of the SASAC.
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(2) The SASAC has the authority to appoint and remove SOEs’ chief executive operators, to 
evaluate their contribution based on their performances, and to make decisions on whether to 
grant rewards or levy punishments.891 The Comprehensive Working Plan also stipulates the 
nature of these rewards and punishments for good or bad performance, including reaching 
emissions reduction targets.892 In short, the SASAC is the only compliance body for the central 
SOEs’ achievement of targets. 
(3) The SASAC is authorised to draft laws and regulations concerning the management of the 
SOEs.893 This responsibility of the SASAC raises the question whether the SASAC can draft 
rules on trading allowances allocated to the central SOEs.  
Based on the SASAC’s three legal authorities, the local governments can neither include the 
central SOEs into local ET pilots nor punish those who fail to achieve targets. Then in what way 
can the central SOEs participate in China’s ET pilots or a national ETS? The first solution is to 
create a national carbon market, allowing both private companies and SOEs to participate. Under 
this situation, the SOEs emissions can be included into the country’s comprehensive target. The 
second solution is to implement local ET pilots based on emissions of installation, and to limit 
the SASAC’s authority in the ET. The EU ETS is an installation-based system, which means the 
cap will be allocated at the installation level. If China’s ET pilots were implemented at the 
installation level, each installation would be responsible of its own emissions reduction target, 
and the ETS would be very simple without considering the ownership issue. 
3.4.2.2 Carbon leakage 
Establishing carbon trading at the company level within a limited territory as China’s ET pilots 
can result in carbon leakage. Central SOEs and their subsidiaries can choose to relocate from 
provinces and cities with an ET pilot to areas without carbon emissions regulations in case 
abatement costs are higher than relocation costs. In this situation, more carbon emissions will be 
released in areas without regulation, as the decision to relocate central SOEs and their 
subsidiaries is not necessarily subject to approval of local governments. However, the local 
governments may not be happy about the relocation because they may lose tax contributions to 
their financial departments. Therefore, the local governments are placed in an awkward position: 
one hand they do not want to suffer the loss of tax contributions, but on the other hand, they are 
pressed to achieve their emissions reduction targets. 
Here, lessons also can be learned from the EU ETS. There are two possible solutions to carbon 
leakage: the use of free allocations or the expansion of the ET programme’s territory. Free 
allocation of allowances does not increase abatement costs, and therefore, participants may not 
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seek to relocate outside the ET piloting area. However, in some sectors, this solution does not 
matter. China’s electricity price cannot reflect production costs, and is always controlled by 
central government’s price-control department. Therefore, power plants cannot pass their 
increased costs to consumers, and whether allocation of allowances increases the production 
costs or not has no affect on electricity prices and the net benefits. In this case, free allocations 
would not affect the decision to relocate. 
The expansion of the carbon market is strongly recommended in China. Actually, the expectation 
for the establishment of a national carbon market has already sent a signal that costs resulting 
from regulation on carbon emissions are not incremental, and all companies in all provinces and 
cities confront this regulation without discrimination. With a national carbon market, SOEs and 
their subsidiaries would not consider relocation because a level of playing field would be 
established. 
3.5 Allocation issues 
3.5.1 Allocation style: Centralised or decentralised  
The EU ETS progressed from a decentralised in its early stages to its current centralised 
allocation style. In the first two phases, each Member State was required to make its own 
National Allocation Plan (NAP). The allocation methodology differed considerably from 
Member State to Member State – for example, the choice of allocation methods, such as 
emission-based or production-based allocation, the base year periods, treatment of new entrants, 
and how reduction potential and clean technology were considered.894 In addition, each Member 
State defined the amount of allowances to be allocated (the cap) in its NAP, which was reviewed 
and adopted by the European Commission. In the third phase the EU ETS dropped this 
decentralised style, and Member States no longer create their own NAPs; instead, a community-
wide quantity of allowances is issued every year, decreasing by a linear factor of 1.74 per cent 
compared with the average annual total quantity issued through the NAPs between 2008 and 
2012.895 
Understandably, the Member States preferred more discretion at the beginning of the EU ETS 
implementation, rather than a uniform standard at the EU level. For one thing, establishing an 
EU-level playing field at the beginning would have been a challenge because the system lacked 
even actual emissions installations, let alone European institutions that could maintain accurate 
information on carbon emissions. Second, each national authority knew what policy would be 
best for its country’s interests. Member States differ in industry development, level of 
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environmental protection and contribution to the increase in carbon emissions. Only a national-
level authority could know detailed information like the impact from regulating carbon emissions 
on industrial development or how much responsibility an individual company or installation 
should accept for its emissions increase.  However, the change to a more centralised allocation 
method was triggered by over-allocation, carbon leakage and even distortion in competition. 
Twenty-seven NAPs defined 27 different caps and allocation methods, easily resulting in 
different treatments of companies in the same sector across Member States and of different 
sectors within the same Member State. If relocation costs were lower than abatement costs from 
emission regulation, a company could choose to relocate its installation to another country where 
the regulations were less stringent.  
In addition, decentralisation resulted in implementation of externalities of lawmaking at the 
beginning of the EU ETS. In the EU, the central regulator was not necessarily the enforcer or 
implementer of its own regulations, and implementation of central legislation was left to local 
regulators.896 Therefore, the central legislators did not internalise the costs of implementation, 
which at times resulted in legislation that was very costly to apply.897 The use of NAPs indicated 
that implementation of the ETS was left to Member States, not EU institutions. As a result, the 
European Commission took responsibility for approving each NAP before its implementation at 
the national level. Moreover, the European Court of Justice stepped in to make the judgment 
when a Member State challenged the European Commission’s decision, which was an additional 
cost. Since 2013, when individual NAPs were replaced by the community-wide cap and 
allocation method, these externalities were removed from the Member States. 
Unlike the EU, which is a super-national organisation that had to set up from scratch a system for 
reporting and collecting emissions data in Member States, China’s centralised, unitary character 
has already created well-established communication networks between the central and local 
governments. Therefore, the costs of collecting and reporting information in a Chinese national 
ETS will not be as challenging as in the EU.  The SOEs report data directly and only to the 
SASAC.898  
The second argument for China to select a national-level allocation is the trans-provincial level 
of carbon emissions. When a regulated problem crosses the borders of local authorities, the 
decision-making power should be at a higher regulatory level, preferably resting with an 
authority which has jurisdiction over a territory high enough to deal adequately with the 
problem. 899  This argument can be countered by the fact that different provinces and cities 
contribute to different amounts of carbon emissions to the country’s total emissions. Some 
                                                           
896 Ibid.   
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898 Qi and Wang (n 890) 31. 
899 Michael Faure and Goran Skogh, The Economic Analysis of Environmental Policy and Law: An Introduction (1st 
edn, Edward Elgar UK 2003) 317. 
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developed areas in China contribute a lot to the state’s national GDP, along with huge amounts 
of carbon emissions, while other developing or even underdeveloped areas (like western China) 
contribute much less..  
The third argument in favour of a central allocation follows the same rationale as the EU ETS, 
which aimed to avoid over-allocation and the externalities of implementation. Concentrating the 
cap-setting power with the central government eases lobbying pressure on local governments. 
Even if local industry has strong lobbying capacity, they may not be able to impact the central 
government’s decisions as easily or in the same way as local governments’ actions. The existing 
research indicates that large carbon emitters, represented by powerful interest groups, have 
received higher levels of emission allowances.900 Considering the externalities of the law making, 
a centralised allocation leaves local governments out of the cap-setting and allocation rules, eases 
the burdens on the local government’s shoulders. Based on these arguments, allocation issues 
should preferably be at the central government level. 
A review of China’s current ET developments may raise the question whether China has chosen 
a decentralised method because the seven ET pilots have been established independently. 
However, I suggest that China’s ET pilots should be considered experiments rather than a final 
design for several reasons. First, China’s national carbon market is to be established after 2015, 
according to the 12th FYP. Half of the respondents to a 2013 survey expected a national ETS to 
be in place in 2018 or before, and more than 80 per cent believed a national ETS would exist by 
2020.901 If a decentralised plan were followed, a very ambitious schedule would be needed for all 
34 provincial governments 902  to prepare allocation plans within that limited period. 
Remembering that the seven ET pilots were mandated to establish an ETS within five years, only 
Shenzhen launched a carbon market before 2013. One can wonder how the remaining 27 
provincial governments will be able to establish an ETS in only three years (2016–2018) or even 
in five (2016–2020). Second, if China were to follow a decentralised method, a new question 
must be asked: Can the remaining 27 provincial governments start an ETS simultaneously? If 
local provincial ETSs start at different times, with different levels of stringency, the result can be 
competition distortion and carbon leakage. Industry may prefer relocating from a province with 
more stringent rules to the one with more lenient ones. 
                                                           
900 Niels Anger, Christoph Böhringer and Ulrich Oberndorfer, ‘Public Interest vs. Interest Groups: Allowances 
Allocation in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme’ (2008) Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper 
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shows a direct relation between lobby pressure and allowances allocation. 
901 Frank Jotzo, Dimitri de Boer and Hugh Kater, ‘China Carbon Pricing Survey 2013’ (China Carbon Forum, 
October 2013) <http://www.chinacarbon.info/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/China-Carbon-Pricing-Survey-
2013_Report_English1.pdf> accessed 9 November 2013, 4. 
902 The Central Government of People’s Republic of China, ‘Administration Division of China’ 
<http://www.gov.cn/test/2005-06/15/content_18253.htm> accessed1 9 November 2013. Until now, there are total 34 
provincial governments, including 23 provinces, 5 autonomy regions, 4 municipalities and 2 special administrative 
regions (Hong kong Special Administrative Region and Macau Special Administrative Region). 
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3.5.2 Allocation methods 
The two general methods for allocating allowances are tthe free of charge allocation and auction.. 
Free allocation methods can be applied either based on historical emissions (grandfathering) or 
benchmarks for production (benchmarking). In short, allowances can be allocated through 
grandfathering, benchmarking or auctioning. 
3.5.2.1 The EU 
The changes in the allocation methods during the EU ETS’s three phases imply that certain 
methods fit best under specific conditions and requirements. Applied under these different 
conditions, each method has pros and cons. The three allocation methods in the EU ETS are 
summarised briefly below. 
(1) Grandfathering is politically acceptable to industry and other regulated enterprises because it 
requires no additional production costs. This method was included as a main allocation method 
when the EU ETS was launched and ET was still a new concept to stakeholders. Grandfathering 
can attract and convince more participants to adopt the ETS. However, grandfathering results in 
windfalls to electricity generators (also named power plants), competition distortion between 
new entrants and incumbents and the incentive to overestimate emissions, which partially 
contributed to over allocation. These outcomes were the reason for gradually reducing the share 
of allowances allocated by grandfathering. In the 2013, 80 per cent of emission allowances in the 
EU ETS were allocated free of charge, with additional annual decreases until grandfathering 
reaches 30 per cent in 2020 and is phased out in 2027. 
(2) Auctioning, which experts always recommend, does not have the problems grandfathering 
has. It fits the ‘polluter pays’ principle and can be implemented transparently through legislation. 
Auctioning also produces revenue for governments. However, before the pilot phase started, the 
carbon market was not in place, thus the enterprises had no idea about the level of the carbon 
price. It would be too risky for them to invest in and participate in a new commodity of which 
they cannot assess the value or risks. Moreover, the auctioning rules were not ready before 
November 2010.903 In the EU ETS’s third phase, the amount of allowances to be auctioned had 
increased in the mature carbon marketplace. In 2013, all electricity generators had to purchase 
100 per cent of their emission allowances by auction. Since then, the auctioning is gradually 
becoming the main allocation method.  
(3) Benchmarking is an output based allocation method that measures tonnes of CO2 per tonnes 
of product. The amount of allowances allocated to each installation equals the benchmark for the 
product times the installation’s output. 	 The allowances allocated refer exclusively to the 
                                                           
903 European Commission Regulation No 1031/2010 of 12 November 2010 on the timing, administration and other 
aspects of auctioning of greenhouse gas emission allowances pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowances trading within the 
Community, (Auctioning Regulation) [2010] L 302/1. 
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production capacity, rather than the historical emission levels and location. As a result, 
benchmarking is fair and transparent.  
With grandfathering, the biggest emitters receive the greatest number of allowances. This 
method lacks transparency because installations may overestimate their emissions to acquire 
more allowances. Benchmarking provides a level of playing field to all sectors based on an 
installation’s product. Grandfathering results in unfairness between new entrants and incumbents 
because allocations reserved for new entrants are limited. However, benchmarking treats new 
entrants and incumbents equally because sectors are categorised according to their product 
benchmark. In addition, benchmarking avoids the risks of carbon leakage because installations 
have no incentive to relocate. Thus, compared to grandfathering, benchmarking is a more fair 
and transparent method for allocating allowances for free. 904  These principles can produce 
strong and positive incentives for participants to decrease carbon emissions per unit of products. 
Participants are more likely to focus on how to utilise alternative resources, such as low-carbon 
technology and so on, rather than waiting for free allowances that can distort carbon price. 
Preconditions for using the benchmarking method include concise data for production capacity 
and a definition of benchmarks. The challenge is to decide on the benchmarks for the different 
categories of products. In the EU ETS, the benchmark was not based on the best available 
techniques (BAT), but on the average performance of the 10 per cent most efficient installations 
in a sector in 2007 and 2008. 
Consequently, the experiences of the EU ETS provide several insights into how to apply these 
allocation methods. First, allocation of allowances must follow the principle of fairness and 
transparency and avoid distorted competition. Second, several factors must be considered in 
selecting an allocation method, including industry acceptance, satisfaction of preconditions, 
maturation and credibility of the carbon market and the readiness of allocation rules.  
 
3.5.2.2 China 
In China’s ET pilots, the study and policy on allocation methods are still in their infancy. In brief, 
Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, Shenzhen, Tianjin and Hubei have accepted a free allocation 
method, based on historical emission levels. Only Shanghai has selected benchmarking, under 
specific conditions that are not yet known. The Chinese government provided limited access to 
information about allocation methods in the ET pilots. Nevertheless, the following section 
describes the challenges to selecting a suitable allocation method for a national ETS in China. 
(1) Risks from grandfathering allocation 
                                                           
904 Deutsche Emissionshandelsstelle (DEHSt), ‘Benchmarks as A Tool for Allocation in the Future EU ETS’ 
<http://www.dehst.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/Archiv/Benchmark/BM_Summary_Pilot_WS_EN.pdf?__blob=publi
cationFile> accessed 12 September 2013, 1, 8. 
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Theoretically, grandfathering is not recommended in China, based on experiences from the EU 
ETS, although industry and other stakeholders may prefer acquiring free allowances in the 
beginning. Grandfathering raises the concerns of over allocation, and in turn, carbon leakage. A 
precise MRV system would be required to avoid over allocation. To avoid carbon leakage, a 
limited amount of allowances should be allocated to sectors at risk of leakage, as the EU ETS did 
in its third phase.905 In this case, the definition and criteria of carbon leakage must be established 
in law. Grandfathering also creates an uneven playing field. Six of the seven ET pilots 
considered free allocation based on historical emission levels as the preferred method at their 
launch. However, the base year differs among the six ET pilots. For instance, the Shanghai ET 
uses emissions in 2009–2011 as the historical emission level and the Guangdong ET pilot uses 
emissions in 2010–2012.  Different emission levels make linkage among the ET pilots more 
difficult, and the different base years can distort competition, make the ET pilots incomparable 
and bar future linkage. As long as the six ET pilots operate independently, the different base 
years are not a problem in the short term, but these issues should be considered when 
establishing a national ETS. 
(2) How does the auctioning rules fit into China’s auctioning law 
The European Commission established regulations for auctioning allowances in the EU ETS, 
which applied directly in Member States. Similarly, nationwide auction rules would need to be 
established for a national ETS in China. To set these rules, policymakers must consider several 
key issues, including whether new rules are needed for auctioning allowances or existing auction 
laws can be applied and how to appoint an auction platform at the central or local level. If new 
laws were needed for allowance auctioning, then China would need to determine which 
administration department should be responsible for making those laws. For instance, the NDRC 
and the local DRCs were the competent authority to make rules for implementation of the ET 
pilots. Policymakers must also guard against potential conflicts between legal rules. China’s 
auction law is made by the NPC, China’s highest legislative body; however, as a department of 
the State Council, the NDRC ranks lower on the legislative hierarchy, and therefore, its rules 
rank lower than auction law from the NPC. If any contradictions arise, the department rules 
would be dismissed.   
The legal nature of allowances need to be established under Chinese auction law,906 which 
stipulates that the ‘auction target’ must be an object or a property right that is exclusively 
possessed, enjoyed and disposed of by the client.907 Thus, only an object or property right can be 
                                                           
905 Directive 2009/29/EC, art 10a (15), (16). 
906 Standing Committee of the NPC, 中华人民共和国拍卖法 [The Auction Law of the People’s Republic of China] 
(in Chinese) (adopted 5 July 1996, amended 28 August 2004), art 7. <http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-
12/11/content_1383591.htm> accessed 12 September 2013.   
907 Ibid, art 25.  A client refers to a citizen, legal person or other organisation that authorises an auctioneer to auction 
the object or property right owned by them (a citizen, legal person or other organisation). 
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regulated by the auction law. Therefore, policymakers will need to resolve the legal question of 
whether allowances are a property right.  
These legal issues would need to be resolved before auctioning of allowances could begin; 
however, China’s Guangdong ET pilot reported its plans to hold its first CO2 permit auction in 
November 2013,908 although there was no public access to the auction rules at the time. 
(3) Challenges for benchmarking 
Theoretically, benchmarking can be recommended for a national ETS in China, although this 
method is difficult to apply at the launch of an ETS. The preparation work of applying 
benchmarking is more complicated than grandfathering. The competent authority must decide 
the products and the categories for defining the benchmarks, and the production capacity of each 
sector or sub-sectors must be collected accurately and completely. An NDRC document states 
that it is possible to assess the feasibility of setting up benchmarks in China and to attempt to set 
up a product benchmark system in sectors with sufficient data, simple product structures and 
production technologies.909 
3.6 Price management 
Carbon price depends on the supply and demand of carbon allowances in the market. The supply 
refers to the total amount of allowable emissions, which is the cap, and the demand refers to 
actual emissions, which can be higher or lower than the cap. A price ceiling means a maximum 
price on each emission allowance. The carbon price can be much higher than the estimation if 
the company’s real emissions are higher than allowed (the cap). A high carbon price can raise the 
abatement costs and reduce the company’s initiative to participate in the ETS. Companies may 
choose a cheaper alternative to reduce their carbon emissions instead of the ETS. To be used as 
an insurance mechanism, a price ceiling must be set at the maximum incremental emission 
reduction cost that society will bear, and the ceiling must be triggered only when costs are 
unexpectedly and unacceptably high.910 A price floor is necessary to prevent the carbon price 
from going too low. If the cap is more than the real emissions, excessive allowances will be 
available, and the carbon price will decrease. As a solution, a price floor signals to participants 
and stakeholders that a certain value of allowances is expected. Thus, participants will not 
abandon the market in the short term because their interests are protected.  
The EU ETS does not include price management in its design, which can be considered as a 
weakness. In its first phase, the EUAs price experienced volatility after the emission report was 
                                                           
908 ‘China’s Guangdong Plans First CO2 Permit Auction in November’ (Point Carbon, October 28 2013) 
<http://www.pointcarbon.com/news/1.2693559> accessed 28 October 2013. 
909 NDRC BPMR Report (n 830), 93.  
910 Robert N. Stavinc, ‘Addressing Climate Change with a Comprehensive US Cap-and-trade System’ (2008) 24 (2) 
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released, because of the loose cap and over allocation. In response, the European Commission 
tightened the cap to stabilize the market.  
In practice, China’s national carbon market has not been established, and therefore it is difficult 
to know whether a price-containment measure will be embedded. However, according to the B-
PMR proposal from the NDRC, China is likely to establish price management in a national ETS 
because it would keep the carbon market stable. Setting a price cap can avoid overly high 
allowance costs, and setting a price floor can entice enterprises to engage in low-carbon 
investments for the longer term.911 
Most of China’s ET pilots remain silent on the issue of price management. Only the Guangdong 
ET pilot has described price intervention, stating that the Guangdong DRC and pricing-control 
authority will cooperate on monitoring and supervising the carbon price.912 But how government 
intervention will be conducted is unclear.  
China’s ET pilots have just begun and all are confronted with a data shortage; therefore, 
estimations of allowable emission amounts may be inaccurate, which could cause the price to 
reach extremes. As of October 2013, only the Shenzhen ET pilot had launched trading, and the 
carbon price ranged from ¥28 to ¥30 on launch day,913 rising to ¥70 ($11.50) on 4 September 
2013, nearly twice the carbon price in the EU.914 It is too early to judge China’s carbon price, but 
as a prevention measure, price management is strongly recommended for China’s national ETS. 
 
 
3.7 Monitoring, reporting and verification 
For the EU ETS, the European Commission adopted Decision 2004/156/EC, which established 
the guidelines for monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) to be implemented by all 
Member States. As discussed in Chapter 3, the 2004 Decision harmonised MRV requirements, 
principles and procedures under the EU ETS. These MRV settings ensure reliability, 
completeness, accuracy and transparency of the GHG emission data and provide the basis for 
estimating allocation amounts and for assessing compliance. In addition, the EU ETS includes a 
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<http://www.pointcarbon.com/news/1.2553843> accessed 10 September 2013. 
251 
 
strong monitoring system with stringent sanctions and penalties. These elements are 
indispensable to ensure proper functioning and supervision of the emissions trading market.915 
In China the NDRC published guidelines for calculation and verification of the GHG emissions 
in 10 sectors on 15 October 2013.916 These 10 sectors include power plants, the electricity grid, 
steel production, the chemical industry, aluminium production, the magnesium smelting industry, 
glass production, cement production, civil aviation and ceramic production. These guidelines are 
still in a trial version, and modifications may be made based on practices. Guidelines for other 
sectors will be set later. The NDRC also indicated that these sectoral guidelines establish data 
collection for GHG emissions at three levels – national, local and enterprise. In addition, the 
local ET pilots can referee these sectoral guidelines and report problems to the NDRC. At the 
local level, only ET pilots in Shanghai and Shenzhen have published MRV guidelines (draft 
versions). The remainder are at the stage of research and drafting MRV guidelines.  
Guidelines in the EU and China have differences in governance level, covered levels, legal 
nature and content. First, Monitoring and Reporting Guidance (MRG) was published in the form 
of the European Commission’s decision, while the NDRC guidelines in China are in the form of 
department documents. The EU ETS’s guidelines must be implemented by EU Member States, 
while the local ET pilots can apply China’s guidelines as a reference. Obviously, the legal nature 
of the guidelines in the EU and the China also differ. The EU MRG has stronger enforcement 
capacity than the NDRC guidelines.  Second, the European Commission decided to set the MR 
system at the installation level, and all activity-specific guidelines for the different sectors are 
provided, while the NDRC’s guidelines are based on enterprises. One enterprise can have more 
than one installation, and one installation means one pathway to emit emissions. Therefore, 
China’s central government sets guidelines based on companies rather than installations because 
of the high administrative cost to monitor every installation of each enterprise. Third, the EU 
MRG covers more sectors than the NDRC guidelines. Considering that the 10 sectors are the first 
batch to be regulated under NDRC guidelines, more activity-specific guidelines are expected. 
Fourth, the EU MRG are general guidelines including the main principle of the MRV, the well 
known ‘compliance cycle’ and the tires of approaches and technical calculation methods. In 
contrast, the NDRC guidelines are more technical, focusing on calculation equations, templates 
and calculation methods. China’s ET pilots are developing their local legal provisions for trading 
allowances and some pilots have promulgated rules for MRV procedures, compliance cycle and 
legal sanctions. Therefore, it seems unnecessary to stipulate these again at the central level.  
3.8 Banking and borrowing 
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The EU ETS allow Member States to decide on banking rules. Most Member States banned 
banking between the first and second phases, except France and Hungary.  The reason was that 
‘any EUA banked from the first phase of the EU ETS adds one unit more to the burden of the 
Kyoto Party’s otherwise fixed assigned amount’. But bans on banking made price volatility 
worse and impacted participants’ behaviour. Concerned about surplus allowances in their 
accounts, participants were forced to sell all their allowances before the second phase. Then, an 
oversupply of allowances in the carbon market caused the carbon price to drop drastically at the 
end of the first phase.  
In comparison, Chinese policymakers realise the importance of allowing banking, and China’s 
ET pilots in Guangdong, Shenzhen, Shanghai and Hubei have confirmed banking rules. But 
unlike in the EU ETS, China’s ET pilots allow banking only within the implementation period 
rather than inter-periods. For instance, Guangdong allows banking until 2015 and Hubei until 
2016, according to its draft rules. Banking is time limited because of the uncertainty of China’s 
ET policy. Although China’s ET pilots have followed a step-by-step approach, local 
governments move cautiously. Without clear permission from the central government that a 
national carbon market will be established, the local governments want to avoid uncertainty and 
confusion in the policy. 
The EU ETS limits the period when allowances can be borrowed. Inter-period borrowing was 
not allowed between the second and third phases, although a de facto unlimited borrowing from 
one year to another seems to exist.917  
In China, the policymakers recognise that borrowing can have negative impacts. Borrowing 
allowances from the future makes reducing carbon emissions more burdensome in the following 
years. Therefore, local ET pilots have either banned borrowing outright or are silent about the 
issue. In theory, if the environmental constraint is constant or does not become stricter over time, 
enterprises tend to use borrowing. At this time, the public lacks clear information about the 
establishment of an ETS and the stringency of cap-setting that might be employed. Therefore, it 
is difficult for both policymakers and enterprises to decide whether borrowing is a possible 
policy or not. But if a borrowing rule is adopted, it should introduce a discount rate so that the 
distribution of emissions through time need not yield to a concentration in early periods.918  
3.9 Use of offsets 
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Both China’s ET pilots and the EU ETS limit the source and quantity of the allowable quotas 
from projects-based programmes. The EU linking Directive (Directive 2004/101/EC) recognises 
flexible mechanisms within the Kyoto Protocol, including JI and CDM, and allows credits to be 
used from these two flexible mechanisms.919 The EU ETS has allowed the use of CERs since 
2005, while the use of ERUs began in 2008. In addition, RMUs from land use, land use change 
and forestry activities undertaken in Annex B countries are not allowed in the EU ETS. 
Before the ET pilots were launched, the NDRC promulgated the 2012 Interim Measures,920 
which defined the sources of the allowable CCERs at the national level. Only projects operating 
from 16th February 2005 can apply for CCERs. These projects are including those that: (1) apply 
the methodology recorded by the NDRC; (2) the NDRC has approved as offset generation 
projects, but are not registered in the UN CDM EB; (3) the NDRC has approved as offset 
generation projects, and that produced emission reductions before registering in the UN CDM 
EB; (4) are registered921 in the UN CDM EB but whose emission reductions have not been issued 
If no CERs are issued from the CDM EB, then these projects are only offset generation projects. 
If these projects are registered and obtained CERs from the EB, then the projects cannot be used 
for generating CCERs.922 The CCERs can be used for offsetting real carbon emissions.923 Thus, 
China’s voluntary ET is a programme based on the voluntary projects that can produce CCERs. 
This programme plays a supplementary policy to the ET by providing a new alternative for 
achieving emissions reduction. According to the existing pilots, regulated enterprises enable to 
use CCERs for compliance use. In addition, the NDRC records and permits methodologies924 
that can result in CCERs. But these methodologies and standards are different from those 
popularly used at the international level, such as verified carbon standards (VCS) and gold 
standards. The NDRC is working on more methodologies for the CCERs, and clarification on the 
difference between the NDRC’s methodologies and those focusing on a voluntary market must 
be made. In fact, in December 2009, China published its own voluntary carbon standard, the 
Panda Standard, which was the first independent carbon standard for China’s voluntary carbon 
market. The Panda Standard recognised the CDM afforestation/reforestation (A/R) 
methodologies and those used for projects in agriculture, forestry and other land use activities 
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(AFOLU) in China. 925  Currently, the Panda Standard is seeking NDRC’s approval of its 
methodologies to be eligible to generate CCERs,926 which may clarify the relationship between 
the Panda Standard and NDRC’s methodologies. 
At the local level, existing rules or drafts from five ET pilots accept the use of CCERs with a 
quantity limit. Four have a precise maximum limit, while two set a limit only on the location of 
the projects.927 
Both China and the EU consider the use of carbon offsets as an alternative to an ETS; however, 
the origins of offsets are different. For China, carbon emission reductions are sourced within that 
country’s geographic area and are not linked to CDM or other flexible mechanisms overseas. 
Therefore, the NDRC has made a clear difference between credits from CDM and the CCERs 
from recorded projects and methods. It is clear that, only the CCERs can be used as carbon 
offsets inside China for the regulated companies’ domestic commitment fulfilment. These 
CCERs are originated from the projects and methodologies that are permitted and recorded by 
the NDRC. The CERs used by Annex I countries for fulfilling their Kyoto commitment, cannot 
be used domestically as CCERs. 
3.10 Non-compliance provisions 
The EU ETS uses several instruments to enforce compliance. First, non-compliance provisions 
and situations have been set down in laws and rules that have legally binding force. Second, 
sanctions stipulated in the provisions have divergent forms, such as civil penalties, performance 
corrections and the ‘named and shamed’ method. According to Directive 2003/87/EC and 
Directive 2009/29/EC, a penalty at a price of 40 euro per tonne in the first phase and now 100 
euro per tonne must be imposed, if installations cannot surrender allowances equivalent to their 
verified carbon emissions. And the penalties rise in line with the annual rate of inflation in the 
Euro zone since 2013. 928  In addition, Member States have discretion to establish stricter 
sanctions at national level for any infringements of EU ETS rules.929 For instance, more penalties 
rules are made in the UK’s national law, when failing in complying with permission, 
surrendering allowances, fulfilling emissions target, reporting actual emissions data and so on.930  
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(entered into force 1 January 2013).  
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In China, ET pilots in the Shanghai municipality, Shenzhen Special Economic Zone and Hubei 
Province have stipulated non-compliance provisions in their laws or draft rules. However, each 
pilot has established different sanctions and different levels of stringency. Three pilots consider 
the penalty as a strong measure to enforce implementation. All of these three pilots stipulate a 
performance correction, making the participants to surrender the allowances within a deadline. 
The risks are apparent: Without a strong compliance system, companies will not fulfil their 
responsibilities for emissions reduction. The Shanghai and Hubei pilots provide a compliance 
chain for companies, including responsibilities for reporting emission data, accepting verification 
and surrendering required allowances on time.931 Consequently, companies are regulated in all 
procedures of implementing an ET. In addition, these two ET pilots set regulations for a third-
party verifier, an emissions exchange and the competent administrative authority,932 which are 
part of their compliance systems. 
Based on lessons learned from the EU ETS, an enforceable compliance system must be 
established in all seven Chinese ET pilots and should be required in a national ETS. In addition, 
the stringency of penalties must be reviewed after one phase, with consideration of abatement 
costs and inflation.  
4. Linking China’s ETS with the EU ETS  
4.1 Introduction  
This section looks at China’s ETS from a different perspective – the possible linkage of ETSs in 
China and the EU.  
As discussed in Section 3, Chapter 3, the economic literature describes the benefits from linking 
ETSs, including increased market liquidity, reduced abatement costs, a uniform carbon market 
that can prevent carbon leakage and an improved level playing field. Most important, 
participation from developing countries and those that did not sign the Kyoto Protocol can 
strengthen their incentive to consider piloting ETSs or linking indirectly with the EU ETS, which 
paves ways for international endeavours for mitigating climate change.  
Thus, from the EU’s perspective, expanding its ETS and linking with others satisfies its 
leadership role in fighting climate change and also fits the EU’s goals for the EU ETS.933 But 
China’s stance may be another story. Linkage to the EU ETS or other ETSs may not be urgent 
for China. The China’s ETS is in its infancy, and policymakers may not have considered the 
                                                           
931 Shanghai municipality government (November 2013) (n 723), art 30-33. Hubei provincial government (August 
2013) (n 721), art 20-21. 
932 Shanghai municipality government (November 2013) (n 723), art 34-36. Hubei provincial government (August 
2013) (n 721) art 22-24. 
933 COM (2008) 16 final (n 355), 43. ‘It is vital that the EU ETS is improved and extended in the light of experience 
during the first “learning-by-doing” phase from 2005 to 2007 and that it is prepared for linking to compatible cap-
and-trade systems in other parts of the world.’ 
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linkage issue outside of China at this time. Right now, China’s focus is to pilot the ETS at the 
local level and then review and learn lessons. Then the establishment of a national ETS will be 
the policy priority. Therefore, it may be too early for Chinese policymakers to consider the 
linkage issue. However, in the long term, expansion of the Chinese carbon market might be the 
right direction for developments of its ETS, and sooner or later, policymakers have to think 
about the linkages with other ETSs. Therefore, each of the three routes for linkage will be 
analysed from a legal perspective, specifically including the linkage requirements, the challenges 
and the solutions. 
4.2 Linkage conditions 
The linking opportunities in Article 25 (1)934 of Directive 2003/87/EC have been expanded by 
Article 25 (1)a935 of Directive 2009/29/EC to include a larger range of countries whose ETSs can 
be linked. In addition to ‘regional, sub-federal schemes and national schemes in countries that 
have ratified the Kyoto Protocol’ (Article 25 (1)), qualified ETSs in any other country or in sub-
federal or regional entities can also be linked to the EU ETS under certain conditions (Article 25 
(1)a). Countries that have not ratified the Kyoto Protocol are not excluded from concluding 
linkage agreements and also non-Annex I countries like China, can be eligible for ETS linking. 
Directive 2009/29/EC provides more specific requirements for these ETSs to link to the EU ETS. 
The potential ETS should be ‘mandatory GHGs ETSs with absolute emissions caps’, comparable 
to Directive 2003/87/EC. What should be understood by a ‘compatible’ ETS is not clarified in 
the 2009 Directive. In addition to the form of linkage agreements with Annex I countries under 
Article 25(1), ‘non-binding arrangements can be concluded to provide administrative and 
technical coordination in relation to allowances’ with other ETS with absolute caps (Article 25 
(1)b). 936  This change expresses a more realistic attitude and shows a dynamic and evolutionary 
process for the conclusion of linkage agreements, starting from a loose cooperation to a formal 
one with enforcement power.937  
On the basis of the EU’s legislations, as a non-Annex I country, China can conclude an 
agreement or arrangement to link its ETS with the EU in ETS. However, it is not clear whether 
China is ready for ETSs linkage, how to set up a linkage, including possible linkage routes, 
                                                           
934 Directive 2003/87/EC, art 25 (1). It stipulates that ‘agreements should be concluded with third countries listed in 
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between the Community scheme and other greenhouse gas emissions trading schemes in accordance with the rules 
set out in Article 300 of the Treaty’. 
935 Directive 2009/29/EC, art 25 (1) a. It stipulates that ‘agreements may be made to provide for the recognition of 
allowances between the Community scheme and compatible mandatory greenhouse gas emissions trading systems 
with absolute emissions caps established in any other country or in sub-federal or regional entities’. 
936 Directive 2009/29/EC, art 25 (1) b. It stipulates that ‘non-binding arrangements may be made with third countries 
or with sub-federal or regional entities to provide for administrative and technical coordination in relation to 
allowances in the Community scheme or other mandatory GHGs ETSs with absolute emissions caps’. 




necessary procedures and institutional issues, and how to implement the linkage, including the 
subsequent interactions938  between the two systems which can impact on the performance of the 
linkage. The next three sections will answer these questions. 
4.3 Market readiness conditions 
‘Market readiness’ describes the necessary technical, policy and institutional frameworks that a 
country and its entities need to have access to and to employ, through market mechanism and 
private and public financing for a low-carbon development.939 Market readiness conditions are 
key components for a good functioning of the carbon market. They are substantial to engage and 
administer a well-performing carbon market and must be taken into account when two ETSs are 
about to be linked.  
Technical elements of market readiness refer to setting coverage, reference year of emissions, 
establishment of a MRV system, a registry of emission allowances and a transaction log.940 In 
China, a MRV system, a registry system and a transaction log at national level has not been 
established yet. However, six out of seven ET pilots at provincial and city level have 
promulgated their MRV guidelines, established their registry system and their transaction logs. 
Enterprises of the six ET pilots can acquire trading units through the registry system. 
Transactions of trading units are available in the transaction log. Thus, China’s national ETS 
does not fulfil the technical conditions of market readiness, but the six ET pilots have fulfilled 
them. 
Policy elements of market readiness include setting emissions reduction target by identifying the 
mitigation potential and the cost in variant sectors, followed by selecting appropriate policy 
instruments, such as baseline-and-crediting, the cap-and-trade system, or others. Finally, the 
adopted policy instruments should encourage pilot activities.941 At national level, China adopted 
a carbon-intensity target of 40-45 per cent based on 2005 emissions level until 2020. Until now, 
the national government has not announced the form of carbon trading and an offsetting 
programme has been established by departmental rules of the NDRC, which is considered as a 
supplementary policy to the national carbon trading in the future. As for the piloting policies, the 
central government has already started the piloting to gain more experiences for the national ETS. 
At provincial and city level, the ET pilots are working on carbon intensity target-based trading 
systems, also with the support of CCERs from domestic offsetting programmes. Thus, China’s 
                                                           
938 Michael Mehling, ‘Linking of Emissions Trading Schemes’ in David Freestone and Charlotte Streck (eds) Legal 
Aspects of Carbon Trading: Kyoto, Copenhagen and beyond (1st edn, Oxford University Press, New York 2009) 118.  
939 André Aasrud, Richard Baron and Katia Karousakis, ‘Market Readiness: Building Blocks for Market Approaches’ 
OECD Doc. COM/ENV/EPOC/IEA/SLT (2010)3 (Paris, OECD, 2010) <http://www.oecd.org/env/cc/46563135.pdf> 
accessed 26 April 2014, 6. 
940 Ibid, Aasrud and others (n 939), 22. 
941 Ibid, 27. 
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national ETS lacks the design on target-setting and policy instruments, while the local ET pilots 
are clear about what they are doing. 
Institutional and legal elements of market readiness require the responsibility for collecting 
emissions data, issuance of trading units, institutions for GHG and verification performance, 
enforcement and compliance. 942  For national ETS, no legal rules on institutional and legal 
elements mentioned previously have been promulgated in China. However, rules on collecting 
and reporting emissions data, issuing trading units and MRV guidelines have been promulgated 
in the local ET pilots. Provincial NDRC and municipality NDRC are the responsible authority 
for supervising and verifying the performance of local ET piloting.  
In summary, China’s national ETS has not yet satisfied the conditions of market readiness 
because it has not been established. As a country, China is not ready to enter into carbon market 
participation and cooperation. Suppose China’s national ETS would fulfil the market readiness 
requirements, what would then be possible linkage or can China’s local ET pilots that already 
fulfil the market readiness requirements be linked to the EU ETS.  
4.4 Linkage routes and procedures 
The first linkage route is to set up an indirect link through mutual recognition of international 
credits. The second option is to achieve a bilateral agreement and then launch a direct link. The 
third option is to unilaterally link to the other ETS.  
4.4.1 An indirect linkage by international credits 
Linkage is based on the recognition of allowances. Although both China and the EU have not 
recognised allowances from each other’s ETSs, the EU ETS has recognised projects-based 
emission reductions through Directive 2004/101/EC, which allows the use of credits created 
from CDM and JI projects. This means CERs from Chinese CDM projects can be purchased in 
the EU ETS. However, an indirect link between China’s allowances market and the EU ETS 
through recognising the international credits in particular CERs is impossible. Because 
international credits from CDM projects can only be used for compliance by Annex I countries 
and not by non-Annex I countries.  As a result, an indirect link through recognising CERs cannot 
be achieved.  
4.4.2 A direct linkage through bilateral agreement 
As introduced previously, countries that can link to the EU ETS ‘should’ be third countries in the 
Kyoto Protocol’s Annex B, and ‘may’ be third countries (or sub-federal or regional entities 
within these countries) with ‘compatible mandatory GHGs ETSs with absolute emissions caps’. 
Non-binding arrangements can be made with the latter group.943 To set up a linkage by bilateral 
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arrangements require governmental bodies and legal procedures existent of to be set up. 
According to the EU law (Article 300 TEC), the Commission has authority to start negotiations 
with third countries or international organisations to conclude international agreements related to 
climate change issues. After the negotiation, the Commission must submit the text of the 
agreement to the Council for approval. The Council’s decision is necessary for the ratification of 
the agreement944, the EU Parliament should be consulted for opinion or be asked for consent.  
According to Chinese law, the State Council concludes treaties and agreements with foreign 
States. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, under the leadership of the State Council, 
administers the specific affairs concerning the conclusion of treaties and agreements with foreign 
States.945 In addition, the People’s Republic of China shall conclude treaties and agreements with 
other States in the name of the State Council or the governmental departments under the 
leadership of the State Council.946 In sum, the State Council and its departments or the Ministry 
of Foreign Affair of China have the competence to conclude bilateral agreements. 947  As a 
prerequisite for an agreement entering into force – the ratification power is endowed to the 
NPCSC decision or the President of China (the NPCSC’s decisions should also be followed in 
the latter case).948  
The negotiation procedures differ depending on the nature and contents of the treaties or 
agreements. There are three types of situations. For treaties or agreements negotiated and signed 
on behalf of the PRC, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs individually, or in collaboration with the 
department concerned under the State Council makes a recommendation and draws up a draft 
treaty or agreement that will be submitted to the State Council for examination and decision. For 
treaties or agreements negotiated and signed on behalf of the State Council, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs or the department concerned under the State Council makes a recommendation 
and draws up a draft text, after consultation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and then submit 
it to the State Council for approval. If the agreement concerns a specific issue, its Chinese draft 
shall, with the consent of the State Council, be examined and decided by the concerned 
department of the State Council. If necessary, an additional consultation with the Ministry of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Challenges’ (The Fridtjof Nansen Institute, March 2013) <http://www.fni.no/doc&pdf/ISA-2013-JW-TJ-
EUcarbon.pdf> accessed 24 April 2014, 9. 
944 Tom Delreux, ‘The European Union in International Environmental Negotiations: A Legal Perspective on the 
International Decision-making Process’ (2006) 6 International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and 
Economics 236. 
945 Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Procedure of the Conclusion of Treaties, adopted at the 17th 
Meeting of the NPCSC on 28 December 1990 <http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-
12/12/content_1383893.htm> accessed 21 April 2014, art 3 (1), art 3(4). (1990 Treaty Procedure Law) 
946 Ibid, art 4 (1). 
947 Ibid, art 2. It stipulates that the ‘treaties and agreements’ in the Law on the Procedure of the Conclusion of 
Treaties, include bilateral or multilateral treaties and agreements and other instruments of the nature of a treaty or 
agreement concluded between China and foreign States. 
948 Ibid, art 3(2), art 3(3). 
260 
 
Foreign Affairs is required. For treaties or agreements negotiated and signed on behalf of a 
governmental department of the State Council, and the issues covered by the treaties or 
agreements fall within the jurisdiction of the State Council’s department, this department shall 
decide itself or shall consult the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. If the covered issues are important 
or require cooperation from other departments of the State Council, this department shall submit 
the Chinese draft to the State Council for decision, with or without the consultation of other 
departments.949  
Negotiating and signing State treaties and agreements and governmental treaties and agreements 
are mentioned in China’s Constitutional Law. Ministry agreements negotiated and signed in 
name of the PRC, the State Council or the Ministries, respectively have no constitutional legal 
basis The competence of the Ministries to conclude international agreements within their 
jurisdictions and function is expressly recognised in the 1990 Treaty Procedure Law.950  
China has no experiences in negotiating and signing a bilateral agreement on linking ETSs. It is 
difficult to know, which procedure China will follow. Which procedure China will follow 
depends on behalf of whom the linkage agreement will be negotiated and signed. For instance, 
both the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol were approved and signed in the name of the State 
Council. Thus, they follow the second procedure of negotiating and signing governmental 
agreements. Bilateral agreement on linking ETSs in the EU and China can be considered as 
either a ‘governmental agreement’ or a ‘departmental agreement’. In both cases, consultations 
with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the NDRC and other relevant ministries and departments 
will be necessary.951 
 According to China’s Constitution Law and the 1990 Treaty Procedure Law, governments at 
local level, including city governments and provincial governments are not endowed to conclude 
bilateral agreements. The Chinese seven ET pilots include five at city’s level and two at 
provincial level. Thus, even if local ET pilots fulfil the market readiness conditions, the local 
governments that apply the ET pilots cannot conclude a bilateral agreement with the EU, 
although Directive 2009/29/EC allows a qualified ETS at sub-federal in non-Annex I countries to 
be linked.  
4.4.3 A indirect linkage through a unilateral environmental measure 
The EU adopted Directive 2008/101/EC to include the aviation sector in the EU ETS. 
Accordingly, carbon emissions from airplanes which depart from an aerodrome situated in any 
EU Member State and those which arrive in such an aerodrome from a third country (including 
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950 Yifeng Chen, ‘The Treaty-making Power in China: Constitutionalization, Progress and Problems’ in B.S. Chimni, 
Miyoshi Masahiro and Thio Li-ann (eds) Asian Year Book of International Law (Routledge 2012) 48. 
951 Interview with an anonymous contact in the NDRC. 
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developing countries) are regulated under the EU ETS, regardless of where the emissions are 
released. As part of the preparation work, the European Commission requires unilaterally 
emissions data from airline companies in both developed and developing countries.952 
Emissions from global aviation accounted for 2.5 per cent of the world’s GHG emissions in 2007. 
Global CO2 emissions from transport have grown by 45 per cent from 1990 to 2007, led by 
emissions from the road sector in terms of volume and by shipping and aviation in terms of 
highest growth rates, 953  which is reasonable to include international aviation emissions in 
regulations to mitigate climate change. Although the Kyoto Protocol stipulates that developed 
countries shall pursue limitation or reduction of international aviation emissions working through 
the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO),954 no international agreement on market 
based instruments with an emission cap for international aviation has yet been adopted. The 
EU’s Aviation Directive seeks to limit carbon emissions from aviation activities and to make an 
essential contribution to the EU’s objective to reduce emissions to at least 20 per cent below 
1990 levels by 2020.955 However, other nations saw EU’s move as a unilateral environmental 
measure that forced them to participate in the EU ETS. The inclusion of aviation activities into 
the EU ETS has triggered vehement concerns from the international community. China’s air 
transport association and four Chinese carriers – Air China, China Eastern Airlines, China 
Southern Airlines and Hainan Airlines – have claimed that the new carbon emission rules will 
cost Chinese airlines some 95 million euros.956 Former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
warned the EU, ‘Halt or, at a minimum, delay or suspend application of this directive. Re-engage 
with the rest of the world’.957 A 25-nation meeting was held in Delhi on 29–30 September 2011, 
to protest against the EU measure, resulting in a joint-declaration urging the EU to refrain from 
including non-EU carriers in the EU ETS and a pledge to work together to oppose imposition of 
the EU ETS. 958  Several American and Canadian airlines challenged the EU’s decision on 
inclusion of the aviation sector in the EU ETS, and the case was brought to the CJEU, which 
dismissed the challenge (see Section 4, Chapter 3). 
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This Directive forces a unilateral linkage with the EU ETS through the aviation sector, including 
the Chinese airlines flying to and from the EU. China was among the critics from the 
international community who objected to the EU’s Aviation Directive. The China Air Transport 
Association (CATA) condemned the EU scheme as contrary to the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities (CBDR).959 The CATA argued that the EU’s inclusion of aviation 
emissions in the EU ETS also breached the Chicago Convention.960  
The principle of CBRD in Article 3 of the UNFCCC stipulates that ‘the Parties should protect the 
climate system . . . on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities. . . . The developed country Parties should take the 
lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects. . . . The special needs and special 
circumstances of developing country Parties would have to bear disproportionate or abnormal 
burden under the Convention’.961 Social and economic conditions are also considered factors 
when applying the CBRD principle.962 The Kyoto Protocol also stipulates that ‘all Parties, taking 
into account their common but differentiated responsibilities and their specific national and 
regional development priorities, objectives and circumstances, without introducing any new 
commitments for Parties not included in Annex I, but reconfirming existing commitments . . . 
and continuing to advance the implementation of these commitments in order to achieve 
sustainable development’.963 Both the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol set the framework that 
Annex I and non-Annex I parties are required to jointly mitigate climate change according to 
their different capabilities and circumstances. The differentiated responsibilities are reflected in 
the commitment of emissions reduction, and only the developed countries must undertake legally 
binding emissions reduction targets. The protocol stipulates that ‘the Annex I countries shall 
pursue limitation or reduction of emissions of GHGs not controlled by the Montreal Protocol 
from aviation and marine bunker fuels, working through the ICAO and the IMO, respectively’.964 
Limitation of aviation emissions for developed countries is not an absolute obligation or 
mandatory requirement, because the language states that the countries only ‘shall pursue 
limitation or reduction’, and the term ‘pursue’ cannot be considered as a mandate. Second, 
Article 2.2 is the only provision to mention aviation and does not require anything from non-
Annex I countries. Therefore, as a non-Annex I country, China does not fall within the 
jurisdiction of Article 2.2 of the Kyoto Protocol. Based on the CBRD principle, the Annex I 
countries supposedly must cooperate with the ICAO to limit aviation emissions with the consent 
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of developing countries that are ICAO members. Therefore, negotiation would inevitably include 
employing the CBRD principle because developing countries would raise it. 
In its November 2011 working paper, the ICAO Council stated that ‘the inclusion of civil 
international aviation in the EU ETS is a unilateral measure and violates the cardinal principle of 
state sovereignty laid down in Article 1 of the Chicago Convention’.965 966 In addition, the ICAO 
Council stated that the measure violates ‘relevant provisions of the UNFCCC’ because ‘the EU’s 
unilateral measure does not take into account different social and economic circumstances of 
different States, in particular developing States’. 967  The ICAO working paper refers to the 
principle of CBDR. However, the working paper is not considered legally binding on ICAO 
members because it is not a resolution of the ICAO Council.968  
The European Commission did not consider the principle of CBDR in EU’s measure to regulate 
aviation emissions. In 2011, the Commission stated that the UNFCCC principle of CBDR 
applies to States and the climate measures that they (those states) take, while the EU ETS does 
not apply to states and applies to businesses active in the EU market. 969  In addition, the 
Commission stated that the inclusion of developing countries in the EU ETS avoids distortions of 
competition and discrimination between operators on the basis of nationality, which would 
otherwise violate the Chicago Convention.970 The EU argued that the EU ETS applies only to 
businesses active in the EU market rather than States. However, it is not the same story in 
implementation. According to Directive 2009/29/EC, the EU can grant an exemption to a third 
country that applies measures to reduce the emissions impact of flights departing from that third 
country and landing in the EU; therefore, an assessment of such measures will be necessary.  
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In April 2013, the EU temporarily suspended enforcement of the EU ETS requirements for 
flights operated from or to non-European countries, while continuing to apply the legislation to 
flights within and between countries in EEA.971 As a positive response to the EU’s action, in 
October 2013, the 38th ICAO Assembly972 agreed to develop a global market-based mechanism 
(MBM) to limit international aviation emissions by 2016 and apply it by 2020. The Assembly 
also published a report on the quantitative and qualitative assessment of three identified MBMs, 
including global mandatory offsetting, global mandatory offsetting with revenue and global 
emissions trading.973 In March 2014, the European Council and Parliament reached agreement to 
limit the aviation coverage of the EU ETS to emissions from flights within the EEA from 2013 
to 2016.974  
Under the circumstance that the EU has postponed the mandate on limiting aviation emissions, 
this measure will not apply to China in short-term run. Thus, a direct unilateral link through the 
aviation sector is not an option. 
4.5 Linkage interaction  
Linkage between two ETSs does not require them to have exact the same design. Literature 
shows that different ETSs can be linked, although a high level of harmonisation and 
compatibility is expected. 975  Some design differences can be accommodated by technical 
solutions and simple adjustments, like conversion rates for different units; while others may well 
preclude decision makers from agreeing to a link, such as price ceilings, absolute cap-setting 
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offset crediting, continuity of schemes and others.976 Thus, negotiation focuses on harmonising 
both technical and essential differences in design. 
The key to a success in linking the EU ETS and China’s ETS require policy makers to assess 
both benefits and risks and to evaluate whether remaining differences and risks can be 
tolerated. 977  Then, an analysis on the subsequent linking interaction between both ETSs is 
necessary. I selected two elements, cap-setting and offsetting, for analysing a potential linkage 
assessment between both ETSs because they are essential to achieve a successful link. 
Concerning cap-setting, the EU applies an absolute cap while China applies a carbon-intensity 
target. A carbon intensity target must be converted to individual allowances, as tradable 
commodity in the market. In China’s national ET, the carbon intensity target can be transferred 
into an absolute target either before the commitment period or after it. Before the commitment 
period, projections on output or GDP are available for predicting the absolute target. However, 
this requires an estimation that actually may overestimate or underestimate the real supply of 
allowances. The carbon price may become unstable and unpredictable. In this case, whether the 
EU ETS accepts to link to an ET with a projected absolute cap, depends on negotiations and the 
costs for increasing the accuracy of the estimation. After the commitment period, an accurate 
absolute target will be available based on the real output or GDP. However, participants may not 
prefer this method, because they can only speculate about the market situation and have to make 
transactions before the absolute amount is accessible. This method seriously sets obstacles to 
market liquidity.  
Concerning harmonising the offsetting programme, this will become a major obstacle. The EU 
ETS relies on the international credits for its compliance, while China established its own 
domestic offsetting programme. As China cannot use international credits from CDM and JI 
projects, these two offsetting programmes cannot be linked. In an assumption that both ETSs are 
linked without considering the offsetting programme, the consequent interaction can still have an 
impact on the carbon price in the EU ETS. Regardless of potential high costs for verifying the 
quality and quantity of CCERs, if more CCERs enter into the EU ETS, this may result in more 
EUAs available in the market and a decrease in  EUAs prices.  
Under the context that China is working on its ETS pilots towards a national ET for post-2015, 
and the EU is making efforts to establish an OECD-wide carbon market by 2015, linking the EU 
ETS with China’s national ET is not likely to happen in the short term. But this issue deserves a 
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follow-up in the near future, as cooperation between the EU and China has started on a common 
basis for sustainable development.978  
5. Summary 
This chapter provided a comparative examination of the EU ETS and the China’s ET pilots from 
the perspective of the two systems’ comprehensive backgrounds and internal design frameworks. 
Six aspects of external conditions of these ETS were analysed. These six aspects impact China’s 
ETS, which is a modified and updated version of a typical cap-and-trade system. 
o First, as a developing party under the Kyoto Protocol, China has less international legal 
responsibilities for emissions reduction than developed parties, such as the EU. As a 
result, China’s motivation to start a cap-and-trade system was less urgent, and China’s 
ET pilots do not have the same stringency as the EU ETS. 
o Second, the expectation and enforcement body in China’s ETS is specific. Essentially, 
the ET policy takes the policymakers’ point of view, and an ETS is considered an 
economic reform policy, rather than an environmental policy. Therefore, responsibility 
for an ETS belongs to the Development and Reform Commission and a clear boundary 
has been set between the Environmental Protection Authority and the NDRC for 
designing and applying China’s ETS. 
o Third, unlike the EU ETS which operates in a well-developed market economy, China’s 
ETS will operate in a socialist market economy with strong political interventions. This 
raises stakeholders’ concern about the transparency of policymaking and the reliability of 
the carbon market. 
o Fourth, the Chinese economic development is highly dependent on carbon-intensive 
natural resources. Sooner or later, carbon emissions reduction will become an urgent 
issue for China, especially considering that China is one of the biggest emitters 
worldwide. Therefore, a cap-and-trade system meets the need to reduce carbon emissions.  
o Fifth, China’s legislative hierarchy places the current ET pilots lower than expected, 
which makes the system less enforceable. Legislation for a nationwide cap-and-trade 
system needs to opt for the highest level. 
o Sixth, public participation in China’s ETS is deficient. The decision to adopt a cap-and-
trade system relies on the National People’s Congress and legislators at different levels. 
                                                           
978 European Commission, Connie Hedegaard: "Sustainable growth is good business" 
 <http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/hedegaard/headlines/articles/2014-04-24_01_en.ht> accessed 24 April 
2014. The Commissioner Connie Hedegaard stated that‘it is a similar system to the one that China is currently 
setting up. We have started a cooperation project with the Chinese authorities on emissions trading this year and it is 
a very good example of how we can work together on climate change’. 
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Having access to the discussions and negotiations between stakeholders and legislators is 
difficult in China. 
In addition, a comparative study was conducted that revealed ten design elements of emissions 
trading in the EU and China. Although China’s national ET did not start yet, the design of the 
local pilots can be used as examples of what can be expected. In establishing a national ETS,  
China should follow some experiences of the EU ETS’s strategy, such as establishing an ETS 
step by step, covering the biggest CO2 sectors and enterprises, applying the free allocation 
method at the pilot phase followed by auctioning afterwards, allowing domestic CCERs for 
compliance use and ensure that strong enforcement mechanism and rules will apply.  
This chapter also analysed the possible routes for linkage between the EU ETS and China’s ETS. 
An indirect link between the two ETSs through recognising international credits is not possible, 
because China is an Annex I countries and cannot participate in trading international credits. A 
bilateral linking agreement seems not realistic within a short-term period, like 2015. Both the EU 
and China have their own strategic priorities, while the expansion of the EU carbon market will 
first focus on the OECD countries. Linkage will become an issue later on once the differences in 




Chapter 6 Conclusion 
This book explored the ETSs in both the EU and China, examining in particular the framework 
designs, implementations and challenges, and seeking exploring answers for two overarching 
questions: (1) What lessons can China learn from the EU’s experience with an ETS; and (2) how 
can the EU ETS and China’s ETS be linked? 
1. Lessons learned from the EU ETS 
Before comparing the EU ETS with China’s ETS, a comprehensive analysis of the EU ETS is 
given. As the world’s largest ETS, the EU ETS from piloting to its third phase can be considered 
as an example for other ETS, both with successes and failures.  
The EU ETS is a self-contained, company-level cap-and-trade system with many advantages:  
1) Adoption of the EU ETS was based on consensus from all EU Member States and 
widespread consultation with stakeholders.  
2) The EU ETS fits all Member States’ interests and is more acceptable because it is a 
market-based mechanism that does not have a primary fiscal nature, and therefore, does 
not require unanimous support.  
3) The EU ETS meets the EU’s commitment under the Kyoto Protocol because cap and 
trading can ensure an absolute carbon emissions reduction, at least in theory.  
4) The EU ETS follows a step-by-step approach to establish a downstream system. As the 
downstream ETS requires GHG emitters to participate at the company level, this phase-in 
approach reduces obstacles from regulated sectors and companies and provides more 
flexibility to participants for their preparation.  
5) The EU has adopted uniform rules for monitoring, reporting and verifying (MRV) 
emissions with legally binding force for the entire EU. The EU MRV guidelines ensure 
uniform calculation methods of GHG emissions, which allow emissions data from 
various companies to be comparable within the ETS. 
6) The EU ETS enforcement system is adequately stringent to force all participants to 
achieve their emission reduction targets. 
7) The European Court of Justice Judgements are relevant to the EU ETS, providing a 
detailed explanation for the application of the emissions trading directives. A dispute 
settlement mechanism is valuable for optimum implementation of the EU ETS. 
However, the EU ETS is also criticised from its opponents due to dysfunctions during its 
implementation:  
1) Policymakers have slowed down its environmental outcome in exchange for free 
allocations to industries and sectors in order to gain their support. In recent years the 




2) A decentralised style of cap-setting and allocation was adopted in the pilot phase, which 
contributed to the price decrease. This was not the fault of the EU ETS itself, but a 
consequence of having inadequate historical emissions data.  
3) Allowances from the first phase were not allowed to be banked in the second phase. This 
restriction made allowances allocated from the first phase invaluable in the second phase. 
Thus, holders sold off their excess allowances before entering into the next phase. This 
resulted in an increase of supply of EUAs in the carbon market and a decrease of the 
price of EUAs.  
4) The EU ETS does not have a price controlling system, and as a result the EU carbon price 
experienced an extreme volatility with no price floor or price ceiling in place.  
Over time, the EU ETS has corrected these mistakes, and China can learn from this trial and 
error approach.  
2. Analysis of China’s ETS 
The concept of emissions trading is not new to China. Cap and trading was introduced in the 
1980s to address pollution from SO2 emissions. Although pilot programmes in trading SO2 
quotas were never as successful as expected, they can provide valuable lessons for addressing 
carbon emissions. Some may argue that CO2 and SO2 have different characteristics and 
emissions trading systems for reducing the two are incomparable. However, I believe the 
experiences of the SO2 ETP are significant for carbon trading in China because the SO2 ETP 
utilised a cap-and-trade model, which any future carbon trading system in China also will use. 
Moreover, the SO2 ETP was unsuccessful neither because of the system itself nor of differences 
between SO2 and CO2. The failure mainly was because the SO2 ETP did not stringently satisfy 
the requirements of a cap-and-trade system. For instance: 
1) Cap-setting was in the form of a demand-and-control policy, covering many more cities 
and provinces that did not apply cap-and-trade at all. The achievement of the SO2 
emission reduction target was a political objective for the government, and was not 
relevant to a company’s fulfilment. 
2) The participants were not targeted clearly, even as a category of industries or sectors, 
which resulted in high administrative costs for the regulator to find out which companies 
were regulated by the programme. 
3) The allocation methods were not uniform in the piloting provinces and cities, and 
different levels of stringency of emission quotas created unfairness. 
4) The system lacked a noncompliance provision at the company level, which undermined 
enforcement. 




China has not yet formed a nationwide carbon market, and carbon trading consists of allowances 
traded in pilot programmes in seven appointed cities and provinces, with a complementary 
CCERs offsetting programme.  In addition, these seven pilots are developing at different speeds; 
some already have adopted laws, while others are still in the phase of proposing rules. The 
comparison of these seven piloting programmes based on existing legislation and policy, reveals 
some issues of attention for the establishment of a uniform national ETS. These are a phase-in 
approach, a downstream ETS and consistent allocation methodologies, a compliance system with 
legally binding force at company level and trading platforms specifically for allowance trading. 
Other elements that are still developing in the pilots that could be applied to an ETS framework 
include an absolute emissions reduction target, uniform allocation methods, with in particular the 
introduction of auctioning and MRV rules. 
Three local ETSs have begun operations, the first on 17 June 2013 in the Shenzhen special 
economic zone, followed by the Tianjin ETS on 27 November 2013979 and the Beijing ETS980 on 
28 November 2013. Considering that these local carbon markets are in operation for only a very 
short time, their performance cannot be assessed. Therefore, this research analysed the 
challenges that a Chinese ETS might confront, based on existing legislation and interviews with 
stakeholders. These challenges include the following: 
1) Viewing the ETS as an economic reform policy, although more reasonable in China’s 
case due to the need to restructure its industry in support of a sustainable economic 
development, is at the expense of pursuing environmental outcomes. 
2) China’s legislative hierarchy places China’s ET pilots at the lowest legal level; therefore 
existing ET legal rules are normative documents, local rules or local regulations. A low 
level of legislation indicates a low political ambition and less enforceable rules, at least in 
a uniform manner. 
3) Rules have been promulgated for using CCERs as a complementary policy to local ET 
pilots. However, key issues are not yet clarified, including the limitation on allowable 
CCERs, the risks of excessive use of CCERs as a result of too many projects and the lack 
of criteria and tools to ensure the integrity of CCERs. 
China’s ETS is still in its infancy. Although policymakers have agreed to key elements of a cap-
and-trade framework, it is difficult to know whether these elements will be suitable for a national 
system. Even if the local pilot programmes perform well, their elements may not perform well in 
a national cap-and-trade system. Academic and industry stakeholders continue to pose new 
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questions on the Chinese ETS design and implementation. If China adopts a cap-and-trade 
system, it will be a long way from local ET pilots to a national ETS.  
3. Analysis outcome of the comparative study and the linkage routes 
This book identified six factors that can affect the design of China’s national ETS. These are – 
China’s international responsibility under the Kyoto Protocol, the use of ET as an economic 
reform policy, unclear boundaries of the enforcement body, the particular China’s socialist 
market economy approach, the structure of its energy consumption, the legislative hierarchy of 
the current emissions trading legislation; and the lack of wide public participation. These factors 
are the basis for significant design differences between the EU ETS and a future ETS in China. If 
China introduces a national cap-and-trade system, attention will need to be paid to the following 
corrections: 
1) A phase-in approach and a continuous timeline for applying emissions trading are 
necessary to boost confidence in the carbon market and strength its stability. 
2) The combination of a carbon intensity target as the government’s responsibility and an 
absolute target at the company level raise concerns about the transparency and accuracy 
of the ETS. A national cap-and-trade system must avoid this parallel responsibility. 
3) A Chinese national cap-and-trade system should regulate emissions of carbon dioxide 
and then expand to other GHGs. 
4) Carbon emissions from industry should be the basis for defining the coverage and scope 
of a national cap-and-trade system. 
5) In considering the participants of a national cap-and-trade system, policymakers should 
clarify the differences between private companies and SOEs and ensure a level playing 
field between them. Allocation of free allowances should be designed to avoid relocation 
of SOEs and their branches. 
6) A centralised style in allocation is recommended. 
7) Allocations can start with a grandfathering approach, and then should move to 
benchmarking and auctioning. Grandfathering can be widely accepted in China’s national 
ETS because of its low cost and simplicity. Theoretically, benchmarking is recommended 
because it is a fair and transparent allocation method. But the preparation for 
benchmarking requires authority to collect accurate data on production capacity and 
GHGs emissions in order to define benchmarks for categories of products. For better an 
implementation of the auction method, rules and procedures of auctioning are necessary. 
NDRC law-making plans on auctioning of allowances should be in conformity with 
China’s Auction Law, since China’s Auction Law ranks higher in the legal hierarchy.  
8) Price management is strongly recommended in a Chinese national cap-and-trade system. 
9) Whether to allow banking depends on the continuousness of the system, otherwise it is 
inappropriate to bank allowances while there would only be one phase. Experience from 
ET pilots indicates that borrowing can bring risks of emissions peaks in the future and 
may jeopardise the achievement of the emissions reduction target. 
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10) Monitoring and reporting guidelines (MRG) are stipulated for both the local and central 
levels. However, the central MRG regulates only 10 sectors, and only two pilots have 
published their MRGs, which limits the availability of experiential data. For a national 
cap-and-trade system, a uniform national MRG will be needed. 
11) Unlike in the EU ETS where the project based carbon credits (JI and CDM) under the 
Kyoto Protocol can be purchased, China can only allow CCERs to be transferrable for 
allowances from the seven ET pilots. Strict rules on the use of CCERs have been 
promulgated and a clear boundary between CCERs and international carbon credits has 
been established. However, the domestic character of CCERs could become an obstacle 
to link China’s national ETS with others due to its potential effect on the price setting in 
those other ETS 
12) Legislation establishing enforcement authority for national a cap-and-trade system with 
provisions for noncompliance, needs to be adopted 
Finally, this book explores the linkage between the EU ETS and China’s national ETS from the 
perspective of linkage conditions, linkage routes and procedures and linkage interaction. Firstly, 
even as a non-Annex I country, China may conclude a bilateral agreement with the EU on the 
linkage issue. The achievement of a bilateral agreement depends on political negotiations, but 
also on the compatibility and linkage potential between the systems. To start bilateral 
negotiations is more clear for the EU since the procedures are well known: the Commission can 
conduct the negotiations, propose a text for a draft agreement, and then submit it to the Council 
for approval. In a linage agreement, the Council can decide by qualified majority with the 
participation of the Parliament or with the necessary consent of the Parliament. Whether the 
Parliament’s consent is required depends on whether an association with common action and 
special procedures will be established by the agreement, such as a joint committee or a joint 
registry. From China’s side, the State Council and its department, or the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of China can conclude a bilateral agreement. The negotiation procedures differ 
depending on the nature of the agreements. In general, a consultation among the departments and 
ministries of the State Council is necessary, while the NPCSC or the President of China has the 
power to ratify an agreement. 
The compatibility and potential of the linkage refers to the harmonisation level of two ETSs. 
Thus, an assessment of the design differences, the possible linking interactions and its influences 
on the carbon market will be necessary. Considering the limited achievement of China’s national 
ETS design, only two elements including target-setting and offsetting were analysed. The overall 
conclusion is that linking the EU ETS with China’s national ETS based on the existing tools used 
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